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A B S T R A C T 
This study was started to assess the extent of delay 
made in the adj'udication of employer - employee disputes 
hy the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal under the 
Industr ia l Disputes Act and labour lajudicating authori-
t i e s under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Payment of 
Wages Act in the State of Jammu & Kashmir. One of the basic 
ob j e c t s of the above said labour enactments i s to ensure prompt 
determination of cases involving labour and management by the 
labour adjudicatory authorities established under them by 
adopting summary procedure as d ist inct from the cumbersome 
and technical procedures of tradit ional courts . The purpose 
of the study was to f ind out with the help of s t a t i s t i c a l 
and f i e l d data whether the object of speedy disposal of l a -
bour disputes through special adjudicatory process under 
the three labour statutes in question has been attained. 
Further , i f the labour .adjudicatory authorities had f a i -
led to real ise the object of speedy adjudication of cases 
as contemplated under the statutory provisions , under-
lying causes of the delay were also intended to be brou-
ght to l ight , so that remedial measures could be sugges-
ted to make the functioning of labour adjudicating au-
thor i t i es more expeditious and e f f i c a c i o u s . 
S ta t i s t i ca l data co l lec ted f o r the study comprised 
331 cabto^ , decided by the Labour Court , Industrial T r i -
bunal , Commissioner f o r workmen's compensation and Au-
thority f o r payment of wages in the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir . Field data consisted of information gathered 
from 388 interviewees comprising workers, union leaders, 
employers, lawyers and adjudicating o f f i c e r s . 
A n a l y s i s o f the s t a t i s t i c a l as w e l l as f i e l d data 
r e v e a l s that a d j u d i c a t i o n o f labour c a s e s by the labcxir 
a d j u d i c a t o r y a u t h o r i t i e s under the I n d u s t r i a l D isputes Act , 
the Workmen's Conroensation Act amd the Payment o f Wages Act 
i s not e x p e d i t i o u s as env:isaqed vxnder t h e s e enactments . 
Delay t a i n t s the f o r inu la t i on o f a d j u d i c a t i v e d e c i s i o n s by 
these b o d i e s in v a r y i n g d e g r e e s . However, t h e data make i t 
main fes t that Labour Court and I n d u s t r i a l Tr ibunal r e l a t i v e l y 
p e r p e t r a t e , more d e l a y in t h e a d j u d i c a t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l 
d i s p u t e s under the Industr ia l Disputes Act than t h e d e l a y 
caused in the a d j u d i c a t i o n o f c a s e s by the a d j u d i c a t o r y 
a u t h o r i t i e s under the Wor]<men's Gompansation Act and t h e 
Payment o f Wages A c t . I t would seem t h a t j u d i c i a l and l e g a l 
background o f the P r e s i d i n g O f f i c e r s o f Labour Court and 
I n d u s t r i a l Tr ibuna l under t h e I n d u s t r i a l D i s p u t e s Act and 
n o n - j u d i c i a l background o f a d j u d i c a t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s under 
the workmen's Compensation Act and the Payment o f Wages Act 
most ly account f o r t h i s d i f f e r e n c e . A n a l y s i s o f s t a t i s t i c a l 
data f u r t h e r makes i t c l e a r t h a t d e c i s i o n s o f labour 
a d j u d i c a t o r y b o d i e s which are made a f t e r f u l l y go ing 
through t h e l i t i g a t o r y p r o c e s s i n v o l v e s more t ime d u r a t i o n 
than t h e c a s e s ( f o r example, consent awards) which do not 
undergo c o m p l e t e l y t h e a d j u d i c a t o r y p r o c e s s . Again^in t h e 
c a s e s in which p a r i t e s are represented by lawyers or by 
t h e i r p r o f e s s i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s more t ime i s spent than 
the c a s e s in which p a r t i e s make s e l f - p l e a d i n g . B e s i d e s , 
under t h e I n d u s t r i a l Disputes Ac t , Labour Court and 
I n d u s t r i a l T r i b u n a l spend g r e a t e r amount o f t ime w h i l e 
a d j u d i c a t i n g on r e f e r e n c e d i s p u t e s in comparison t o o t h e r 
types o f c a s e s ( f o r i n s t a n c e , c ompla int c a s e s under S'.33 -
G(2) o f Act) . 
Major cause o f p r o l o n g a t i o n o f a d j u d i c a t i o n 
p r o c e e d i n g s b e f o r e the labour a d j u d i c a t o r y a u t h o r i t i e s i s 
the l i b e r a l a t t i t u d e o f t h e a d j u d i c a t o r y a u t h o r i t i e s 
c o n c e r n i n g g r a n t i n g o f adjournment t o t h e p a r t i e s . L i t i g a n t 
employers seek most o f the redundant ad journments . Most 
s u r p r i s i n g l y , s t a t i t o r y la jnits r egard ing grant o f adjournments 
by t h e l abour a d j u d i c a t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s are r e c k l e s s l y f l c u t e d . 
A d j u d i c a t o r y a u t h o r i t i e s are a l s o u n u s u a l l y l e n i e n t towards 
the employers who d e l i b e r a t e l y evade t h e i r p r o c e s s and 
a d j u d i c a t o r y p r o c e e d i n g s . This a l s o addes t o the d e l a y . 
In a d d i t i o h , e x i s t e n c e o f o n l y one Labour C o u r t - c u m - I n d u s t r i a l 
T r i b u n a l in the s t a t e o f Jammu and Kashmir p a r t l y e^rolains 
s l ow turn out o f a d j u d i c a t i v e d e c i s i o n s under the I n d u s t r i a l 
D i s p u t e s A c t . On t h e o ther hand, a d j u d i c a t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s 
under t h e Workmen's Compensation Act and the Payment o f Wages 
Act d i s c h a r g e both a d j u d i c a t i v e and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f u n c t i o n s . 
C l e a r l y , t h i s r e t a r d s speedy a d j u d i c a t i v e d e c i s i o n - pak ing 
by them. 
As mentioned above, s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s have 
p r o v i d e d f o r summary p r o c e d u r e f o r the a d j u d i c a t i v e d e c i s i o n -
making by t h e labour a d j u d i c a t o r y b o d i e s . But in p r a c t i c e , 
t h i s p r o c e d u r e has become d i l a t o r y and l e g a l i s t i c . This f a c t 
i s c l ' l y e s t a b l i s h e d by huqe number o f adjournments granted 
by the labour a d j u d i c a t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s f o r the a d j u d i c a t i o n o f 
labour c a s e s in patent v i o l a t i o n o f s t a t u t o r y l i m i t a t i o n s 
p r e s c r i b e d in t h i s b e h a l f . F i e l d e v i d e n c e a l s o t e s t i f i e s t o 
t h i s f a c t . Workers and employers^ by and l a r g e , regard t h e 
p r o c e d u r e o f labour a d j u d i c a t o r y a u t h o r i t i e s d i l a t o r y , e x p e n s i v e 
and l e g a l i s t i c . T h e r e f o r e , t h e e x i s t i n g procedure i s no t 
a c c e p t a b l e t o them. They want s h o r t e r procedure f o r srjeedy 
d e c i s i o n s . In c o n t r a s t t o t h e response p a t t e r n o f workers 
and employers^ only one h a l f o f lawyers and adjuf i icatAng 
o f f i c e r s regard the procedure as t a r d y . One t h i r d o f lav/yers 
and a d j u d i c a t i n g o f f i c e r s c o n s i d e r the e x i s t i n g p r o c e d u r e t o 
be s imple and u s e f u l . Further , workers and employers g e n e r a l l y 
ihaf 
b e l i e v e ^ p r a c t i c e o f l e g a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the f i e l d o f 
l abour a d j u d i c a t i o n p r o t r a c t s t h e a d j u d i c a t i n g p r o c e e d i n g s . 
A good p r o p o r t i o n o f lawyers a l s o ho ld the same v i e w . For 
the purpose o f s t rea in l in ing the e x i s t i n g procedure o f labour 
a d j u d i c a t o r y a u t h o r i t i e s , workers and employers unanimously 
and one h a l f o f lawyers and a d j u d i c a t i n g o f f i c e r s wqnt a 
summary common procedure c o d e which i s t o be made a p p l i c a b l e 
t o a l l l a b o u r a d j u d i c a t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s . 
Another aspec t o f t h e study was t o a s c e r t a i n 
e m p i r i c a l l y whether the e x e r c i s e o f r e f e r r a l d i s c r e t i o n by t h e 
government under the I n d u s t r i a l Disputes Ac t s e r v e s any u s e f u l 
p u r p o s e . A n a l y s i s o f data in t h i s c o n t e x t i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
e x e r c i s e o f r e f e r e n c e d i s c r e t i o n by t h e government i s no t 
c o n p l e t e l y i m p a r t i a l . Workeia, employers and lawyers m o s t l y 
b e l i e v e t h a t government is i n f l u e r c e d by p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s 
w h i l e f o r m u l a t i n g r e f e r e n c e d e c i s i o n s . An a p p r e c i a b l e number 
o f workers a l s o th ink t h a t monetary c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a f f e c t 
the e x e r c i s e o f r e f e r r a l d i s c r e t i o n by the government. As 
a mark of t h e i r disenchantment with t h e e x e r c i s e o f 
d i s c r e t i o n by the government, an overwhelming m a j o r i t y o f 
a l l t h e c a t e g o r i e s o f respondents favour t h a t r e f e r e n c e 
d i s c r e t i o n should not remain with the government, r r l n c i p a l 
reasons adduced by the respondents f o r the a b o l i t i o n of 
r e f e r r a l p r o c c s s under t h e I n d u s t r i a l Disputes Act are t h a t 
i t i s s u s c e p t i b l e t o misuse , redundant and delavn or d e n i e s 
the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a d j u d i c a t o r y remedy under the I n d u s t r i a l 
D i s p u t e s A c t . Ana lys i s o f s t a t i s t i c a l data a l s o c o r r o b o r a t e s 
the f a c t t h a t government makes c o n s i d e r a b l e d e l a y w h i l e 
t a k i n g d e c i s i o n s f o r r e f e r r i n g d i s p u t e s f o r a d j u d i c a t i o n . 
Regarding the h i g h e r j u d i c i a l coayt^ j u r i s d i c t i o n s 
in t h e labour a d j u d i c a t o r y f i e l d , study shows that h i g h e r 
j u d i c i a r y has g r e a t l y sapped t h e e f f i c a c y o f labour 
c> 
a d j u d i c a t i o n as "d ispute s e t t l e m e n t method. I t i s d e a r from 
the a v a i l a b l e s t a t i s t i c a l da ta in t h i s c o n n e c t i o n t h a t awards 
o f l abour a d j u d i c a t o r y b o d i e s remain pending in t h e High 
Court f o r many years in w r i t or a p p e l l a t e p r o c e e d i n g s . 
S i m i l a r l y , i f a labour c a s e goes t o t h e Supreme Court f o r 
i i n a l d i s D O s a l . i t takes a l ong p e r i o d f o r d e c i s i o n . However, 
a D i s t r i c t Court appears t o take l e a s tirr.e v.'hile d e c i d i n g on 
appea ls from the d i r e c t i o n s o f the Author i ty under the 
Payment o f Waaes Act in comparison t o the t ime f a c t o r 
i n v o l v e d in the High Court and the Supreme C o u r t . These 
r e s u l t s o f the S t St 1. S t -i- C a 1 data have been c o r r c b o r a t e d by 
the f i e l d e v i d e n c e a l s o . An o v e r r i d i n g m a j o r i t y of workers , 
employers , lev/yers and a d j u d i c a t i n g o f f i c e r s nolnt.T out t h a t 
l engthy d e l a y made in the h igher j u d i c i a l c o u r t s in t h e 
d i s p o s a l o f labour cases has rendered labour adjudicatory* 
system c o u n t n r - p r e d u c t i v e and u n s u i t a b l e f o r de te rmin ing 
labour d i s p u t e s . Mont o f the workers and employors (and a 
f r a c t i o n o f lawyers and a d j u d i c a t i n g o f f i c e r s a l so ) ' f u r t h e r 
d i v u l g e t h a t expens ive l i t i g a t o r y p r o c e s s in the h igher c o u r t s 
i s i n i m i c a l t o the i n t e r e s t o f working c l a s s as i t e s s e n t i a l l y 
h e l p s t h e f i n a n c i a l l y s t r o n g p a r t y t o the d i s p u t e . Moreover , 
a preponderant m a j o r i t y o f a l l the groups of respondents s ta ted 
t h a t j u d i c i a l c o u r t s are not a p p r o p r i a t e forums t o a d j u d i c a t e 
on l abour c a s e s because o f s p e c i a l c h a r a c t e r o f l abour 
l i t i g a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , preponderance o f op in i on o f t h e 
respondents favours o n l y l i m i t e d i n t e r f e r e n c e o f j u d i c i a l 
c o u r t s with the awards o f labour a d j u d i c a t i n g b o d i e s and f o r 
t h a t t o o they p r e f e r some mandatory measure t o ensure q u i c k 
d i s p o s a l o f labour cases in the h i ^ e r c o u r t s . In o rder t o 
make a l l - r o u n d improvement in t h e labour a d j u d i c a t o r y system; 
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workers , employers , lawyers and a d j u d i c a t i n g o f j ' i c e r s have 
almost unanimously impressed on the need f o r the e s tab l i shment 
o f s e p a r a t e labour j u d i c i a r y . 
Next, the p r e s e n t study shov/s t h a t u s e r s o f l abour 
a d j u d i c a t o r y mechanism a c c e p t t h i s method f o r t h e r e s o l u t i o n 
o f t h e i r d i s p u t e s o n l y as an u l t i m a t e remedy and an u n a v o i d a b l e 
c o u r s e a v a i l a b l e t o them. They have i n s t i n c t i v e l i k i n g f o r 
v o l u n t a r y n e g o t i a t i o n s . They a l s o p r e f e r c o n c i l i a t i o n t o 
a d j u d i c a t i o n . In c o n t r a s t , o n l y l e s s e r number o f lawyers 
(one h a l f ) p r e f e r v o l u n t a r y n e g o t i a t i o n s t o , o ther methods f o r 
s e t t l i n g l a b o u r d i s p u t e s . Reasons g iven by the respondents 
y 
f o r p r e f o r i r g v o l u n t a r y n e g o t i a t i o n s are thpt tliey are a 
speedy, c o n v e n i e n t , s imple , i n e x p e n s i v e and in formal method 
o f s e t t l i n g d i s p u t e s . Far ther , resoondents have mainly s t a t e d 
two reasons f o r the s low p r o g r e s s of n e g o t i a t e d j u s t i c e in t h e 
s t a t e o f Jammu and Kashmir. These reasons are abscence o f 
deve loped t r a d e unionism as w e l l as l a c k o f h e a l t h y t r a d e 
union movement and i l l i t e r a c y o f t h e working c l a s s . I t i s , 
t h e r e f o r e , c l e a r t h a t i f a p p r o p r i a t e measures are undertaken 
f o r the promot ion o f v o l u n t a r y s e t t l e m e n t s between the p a r t i e s , 
the need f o r t a k i n g r e c o u r s e t o i n v o l u n t a r y a d j u d i c a t i o n would 
be o n l y min imal . 
Thus, in some measure, t h e p r e s e n t study i s 
s u c c e s s f u l in e s t a b l i s h i n g that labour a d j u d i c a t o r y system as 
i t i s in o p e r a t i o n at p r e s e n t h i g h l y d e f e c t i v e remedy f o r 
s e t t l i n g d i s p u t e s and c l a i m s o f the i n d i g e n t worker on account 
o f stupendous de lay made in t h e a d j u d i c a t i o n o f labour c a s e s 
and r e s u l t a n t c o s t o f l i t i g a t i o n i n v o l v e d t h e r e i n . Rather , i t 
i s i n c r e a s i n g l y becoming an instrument o f o p p r e s s i o n o f t h e 
impecunious worker in t h e hands o f r e s o u r c e f u l and s e l f -
c o n c e i t e d employer . Hence/urgent remedial measures are needed 
t o cut s h o r t d e l a y f o r making the system f u n c t i o n a l l y e f f i c a c i o u s 
and s o c i a l l y r e l e v a n t . A s t a t u t o r y m.easure needs t o be enacted 
t o s p e c i f y t h e p e r i o d wi th in which labour cases must be 
d i s p o s e d of both l->y the labour a d j u d i c a t o r y a u t h o r i t i e s and 
api^ellate forums (whether h igher j u d i c i a l c o u r t s or Labour 
A p p e l l a t e T r i b u n a l ) . P r e f e r a b l y t h e o e r i o d f o r the d i s p o s a l o f 
c a s e s by t h e labour a d j u d i c a t o r y a u t h o r i t i e s should be t h r e e 
months and at the a p p e l l a t e s t a g e i t should be s i x months . 
Once a labour a d j u d i c a t i n g a u t h o r i t y i s s e i z e d o f a d i s p u t e 
or c l a i m , i t should conduct t h e p r o c e e d i n g s o f the c a s e at 
s t r e t c h t i l l the d e c i s i o n o f the c a s e . Legal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
needs t o be t o t a l l y e l i m i n a t e d from, the f i e l d o f l abour 
a d j u d i c a t i o n f o r minimis ing d e l a y . A summary procedure c o d e 
f o r t h e labour a d j u d i c a t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s c o n t a i n i n g minimum 
reguirements o f the p rocedure w i l l h e l p in b r i n g i n g about 
u n i f o r m i t y in the procedure o f t h e s e b o d i e s . R e f e r e n c e power 
should a l s o be taken away from the government and p a r t i e s 
should be d i r e c t l y p e r m i t t e d t o avaAt themse lves o f a d j u d i c a t i o n 
machinery under the I n d u s t r i a l D i s p u t e s A c t . Next, one more 
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Labour Court - cu ir i - Industr ia l T r i b u n a l needs t o be s e t up f o r 
the e x p e d i t i o u s a d j u d i c a t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l d i s p u t o s in t h e 
s t a t e o f Jammu u Kashrrdr. On the other hand, in order t o 
ensure speedy f o r m u l a t i o n o f a d j u d i c a t i n g d e c i s i o n s by the 
A s s i s t a n t Labour Commissioner^j v/ho ac t as a d j u d i c a t i n g 
a a t h o r i t i ' ^ s under thie Workmen's Compensation Act , the 
Pa;i'ment of Wages Act , e t c . , the;^ should be d i v e s t e d o f 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f u n c t i o n s and should be requ i red on ly t o 
d i s c h a r g e ad jud i ca tor\ f u n c t i o n s . B e s i d e s , - c r e a t i o n o f 
s eparate labour juc^ic iary may, in a g r e a t e f measure, 
r e c t i f y mo'it o f the e v i l s a f f -^c t ing the oreval '^nt l abour 
a d j u d i c a t i n g mechanism. 
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"In our hl«z«xohixtal court system, th« l l t t l « 
nan livas in ttui ahoxt run taut most litigation l ivM in 
f 
the long nm" • JUsti<M Xcislwa lymt* 
Laboax lagialation was v ixtual ly iion->«xistent 
M o x a tha advant o f ZnAistxial nsvolution, lut th« 
induatxialimaftion and Ohanga in tha sola o f tha atata txm 
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laiSflMB £«li:« t o so c ia l walfasa s t « t « l «d t o the onaetiMuit 
o f m o f labour laws In th« danoexatio industxial 
•oeiatiaa dixxing tho f i x s t hal f of th« pxasant cantuxy fox 
xagalatlng tha taxns and eondltiona o f woxkaxa* anploynant 
in tha industry. This gava xisa t o an altogathex now bxanc^ 
of Jurisprudanoa* v i e . t Industrial jurispxudenea. 
In India the process of enacting labour laws 
started imc^ bafora tho attainnont of Xndepaandanea • But the 
growth o f labour leg is lat ion and detvelopmant o f industrial 
jurisprudcHioa in rcMil sense have tidcen p lace only with tha 
dawn of Independence and increased pace o f industr ia l i sat ion . 
Prime ob jec ts of labour l eg i s la t i on are t o secure f a i r deal 
t o the worker who cannot t reat the cap i ta l on equal tenes 
because o f l e t t e r ' s contro l over means and xesoixces and 
pxeventien of disputes between eniployexs and smployeas* so 
that pxoduction nay liot be advexseXy a f fec ted and the laxgex 
Intexast o f the piablle nay not suffex.^ Por the e f f e c t i v e 
xaaliaatian o f these iri»Jeeta and ^mtAy ia^lamentation o f the 
legal pxaviaioiis* •axima laboiix laiMa oxaataA theix own 
Mtalniatxatlve and qftaal^judieial li^ botax «ithoxitie8» Cxeation 
of ipeoial Ittboax adji^aatoxy bodies in tha lia>aix f i e l d has 
baan* inter alia« intended t o Mka apaedy da^exnination of 
disputed liiboax nattexa and thaxdby affoxd ^ i d k and 
in«i9«iaiTa xewadies to tha laboax by foUowiag suMaxy 
pxooadaxea as diatinot twm tha onMbaxaana and taohiileal 
pKOoaAuxaa and pxaeeaaaa of ardinaxy oauxta*' To thatt extant 
Ittomx adjttdioatlng bodies ooeupy « p i v o t « l poait lon in 
xegaxd t o th« basic objeot ivos o f labour l og i s la t i on . Th« 
functioning of thasa bodiaa i s also tha single nost inportant 
indax t o show whathar tha workax i s gatting a fa i s daa l . 
yareftff^ 9t iiwiY 
ut i l i za t i on of adjudicatlva nethod f o r tha 
rasolution o f labour diapataa has baan tha subjaot o f haatad 
contcovexsy and staunch aritiolsro av'erialnoa i t was Induotad 
in the industrial relations f i e l d . Moat of i t s c r i t i c s daam 
i t as inimical t o the interest of l ^ o u r on account of i t s 
being expensive and inaaq>aditiou3 ramady. It has also hmtn 
severely c r i t i c i s e d f o r retarding the avolution anr' growth 
o f instituticm of c o l l a c t i v e bargaining in Smlla as i t 
apparently saps tha nutual i n i t i a t i v e o f tha part ies f o r 
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voluntary sattlaiaant o f the i r disputes. 
Of a l l tha o r i t i e i a n s o f labour adjudication* tha 
o s i t i o i s a that •djodioativa method parpatsatas long dalay 
in tha apaady xaaoltttlan of labour dispute* Is tha nost 
txanohant and paxais tant . ' Faxpotxatiofi ttf dalay in tha 
•djudiaatiflo ai laltaux iasuaa la oontxaxy t o tha i n i t i a l 
aaatuvtlona and oonsidaxationa which pxa^otad tha adoption 
o f ^ j o d l e a t i v a method in tha laboux f i a ld* 0Qnaa<|ttaiitl7f 
i t ia baing ijMxaasingly f a i t that •djudlaatioii has l o s t 
i t s xalavanoa and usaftilsiaMi f o x aatt l lag tha gxianranoaa 
and iaauaa o f tha Idboux in^daairablo and afftMtiva awnnox* 
ThecafoK«« t h « atudy has hmm apaelfieally daai^ad t o 
corroborate or disprove by aiapirioal «vidane« and roethod 
the aasertlon that adjudix:ation leads to delays and i ts 
u t i l i t y and e f f i c a c y as labour dispute ssfttlanent method is 
affected thereby* The study a l so places special focus on 
bringing t o f o re the reasons that underl ie the protract ion 
of adjudicating prcKseedlnga before labour adjudicatory bodies 
and suggesting remedial measures on the basis of f indings t o 
make adjudicatory system estpeditlous and e f f e c t i v e . Further* 
i t has been cor>ten|>lated t o lofiow the viens and reactlcms of 
both employees and mnployers vho are users and real su f f e rers 
of the ayatain of labour adjudication concerning i t s relevance 
and value f o r se t t l ing labour disEM^tes. 
The present study re lates t o the «iraluation of the 
funotlmilng of liJsair adjudicatory bodies constituted under 
three labous mumstimntm, namely* the Xnditstrial Disputes Aet« 
1947# the Payaeiit o f Itages mt, 1936 and the Hor)ciiien*s 
Cflsi^ eBMKtion hett 1924 in the ataite of Jimmi and Kaslwilx. The 
seasen fog oonfinlng the study t o ono paxtioiXar state is 
oianrioiis. I t has bosn intandod to nako in depth study of 
tho opexatisR of adjudieatting sAthorltios ftmetlonlng undor 
the thxos labour enaotMsnts and t o ssosztsln wq^irieally 
uliothox the legls lativo intsnansfit of tho lidboux ststatos in 
giestion oonoexiilng ipoody dispooal of Xsbour ossos I s bolng 
ooxxlod out. The soiootioo of Xabstix sdjudiostoxy aathoxltlos 
ttndoc thoso latoour m o « « e i i t s i s paxtXy ptm^mH by tho fast 
that ra«jor iidjttdloatosy wock In th* laiboas f l « l d in th« stata 
i s nainly eonAaetad undas thaaa statutes . Partly i t i s a l so 
aetuatad by tha oonsidasation of making oosqparativa assassiBant 
of tha prooadura and sodas of adjudioativa daoisionHsaking;^ 
on tha ooa hand of the lai>aax tribanals undar tha Industrial 
Disputas Act that sre oparatad by parsons having f u l l j ud i c ia l 
background and^ cm thB othar# o f adjudicatory authorit ies 
under the Workman's Ccntpensation Act and the Payment o f Wages 
Aot Whicdi are mannad Toy aaministarativa o f f i c e r s ( o f f i c e r s o f 
Labour Department) # having no Judicial background^ legal 
qual i f icat ions* training or e>qparience. 
Significance of the investigation harrlly needs an 
esqplanation. Labour adjudication* , 
in the State of Janinu & Kashmir has been a 
v i rg in fi€4.d thus far in terms of legal rasaareAi# both 
•tipirioal and b ib l iographica l . Tha reason f o r th i s i s that 
tha State of J M M U 6 Kashmir i s t r a i l i n g behind in many 
raqpaots from tha rest of the country dua t o i t s r e la t ive 
baokwaxdnaas and g s o - p o l i t i o a l oondit ions . 
yuw 
Regional studies are important',! yet another angle* 
Although « t tha national l eve l muoh reseaxoh ( i t i s mostly 
doet i ina l ) on •ariad aapaots o f i j idustrial re lat ions law has 
baan oasriod an* tliasa ia paxoaptibla laek of xagiocial studies 
in t h i s z a 9 u d . * N^xaovar* what i s found t o be salsnrant or 
va l id f o r tha otttBtsy as a iHiola naad not ba al%»«ys so in 
oaao o f a p a x t t e U s zosion ox a state* »or« thaxa i s a 
G 
gxeat div«jeg»nee In the l « v e l and pattern of Industcial 
developncdtit^ In the awareness and at t i tude of the working 
elas9# development o f trade unionise)^ soeio-eccmoniQ 
condit ions , and the l ike* Henoe« the ne«K9 f o r undertaking 
studies at the regional and state l eve l f o r acquiring be t te r 
knowledge and understanding o f the operation o f the law. 
Even in terms of naticanal iciporteince the u t i l i t y 
of th is investiqatlon i s obvious. F i r s t , i t la so because 
eR^ir ice l research in the f i e l d of law i s yet in the seminal 
s t a t e . Second, labour adjudieatlcnn in India h i therto has 
bean mainly the subject of (foctrlr.al research, though recently 
in some quarters amplrlcal study on t h i s o b j e c t has 
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carr ied out . To the best o f the author 's knowledge no 
invest igat ion has yet been conducted in the country in which 
oon^arative evaluation of the working of d i f f e r e n t labour 
adjudieatoxy authorit ies has been made. This ooi^ariaon 
asqyilres 4p»«oial a igni f ieanoe in those states %4iere adnin is -
tratiire o f f i o a r s ( o f f i o i a l s o f Labour ospartnent) aot mm 
adjudieatory author i t ias under statutes such as the workman's 
Coaqpensatimi Aot# the Payment o f Wages Aet, e t c . , and 
Presiding o f f i c e r s of laboar oourts and Industrial t r ibunals 
iindex the Industrial Disputes Aet are dxawn from the Judic ia l 
serv i ce o f the 3tate . Th^ conparison i s lJBqH»xtant t o f ind out 
whathex d i f f e r e n c e in the background o f d i f f e r e n t adjudicat ing 
author i t ies leads t o d i f f e r e n c e in the formulation o f 
ad jadioat ive d e c i s i o n s . 
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Th« study attonpts t o •xamins the following 
hypothvsMi 
1 . Tha ptoceduze adopted by labour adjudicatory bodlaa 
fao l l l ta tas tha spaady disposal of tha laauaa and elalns 
of the labour. 
2. GovarnnaRt's zafaranoa maXlnq dlacratlon baslAas bain? 
mlsusad* dalays tha eanmcmeemant o f adjudication 
prooaadlnga in the labour court or indjistrlal tribunal 
for the adjudication of an Industrial dispute. 
3. Dilatory and cos t ly l i t igatory process In tha higher 
jud ic ia l courts has rendered their del ivery system of 
Justioe obsolescent for dealing out j u s t i c e t o tha 
working c lass and. f o r bringlr^ labour disputes t o 
spaady conclusions. 
4 . Voluntary negotiations are nore suitable for resolving 
employer-employee di3putf='3, and, i f propar climate for 
their operati(»n i s created^ they considerably obviate -
tha need f o r taking to adjudicative method f o r the 
sattl^oant of labour d i sp i t es . 
The method «Rployad for conducting tha study is . 
•ssontially analyt ical . Data f o r tha study 
honra baan drawn mainly from thrae sources, rirst* f i a l d data 
oollacrtad from tha intervlairs of 388 raspondants ooiqprislng 
iiorkars« unicn laadars« «q;>loyars, lawyers and «ajudloating 
oCfioaxs. Sacond* s t a t i s t i o a l data col laotad from tha saooxda 
of tha bffioaa of %t%m laboar adjudicatory wthor i t iaa oonsistlno 
9t tha study ot s n eaMS dMid«d by thasa « i thor i t ias« Xn 
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• M i U M f f « f m i } « « ««••• h—tk MMOmd* It lias 
li««a «oik« l e MMJPtftla Dm AtXajr m « « tiM gowranHit 
l a v a f m l a g ••••• f ov iiAja41«atieQ aadtr aim Za4tt«%ri«l 
OltptttM A«t« l « t i d t « t KvailakU dMls i on i in 
typaaU aad writs la Xaboay aa«t«ra hf thm D i a t n a t Caarta, 
aaA tba Stata HlfH Coort bava alae l>aaa ataOiad* f l i i » l » a 
XialtaA iofazwatiaa haa baaa gatliarad by tba appUeatioa 
o f i ^ e a a s o f aoa^yartialpant obaayvatioQf i »a» by obsar* 
• ioc tba procaaOiiica o f labeor adjadiaatory bodlaa* 
For tba aoUaatioa o f f l a i d data and a t a t i a t U a l 
data f ear d latr l c ta of JiMaa d Xaabair atata vara abeaaa* 
fbata Matr l e ta wara i JaaMi« Katbuai Sriaagar and Baraatt* 
Xla* milla aalaeting tbam oara «aa takao to aaka tba aiajp* 
l a t a r r i t o r l a U y rapraaaatatlva aa wall at ia taraa of t a -
daatvial daTalof«aat In d l f farant araaa o f tba atata* Tbara 
l a ralatiTa];y falgb lavaX of l a ^ a t r l a l d^TalopaaQt ia tba 
Oiatrieta of Jaaaa and srinagar* On tba otbar baadf Oiat« 
Hata o f Eatbiia and BarawUXa bara iiada oaly aargiaaX l a -
dtat f iaX davalajeaat* ' 
fHH, ambav af aorbafa and asployara aba 
aatd iatanrUaad vaa ISd and r a a p a a t W y Of t M 
warbara f iO vara trate nnloa af f laava* 
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and wplof^rt m m t«X««««d trm ••takUslMMiitt ^lengiag 
t o kotli pvivaU t t e i o r f * * m tiM pttvyot* e f 
Aymlai ny M awipUt «I1 tlM iadiistirlal •sttblisli-
Mats froB Hm fuMio iMtov w«r« tAkra* siBiXavlyf trm 
tiM tMtor prlTftt* indnstrUX ••taHIlsli* 
••Qts aikl e«r««lB m i l Uiportaiit ImsliMt* toiioanis 
eliosM* ibl l« MlMtloc ivorkeri, f l r i t eliole« natttraUy 
f « n ttpoQ Ilt lgMt workertt !•••» who m * InvelvtA 
•t %tm In litigation wltb tko o^loytrt b « fer« • 
X^bottir adjadleatory tntHorlty* I t ought to aotod tli«t 
only • tl«iid«r auabor of moIi norkors ««• foiifid* As 
to tlio rett oX tbo rotpoQdont vorkorsf aXl tho eatogo* 
r l«t of noskora oaployod In an •stobllskmoiit voro lao* 
liidod to nako tho auyplo roprosontatlvo* Thoj InoXododf 
•klXXodf on«kiXX«d| ixxitoratoi odaeatod workartf womb 
workorsf gaardamny pooaa aad Momkara of eXarloaX atafX^ 
Za tlia oatakXlsliMata alMYO tirada onlona vara axlatlag thalr 
jpriaolpaX o f f U o r i f aoMly , j^oaldoatSf Yloa*pMsldaatat 
•••rotarloai ato«t voM latorvlovad* 
M«fa>ilat tiM Mantetiwa of a^pXaratat i a prlfata 
aatakXialuMsta aaaalXy Hm anplerer kiaaoXf was i f ^ r e a a M 
t o r latorvUv (toMtaXXy mmmw at ytiirat* aatakXlakMSta vata 
raXaataat to aXXov iatatvlov)* Xa aaali « f IOm yakXia aaat^r 
aadaytiriiUca i t X i d t i l a IIm aa^pXOf titfot top aaiikava of tlM 
•aaacariai^ atatf oofa Ivtorvlsvai ( l a aoaatraat to ^ v a t o 
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onployaru* th* inanagaments of public undartakinga rawSlXy 
permitted intarviow). 
Third oatagory of xaapondants oonsistad of lavymxa 
and adjadicatory authoritiaa in the labour f i a l d . Zn all« 
69 lawyers and 6 labour adjadicatinq o f f i c e r s wara intarviawad. 
originally* i t was plannad to interview a l l the labour 
adjudicating authoritiaa functioning at d i f f erent places in 
the s tate . But soma of thain could not be contacted inspite 
of bast effor1»b and acme wara hesitant to give interview 
despite instructions of the Labour CoitRnissit^ier in th is 
connectiori. altiinately only s ix adjudicatory o f f i c e r s ware 
intarviawad. This included a secrcrt^ary*) Labour repartroant* 
A 
tty\ who was not I adjudicating o f f i c e r . 
r\ 
As t o lawyer interviewees, main consideration %fhich 
«iaighad with the select ion was their special ac<}uiaintanca with 
labour matters. Thus* the preference was givan t o lawyers who 
wara practising before labour adjudicatory authorities in tha 
foax salaeted Distr i c ts aa wall as t o those apac i f i ca l l y 
dealing with labour matters before tha Labour Court and 
Ztiduatsial Tribunal and the H i ^ Court. I t may b« roantionad 
that only a faiw laiwyars exclusively practising in labour 
matters wara anrailabla in tha state . Rest of the raspondanta 
belonging to this category ware selected randomly. Responses 
of lawyara and adjudieating ofxloars have baan tabulated 
jointly as, for the most part, there did not appaar any 
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discz«panoy in th« ic ceaponae patterris and tihanetvar difforemoa 
la founds It haa baan h l ^ I i ^ t a d . Wot tha pucpoaa o£ 
intaiviowlRg workers, annloysrs and law/ara and adjudicating 
o f f i cers* three aeparate< intervlaw sohadulas have baan usad 
f o r the thrae groups of respond ^ t a . 
Tha selaotlon of the casas f o r the co l l ec t i on of 
s ta t ia t i oa l data from tha o f f i c e records of adjudicatory 
authorities was also made randomly. A schedule has been 
ut i l i zed to c o l l e c t s t a t i s t i c a l data regarding d i f ferent 
aspects of formulation of adjudicative decisions.^^ These 
casas were selected from the dacisions of Iiabour Court 
and Industrial Tribunal and from those of Coinmisnloner under 
the workm<Mn's compensation Act and Authority under the 
Paymetit of Wages Act decided over tha period of tan years 
(1969 - 1978). 2n the case of Labour Court and industrial 
Tribunal* one half of the casas decided by thm during tha 
above stated period of tan years ware stadi«K3. On the other 
hand* in the oaaa of Conmissloner f o r Con^semsation and 
Authority f o r paynant of wages* sample was confined t o 
twenty-five par cent of tha oases d€K:ided by these adjudl~ 
catory authorities in the f a i r Dis tr i c ts (above referred to) 
of the state in tha said period of tan years. In the selection 
of these oases* hofwvver* apeolal not ice of the fac t was takan 
that no case was l e f t out of the sample in vAiidh an 
appeal or writ had baan f i l a d . 
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OrSLginall^f i t latMi4«d to t ikt oaly fi^t et 
e M « t of L o t a r Court aaft Xodastrial f f l taaaX | M 
wat tb« ooto wltb tbo Atoitioat et ComiIssIoiiof f o r 
CoBponsotioii and Aatfaorlty for payMat of vafoa* Batf 
talifoquoatXy) koopiag la irlov rolot lvolr loot aambor 
of tho e«s«s declAcd h j Latioar Court n A Xadaatrial. 
f ribttaalt amibor vat raiaod to to sako adaqaato 
aisa of tfaa proportioa of tha daoialoaa of Laboar Court 
and iQdastrlaX tribaaaX in ^ aaMplo* 
For tbo parpoaa of tlia atady^ a l l tlia aaaaa da-
eidad by tlia High Court of Jumn aad Kaalwir in labour 
nattars • ahotbar la appaal or wrlllttadar tba Industrial 
Dlspataa Aot, tha WorkaanU Coapansatloa Aot aad tlia 
Paymaat of wagaa l e t duriag tha pariod uadar rafaraa* 
ea taava boaa atadiad # Baportod daoiaioaa of tba Bigh 
Court uadar tha aaid tliraa atatutaa delivarad ia 1979 
aad 1990 aad aoaa of thoaa givoa dnriag tlM pariod 
proaodlag 1999 vara alao axaalaad* Thia vaa doaa 
in wUm of avai labi l i ty of aattraaaly aaaU atii^ar of 
JudgMMita of tbo Kigb Court ia lubour Mttara • 8 i a i -
luvly , tbo iudgboata of .tbo Distr ict Courta ia « m 
O U t r i a l i Oif ^aHH » 9yifiagi^ # .BaraMOla aad Katbus 
paasoA i a appoal trm tbo ordora of Authority for psy* 
BObt of vagas duriag tba pariod of toa yoara uadar 
bava boaa studiod* I t aay bo aotod tbat dao 
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to lapfopcf Mlotcauio* et wwHm la thm efti««s 9t 
Atfistuit ttiwue CoflnissloMrs ooly a taw aaali aaaaa 
hava ^ a a laaatad* 
Aa haa Itaaa aaatloaad aarllar» a Ualtad uaa of 
tha taalinlqaa of noa-partloipant obsarvaticm has alao 
baaa mmdm for tha ealXaatioQ of data, irhreagh thla pro* 
aaaat aoadaet of adjadloatoarir prooaadlaga lijr tha XalMur 
adjadieatory aathorltlaa aadar Imraatltation was obsar* 
•ad« Spaelfla aota waa takan of tha faat vbatbar tha 
aoda of thalr fanetioalng vaa aaaantlalXy Infomal aa 
diatlaot froa tha foraal atnoaphara oharaetarlatia 
of JadielaX courts* Attantlon was alao foeossad on 
tha faat how anraprasaatad partias are dealt with 
by tha laboor adjadleatory aathorltlaa bafora than* 
Data aoUaatad tiara baan proeaaaad aaaaaUiF 
and rapraaaatad la ti^Xar ton* for ^ l a parpoaa 
ttfbaXatlan Mtliod ( gbowl&i fraqaanty dlatrlbatloa 
of dlffairaat •crlibl.aa with paraaatagaa } baa baan 
aaad to aoaivay tba raaalta and fladlaga of 
tba atody* 
Mala fladlaga of tba atady ara t 
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1« SBMunr m laiA dom in «h« Xa4ttt%« 
rial Oisj^tM A«lf til* Workaaa** Coaptaaatiea 
Aet tad tli« PtyHMt of w«f«t for 
•4jadi««tioa of Ickoar cotot licvo Iiooom 
tory and foaailiiod* Bj cad largOf tlioy in* 
hibit felio ipoody dispof«I of labour 
S« BzoroiM of roforoaeo naking powor by tbo 
SOTornMnt is vitiatoA by oxtoraal fMtors 
sQOli M politieaX iafiaoaoo aad M>n«tary 
ooflfidoratioaj* B*«id«»9 ^^ iaT«risbly 
doXays tho start of adjndieatory procaod-
ings for aattliag a diapata by adjudicativa 
nathod • 
3« Adjttdioation of labour easaa by tba adju* 
dicatory anthoritias uadar tba lodustrial 
Oiaputaa A«t , tlia VorloiaB's Coapaaaation 
Adt aad tba payaaat of ffagaa Aet is aarraA 
by dalay ia varyiac daajpoaa* la aompari-
8«tt to IiaboiiV Court and Zndiia trial f r i b v 
aal uadar tba Xadnstrial Diaputaa A«tt 
adjudicatory antboritias aadar ttia Wotk^ 
•aa*a Coapaasatioa Aat aad tlia Fay»aat 
of Wagas Aat aaka lasa dalay abi la adju* 
diaatiag oa liboMP aaaaa* 
4. Voluntary iMigotiatlons ara the most psafacrad mathod 
of Battling oraployar-eniployaa disputas. Adjudication Qyv 
i s aooaptabla only asj^ultimata xwiady whan voluntary 
nagotiatlona and ooncl l iat ion hava t o t a l l y fa i led t o 
raaolva a diaputa. 
Brief ly the contents of this study are aa fo l lovat 
m Chapter I reasons for the creation of labour 
adjudicating bodies in recent t ines have baen described. 
Besides, %ihile dealing b r i e f l y with the origin of adjudi-
catory process in the labour f i e l d in India, i t contains a 
detailed account of origin and growth of labour adjudicatory 
authorities in the state ot Jaimu & Kashmir. Composition of 
the lab<»ir adjudicatory authorities iifhich are the subject of 
the study has also been delineated in the Chapter. Chapter I I 
contains a discussion of the l«K;al provisions which relate t o 
the procedure observed by labour adjudicatirt^ a i t h o r i t i ^ 
under tha Industrial Disputes Act, the worlonan's Condensation 
Astf and the Payaant of Wages Act . Results shown by the 
analysis of data regarding procedure of labour adjudicatory 
bediM hafva also bean dealt with. Chapter H I ooneerns itaalf 
with tha aiiasoiaa of referral discretion by the government. 
Lagal fxsma-voxk of referral discretion and an^izioal data 
about the exercise of this power by the government have been 
•JOffinad in the Chapter. Chapter ZV ia devoted to aacertaining 
*aelay* made in the adjudication of casaa by the labour 
•Ajudleatery authorities under diseuaaioit on tha baaia of 
atatiatioal daita eoXXaetad in thia sagaxd. An analysia of tha 
J G 
o«u8«s which lead t o 'd«l«y* in the deoision-Hsiaking by 
the labour adjudicating authorit ies haa also beem made* 
Chapter V « STALAJITOEY and const i tut ional provisions about 
appellate and writ powers of Judicial courts in the labour 
matters have been examJjned* Whether h i ^ e r courts perpetrate 
delay in tdie disposal of labour oases has also been considered. 
Snpirioal data regarding exeroise of Judic iary 's power in the 
labour f i e l d have also been presented in the Chiqpter. Chapter VX 
relates to^discussion on the re lat ive e f f i c a c y of voluntary 
negotiations and involuntary adjudication with regard t o 
set t l ing laboir-managsfnant disputes. It has been c o n s i d e r ^ 
whetlvir labour adjudication la asser t ia l l y destructive of the 
inst i tut ion of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining and voluntary Beqotlations 
or these two methods of se t t l ing labour disputes can operate 
ina^corapleBientary manner. Beaidea, views of the responder^ts 
(workers* employers» lawyers and adjadicatir>^ mthoc i t ias ) 
coRoeming the adoption o f a s u i t ^ l e rethor^ in the labour 
f i e l d have bean sat out in the Chapter* Finally* Chapter VIZ 
contains an appraisal of the i ^ X e work and reconnendations • 
FOE the purposes of c l a r i t y and dfiinands of anal^'tical 
a^^xomdti, th i s study has adopted the fo l lowing de f in i t i ons and 
meanings f o r some of the terns used herein* 
1 - / 
Th« tarro "labour •diudioation" Aoma not denote 
<mly th« a«ttl«inant of Induatcial disputes by th« adjudioativa 
fBa^in«xy astabliahttd undac tha Xndastxial Dlaputes hat, as i s 
g«n«rally andaKstood^^ , i t also in«ana tha datazuninaticMnt of 
issues and olaiins of the woxkars thcough adjudieatoxy pxocess 
by the labour adjudicatory authorities functioning under 
labour statutes such aa the Payment o f Gratuity Act* the 
V40K)anean*a Compensation Act# the Payment of Wages Act« e t c . 
<1 » 
Delay s ign i f i e s the time spent by a labour adjudi-
catory authority in the adjudicaticm of a case over and above 
the normal time recpired f o r the disposal of that case . 
A labour dispute any disputed matter or issue 
b«t%NMn the esqployer and osnployee required t o be detexnined 
0X\ 
by a labotix adjudioatoxy «ithoxity ln)ObJeotive fRosinex aftex 
heazlii5i •vldenoe« This disputed mattax ox issue may axise 
•ithex undax the InAxalttlml Disputes the Mdxlmen*s 
Caipsnsatioii Aot ox the Payment of wages Aet. Tox the 
Ipuxpose of the pxesent study the texms industxlal disputes* 
Uiomx di lutee , iMu«s« elaim«« disputed ItfMux m«ttexs# 
laboux Mnagenent <sonfliet8«eto.« have bean used 
intexohangeably • 
Awaxd r«£«x;8 t o a daolaion given by aithar Labour 
Court or Industrial Tribunal undar tha ZRduatrial Diapatea 
Act or Conmisaic^ar £or Workman's Coiqpansatlon or Mithority 
f o r payraant o f wagas whila adjudicating on disputad labour 
mattara. 
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Th« rsMons for the astablishannt end grovth of 
labour ad judicatory bodies for a«ttllng aRq^loyax-an^loyva' 
diapatas ara lay and tha ama aa aotaatad tha oraation 
of variad and miatitudlnoua adniniatratl^a trlbunala In 
raeant tinaa.^ AdMiniat sat lira tribunala axa a naat 
ickabla phanonanon of tha 10th cantury* V%to faotora 
Mainly aoaoiint for thia davalapawnt* Firat* atupandeua 
inaxaaaa In tha aparatiena and aotiiritiaa of i^a Mdaxn 
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governmont. 3«aond# ehangoover £zon th« oonocqpt of la isses 
fa l ra state t o soc ia l welfaze atata.^ A soc ia l waifare state 
has necessarily t o engage i t s e l f in variegated welfare 
progrwoBies. For carrying out this task i t has t o enM± 
welfare and regulatory legis lat ion on a wide scale* Under 
the new leg is lat ion mneroua claims and controversies of 
people o f small neans need to be decided quickly, inea^^ensively 
and informally.^ Ordinary judic ia l courts were unsuitable 
to decide new jus t i c iab le issues because o f various reasons. 
4 
Their node of functicming has be«n slow# expensive and formal. 
Between the in i t iat ion of a claim and i t s f ina l disposal 
many years need to be spent before a court . Slaborate and 
cost ly court procedure was manifestly contradictory o f 
avowed object of deciding t iny claims and entitlements under 
newly enacted welfare laws speediLy and cheaply.^ Undoubtedly, 
the need was far< more amenable and f l e x i b l e bodies for 
liapleRefitiiig welfare sohenes. One noted authority on 
tribunals has eloquently described th is pos i t i on . 
Mliat is needed above a l l else is a oheip and 
speedy aettlewent of disputes. Vor these eases 
Mm not want m RoXls-Royoe system of JustiQe*.. 
Zf the mmxmtm nlmim to benefit is less than M 10 
we do not w«Rt a judge on a pensionable salaxy of 
over M 12*000 a year.*, to decide the elain* Mor 
do wo wait to wait for years to elapse botwoen 
the Mdeing of the olalm and the arrival at a 
final deoiaion..." € 
further* the courts have a leng inherited praotieo 
of interpreting statutee in literal fashion. This qpprooOh 
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was «nt l th«t ioa l to the f l e x i b i l i t y which was required t o 
interpret soc ia l l eg i s la t i on . The predioanent of j u d i c i a l 
courts was further compounded by tha doctrine of atare d e c i s i s . 
The judges ought t o fo l low the precedents of their predecessors 
in similar cases- efven though the earl ier decisions require 
reconsideration. Besidas* legis lators have innate 
ehension, whether well founded or not, that soc ia l 
p o l i c i e s and ends envisaged in i t s diverse laws might be 
thwarted by the ordinary courts in their esuberance t o 
protect rights of the individual. In the changed context, 
individual interest has perforce t o be subordinated t o the 
7 public weal. 
Another lacuna in the courts t o deal with 
administrative l i t i ga t i on was general character of their 
jur isd ic t ion and conseqiert want o f special expertise and 
•aqpttKioouse t o dii^ MKse of oases c«<|iiring flpeoisl knowleKSge. 
A variety of nsw e la i » s and issues are desirably t o be 
disposed o f by bodios having special knowledge and s k i l l s 
ill d l f f e cont f l o l d s . * ftomm bXU aainlnistsatlv« l i t i g a t i o n 
trats o f InflBltlr ttmonagoabls ma^iitado. Xf a l l th i s 
litigatory wosk had been ^— - • - - assigned to tho 
judicial courts* they would have indubitably cruUblad under 
Its w a l ^ t . ' Administrative adjudicatory bodies^ howover, 
psosant a zofxaahlng contiasty plotaxo in relation to 
jttdioial courts. Thay are qulta infomal in thair functioning. 
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Parties* mrm not cepraaentad by lagal ooinaal* can 
put focth thait view points unhestitatlnqly and without f e a r . 
There i s no oourt roon tense* fozmal and frightening 
a t m o s p h e r e T h e s e bodies have also the advantage of eaqpert 
knowledge in the concerned f i e l d s . Even where the adjudicating 
aathorities are not eapert') in the course o f t ine they build 
up valuable store of e>^artize by cont imcusly deciding 
cases or a particular n a t u r e W h a t i s more important* the 
procedure adopted by adjudicatory bodies i s far more f lexible^ 
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speedy* simple and access ib le . I«aw ConiBisaiaa of India has 
also tersely described the reasons for the establishment of 
tribunals in modern tineas 
" . . . Zt may be that in view of certain inherent 
advantages l ike speed* cheapness* procedural 
simplicity and ava i lab i l i ty q£ special Xnowledga 
ia extra- judic ia l tribunals* these may be useful 
as a supplsnentary systom (supplementary t o the 
system of tradit ional hieraroy of jud i c ia l counts) . ..** 
Besides these causes which are connan both t o the 
administrative tribunals and labour tribunals* sona other 
factors peculiar to labour management f i e l d underlie the 
creation and growth of labour tribunals and adjudicating 
bodies in nodem democratic industrial soc ie t i es• 
There tias a tine when worker was easily susceptible 
to being hired and fired by his «aployer. Trade Union 
Organisationa Mre txeaftad as orininal conspirateiaa by 
PA 
Judicial courts inst«Hid of being lagitlmate institutions 
t o sorva th* o«us« of labour. Zjaglslatora also did not lag 
bahind in Rulotlng tha labour c l a s s . Thay raadily accorded 
l€igislative sanction to the panal contracts and other devices 
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designed t o persecute workers and trade unions. l^t in 
loodern industrial soc i e t i es sucdi treatnent of^  labour has 
becomej^thing of the past . 
with the emergence of(Concept of soc ia l welfare 
state* c o l l e c t i ve bargaining became an accepted device t o be 
resorted t o by xrorkars in their organized capacity for 
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ameliorating their Gondltions of einployraent Legislature 
also gradually started passing labour welfare latrn t o batter 
the l o t of worker and t o inprove terms and conditions of 
his serv ice . This followed the dawn of enlightened thinking 
and appreciaticm of soc ia l need for according f a i r treatment 
t o tha lidbour In sharing industrial f r u i t s of their services 
to industry and soc i e ty . Natv daal f o r the labour was 
warxantad by tha inparativas 'of rapidly changing social* 
aeonomia and industrial conditions in raodem state.^^ 
A distinguishing feature of labour laws haa baan 
that thay are invariably Imbuad with prograasive social 
philosophy.^"' Their underlying s p i r i t unmistakably points 
to dealing out social justice t o tha working class. Tha 
ooneapt of social justice i s founded on the basic ideal of 
aoolc^aaanoBio equality and its ain i s t o ass ist tha removal 
r -
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of sooio-eoononlo diiqparltl«B. SndMd* the concept o£ 
soc ia l Juatloe haa now beoone oicd) an Integxal part o£ 
Industrial law that no systam of aott l lng labour roanagwrant 
disputes can ignore i t while deciding industrial disq^Mites*^^ 
This naturally required that adjudication of 6n)ployer->eRployc»s 
isaaes be not made according t o s t r i c t law of roaster and 
servanti because in any case of industrial adjadication the 
claims of the employer based on the freedon of contract have 
to be adjusted with the claims of industrial employees for 
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soc ia l j u s t i c e . Moreover, under the swi f t l y mounting labour 
welfare and racwlatory l eg i s la t i on , a a l t i t u d e of jus t i c iab le 
rights of the labour cropped up whidi needed t o be f^ecided 
quickly and cheaply. 
Undoubtodly, j u d i c i a l courts are not suitable 
forums t o adjudicate upon industrial matters owing t o diverse 
f a c t o r s . They have been aocustoroed t o dispensing Justice 
according to adversary method.^^ In the oR^loyar-employees 
f i e l d courts haive long heritage of s e t t l i n g disputes in 
conformity with the law o f master and servant and c o n t r w t 
of an^loyment. To incorporate any humanitarian consideration 
or claims o f s o c ia l Justice, as d i s t inc t f ron t e r m o f 
contract of onploynant* was ineoR|>atible with the ir 
eonventional fraiii»>work of functioning. Being bound by 
ordinaxy law, they proo«ed on the a««inption that they can 
only enfocea cucisting oontraeta botw«en the part ies and 
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cannot redraw « oontraet entered Into by the par t i es . Bat 
coT'slderationa of f a i r play and olatns of soc ia l j u s t i c e 
may at t ines demand not only enforcement or exist ing contract 
bgtwawi the part ies but a lso rewriting then for the parties 
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by the labour adjudicatory forums. Courts are a lso given 
t o deciding disputes by ad<^ting l e g a l i s t i c and doctr inaire 
approach besides being tardy in turning out their decisicwjs.^^ 
Judicial courts suf fer frow other Inhibitions as 
well which render th<an unsuitable f o r adjudicating on labour 
disputes. Working claas generally aaapects the impartiality 
are inti^qrity ox c c i r t s in dealing with labaar matters. This 
aversion for tho courts i s the re f l ec t i on of t i r e s when courts 
lent unstinted support f o r enforcing anti-labour publ ic 
p o l i c i e s which did not recocqiize labourl right t o act in 
concert*^^ Curiously* this be l i e f o f the working claas s t i l l 
persists? thou^i conscious pro»labour p o l i c i e s of modern 
goveriHD€«t and greatly transformed legal attitudes and values 
towards woiOcex axe a t o t a l antipode of the old antipathetic 
treatment o f the labour. In addition, workers and union 
leaders harbour the f ee l ing that judges moatly cofoe fron 
ipropertied classes t o which employers belong. As a result 
they may not del iver j u s t i c e t o the workers due t o their 
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soc ia l background. It i s also feared that courts are not 
properly eqialpped t o deal with labour disoutes which ananate 
fron s p e c i f i c legal and econonio relationship and presents 
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aansltlvte pcoblens of haman celationa. Parties Involved in 
the disputes are on unequal soc ial and eccmomic foot ing. 
Gsneralist judges are not particularly familiar with labour 
matters and ccxnplexitiea besetting employer-worker and 
ecnployer-union relationship as well as the needs of the 
industry, worker, employer and national economy. Consequently, 
they are not deemed f i t t o handle labour issues with requisite 
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special legal , econornic and soc ia l €»(pertness. Besides 
tense atmosphere of the courts does not permit frank and 
informal discussion necessary for hammering out mutual 
agreements which are acceptable t o the part ies , and more 
congenial f o r bringing about durable industrial peace. Above 
a l l , labour management relations arena i s highly sensit ive 
and inflammatory. Status qao obtaining at a particular period 
i s of h i^i ly evanescent and elusive nature. Ihdefiriite 
d«f«rz ing or delay in the determination of rights of workmen 
(whicdi w i l l JAevitably happen i f industrial matters are t o be 
d«eid«d by judleiaxy) may result in industrial unrest and 
IntMKttptlon o f work %Aiich are disastrous to the interest 
of both pasties as i fol l as the conmunlty. 
Finally* the process of collective bargaining 
(mutual negotiations) as also conciliation and voluntary 
arbitration, is intrinsically incapable of detemining al l 
the disputes which conceivably can arise in the industrial 
relations sphere. Because collective bargaining (mutual 
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negotiations) and other voluntary and neutral settlement 
procedures l i k e conc i l iat ion and voluntary arbitration are 
a f f l i c t e d by certain inherent shortconsings and this a lso 
partly ccHitributed t o the developfoent of nandatory and prompt 
adjudicatory procedures in the labour f i a l d . It has hc^encKl 
even in countries* for inatancajiAmerica %ihich greatly fonc?le 
an<l re l ish the peaceable settlement o f labour issues in 
extra - jud ic ia l p r o c e e d i n g s . T h u s * the dispute between a 
union and i t s member or between two r iva l unions traverses 
the area of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. are the neutral 
agencies eas i ly available t o adjust such disputes. The same 
very d i f f i c u l t y w i l l be encountered in se t t l ing disputes 
through mutual negotiations and ccmcl l iat ion in Andustrios 
which do not have c o l l e c t i v e cantracts or do not provide 
f o r settlement procedures.^® i^Jhat i s more important, in many 
a case # as i t ware« the process of negotiation cannot be 
stretohod beyond a particular point in case o f disagreement 
b«tvtten the part ies and conc i l i a tory or voluntary procaiures 
f a i l t o resolve a deadlock. This dMdlook point may be 
anywhere betiweii the in i t i a t i on of bargaining process and 
29 r«0oxt t o eaononie sanotimis. Furthennore* an individual 
a 
worker* not being mwber of |union« or workers coming from 
unorg«niBed seotor would be intmore serious predicament wh«n 
A 
in dispute with his enployer. Bargaining process lays bare 
i t s hollowness for him as he i s in Iweak bargaining pos i t i on A 
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in contiast t o his econonically mighty employee. Further, 
unlike the dPKSiaions of courts and adjudicating bodies^ which 
are attended with a degree of legal sanct i ty and i n v i o l a b i l i t y , 
decisions arrived at as a result of mutual negotiations are 
not se l f - en forc ing . Therefore, d i f f i c u l t y o f their enforcanent 
s t i l l remains i f they are f louted aubsequwitly or i f there 
is d i f ference on the interpretation of terms of any such 
agreement. It may at times compel the part ies t o resort to 
economic sanctions. Provision for s e t t l ing such cllfferersces 
before a labour tribunal or industrial court could avnrt 
recourse t o oconanic sanctions, noroover. In co intr ies l ike 
India, an additional reason for having labour adjudicatory 
bodies to resolve amoloyGr-employee issues in that the 
climate for the operation of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining inst itution 
i s not wholly propitious because a s igh i f i cant portion of 
labour is s t i l l unorganiaed and organised labour has been 
grevioualy a f fected by b i t t e r inter-union r iva l r i es and 
i l l i t e r a c y . 
^snrt^ pf I'yfcff"! ^ mdia 
In India creation and growth of liA>oar 
adjudicatocy bod lea had becm alow and haphazard t i l l 
&idepend«nce, as waa the case with the enactmant of labour 
welfare laws.^^ It was so Inspite of the raconiBendations 
of various canmisslona and confarencsa regarding baittarnent 
and regulation of working conditions of l a b o u r T h a 
oQ 
reasons f o r th i s are not far to seek* The c o n c ^ t s of 
laissee fa ire and freedom of contract were ruling roost 
during 19th century and In early part o f 20th century. 
Foreign rule also partly contributed to the neglect of 
the working f o r ce . 
In 1860, the State for the f i r s t time by aiactlng 
the Bmployees and workmen's Act# 1860, entered the a r ^ a of 
industrial relations f o r the determination of labour disputes 
by coinpulsory adjudicative method in India. This Act provided 
f o r the aunwary diaposal o f disputaa relating t o wages by 
magistrates. In 1881, the Factory Act was passed. This Act 
went through the process of several amendments t i l l i t was 
f ina l ly replaced by the present Factories ^ t , 1948. This 
Act, provided f o r the discharge of certain functions in 
qiiasi-Judicial manner (as for example granting or refusing 
permission t o the use of a s i t e for factory or l icencing 
of a factory, e t c . ) . Provision was also made for hearing 
a|>peals by the state government and Central Government in 
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The WorXnen's Compensation Act, 1923, i s yet 
another piece of early labour legis lat ion that proiridad for 
the u t i l i sa t i on of adjudicatory procedure f o r set t l ing 
diaputed oXaiias t o coi^pensation of %iorkm«n.^^ The Workmen's 
compensation Act was followed by the Payment of Wagea Act,1936 
In respect of using adjudicatory method for s e t t l ing 
disputes. Under the Paymwt of Wages Act« claiirs mf delayed 
wages or i l l e g a l deductions of wages were required t o be 
decided through adjudication.^^ The Bombay industrial 
Disputes Act* 1938« i s the precursor of the wielding of 
labour adjudicaticm process in the industrial relations 
sphere on a large s ca le . Under the provisions of this statute, 
the Oovernxnent of Bombay set up an industrial court f o r the 
resolution of industrial disputes. This measure was 
incorporated in Rule 91-A o f the Defence of India Rules 
during the Second Vtorld War t o ensure uninterrupted industrial 
peace during the war period and consequent unstinted f low of 
production t o further war e f f o r t . Rule 81-A was applied on 
a l l India l eve l . This Rule was t o lapse on 1st October* 1946« 
but since the government found i t handy in checking industrial 
unrest* i t was retained intact by the Bmergency Power 
(Continuance) Ordinance* 1946. Ultimately the essential 
r r inc ip l es of Rule 81«A ware 0Rax>diad in the inAistziml 
Disputes Act* 1947* thereby* according permanency t o the 
provision for a « t t l i n g industrial disputes by c o n ^ l s o s y 
adjudication. The Industrial Disputes Act provided f o r 
•stablishnent o f industrial tribunals f o r adjudicating 
upon industrial disputes.^^ sukseqaently* industrial Disputes 
Aot« 1950 wms snaotad f o r set t ing up Labour Appellata 
Tribunal t o hear appeals fron the a%fards o f industrial 
txibunals.Howavar* Labour Appmllmta Trilxinal was abolished 
In 1956 on account o£ I t s di latory and «>p«nslv« method of 
working %^lch was considered t o be inconsistent with the 
object of speedy settlament of disputes.^® In 1956, an 
arooidinent to the Ihd js tr ia l oi^>utes Act provided fox 
37 constitution of labour courts . 
Since Independence, with the rapid pace of 
industrialization in the country, the rftiinber o f Irfrour 
statutes providing f o r determination o f labour isaues and 
grievances t h r o u ^ adjadicatory process , has been constantly 
swell ing. Soise of these labour enactmer.ts ares Industrial 
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Snployinent (Standing orders) Act, 1946 ; Minlirwro Wages Act, 
1948^^ ; ^p loyees State Insurance Act, 1948^° ; Maternity 
Benefit Act, 1961^^ t Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972^^ t 41 
Eq^jal Remuneration Act, 1976 • 
of Adjadiffa^9lY 
C^owth of la):K9ur adjudicatory bodies as well as 
labour laws in Jamoa & Kaahnir state i s aloweYeoRipaced 
-Hst 
t o I cast of the country. Two factors , i t would ••en, mainly 
aooount fox th i s i f i r s t , industrial backwaxdneaa of the s tate , 
t h o a ^ of la te , the state has speeded up the pace of 
indhistrialiaationy second, special procedure preaerUsed in 
Act io l* 31^ of the Constitution of India fox the operation 
o f Cantxal laws in ths state.^^ Cehtxal labour laws are not 
O i 
opeKabl* in the state of the<ic own force on account of 
Art ic le 370. Therefore* a C ^ r a X labour law in order t o 
be explicable to the state nuat undergo the procedure 
contained in Article* 370. Keedless t o mention* the state 
was rather slow in applying ^aentral labour laws t o the s tate . 
Jainni & Kashmir state Labour Regulation 1909 was 
the f i r s t statvitoty roeaaure which inducted adjudicatory 
process in the labour raanagem^t f i e l d in the state f o r the 
f i r s t time. This regilatl<Mi provided for a separate adjudicatory 
machinery for determiniftg disputes of labour employed in 
certain public undertakings. Under the Regulation, the 
Maharaja was enpowered t o authorize a Magistrate or other 
person exercising the powers of ^laglotrate t o decide disputes 
of labour speedily and cheaply.^^ 
a he vvorkmen's Compensation /»ct v/as enacted in the 
State in 1943. It was the f i r s t labour statute in the state 
which applied the adjudicatory process for the settlenent of 
claims of workers or their legal dependents relating t o 
cQBQ^ensation in the modern sen^e. Ccxmnissioner i s the 
adjudioatory suthority under the Act. In 1970 Central 
Workmen *• CQH|>«nsatlon Aot« 1924 was adopted in the state 
which seplaoad State 's workmen's Compensation Act.^^ No«r 
the Ccnnlssioner discharges his adjudicatory functions under 
the Centxal Aot. State's Iki^strial Disputes Act i s the 
other labour enaotaent th«t Introduced adjudioatory process 
in the early stages in the stafte. 
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anaoted In 1950« t^ is Act provided for the establishment of 
industzlal tzlbtinals to adjudicate upon Indastclal disputes. 
At pre3»it« Centzal Xhaistclal Disputes Act* 1947 la operating 
in the State, I t was extended t o the state In 1970.*^ 
Under this Act« a labour court and an Industrial 
tribunal decide the Industrial disputes in the state referred 
to thaw by the government.^® Even t h o u ^ the law of industrial 
disputes was enacted in the state in 1950 requiring setting 
up of seoarate adjudicatory machinery f o r the adjudication of 
industrial disputes#separate labour court-cum-industrial 
tribunal came t o be established in the state c«nly as late 
as 1972. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1950, has been followed 
by the Payinent of Wages Act, 1956 in adopting adjudicatory 
process in the Indaatrial relations f i e l d . ISiterestlngly/ 
the Paynent of wages Act was ^acted in the state in 1956 
after the elapse of twenty years since i t s enactment at the 
C ^ t r e . The Authority appointed under the Payment o f Wages 
Aot adjudicates upon oases of i l l ega l decoctions of w«ge» 
or non-paynoit of wages.^^ Prestuntly, the Central Payment 
of Wages Aot operates in the state.^^ Aithority decides wage 
disputes under the Central Act now. Jairanu & Kashmir 
Industrial BBaployment (Standing Orders) Act. 1960, also 
roqMirea diaohaxge o f certain funetions by fol lowing the 
•djttdioatery pcooedure. These funotions consist in 
oertlflOtttioo of standing ordexs by the Cert i fying Officex 
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which lay down conditions of an^loyraent in an industcial 
oatablishinent Industrial Gnploynent (Standing Orders) Act 
Its o-vvA^ fW./ in the state around sixteen years a f ter i t s enactmcKit 
at the C ^ t r e . In 1970, the C ^ t r a l mdustr ia l Snployinent 
(standing Orders) Act, 1946 was made applicable t o the state , 
which is in operation at present. Cert i fy ing Of f i cer functions 
under the Central Act. Jn 1960 another labour statute* 
namely, the Shops and Sstablishm^t^Act was enacted. I t was 
later repealed by the Jaimu & Kashmir Shops and Bstablishmonts 
Act, 1966. Under the provisions of th i s Act, Labour Caimiissioner 
decides the dispute between the inspector and an atployer 
regarding assigning of one category or the other t o an 
establishroant at the time of reg istrat ion . Labour Commissicmer 
takes congnizance of the njatter on the reference being made 
by the Inspector. Labour Conraissioner decides th i s matter 
in accordance with cpas i - jud i c ia l p r o c e d u r e . ( j n d e r the Act, 
Daputy Z«abaur Coramissioner hears appeals from the orders of 
Inspector prohibiting the use of building, plants, ways, e t c . 
on the ground of posing Imninent danger t o human l i f e or 
safety.^^ Besides* section 30 of the Act oi^owers the 
government by a n o t i f i c a t i o n t o vpply the provisions of the 
Payment o f Wages Act t o the establishments and employees 
covered by the Shops and Establishment Act . It i s therefore, 
c lear that on the applicaticm of the Payment of Wages Act, 
the ^ t h o r i t y under that Act may decide wage claims of the 
onpIoyeQs governed under the shops and Establishn^tc Act. 
However, t o date no such not i f i cat ion has been issued. 
lMrthei# Soction 56 of the Shops ar.d Establishment^Act 
applies the existing provisions of v^orlonai's Compensation 
Act and the rules made under i t t o every employee of a shop 
or connneraiai astablishroen-t.. Therefore, by virtue of Section 
56 the Conanissionor is entit led to entertain ccwnpensation 
claims from tha employees of ahop-? anc^  commercial establishments. 
Thsjs froKi the abov^, i t 1 ecoroes plain that the 
pace of ut i l i zat ion of adjudicatory nrocedures for s e t t l ^ o n t 
of labour inanaqement issuer} was tardy and 3pora<^ic in the 
state t i l l the a<^ /^ert of 1970 s . It was not surpriaing that 
Inportant labour statutes such aa the Mlnlniuw 'Jages lict, the 
Snployee's State Infjuranee Act, the Payment of Grat^iity ;»ct, 
e t c , which ccwitain adjudicatory procedures f o r the 
determination of labour claims under them wore not existing 
in the state t i l l 1970. Zh 1970, a major dewelopwent occurred. 
This related t o tha extension of the Central Labour Lawn t o 
the s tate . Central Labour hixm (Exbension t o J&K) Act« 1970 
was passed. By this Act a nunlber of Central Labour statutes 
were applied t o tha s tate . Apart frcn the Ifodastrial Disputes 
Act, the Payment of Wages Act and the workmen's Compensation 
Act# which have been referred t o aibo'/^, other laws whidh 
provide f o r settlement of grievances of l ^ o u r through 
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adjudicatory procadure axes the MinlnuR) Wagas Aot« 1948; tha 
£iif>loyea3 3tate Znsurancs Act* 1948; the Working Journalists 
(Condition? of Servica) and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act/ 
1955; tha Maternity Benefit Act, 1961; tha Motor Transport 
(Workers) Act, 1961. 
Under the Minimuro Wages Act, tha Authority i s 
invested with adjudicatory functions ccsnprising claims 
arising frcxn payment of less than rainiroain rates of wages t o 
the on^jloyees.^ Although, thin statute was adopted in the 
state in 1970, ita provisions have not been inipleicented so 
f a r , Gonsequertly, the Authority under this /vct, does not 
ce 
perform any adjudicatory functions. At the niorrtent, however, 
schedule is beijng prepared to specify tha industries t o which lU 
Act is to be appliad. The KSiployee's State Insurance Act, 1948 
contains provision for setting up two adjudicatory forums -
Medical Ai^eal Tribunal i^ich i s t o hear ^ p e a l s from the 
doteriQinations of the Medical Board respecting disablenient 
and anployee's Ikisuranca court whioh i s intendod 
t o hear «$»p«als from the dacisions of Medical ^^^aal Tribunal 
b«sld«s deeldlng qMastions about matters spaoificid in Section 
75 (1) and (2) of tha Aet.^' ' Like the Minimum wages Act, tha 
iiqplsnantation of the Gnployees state Zkisuranoa Act i s also 
hanging f i r e sinoa 1970. As a rasult, no adjudicatory body 
functions as yet in the state under th is Act. working 
Joamal i s t s (conditions o f Servioe) and Miscellaneous 
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provisions Aot« 1955* which has been applied t o the state 
by the C ^ t r a l Labour Laws (Bxtonsion to the J&K) Act 1970, 
a s s i e s adjudicatory :&anctions relating t o f ixat ion or 
revision of wage rates f or working journal is ts t o the Wage 
Board t o be constituted under it.®® The said Wage Board i s 
empowered t o exercise the powers of an Industrial Tribunal 
constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 while 
discharging i t s functions.^^ Under the Maternity Benefit Act, 
1961, prescribed authority (Labour Camnissioner is prescribed 
authority) acts in adjudicating manner while hearing appeals 
frcwn the order of employer which deprives a woman of maternity 
bene f i t or medical Wtoaa in v io lat ion of the provisicais of 
the Act. Labour Commisaionar also hears appeals from the 
order of the Inspector which obliges an employer or manager 
to pay maternity benef i t or any other amount <^e against him 
under the Act t o the aggrieved woman, or nominee or legal 
heir.^^ Although, the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, 
envisages the cc^stituticm of adjudicatory nachinary, i t has 
not been doiMi so far • This machinery is t o consist of an 
an^EKillate authority fox entertaining appeals from the orders 
o f aaspector and Chief Inspector under th« Aot.^^ But Section 24 
o f the Aot tppXies the Payment of Wages Aot« 1936, t o motor 
transport workers* thereby, enabling them t o approach the 
Authority under the Payment o f Wages Act f o r the determination 
o f wage disputes involving i l l e g a l deductions of or daisy in 
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payment of w a g e s . T h a Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 Is the 
other Central Labour Statute operating in the state that 
contemplates determination of gratuity disputes throuc^i 
adjudicating process . Two adjudicatory authorities* namely, 
control l ing Authority (Assistant Labour Commissioner) and 
Appellate Authority (Deputy Labour Conmisaioner) functions 
under th is statute in the s tate . Control l ing Authority 
determines the disputed amount of gratuity payable t o an 
employee under the Act and disputes about admissibi l i ty of 
any claim of an ec^loyee for payment of gratuity as well as 
the disputes as to a person's r i ^ t t o rcKseive gratuity.®^ 
Deputy Labour commissioner hears appeals from the decisions 
of Controlling Authority.®* It should be noted that the 
Payment of Gratuity Act is one of the very few labour statutes 
under which in pract i ce adjudicating process operates in the 
s tate . Finally* the EqMal Remuneration Act, 1976, i^icdi i s 
a Central law and applicable t o the s tate o f J&K, provides 
yet another instance of operation of adjudicatory process in 
the s t a t e ' s labour field.®® Under th is Act, both naputy 
Labour Ccnmissioner and Assistant Labour ConMissioner have 
been vested with adjudicatory funct ions . These functions 
oonslst in hearing oonplaints about contraventions o f the 
proris ions of the Aot and deciding clelms of non-payment of 
•<|A«1 wages t o mtn and women for work of a similar natura* 
Authority t o be spec i f i ed by the government in th is b ^ a l f 
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i s t o 2i««r api^tXt f roa d « e i « l o i » of Assitftaiit tiiA S>€pm%f 
hmhear CoMilt«ioa«rs I HewtvcVy no saoli antherlty h— 1mm 
8p«e l f i «4 by SttiU to 
BoslAof Uioto lalMiir •djiiAieaterj eporatiat 
i o tli« stato of J«MMi & XMhBlr tbort aro a atwbar o f aai* 
thor l t laa andar Ttrioiia labour atatataa viiiob axayaita qaaal-
JttAloiai faaotiont with ragard to raglatvatioa of aatabllah-
Bant and lasoa and rdirocatlon , ata*| of l l aaaeaa*^ 
tJoA9t tha BoUar'a Aat| X894, ( a Stata aaaetaaa«)t 
Cblaf Xiit|)«etor graatai rafaaaat ranavsi ravok«s» ate*<o& 
tha raport of tha latpaator ) a raglatratloa ear t l f i ea ta f o r 
tha ttia of « toollar* Appaala from tha daelslona of lospaotor 
Xla to tha Chlaf Xaapactor and f roa tha or ig inal and appalXata 
ordara of tha Chlaf Znspaator to tha appaXXata authority 
appeiatad hf tha govaroMaat aadar tha Aat*. ^ Ondar ^ a 
Faetorlaa Aat» 1943 both Chlaf Xoapaator of Faatorlaa and 
goTaramant axaralaa (taaai-iadielaX faaotloaa idiiU graatlag 
o r rafaalag paralaslon to ^ a aaa of a alta f o r aoaatraatloa 
o r axtaaaioa of a faatorjr or raglatratioa or Uaaaaiog o f a 
f a a t o r y * ^ fho erdar o f tha Chlaf Saapadtar la appaaldbla 
t o tha Stata omvfamnt aad that of tha Statd Qavataftaat to 
tha caatral aovara»aat*^ tha Is lat lag raatorlaa Aatf^Mi 
l a a Cantrai lav* Xt vaa aaitaadad t o tha atata by CaatraX 
Laboar X m (txtaaaloa of M ) dat* 19f0« Xt rafXaaad tha 
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atata Factories Act, 1956. Fiiat faetoxi«a l eg is lat ion was 
enacted in the state in 1942. Under the Trade Union Aot«1928. 
Registrar (Lid:>our Comnissioner) acta in qpasi-Judicial manner 
in respect of granting, refusing* cancel l ing and 
a c e r t i f i c a t e of registration. ' '^ Decisions of Registrar 
regarding these matters are appealable t o the n i s t r i c t and 
sessions Juc'ge.'^^ The existing Central Trade Union Act»1926 
repealed the state Trade Union Act, 1950. Under Contract 
Labour (Regulation and Abolition)Aftt, 1970, Registering Of f i cer 
(Assistant Labour Commissioner) fo l lows cfaasiojudicial 
procedure while registering certain estaMishinants (as for 
eaean^le, an establishment employing contract labour) and 
revoking registration of the stfne.'^^ Appeal against the 
order of Regislitring Of f i cer l i e s t o the Labour Conmissicmer. 
Assistant Labour Ccnanissioner, being l icencing Of f i cer under 
dneL 
the Aot« grants f revokes l icences t o c<Hitraotor8 f o r «mgaglng 
lidKux on ocmtract bas is . * J ^ e a l fron the order of Liooioing 
Of f l o o r l i o s t o the Labour Comniss loner Lastly* tho Motor 
Txaasport (woidcess) Aot, 1961, empowers the pzososlbod authority 
(LiA>oax Connisslonor) t o ismae, renow, eta,# a o o r t l f i o a t o 
of registering'^BJOtor transport undertaking.^^ As stated A 
oar l los , the Aot refers t o loaklng of rulos f o r q^oolfylng 
tho authority to hoar appeals from the doeisions of Labour 
Conolsslonor. a i t i t has not boon dono so fox* 
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The adhilnistzation of labour lews In J&K stata haa 
been antrustad t o the Labour Dapartment, J&K oovernment. The 
Labour Department haa been bifurcated into two branches. 
Ona headed by tha Labour Comnlasloner and tha other by the 
Labour Secretary at the admlnistratlva level with overal l 
control lying with the Labour Minister. Labour secretary has 
hleracch'eal band of subordinate o f f i c e r s such as Deputy Labour 
Secretary* Under Secretary, etc* under him t o conduct the 
a f f a i r s of the nepartment. s imilarly . Labour Commissioner 
haa a number of subordinate o f f i c e r s l ike deputy Labour 
Commissioner, Assistant Labour Commissioner, Labour Of f i cers , 
Inspectors f or carrying out the assigned funct ions . Li^our 
CoRmissionar functions at the state l e v e l whereas Deputy 
Labour CommissdUaner at the province level (both the provinces 
o f J & K have one O^suty Iii^our Commissioner each t o discharge 
the Yasious duties assignad t o them under d i f f e rent labour 
anaotnents). Assistant Labour CQRIBISSloner* Labour o f f i c e r 
and HispeetoK function at the d l s tx i c t l e v e l . 
Both the LiOaour coBmlssioner and Labour secretary 
balong t o the cadre o f Indian Admin i s t rat iva Servlea. Th«y 
nay d i r e c t l y cone f roa Indian Administrative Serviea or Join 
tha oadra t h r o u ^ departmental proKition* Their sarvloat 
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subjeot t o truiafar t o othor goiremiB«it (tepactnmta • D^^ty 
Labour Comnisslonar la Pflpaitnoental pronotee from the xtaik 
of AaalataPt Labour Coamiasionar* Aasiatant liabaar CoRSslasiGmsr 
i s recruited t h r o u ^ competitive tcMit held by the State 
public Service Conmiaaion in vhiah labour Secretary and an 
expert in labour a f f a i r s part i c ipate • Their aervicea are 
tranaferable within the department t o d i f ferent d i s t r i c ta of 
the atate. Lab<xir o f f i oera and mapectora belong t o the 
lower cadre of the atate labour serv ice . 
Of more relevance and importance t o the present 
study are Labour comroiasioner, T eputy Labour Ccjwnissioner and 
the Assistant labour Comtnissioner, as they are the principal 
adjudicatory authorities under roost of the labour statutes in 
J5K s t a t e . L a b o i r commissioner Is primarily an appellate 
authority. Deputy LeO o^ur CoBwiasioner is both original and 
appellate adjudicatory authority. Aasiatant Labour Comnissicmer 
i s exeluaively or ig inal adjudicatory authority, and perhaps* 
the Boat lni>ortant adjudicatory functionary in the s t a t e ' s 
laboax f i « l d . 
Hifriiiih^g 
As regards the nonberahip of labour adjudicatory 
bodies under thrse labour enactments - Xhduatrial Disputea Aet, 
VforkRi«ti*s Conpenaation Act and Payment of Wages Act - whic^ 
ace ths siabjset of prsssnt investigation, loibour adjudicatlttg 
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bodies under the XMuatrial Disputes Aot (Laboux Court and 
Ihduatrial Tribunal) are manned by persons with Judic ial 
eaqperience* While those under the workm^>*s Ccxspensation Act 
and the Payment of Wages Act are operated by the o f f i c e r 8 of 
the Labour Departiv.ent having no jud i c ia l estperience or legal 
cfjialifications.^^ Thus in Jamrou & Kashmir, according t o the 
prevalent pract ice , an acting Distr ict Judge or Additional 
Distr i c t Judge i s appointed as the presiding Of f i cer of the 
Labour caaxt and m d i s t r i a l Tribunal. The same person 
presides over the proceedings of Labour Court and industrial 
Tribunal, s ince the Presiding Off icer o f the Labour Court 
and Industrial Tribunal i s from the state Judicial service* 
80 he is subject to transfer back in the parent department. 
Ls^our court and Industrial Tribunal funoti<Hi under 
the control and supervision of the H l ^ c o u r t . Hi J & K, the 
statutory provisions recjairing the appointment of two 
assessors fox advising the Sodustrial Tribunals in a procaading 
have never b«en u t i l i s e d . At pres«)t« there i s only one 
Labour Coiixt»euu»>industrial Tribunal in the s t a t e . I ts aomal 
plaow of %forkiiig i s in srinagax. It holds monthly canqp f o r 
one waak or so (d«p«ndlng upon the ease-load) at Jainnu t o 
•tfjudleacte ttpon industrial disputes ar is ing in Jtmn provino*. 
I t o a ^ t t o b « mentioned that the Laboux Court^cun-Industrial 
Tribunal* •• i t i s fanotioning at present in the stata* was 
eonatitiitad only in 1972 t h o a ^ 3tat«*8 Industrial Diaputaa Aot 
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providing foK th« •stablishnant of Ihduiatrial Tribunal i n i t i a l l y 
and then LaJsour Courts in a later staga (1956) was anaotad as 
far back as 1950. B^ore 1972* Indistr ia l disputes vara 
referred t o a Dis t r i c t Judge in i4tose jur isd ic t ion a dispute 
arose, rianifestly* the state ^tavernment ooranitted a grave 
lapse of inordinate delay in the establishment of separate 
Labour court and Industrial Tribunal. A probable causa for 
this appears t o be that the number of industrial disputes 
arising in the state during l950-s and i960 s was cSiyiiiS.i ' 
On the other hand, both Deputy Labour Convnissioner 
and the Assistant Labour Conmissioner have been designated as 
authority under the Payment of Wages Act as well as Cogmissioner 
under the Workmen• s condensation Act . In actual practice* 
Assistant Lak>aur Comnissionar mostly discharges ndjudicatory 
funatixms undar both the above noted enactments. Deputy 
An 
Labour Ceiasissionar, as i t i s , act6 as j[authority and Coranissionar 
undar the Pmymtmt of Wages Act and workman's Conpansation Act 
raspactivaly at province l e v e l . Kovsvar* i t i s not c lear 
as t o why thasa two o f f i c e r s of the L^our Department (ona 
subordinate to the other) have hmasa invested with the 
ooneurrant jur isd ic t ions At timas# i t baconassauxea o f 
confusion and c l a ^ in ragasd to jur isd ic t ions of these two 
o f f ioars and )aonsa(|UiantXy» ^ ^ leads t o delay in l^a disposal 
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of it olaln In qa^stion. This is not a far-fotchad idaa but 
a. reality.®^ 
J«dC L«bois servica (Gaaatttad Rilas) do not 
proHiCribe any legal c i ial i f icatlons f o r na)cing th« appoiiitment 
of Assistant l<abaur Ccnasiaaloner or Doputy Labour Connisaionar. 
Requisite qtial i f lcations as speci f ied f o r appointing thosa 
o f f i c e r s are that candidate must be a graduate and have a 
Master's degree in soe la l and Labour Welfare. According t o 
the prevailing pract ice in the state, these qual i f icat ions 
are not being complied with. While sorae o f the Assistant 
Labour Comnissicmers possess the requisite qual i f icat ions 
laid down for their recruitment, others do not possess afven 
82 itiinlmuni qual i f icat ions f o r the appointment. 
Assistant and Deputy Labour COBnissioners have 
been appointed as adjudicatory author i t under the Payment 
Of Wages Act and the worXmen's cooaponsaticm Aot only after 
1972. Previously, Dsputy Conraiasioner o f the ooneerned 
d i s t r i c t was acting as authority under the Payjnent of Wage* 
Aot a^s well as Coraroissloner under the worlcnan *a CoRrpensation 
Act, This was inspite of the fact that the Worknan's 
Cenpensation Act was enacted in the state as early as 1942 
and the Payment of Wages Act in 1956. Thia ocaidusness towards 
oonstitution of separate maohinery o f se t t l ing disputes and 
olalns under these tvo statutes i s insMCusable, as these 
snadtiraBts envisaged speedy detesninatlon of the Uboar olalas. 
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Dopity Comisalonar b«ing hMviXy burdattttd with nu l t i fax loas 
c e spons ib i l l t i a s and duties* could h«va baan hardly a 
suitable foruM f o r the datetmlnation o f labour easaa. 
A word naada t o ba said conoaming the anaolunents 
o f labour adjudicatory authorit ies while disouaalng coopos i t lon 
o f these bodies* The eroolumenta of the Presiding O f f i c e r s o f 
the Labour court and Industrial Tribunal are by and large 
lucrat ive and t o the ir sa t i s fac t i on .^^ A newly appointed 
Presiding O f f i c e r of the Labour Coirt and Industrial Tclbtinal 
dra%ia more than rupees 2 ,000 / - depending upcm his length o f 
serv i ce as D i s t r i c t Judga or /vc'dttional Dxatrict Judge. But 
in s tr ik ing contrast t o t h i s , the l o t of adjudicatory 
authorit ies under the Payment of Wages Act and the v^orlonen's 
OOB^ansatlon Act i s extremely miserable in t h i s regard. 
Assistant Labour Ccsnmlssioner has been placed In the grade 
o f Gs.450 • 9S0 and his s tart ing salary i s about i&.TOO/- p.n). 
Inoludlng a^X allowances. These emoluments are hardly 
aCiHiisnaux«t« wlttt the status and nature of dutlaa «ntrusted 
t o an adjudicatory authority . This i s par t i cu lar ly so in 
o « f a o f an adjudleatory body, l i k e conmlssloner f o r workmen's 
dcMpanaatlon bafoca iihan a claim f o r compensation Involvaa 
thoasands o f nipaas. A poor ly paid o f f i c e r may e a s i l y f a l l 
pxoy t o t « t>tat io i i In auoh oixaurastances 
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VttxiJLy th« pxoooAtze folloirad by an «djU(9io«toxy 
body in its Omaimim * mailing lftxg«ly d«t«niilnes its uti l ity 
and wttimmsf* Tha Mia alaboxata and femal tha prooaduxa 
of an adjiidloaitiiiv body* tha aoxa taxdy and aapanaiva will 
bo dooloionol o a ^ t « and oonao^iont^y' tha laaa will ba ita 
aoe^ptatoility • «t loaot In ouch ^axtara lAiara prompt Jaatioa 
is an ladispoBsablo nooaosity* Comraxooly* tha now ooneiaa 
and sliqpio axo psoooAtxal ro^iraoants to ba eaq>liod with 
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by th€ ftdjndiettory bodies f th« !«•• will b« t iM sptut la 
aailMtog M i f l o a s by t!i«B« 
if««dl«ss to stfttOf the n««d for qal«k dMltloni is 
fliost Ini^eratlvf In tiie Ixidastrial field* This i i to 
the dosirtibility and orgoiioy of providing roliof to th« 
poor and n««dy worker roadiljr* It is also necessiteted 
bf tbe expedieney of averting eonflagration of indnstrial 
eoofllets nfoleh would inevitably erupt if the settlenent 
of industrial disputes is deferred indefinitely or for an 
undKly long period* Zn this ehapter thus it is proposed 
to exaoine the proeedurel reftuirenents observed by the 
labour adjodieating bodies and the results of the res-
ponses given by the respondents regarding the procedure 
of labour ad^udieating bodies based on m statiatieal 
survey oondueted as a part of this study* 
Prf|.i«inaCT »attera 
Under the Industrial Disputes Aet, XM? » three 
types of esses ere taken before the Lsbour Court and 
Xndastriel Tribunal for edjwdleetioB* rirstf eases refer* 
red to ^ the govenuMat oader 8e«Uoae (10) * 18(ft) of the 
net* Seeoadlyi eases involving setioa egeiast evpleyees 
with the approval of Itstoour Cou^t or ladastriel 7tibiiaelt 
•s the ease aay be* daring the peadeaey of disputes for 
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«djudlGa«lon ( sw. 33, mdamttimX DispatM Aat). L«itXy, 
ecnplaints filod toy moKTmrn xalating t o action takan against 
tham in contronrontlon of the provisioxis of sac. 33 xindar 
Saotion 33-A o f tha SndistriaX Dlaputas Act. Baaldaa* a 
1/abour Court i s a lso ooopatant t o datermlna the amount o f 
monoy duo t o an aniployae in a given casa o f t o deteriBlna tha 
anount of nonoy for a benef it available t o a workman on the 
presentation of an application for the aaiMi.l 
Quest Ions al>out the prooeaira and pract ice before 
the Labour court and Aidbatrial Trllaunal are governed by the 
provisions of the Indaatrial Disputes Act as well as by the 
Industrial Diaputas (J&K state) Rules, 197^. m reference 
cases vhlch fono most v i t a l part of adjudicatory worX under 
the ZtadastriaX Disputes Act, m i s t r i a l Tribunal or Ziabour 
Court do not have d irect jur isd ic t ion , i . e . * unless Labour 
DopastMant rafars a case for adjudication, these bodies 
osnaot talca oogniaanea of the disiMte. Referanca dlaputas 
asa of tuo types i firat, those disputes wiiidhii after tha 
•ilMBiMioii of faJLlttsa saport by the ConoUiation Officas 
mMm xafaxsad by the Xi^ boax Dapaxt«ent for adjttdicationf 
•aoand^ those diaputas vhioh tha partiaa voluntarily by 
agxoaaant gat rafaxraA by tha Libeur DapaxtMent fox 
•djttdioation.^ wben the paftiaa to a dispute agxae fox 
xafaxanoa of a diapute, an ipplicMXtlon in roxn A haa to bo 
•ubnittad by thaii <a«vaz«lly ox oollaotivaly) to fShm qovonMiant 
fox this puxpoaa. sum mplUtt^im ou^^t to oantalii tha 
O o 
paxtlctalacs mxoh mm paxtiva involvad in tha disputa* 
o f diaput«M3 nattmca, noinbar of workora wpioyad 
in th« landortaking in <|ii«ition« th« nuobeK of woxkoss 
af feotod by the d i ^ u t a and tha a f forta nada by partiaa to 
aattla diaputa mutually.^ AXthough tha mduatrial Diaputaa 
Act aonfaxs po«iar on tha Laboux Dapaxteent t o maka xafaxanea 
of a dispute fox adjudication as soon as i t appxahands tha 
occurrence of such dispute or on i t s occurcenca« in actual 
pxaotioa* nutual a f foxts of tha pmxtLmm t o adjust disputes 
themselves or e f f o r t s of the Conciliation o f f i c e r t o bring 
about conpxonise between parties ougjht t o esdiauat before a 
dispute i s xafaxrad by the govemraant.^ Oa the other hand« 
in i^pxoval and oonaplaint cases as va i l as the cases xequixing 
daterrainaticm of money due t o an avployae by the l^aboux Court, 
pxooass of xafaxanea making haa baen Obviated. Appxoval oasas 
oan be put into tiwe olasaas - the oasas in which onqployaxs 
have t o saotxa paxniasion o f tha Labour coaxt ox mduatxial 
Txibunal pxi»f t« tha astioii to be tak«n# and those in which 
hava t» aaak approval of tha Laibotix Coiixt ex 
IMttatxlal Txibttnal f«x aotion alsoady taken by him 
•gainst an a^ployaa,' Zn tha fixst typa of oaaaa* i»a,# 
easM in which m l^&rmtm mxm xaifiixaA to aaak pxiox paxaiaaioB 
fox intended aotion againat «n «Bl«pyoa« an application in 
roxM J in tsiplioata is to ba siOaaittoA to the Laboax Couxt 
ox Txibanal* fii addition* the aa^loyax has to f i l a aa Many 
.5' 
oopios of fl|>plio«tloii ttm th«x« mxm opposit* p u t l M , * The 
oases In vhloh mploy^t needbthe appzcRraX of Lebokix Coiart 
iiken 
ot Industrial Tribunal f o r the action already has t o present A 
an Implication in t r l p l i o a t e In *Fom A* before the Ijabour 
Court or Industrial Tribunal, further* along with the 
cqpplioaticm* eiiq[>lcyer i s t o sutanit the copies of application 
7 for a l l the opposite part ies connected vithj^disputer<>' 
As t o coinplaints which may be made under Sec. 33-A 
of the Xn^str ia l Disputes Act for the infringement o f the 
provisions of sec . 33, they are t o be f i l e d in.Form I* Besides^ 
the coR^laint nust contain the copies in t r i p l i c a t e f o r a l l 
a 
the opposite part ies . Tot t^e purpose of conputing the 
anount of a benef it which i s dae t o an mployee 
from an «i^loyer# the employee ^ a l l have t o apply in 'Form K^' 
before the Labour court for the determination of the said 
•IBOUIIT. ' 
Proeedure followed for the detemination of 
disputed oei^ pensaitioo claims of %iorknen against their •Mployexs 
undM WBrloMii's CoH^ensation Act has been pxoirld«d in the 
li»xlOMii*s CflHpsnactien Rules, 1973, enaeted by the state 
ammxmmmtrn MB ipplicMtion for settling a disputed elaiii to 
ooqismtttioB is to be presented to the CcBnissloner by the 
Hiplioaiit ms Ilia dspendwt. The said aipplioatlon eu^t to be 
•ade in daplioate and mmy be presented eithes in pexson os hf 
jregisteced pmtm The vpiioatieo should be mwniHied hf a 
eertifleattt* bearing the slgnatuca of the applioant* th«t 
the statement of faots acmtalned in I t Is aecuxate t o the 
beat of appXioant's knowledge and beXief.^^ An appXloation 
f o r the olaln for compensation, matig other particulars whioh 
may be prescribed, mist ocntain the foXXowingt (a) a br ie f 
statement of the cizoumstances in which the oppXication i s 
made and the re l i e f or order s c u ^ t by the appXicant;(b) the 
date of the service of not ice on the employer against %^ om 
application is made, and in case of fa iLire t o serve such 
notice or the fa i lure t o serve notice in time, the reasons 
for auch fa i lure / (c) names and addresses of the partiesf and 
(d) a br ie f stat«nent sett ing out the matters connected with 
the claim on which the agreement by the parties has bean 
reached and the matters in relation t o which parties were 
unable t o cone t o agrevnent.^^ further, i f the oppXicant i s 
iXXiterate or for any other reasons unid»Xe t o fuimiah the 
reqpilslte infonoaitlon in writing, the application nay be 
px«l>ar«d ttBtex the d i rec t ion of the ccmnlss loner in 
•oo^sdaiuM with the wiiili of the appl leant 
Frooedure for dlapoeal of coiqpXalnts regarding 
IXXegaX daducttlons f soi weges or deXay tuide in the Payment of 
Nbgas Is pxe«exlb«A In the Paynent of wages Aot and in the 
PayMt of l«a«M RuXee, X972, framed by the JCdC oovemnent. 
Ml aggrlered either by IXXegaX deduotions ttm wegea 
or doX^r o«i*od In the pafent of wogea to hla la xoqalrod to 
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apply in th« pxaaezib^d form b«foxo the authority appointed 
f o r thXa purpose.^^ A legal praotltloner or of£lel4a. o f m 
registered trade union or &ispeator appointed under the 
Paynent of Hages Act or any other person acting with the 
permission of the mthor i ty i s also entit led t o make conplaint 
on bdlal f of the aggrieved worker.^^ If in a particular case 
in a factory or an indaatrial oatabliaYanaPt more than one 
worker have been af fected by delay in the paym^t of wages« 
a single application sett ing forth the c lains of a l l of them 
nay be made.^^ 
Preliminary Bars to Juri'^f^iction and 
^ ^ ^Pf Cqgp^qipg Psogga^pnqsi 
Prelininary bars t o the start of adjudicating 
proceedings in Xjabour natters spec i f i ca l l y anoanate frona the 
relevant statutory p r o v i s i c ^ . The most conspicuous 
inhibition f o r the in i t iat ion of adjudicating proceedings foe 
se t t l ing Indhtstrlal disputes under the Industrial Disputes 
Act i s In XMpeet of ritference disputes. This restricticm 
stons from the fac t that a Labour Court or industrial Tribunal 
oannoft adjudieate on a referenee dispute unless i t is referred 
for adjudication by the Labour Departiaent. Moreover, the 
Industrial Disputes Aot provides for varied net-work of 
dispute s«ttl«iient machinery t o be adopted for resolving 
Indbstrlal disputes. Zt csonslsts of works c o m l t t e e , 
ConolllatloB Qffloerf Board of conc i l ia t ion , court of EnqMilry, 
C O 
Axbitxation* Labour Court «nd industrial TriJaunal. Thasa 
dispute set t l ing fonins are not intended t o discharge their 
functions in hierarchical fashion in the sense of one under 
the control and supecvision o f j^other* But in pract i ce a l l 
these agemsies do not engaqe thamselves simultaneously in 
resolving a dispute* Thus* i t is sett led pract ice that 
Laboar Department refers a dispute for adjudication only 
a f ter the fai lure of Concil iation Of f i cer t o bring about 
agreenent between the disputants* Jxi fact« the esdiaustion 
of c (» io l l iat ion e f f o r t s before refer«moe roaHing is implied 
in the statutory provisions also.^® 
The v/orkmen's Compensation Act* 1923« izaposes 
cartain preliminary procedural restr ic t ions as well as 
[Qpecific time^liinit regarding inst itut ion of claims for 
condensation before the Cooiniasioner • An aggrieved eniployee 
intending t o f i l e an applioation f o r h i s claim before 
Conraissionar oust serve notice of accident (giving r i se t o 
cause of action) vam the en^Xoyer* This application ou#«t 
to be fi led within the period of two years from the date 
of aocident or death. Howwrer* if the CoHiiasionef finds 
that failure to give a notice or prefertclain within the 
specified timeies due to ouffleient dause (as for exM^le# 
whm eaployer had knowledge of the oecidient f roa somo aouroe* 
«boonoo of notice shall not bar the entertainnent of^olaiM) 
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ConBl«sion«r nay «ntext«ln th« olain and d«oid« th« 
An «9gri«irttd voxk«x sha l l not hm s n t l t l « d t o oQ^paRsction i f 
th« Injury In <]iia8tion doos not oocaslon t o t a l or part ia l 
diaablenant f o r mora than thraa days or ifhsn injury has baan 
oauaad under tha infXuanoe of drink or drug or whan v i l f u l l y 
ignoring an ordar or rula dasignad t o seoura safaty o f tha 
worker.^® 
Undar the Paynant of wages Aot# the worker aggrieved 
by the untenable daduetions from hia wages or delay made in the 
payment o f his wag<» has t o n)ake;V>Plicatic»i within one year 
from the date o f deduction or date o f delay before the 
Authority, Aa a i^l i cat ion submitted beyond the period of 
one year w i l l be entertained only i f s u f f i c i e n t ceuse i s 
shovm by the applicant f o r the delay.^^ 
I t has baan noted above thatj^clain application i s 
f i l e d by the applicant along with - ^ copy of the application 
fox tha opp<»9ite party with the concerned adjudicating body. 
After subBoission of applioation by tha a|»plio«nt« i t baooMS 
tha duty o f tha adjudicating body t o serve tha copy of tha 
• ^ l i o a t i o n upon the apposite party* Adjudicating liodiaa 
under xaferance have prooaos servers f o e tha t a ^ . Xn placMS 
naax in distance* sasvieaa of iMCooass sarvA ara u t i l i « a d f o x 
sgnding notices* atto. But in far o£t plaeas not leas axe sant 
througli ragiatarad peat with aolvioirladgsnaRt dua^ as tha 
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gcnraxiSBant do«s not pxoirlila f o r t rave l l ing allonanoas fox 
th« pxoa«0S 8«xv«zs, In aotual pcaotiea« adjudloating 
authority a f tar ths racaipt of application Immediately issues 
notloea in prascrlbad f o m a t o the part ies (a copy of the 
e^licaticm/cscMqp'J^lnt, i s a lso sent with the not ice t o the 
respondent) t o a(>pear before i t within about f i f t e e n days 
period in ocsuieotion with the case* This period of fiftmmn 
d&ponAing 
days can be increasad or decreased/Upon the individual 
circuiQstancas of tha case* This Is the posit ion regarding 
service o f application under the Workmen's Compensation Aet« 
the Pa3^ent of Wages Act as wel l as with regard to approval 
and complaint cases under tho Industrial Disputes Act . 
As regards reference cases« %dthln tha period of 
two weeka o f the date of racei^^t o f referenoe# labour Court 
or the Industrial Tribunal c a l l s upon the concernAd \M>r3aMua 
or workman t o make statement of demands befoxa i t . Tha said 
time l imi t may be extended or raduced t o one week in atnexgMnt 
ih 
eaaaa fox xaiwons in writing in the disexation of Tribunal 
ox th« Laboux Couxt. Further* t h i s t ina l imit f o r f i l i n g 
ataftflOMRt of danands may be xaduead ox tha vaxy xaciuixamant 
o f f i l i n g tha atatanant may ba dispafisad with i f both tha 
paxtiaa nalca an agxaanant t o that a f f a o t . Tha party making 
atatanant o f donanda has t o sand a copy o f that t o tha 
paxty. Aftax the xaoelpt o f statement of danands by tha 
Labflttx Couxt ex Txibunal^ tha ottiax paxty i s obligad t o f i l a 
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cajoinder or written statonemt. Respcmaint Is ceqdiirad t o 
submit rejoindar within t%ro wooks of tha sulomission of 
statamant o f d€«aanda by the (applicant before the Tribunal 
or LeUxMr court . This period of two weeks nay be enhanced 
or short^ed by the Labour Court or Tribunal or by the 
parties by agreement in l i k e manner in which the period of 
two weeks can be extended or decreased in case of f i l i n g 
o f daroands statement* as ^ vn&v^ iiovstj^  above. 
Ef forts f or mtual Settlement 
m perauance of the notice when the part ies appear 
before an adjudicating authority» the i n i t i a l e f f o r t s of the 
authorityCas part o f g ^ e r a l practice) would be aimed at 
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bringing aboutj^con^proroise betwe^ the par t i e s . Adjudicating 
authorit ies in the labour f i e l d are generally inclined in 
favour of mutual settlementi of dis^utws or claims by the 
par t i e s . Xt i s so becaase, apart from the higher j u d i c i a r y ' s 
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«D|>haai«'* on outual aafttlaroent of labour disputes* there i s 
ganesal notion that only m caaq^ronisQ sattlamant can pac i fy 
both tha parties in « kmI aansa baaidas bringing about tha 
dlflputa t o «n instantanaous and. Thartdfora* i t i s but natural 
that at tha very outaat on tha prasantation of a claim bafora 
tha adjudloating authority f o r adjudioatlon* i t makaa ganuina 
andaanroura t o induoa tha part ies for xaaohing an agraamant. 
adjudieating forum would l ike t o bring hone 
A 
diatsuot lv« oons«K|i«notts ( l i ke delay* o to« ) of l i t i g a t i o n t o 
the parties* so that they be goaded into oonlng t o an 
22 agxeenant • 
X£ the part ies f a l l t o arr ive at a con^romise in 
the dispute and ins i s t on going ahead with the adjudicating 
proceedings* ncff:-cspplioant i s reqi ired t o sabnit written 
statofoant forthwith, t^ny a t ine reapond^t seeks two or 
three adjourmnonts be fore p r e s w t i n g his re jo inder . This 
may be part of his alcw Bjoving strategy in the exasporattvi^) 
and Icmg process of l i t i g a t i o n , i t also gives an Inkling of 
casualness with which he reacts t o s e t t l i n g a dispute \/ith 
a workman t h r o u ^ an external agency outside the boundaries 
of industrial »stablishincant. F i l ing o f written statoment i s 
an i iq^rtant ooiapocient o f adjudicating proc« i s « Failure t o 
f i l e w r i t t « i s ta tenwt i s f r a u ^ t with serious adverse resul ts 
f o r the respondont* for* i f he does not turn up t o esq^lain 
his i n a b i l i t y t o Aibnit written stateroent* the authority 
pxeeeeda eso-parte and gives an ^ p a x t e award, saoh ex-parte 
awards nay be reviewed by the author i t ies i f given under the 
P9^mmt of Wages Met and the workmen conpansatlon Act* but an 
e»-paxM deoielfln i s f i n a l under the industrial D i ^ t e Aet 
« • thec« i s no provision under th i s Act or the rules 
f ooMlated thexeuiMSex whiBh enables an Industrial Tribunal or 
thtt Labour court t o r«vlew i t s cnm d e c i s i o n s T h « o c t a n t s 
o f the rejoinder nainly relate t o the grounds on wliioh the 
non-^pplioant intcoids t o res ist the claim f i l e d against him. 
I f i t contains some pxeliininary objecticms concerning the 
maintainability o f c la in application* as for example* 
application being time barred or lack of jurisdicticsi o f 
the adjudicating withority to decide the disputed claim, i t 
sets in 7 paral le l exercise of adjudication entai l ing 
hearing evidence and eucguments and decisicMn and then appeal 
or writ yitiBt&v&x is available in the High Court or D is t r i c t 
court . This qpportunity afforded by the adjudicatory process 
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would be rarely roissed by a resourceful and cunning employer. 
Obviously* i t cuts at the vary root o f labour adjudicating 
procedures which were s p e c i f i c a l l y designed t o decide 
labour disputes c|iickly and inexpensively. 
f Fipli^ff 91? 
Frcroing of ismies ccxnstitutes another jjnportant 
stage in the aidjudlcating proceedings^ for* a f ter the 
f o r m l a t i o n of issues* rest of the adjudicating process ia 
confined t o the determination of issues apao i f i ca l ly fomulated , 
Having gone throii«|h the pleadinga o f the part ies (plaint md 
wsitten tttatwseiit}* the •djudioatlng bodies cause the issues 
o f » « t «x i « I . pxqpeaition of f a c t s and law t o be fr«Bed. 
While the Monotsn's CoBpsnsstlon Hiles s p e c i f i c a l l y provids 
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for %hm fonMa«tloia of noltlior tiio loAiistrial 
Oicpiitot M and BoI«i nor tho PajrMat of wagM M maA 
Riilos m«k« afqr tueki provialoa* Tliaraforoi tha proaaOara 
providad ttodar tha ClTil Frocadara Code is gaaaraIXy app* 
Xiaabla to tbla part of adjadieatlac procaadlaga aader tba 
XadaatrlaX Olapataa Aat aad tha Paynaat of wagaa Aat« It 
la aeaaviiat straaga to aotloa that avaa If a partiaalar 
procadaraX proirlaXoa of civi l Prooadura Code la aot «ada 
apaelfieally appXlaahla to tlia daalsloanialdlag by tlia la* 
boar adjudleatlag 1iodlaa» thasa aathorltlaa apply It wblla 
•aklaf dael8loaa« Ita laavltabla raaalt la that laboar ad* 
Jadlcatlns aathorltlaa oftaa latrodaaa proaadaral taohal*' 
ealltlaa of O I T I I ooartaf tharaby aagatlag tha Tary adraa* 
tagaa for which thay hava ba«i eraatad* 
Ktridanao 
Laboar aaaetaaata irtiieh ara aabjaat of tha praaaat 
lanraatlgatloa hava aada ahatahy aad gaaaral provlaloaa ragar* 
dlat Iba takiag of avldaaaa by tha adjadleatlag bodlaa* Thaaa 
aaaetaaata vaat tHa aaaa p m r la adjadlaatlag aathorltlaa 
fttMtleolJig «aAat thaa to raaalTa arldaaaa aad aaferoa tha 
attaadaaaa Oif any paraoa aa vltaaaa or prodaatloa of a do* 
a«naat aa O I T H ooarta poaaaaa la raapaat of thalr daal* 
alatt-aaklag**^ 
Thara la ao hard aad faat mXa aa to tha prodadtlim 
aad raaaptlea of doaaaaatary avldaaaa la aappert of «i ai^ p* 
lloatlan or aXala or for oomtarlag aa appUaat&oa of 
> t 
9lmim • XtHtoat •djndloatiiig body* An appXlOMt mwf 
sntalt do«a««Qtt fapportlnc hit «X«la mt tb« %%am of 
sontatioB ef bis •pplloatloa or rabsoqnmtly tft«r tli« i t s -
ti«s ht?« li««Q fraatd* SioHurXy r«spoiid«iii ••a 
prodae* doeuMiits •gaiost th« ftppXlofttidii f l U d agaiatt hlji 
ml tb« tint of pr«»«Qtiz}g hit vrlttan ftatcmaiit or at a la* 
tar «tas« whan tha partlas ara r«qiilrad to dlseharga tha 
oniia of proof eoneeriiiiig iasaea asalgnad to than* Howarari 
i t taaa baooMa auatoaary now that partlaa addaea thalr doott* 
maotary aa wall aa oral aridanoa aftar tlia fonmlatioa ef 
iaaeaa* It ia aa aatabliahad praitlaa tbati la tha f lrat 
iaataaaa« appHaaat la givaa oppertaalty to prodaea doaonaata 
and hit vrltnaaaas aad aftar tha ooaplatlon of avldanaa by tha 
appllcariti* opponent aabmlta hit doeOBants and wltaaaaaa ia 
sapport «»f hla aoataatloa* 
0aaarall7i parties bring witaaaaaa oa thair ova i aad 
wfaaa thay f a i l to do ao, thay aaaara witaaaa ordar froa tha 
aathority aftar dapMitiag aa a m a t to aaat ^ a aaaaaaary 
axpaaaas of tha witaaaaaa* Oa aartaia oaaaaioaat aa for axaa* 
pl«» wHaa taam a»»liaaat ia t M poor, adiadiaatiat anthoritlaa 
•haw a MMNi aoaaidarata and baaavolaat a t t l M a aad wiait tha 
plaaa af W99k raaidaaaa to axaaiaa witaaaaaa thara«>^ How* 
awat, thia praetiaa ia aera ^araetaristia of adjadlaatiiit 
aathoritiaa aadar tha Faymat of Wmgaa Aat aad tha tarloMaU 
Caapaaaatiott Aat thaa of adjadiaatiag foraaa aadar tha Zadaa* 
tr ia l Diaptttaa Aat**^ 
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TIst prM«l«« of •xMilninc ca4 txMilaiac 
«ilA«ti«s is ttw sMM M t^UmmA in eivU • w l , 
wh«ii • party predBe«s • «lta«tf to sapport his o«it«t 
6h« oth«r party ic aatltlaA to oroat txaMlna tbat wit* 
iiasa* Vban betb tlia partUa flnlali thai? aTi4aQea» thay 
ara ganaralXy allo««4 to naka eloalnc atatamaata oa avl* 
daaoe addaaad by thaa* Farthari tt la aXanaatary that 
whlla tba Xaboiir adjudlcatiag liodlaa follow tlia pattara 
of elvlX eoarta la ragard to taklag of avldanaa, thay 
do aot follov tha atrlet and taehaleal raXaa of tha Za* 
dlaa Srldeaoa Aet*^* 
i T g w q t i 
At tha eoaelualoa of avldaaoe, tha parties ara 
iQvltad to argae with raapaat to thalr raspaatlva ooa* 
taatloaa* UaaaXly, appXleaat ai^Xoyaa gata flrat opp-
ortaalty to aahiiit argtiaaata* Hla argoaaata ar« 
foXXowtii by thoaa of tha raapoadeat a^pXoyar* Arga* 
•aata of tha partlaa oaght to aoaalat of OMnaatary oa 
tha anrldaaoa taadavod by thaa aad Its approaiatloa to 
proira thalr faataaX aaaartloaa* fartloa aXao aako aab* 
alaaioa oa aay polat of Xaw iblah thay waat to ba ooa* 
aidarod by tha adjadloatlag authority* Xa aapport of 
thoit tabBlasioat . profaaoXy alto daolaloaa of 
hlfhor Jadlolaiy (ooaalatiag of High Coarta aad tiM 
saprano Coort}* 
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The deolslon of the edjudlcating aithoclty i s 
noKinally given within about f i f t e e n days time after the 
o lose of argumtfits. Raiely« i s a deeiaion given on the date 
of the f inishing of arguments.^^ 
NoedlcMis t o mention^ the labcur adjudicating 
authorties being qpiaS^i-Judicial bodies, give their decisions 
in object ive manner. Their decisions are based on the 
roetarials on record, and they cannot incorporate their 
personal whiflis an<^  fancies or extraneous ccmsiderations in 
their dec is ions . 
They m s t c lear ly state the rules of law on 
whidi their decisions are based. Similarly, their conclusions 
of f a c t s must necessarily be rested on the evidence adduced 
and must not take into consideration evidence not produced 
before them. Further, these o u ^ t t o be finding on ea<^ 
of the issues of facts fraiBed and reasons fox making 
aiieh findings. 
I ' . labour adjudicating bodies give (and ought to) 
•dcqfuite ceasona £ox thelz deoislons. The need t o give 
SMOBS foe deolalens arises prlntaxUy from the fact that 
de«l«leiia ax« Mibjeot to i^peal and writ jurisdiction of 
lii#i«K jtiAialaxy. Xn imat, hl|^ex judiciary's wpp^l^m and 
ifilt ^fledietieBe in XidMus Matters serve asTnotlvatlng and K 
tnmmUrm immt fo i 0m ItitmE adjodleatlng bodlMi to give 
0 
r«Men«d ittdpi«iitt mippertcA follsr •viAcne* on rMori* 
cottnt ttajft otiMr»ls«i pMs stritliirM acftlnst 
«li«s« autliaritUt*^^ St*ta%oi7 proYlaleaa May alte aid^ a 
i t ebllfstory en adjudlefttiiic aatliorltits to sp«lX out 
rcMoas for th«lir decisions* Xt is satfilisitlT so in 
ssss ef sdJaOiestini sutlidritiss itii4«jr tbs Fsyssat ot 
Wsgss Aet fliad tlis WorkMo's Cmp»n»Moa Aet*^^ 
An sdjudiesting authority a! ong with its dseisioa 
•ay also pass an ordar raqniring a party to pay eoata* 
fha XadastrisX Oispatas Ealas hava U a i t ^ ths 
ttanhar of adjotamaants to thraa that eaa ba graatad to a 
party to ths proesadings bafors Lahoar Coart or ZadastrisI 
frihaasX* Thasa Balss also Xiait ths psriod of an adjoa* 
ranaat to savaa days* Ths LsJioar Coart sad XadastrisJi 
fwUmnwX sray sapevsrsd to grant adjoannants to a party 
•«rs thaa thrsa ia HWrtiar or an sdioaraasat loagor than 
siffaa days aftsr rssordlag raasoas la writing for tHa 
• m m ^ la •oattsat to tha Xadastrtsl oispatas fialas, tfes 
ffoftosa's CavpsasstioB aOsa hava gaaa s t i U farlftar ia 
as thay 
raapaat of spaody disposal of a sa^poasatioa s ls i« /ra^irs 
diapasal ^ aas^paasatiaa aasa ia oaa haaring only* Xf^hov 
•vovt Caasissioaar is aaihla to disposa of s slaisk ot . oaa 
liaariagiha shaU hato to rocard raasoas for ths postpoaaaant 
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of thtt hearing.^^ Alt^ou^ th« Payment of Wages Act or the 
tulles made under i t do not expreasely lay down any statutory 
l imitation on the number of hearings or adjournments that 
may be permitted in a oase* in an indirect manner i t emphasises 
the need for imnediate disposal of the case . On the 
entertainm^ant of the explication* the parties are required to 
appear with necessary documents and witnesses on the date 
apecifi€K3 in not ice . If the employer or his representative 
f a i l s to c^pear on the spec i f ied date* ^ e mthor i ty may 
decide the case e»>parte. Similarly i f the jEiq[>plicant f a i l s 
to be present cai the date so spec i f i ed , the Authority may 
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dismiss the s^pliaation. Thefse provisions c lear ly require 
urgent disposal of applications for the delayer? wages or for 
i l l e g a l deduction of wages. 
Statutory req^ir^nent as t o adjournments and 
their duration notwithstanding* lab<Kir adjudicating authorities 
f l out these legal inhibitions in'^most f a c i l e and b l i s s f u l 
manner whdULa adjudicating on labour matters. It i s rather 
IneonoaiViibla that a labour case may get disposed of within 
two or three hearings and within the statutory l imit of three 
•djoummaiits to a party. One shudders whan one lotiks at the 
flpcKstaola of labour adjudicating authorities granting 
•djounwents in many eases between 20 and 30 and in some 
oases as many as 100 and more. I t brings t o the f o re the 
faot that how f rag i l e mtm the l eg i s la t ive Injunotiona and 
how £ax*off they xamalA tsom their profasaad goal or ob joot ive . 
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As w i l l be seen tnoca f u l l y later on« granting of adjournments 
by the labour adjudicating authorities with ease and in l i ^ t -
hearted manner has indeed made labour adjudicating mechanisin 
counter-productive and« as a result^ rendered i t unsuitable 
for the task (ciaick disposal of labour matters) f or which i t 
was or iginal ly devised, 
ffffPJFQ^ent^tigp Bafor^ Adjqdi«?atipg Aajbhoffiti^g 
Drafters of labour legis lat ion <^pear t o have 
exercised l i t t l e circuinspectlcm in avoiding contradictions 
among the prov i s iws of d i f f e rent labour statutes concerning 
similar Important matters. One such subject of ccmtradictory 
provisions under d i f ferent labour statutes relates t o 
r^resentation before various labour adjudicating authorit ies . 
Thus, while the Dfidastrial Disputes Act bars f r ee legal 
repres^tat ion before the Labour Court* Indastrial aribunal 
or National Tribunal* the Payment of Wages Act and the 
wor)aaen*3 Compensation Act permit appearance of lawyers 
freely before tha adjttdiaatlng tuthorities constituted under 
tham. In a psoeaading b«for« a Labour Court or Indbstrial 
TxDoanal or Kational Tribanal a workman %*io ia a party to 
tha prooaeding and ia mambar of ^ragiatarad union is entitled 
A 
to ba xapraaantad by an off iaial of that traAa union* or by 
an off icial of federation of uniona to which his union ia 
affiliatod. Whara the wortaRaii|p«^ ^ prooaading . ia 
not a member of a union, ha antitlad to be 
/ 
repreaanted by «n o f f i c i a l of any union connected with his 
indkistxy or by any otiier workman eiqployod In that industry. 
On the other hand« an employer* party t o the proceeding and 
a member o£ aa^oclatlon of en^loyers can be represented by 
an o f f i c e r of that association or by an o f f i c e r of federation 
of e m p l o y e r a s s o c i a t i o n s t o which his association i s 
a f f i l i a t e d . A party t o an adJadlGating proceeding under the 
Industrial Dispute Act is not allowed t o be represented by a 
legal practitioner unless the c o n s ^ t of other party and leave 
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of the Labour Court or Tribunal has b e ^ obtained. It 
should be noted that i f the parties t o the dispute have agreed 
t o appear through lawyer, permission of the Labour c a i r t or 39 
Industrial Tribunal becomes only perfunctifrry. Further, 
prohib i t io i Imposed on the appearance of lavryer;before a 
Labour court or Industrial Tribunal works in favour of 
omployer t o the d e t ^ i n e n t of disputant worlcman or worlcmen. 
I t i s so because «n individual smployer or enplc^er companies 
can wuiily snpXoy lawyers as their o f f i c e r s %iho can represent 
then in adjudioatlng proo«edings. This eaqpedient cannot be 
resected to by the ifosknan or worXmen. fan^loyers are not 
infrequiently Baking use of th i s ^ d&vtee. t o defeat the 
object o f amo, 36(4) of ensuring O|»postunity t o parties 
on^e^Aal foot ing t o saouxe jus t i ce ftcm the Labour Court or 40 XDdAstrlal TrltunaX. 
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In a proc«adlng befoxe the Authority under th« 
Paynmnt of w«gea Act an applicant omployae Is authoriaed t o 
ba xepxwasnt^ by a lagal pract i t ioner or an o f f i c i a l o f a 
registerckl trade union or a labour Ibspector or by any other 
person acting with the pemiss ion of the authority. Similarly, 
there i s no prohibition on a respon^@nt QRiploy@r t o represent 
himself by a lawyer or other person with the pertoissicm of 
the Author i ty /^ 
Under the Wozkman CoR^ensation Act* p a r t i e s t o the 
proceec'ings before the Gcsnwiissioner may be repreacffited by a 
lewyer or by an o f f i c i a l of insurance ccaiiipany or rec^iiatared 
trade union or by an Inspector effspointod under the .^'actories 
Act# 1948 or by any other person with the peraission of the 
Gorainiaaioner It should be noted that any other person 
desiroua of cqppearing on behalf o f a party before Authority 
under the Paymant o f Wages Act and the Camnissioner under the 
Worlonen's compensation Act has t o present t o the concerned 
authority a br ie f written statement e3q>laining his interest 
in the matter. The Authority or the Coraniisaionar« i f he 
decides t o refiise pemiss i on t o such person t o appear on 
b^ial f o f a party« ia t o record reasons ^ i c h foxna 
43 m pmxt of the record o f the proceedings before him. 
I*«g«l represent at ion« be fore labour adjudicating 
ihc 
bodies, i t ia subsittttd, haa baooae bane of the labour 
•djudiooiting ayaton. In the course o f i interview of 
Presiding Off loecs of th* labour adjudicating foruna (Ma* 
presiding o f f i c e r poignantly doaerlbed lawyers as "Iiegal 
Daoolts** %«hlle cornnentlng <m the role of lawyers In the labour 
f i e l d . I t Is our e}q>erlence that an applicant himself can 
perhaps act batter before labour adjudicating authorities 
(except before the Presiding Of f i cers of Labour Court and 
In<^3trlal Tribunal who are inore formal due t o their jud i c ia l 
backgrour^d) than being represented by a lawyer. Ihe reason 
i s that labour adjudicating authorities are soconfi t o none 
in the ir synipathetic attitude toward.') an applicant employee. 
However, a Presiding Of f i cer outwardly helping a party in the 
proceetiing before him in presantinq his case or argumoTits, 
may l « i d hluiself to the charge of being partisan in the 
subject matter before him. 
Enforceatent of decision 
Under the Payment of Wages Act and the i'K>rKinen's 
Conpmsatlon Aet« tmployer, as a matter of pract ice , i s 
obligated to conply with the terms of the decision v^thln 
one nonth of the date of the communication of the dec is ion . 
The respondent la at l iberty either t o make payment d i re c t l y 
to the applicant «ptiployee or t o tlie adjudicating authority. 
The provisions of the Payment of Wages Act and the workmen's 
compensation Act or the rules framed under them do not speci fy 
any period within %^ieh a decision must necessarily be 
er«foroed. Perhaps this period of one tocmth is allowed t o 
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«nabl« the losing party t o f i l e an appeal or^ review pe t i t i on , 
whatever rwedy la available.^* the event a party decides 
t o f i l e appeal against the decision o£ Authority under the 
Payment of v^ages Act or of the Ccxnmisslender under the workmen's 
Coii»en3ati(»} Act« he nust daposit the amount avrardcK? against 
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h.tiB with the Authority ot Coromissioner, as the case may be . 
This ia sine vjio xi<»i f o r the very pr©s6r.tatl<»i o f appeal 
pe t i t i on before the appellate forum. 
I t . case a review pet i t ion or ap'^ >eal i s not f i l e d 
and the awarded auin i s not pai<^ over t o the applicant or the 
authority# reccA/^ ary process is cotnmQnced by the authority t o 
recover the sunount in question. The Qommissioner under the 
Workmen's Coroponaation Act i s empowered t o e f f e c t recovery 
himself^ though in pract i ce , he does not make rocovery 
personally because o f lack of necessary recovery making 
machinery (Naair ate . ) with him.^^ Therefore, due t o non-
ava i lab i l i t y o f recovery « f£oc t lng staf f* he is constrained 
D' 
t o r « f e s oonpenstttion caans for recovery t o the e o l l e c t o r . 
tmdex the Payment o f Wages Act, i f the Authority i s 
a Magistrate, he can e f f e c t recovery of the amount t o be paid 
on his own. I f , however, the Authority i s not Magistrate, i t 
has t o send the application f o r recovery of directed amount t o 
a Magistrate Xn JCdC state Authority being an administrative 
o f f i c e r (Assistant Labour Connlas loner) , cases f o r the recovery 
3' 
undax tha Paymant of Wages Act are a«nt t o the Magistzata. 
m actual practice* the recovery cases under th is Act are sent 
by the Authority t o ch ie f Judic ial Magistrate of the 
concerned d i s t r i c t . 
Under the Inc^strial Disputes Act, the process o f 
enforccajnant of award given by the labour Court or Industrial 
TritRinal i s more complex* compared t o the enforcement o f 
decisions under the Payment of Wagea Act or the workmen's 
Compensation Act. This may be on account of the fact that 
awards of the Labour Court and In<&i3trial Tribunal frequ«aitly 
involve greater economic and soc ia l iiaplications e f f e c t i n g at 
times the into rest of ent ire community whidi occasicnnally may 
a lso pose a law and order problem* As a result / greater 
circxunspection need be taKen while iioplementing the awards 
of Labour Courts and industrial Tribunal/, and th i s may 
probably be one of the rcMBisons for the involvement of the 
Oovemnent (Labour Dapartnent) in the inplementaticm process 
o f the mnxdB of Liidaeux Coirts^and ftidustrial Tribunals* The 
Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal^ as i t were« ought t o 
MBd i t s MfttKd t o the appropriate Ootrernment. The apprcpriate 
aenramiient within 30 dvys o f the receipt of the rnmxA has t o 
publiaii i t .^® An award so published by the appropriate 
09ir«ment beccoas e n f o r o e ^ l a on the expiry o f t h i r t y days 
/ O 
froB tiM 4at« of its pablieatieii*^ ttiis i t MlljMt 
to a la tli* of ta «ir«r4 Mdc by tii« cmwt or 
bjr XvilNUial in «o iodattrlaJL ditp«t« in viiieh ^ppre^ioto 
OoToroMOt i t • partr or in ta aarord naAt bjr tlio MttloaaX i n * 
baaal.* fk9 rldov ttiotf oa gmnd of Mttloaal ooeawy or so* 
oiajL tbo said aj^propriato Govoraamt or Caatrel Qofora* 
aaat nay toy ootlfieation In tb« offlelal Gasotto ailco daolaratioa 
that award la qaaatlea atiaXX not ba aaforead oa tba axpiry of %lm 
parlod of 30 daya* fartliari approjprlato Oovaraaiaat or caatral 
GoTaranaat aakiag abova daelaratloa say naka an ordar rojaetittg 
or Kodlfyiag tba award vithia 90 days of ita irtablieatioa* It it 
doaa not aaka an ordar of rajaetioa or sodlfleatloa at aaid abovof 
tha award bacooaa anforc«at»la on tha axpiry of tha aforaaaid 90 
daya« An ordar aodlfylag or rajaeting tba mrard la to laid 
baforo State I^agiaXatara or FarllaMaatf m tha eaaa aay ba, at 
tha aarXieat opportunity by ^ a appropriata Oo^aranaat or tha 
CaatraX Oororaaaat* Oa tha oxpiry of XS days fron tha data of 
award boiag Xaid boforo tha stato I.ogisXatora or FarXiaaaat^it 
boooaas oaforoo^Xo**^ Xt appaara to ba aaaaoXoaa that tha 
OoYoraaaat «aa oatiraXy rojaot aa award aad at tha aaaa tiao 
rajoatod award is aaforeoabXa aftar its praaantatioa boforo tha 
XoglsXatefii dotaraaoats povor to rojaot or aodlfy aa 
award aada by ^ I.aboar coart or iriltoaaX is XiabXo 
«• aritiaisa oa two aoaats t (1) Ckywaraaoat boiag a 
party to tha «ward| aay aibitrariXy soak to aodify or rojoot 
an award whiah is agaiast^ it« Zt woaXd aat as Jadga la 
i f mm aaaaa« aad t^iaralnrt •ieUta tha priaoipXas of aataraX 
Ittstiaa if i t doas Mdify or lalaat aa to M d h i t is 
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a pacty; (11) Labour Caxtt, Induatxlal Tribunal or National 
Tribunal* are unqieatlonabXy <|iaalp-Judicial bodies®^- *belr 
declslcms necessarily deserve the same degree of sanctity as 
la attached to the decisions of Judicial courts . Therefore^ 
superlnqposltlon of the verdict of the executive body on the 
Judgement of Labour Court or Tribunal would tantamount to 
v io lat ing that sanctity . Besides/ i t would ®nount t o 
substituting the well reascmed decision of an escpert body 
made a f ter considering and w e i r i n g a l l the relevant 
considerations involved in the dispute by the decision of 
re lat ively inesqpert agency made soroetlmes on grounf^ of 
p o l i t i c a l eaq^e^ii^cy an<^  sometimes on personal whlir.s ai^ d 
fancies of bureaucrats. 
After going through afore-stated process provided 
under the Industrial D i l a t e s Act whan an award becomes 
enforceable* applicant employee is required to give a not ice 
o f Ammnd t o the respondent employer f o r roaHlng over money 
t o him. If ai^loyer does not make paymeoit on such a not lee # 
the haa t o apply t o the secretary* Labour Dapartnent 
of the Govariment^  in Farm K for the recovery of the money. 
Tha Labour Staoretary on being sat i s f ied that the amount i s 
dua t o th« applloant. Issues a c e r t i f i c a t e for the recovery 
of amount In <]Aa8tlon t o the c o l l e c t o r . The Collaetoz niakas 
the K 9 raoovaxy of ^ said amount aa an arrear of land revenue. 
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Tha above dfwaxiption shows that thaxa aza certain 
s ln i lax i t l es as wall as d l s s l n l l a i i t i o s respecting procedure 
followed by d i f ferent labour adjudicating bodies In regard t o 
the discharge of adjudicatory functions by tinwn. These 
procedural variations are unwarranted in view of more or 
less similar character of labour Issuen and claims resolved 
by adjudicating bodies under di f ferent labour enactrawita, 
whatever flaws may be a f f l i c t i n g the procedure of labour 
adjudicating bod las # i t has one salutary feature. It is that 
both the parties to a dispute get adecjiata Of^rtunity of 
putting forth thair reapective view points, whether the 
proceodin /a are beforo Labour Court or iJidustrial Tribunal 
Presiding Off icer of which is a person of f u l l jufUcial background 
or before the adjudicating authority under the statuteif l ike 
the Payment of Wages Act where he lacks judic ia l background 
and legal <|jiallficatlons. Indeed, parties get over stretched 
oppojctunity of being heard «v«n whoi they are del lbzately 
avoiding the process of the authority t o present thetnselves 
before i t . Thus, it has become customary now ( thou^ without 
statutory backing) that even i f a party Intentionally absents 
hJjaself Iron the hearlng»it is l ight ly ignored by the authority. 
And i t would be only af ter a party continuously (three or 
four tiaes) neglects the proceedings that the application will 
be dismissed or ex-parto proceedings shall be ordered^ as the 
ease laay b«* Svon a f ter the start <xCf ex parte prooeedinga^ 
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1£ the non-applioant comoa before the authority. I t w i l l 
lenient ly terminate the ex parte hearings and instead restore 
the regular proceedings.^^ There appears t o be an increasing 
tendency on the part of labo ir adjudicating author i t ies o f 
conducting proceedings more a f ter the pattern of j u d i c i a l 
courts . This savours o f notorious c^ilatory processes o f 
ordinary courts , i s f as t foss . / l l z ing the labour 
adjudicating mechanism. 
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Having exeonined legal frame work of the labour 
adjudicating procedure, i t w i l l be f r u i t f u l and indeed 
imperative t o p r e s e t th j views and reactions of respondents 
o f our sample regarding t h i s procedure and what they cociiittid 
in th i s regard. While e l i c i t i n g Information from the 
respondents concerning procedure fol lowed by labour adjudicating 
bodies, our f i r s t e n ^ l r y was naturally related t o %4hether 
the prooiKiuire adopted in the discharge of adjudicating 
funotlons WM antire ly statutory or some other procedures were 
fo l lowed, 
TiA>le l . l shows the responses o f latryers and 
Presiding Of f leera in order o f preference about whether 
stttttttory proe«kixe# pr inc ip les o f natural Justice o t some 
ether proeedare (arbitrary) i s cAsserved by authorit ies In 
•djvidieatiiig on labour disputes , i t i s plain from the table 
that in f i r t t prefer^noe an over-r iding majority o f lawyers 
and r sMid iag O f f i c e r s who %rere interviewed state that only 
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T4Bd3l« 3ho«d.ng t0ap<maea of lawyata and adjudicating 
o f f i c e r s about the pzoeedure followdd in 
discharging adjudicative funct ions . 
(Figs, in percentage)• 
Order of oreferfloice 
S.No. Procedured followed 
z 
{n-i75) 
ZZ 
(n-52) 
1. Statutory procedure 89.33 00,00 
2. Principles of natural 
j u s t i c e 2.67 96.15 
3 . Other 6.67 3.85 
4 . No c^inion 1.33 00.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 
statutory procedura I3 fo l lowed. In second ^reference of 
the f i f t y responses, almost a l l 491*15 %) point t o the 
observance of pr inc ip les of natural j u s t i c e in the 
adjudication of labour issues . Happily t^ough« the respcxidents 
who point out that labour adjudicating authorit ies fo l low 
arbitrary procedure are absolutely neg l ig ib le in number* Zt 
i s an undisputed fa c t that an adjudicating authority ought 
t o conduct i t s e l f within the parameters of the law %iAieraby 
i t has been const i tuted. Therefore# t h i s ia but natural 
that lawysra and Presiding Off icers belonging t o our sample 
v e r i f y the faet that labour adjudicating authorit ies 
diseftiasgs the ir function is a<msonance with statutory 
pcoosduM* And I f « loandatory procedural rule i s arb i trarUy 
£Ioatsd# i t bsoonss a point f o r writ or appeal* whatever i s 
SfvaildDls in the higher courts . Howsver* one s tar t l ing 
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revelation of the above table i s that as many aa one third 
of the lawyers and Presiding Off icera interviewees do not 
know whether principles of natural jus t i ce are applied by 
the labour adjudicating bcx^ies. Nor did they make bones 
about the fac t that they do not possess the requisite 
knowledge of the ccaicept of natural Justice . It Is a sad 
fact that even Presiding Off icers of labour adjudicating 
forums are ignorant of the concept of natural jus t i ce v^ich 
i s a cardinal feature of legal systems of modern c i v i l i z e d 
s o c i t i e s . It i s an incontrovertible fac t that quasi-*judicial 
authorities (which labour adjudicating bodies ate) ought t o 
act in compliance with the principles of natural jus t i c e in 
the abscmce of statutory provision t o the contrary.^^ 
Next information which was spec i f i ca l ly sought 
from the lawyers and Presiding Of f icers only pertains to 
Whether labour adjudicating bodies such as Labour courts 
XnduLflitxial Tribunal* CORinissioner under the workmcm's 
C<9im>«miatlon Aot» Authority under the Payment of Wages Act 
£OIloir ttnifoim pzoeeAace while adjudicating on labour issues. 
Tibl« 1.2 px«8«&ts the xeaults of responses in this behalf. 
It is evident fxon ViJdle 1*2 that majority of respondents 
(56 %) consider that procedure adopted by labour adjudicating 
flttthorities is varied and not ttnifom. fin contrast, nearly 
one third of the respondtfits (29,33 %) think that there are 
no pxoeedASal variatleiis in reqpeot of «ajudio«ftion of 
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Tabla 1 .2 . Showing ceaponaes of lawyers and abjudicating 
o f f ioaxs alaout whathar prooadu^a folloiMd by 
laboux adjudicating bodias in unifoxm. 
Pazc^taga of 
S.Ko. Kind of rasponsa raspond«ant8 (H«75) 
1. Yas 56.00 
2. No 29.33 
3. Don't know 14.67 
Total 100.00 
labour issues and clalina by various labour adjudicating 
bodies. A amall fract ion of the respondents (14.67 %), 
however* aachibit their ignorance about having any knowledge 
whathar the procedure followed by the Labour adjudicating 
bodies i s unifozJR or otherwise. 
Table 1.3 indicates the reasons adduced by the 
respondents for procedural d i f f e r « i t i a t i o n in the functioning 
of laOsour adjudicating bodies . It is claar fcon the t ^ l e 
that the main saasona for the proeaduxal di f farantiat ion arat 
lack of legal background in Assistant Labour CoRRiiaaimer 
in contrast t o Judiaial baoHground of Presiding Off ioars of 
x«aboar court- and Sndiistrial Trilsunal lack of uniform 
prooadkiral Qildanea or d iroot ira fox thasa bodies; axbitrary 
approaoh of Prasiding 0££ieax/>,ate. I t i s ijiqoossibXa t o 
dxaw any infaranca fron Tabla 1.3 as tha data incorporatad 
in i t oonatituta extr«naly inauff ioient anjjlirical avidanca 
fox supporting a conclusion. Of 42 lawyers and adjudicators 
who adnittad that thara is no uniform procedure in the labour 
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adjudicating f i e l d ^ emly half of this number have given 
reasons for such procedural variations among labour adjudicating 
bodies, How&vBZf of the respondents spel l ing out reasons for 
Table 1 .3 . Shwoing reascms of lawyers and adjudicating 
o f f i c e r s for variation in procedure adopted 
by adjudicating bodies t o decide labour cases. 
Percentage of 
respondents 
s . No. Class of reason (n *> 22) 
1. Laclc of l e ^ i Icnowledge/ 
background in Assistant 
Labour Commissic^er and 
presence of fiill Judicial 
background in the Presiding 
Off icer of Labour Court and 
Induatrial Tribunal 50.00 
2. Lack of uniform procedural 
guidance 13.64 
3. Arbitrary approach of 
Presiding Of f i cer 13.64 
4 . Others 22.72 
Total 100.00 
the adoption of varied procedure by the l ^ o u r adjudicating 
bodies* half of them have shown that procedural variations 
among labour adjudicating bodice are primarily due t o want 
of legal q ia l i f i ca t i ons and knowledge in the adjudicating 
bodies under the Payment of Wages Act and the woclanaci's 
Canpena«tion Aot and prea«ice of legal qual i f icat ions and 
Judicial ejiperienoe in the Presiding Of f i cers of Labour Court 
and Industxial Tribunal • There appears to be some truth in 
this l ine of argument becaase of the fac t that the authorities 
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und«r th« Payn«nt o f wages Act, the workmen's compansatlon 
Act, e t c . are aQinetlinos t o t a l l y uncfuallfled®®/ and, at any 
rate, lacking Icsgal s a l i f i c a t i o n s and jud i c ia l t ra in ing . 
Therefore* they are not s p e c i f i c a l l y attuned t o adjudicating 
work. In vLent of th i s , these authorities may sometimes teeaA 
to be arbitrary in respect of their functioning and sometlwes 
may look to ex»orl« iced legal counsels f o r d ictat ion in 
procedural matters. On the other hand, the Presiding Of f i c e r 
of the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal being mai^r of 
Judic ial service of the state , may often he tempted t o adqpt 
the procedural formality which is typica l of jud i c ia l ccHirts 
in the adjudication of labour disputaa. Inspite of appar^t 
va l id i ty of the above argument, i t lacks empirical credentials 
on account of paucity of evlj6ence in th i s regard. 
Tables 1 .4 ,1 .5 & 1.6 represent the views of workers/ 
union leaders, employers as well as lawyers and adjudicators 
respectively about procedure followed by labour adjudicating 
authorities in the formulation of adjudicative dec is ions , 
rron the data rsprescMntcsd by Table 1.4 in order of preference, 
i t i s manifest that our respondant-workers and union leaders^ 
by and large, f ind the procedure of labour adjudicating 
bodies, tlae-consuning, eapensive.^ ~ . . . . . A large 
majority of workers (72.66 %) in f i r s t preference shows that 
the present labour adjiidicatory procedure i s time-consuming. 
Respondent-wotkers wlio consider the procedhire o f labour 
•djttdieeting bodies t o be eaqpwsive const i tute seoond largest 
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nun^r . R«apcNnd«nts belonging t o this oatogory tiho 
show that labour adjudicating pcocaduxe i s expensive have 
greatly redeemed their posit ion in second preference wherein 
Table 1 .4 . showing the responses of workers and union leaders 
concerning procedure followed in the adjudication 
of lidaour cases (Figures in percentage) . 
S.MO 
Kature of 
procedure (ni256) (n»216) 
zzz (n»118) . 2V (n»47) 
1. Too l e g a l i s t i c 10.93 14.81 31.36 00.00 
2. Es^ensive 12.11 62.96 11.86 00.00 
3. Time-consuming 72.66 13 .10 12.71 00.00 
4. simple 1.17 1.85 00.00 00.00 
5. !^aec^ £3 to be changed 00 .00 2.78 44.07 100.00 
6. Others 3.13 00.00 00.00 00.00 
7. Don't know 00.00 00.00 00.00 00.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
out of 216 workers showing second preference, 62.96 % have 
shown the procedure expensive. In f i r s t preference, as i t 
were* their minber was negl igible (12.11 %) . Althougi a nuBiber 
of workers also deem that the laboar adjadicative procedure 
Is a f f l i c t e d by legalisRi, their number in a l l the preferences 
is con|>aratively unimpressive. As a result , they f a l l short 
of eonatitutlng re l iable empirical basis for the inference 
that the procedure observed in the making of adjudicative 
decisions in t o o l e g a l i s t i c . 
Over €ind above* I t i s patent from the tab le 
under reference that our respondcmt-workers at»3 union 
leaders do not regard the procedure o f 2 ^ a i r adjudicating 
bodies as sinqple". Finally* as a mark o f re j e c t i on o f the 
prevai l ing procedure of labour adjudicating bodies on account 
of i t s being defect ive* a s izable number of workers add union 
leaders in third and fourth preferences (44.07 & 100.00 % 
resptsctively) erophasiae the need t o change the procedure. 
Paradoxically* employers have more or l ess f o l l o w ^ 
in the foot -3tep3 of workers and union leaders in the i r 
assessment of the procedure followed in reaching laboaz 
adjudicatina dgfeisions. Table 1.5 makes i t c l ear that l i k e 
workers the atiployers a l so regard l abc i r adj'idlcator%^ 
procedure as time-consuming* c o s t l y . 
Table 1 . 5 . Showing the responses o f employers concerning 
procedure fol lowed in the adjudication of 
labour cases (Figures in percentage) . 
3.NO . Mature of proc« i^re 
z 
(N-57) 
ZZ 
(N-43) 
ZII 
(N-16) 
1 . Too l e g a l i s t i c 12.28 ie«60 75.00 
2 . Bi|>ensiva 10.53 53.49 6.25 
3. Tin€ii.ccmsuning 70.18 29.91 18.75 
4 . Others 1.75 00.00 00.00 
5 . No opinion 5.26 00.00 00.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Qt^loyers in i^ose opinion procedure i s slow moving are in 
an iiqpreasive majority (70,18 % in f i r s t preferanoa) • 
an 
Respondwnt-flinployera «ho find procedure aa being coatly 
foY>m the second largaat group. Howaiver# moat of the sn^loyers 
(53.59 % out of 43 respondenta) subscribing t o thia view COOMI 
from the category of second preference. What ia more 
important # about half of the employer a belonging t o the 
atfRDle indicate l ega l i s t i c elent^ta in labour adj idicating 
procedure i f the reaponaea of a l l the given preferences 
ahowing l e g a l i s t i c diaractera of the procedure are t a k ^ 
together. This ia in inarlced contraat t o the number of workers 
and union leaders \rtio perceive that the procedure adopted f o r 
the disposal of labour cases is l e g a l i s t i c . However^ in terms 
of i t s empirical value, i t appears at best t o be scrappy 
evidence t o ver i fy the assertion that existing procedure of 
labour adjudicating bodies ia too l e g a l i s t i c . 
It is evident from Table 1.6, that a good number 
of reapondent-lawyera and adjudicating authorities(26.66 %) 
regard the labour adjudicating procedure as too l e g a l i s t i c 
and about the sane number (22.67 %) conaider the procedure 
t o be d i latory , though in terms of overal l posit ion of a l l 
the rankst resp<»ad«nta belonging t o t h i s category mackedly 
over>rid« the respondents who treat the existing procedure 
of the labour adjudicative authorities as being too 
Xegalistlo. Therefoxe* In view of the legalistic and 
dilatory nature of the pxoaedure, a majority of lawyers and 
•ajudioatoKS (58.0 %)j eoosidexing the position of al l the 
so 
xamkr f e a l s nacesalty of changing the exist ing procedmra of 
labour adJudJLoatlng bodies• As a raraadlal measure^ one third 
Table 1 .6 . Showing the responses of lawyers and adjudicating 
o f f i c e r s about the procedura adopted in the ad-
Judloatl<xR of labour cases (Figs, in percentage) • 
S.NO. Mature of procedure 
I 
(N-75) 
I I 
(N«50) 
H I 
(N"27) 
IV 
(N»21) 
1. Too l e g a l i s t i c 26.66 6.00 3.74 00.00 
2. Expensive 10.67 12.00 00.00 4.76 
3. Dilatory 22.67 24.00 25.79 4.76 
4 . Slrople and useful 28.00 8.00 3.74 4.76 
5. Needs to be changed 6.67 38.00 44.44 33.33 
6. Need for consnon 
procedure code 4.00 12.00 14.81 52.39 
7. Others 00.00 00.00 7.48 00.00 
8 . Don't know i .aa 00.00 00.00 00.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
o f the respondfunts* tePclng again the score of a l l the ranks , 
hav^ e suggested a ooninon procedural code containing basic 
Ke(|Aireiaenta of fairness to be applicable t o a l l l ^ o u r 
•djudioating bodies. 
On the ocntrary« nearly an® third of the respond«Hits 
think that the procedure of ItHoaax adjudicating bodies i s simple 
and use fu l , and conseqaently, they do not deem It necessary 
to change the prevalent procedure. Further* i t i s interesting 
t o note that the lawyers and adjudicators do not (excepting 
a few anes ) t^e the Utbour adjudicating procedure t o be 
•aqpensiva* thou^^as umn many of then regard i t as 
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baing t«lnt«d by dilatoriness and legalism. It would appear 
t o be an«nolous that the procedure of labour adjudicating 
bodies Is tardy and l e g a l i s t i c and yat at the same time It 
Is a lne>q>an3lve. For* the cost of l i t i ga t i on cannot possibly 
be dissociated from the slow>-inovlng and l ega l i s t i c process of 
adjudicative decision-making. It is particularly so In view 
of the fa c t that a labourer« party t o a dispute, has 
' per - f o r ce ' t o lose the wages of the day cm which he attends 
the hearing of the ca3e# and has to spend for transport fare#etc. 
The data presented In TiO^les 1 .4 ,1 .5 & 1,6 bring 
out some glaring variations In the views of three groups of 
our respondents about how they look at the orocedure reopilred 
to be compiled with In deciding labour matters under the three 
statutes, the subject of this study. These variations ftre 
mainly between lawyers and adjudicating authorities on the 
one h«nd and %rorklng people and employers on the other . 
Viorkers and «iployars^on the whole, precelve the same defects^ 
though In varying degress* In the labour adjudicating 
pcoe«daK«s. Thas« the respondents belcmglng to both these 
group* regard the prooedare as dilatory* ea^enslve and 
legalistle. Rtf^onses of lawyers and adjudicators are evenly 
dlirid«d between the two soales of the balance * one Indicating 
that the existing pcoo«lure Is good and benef i c ia l and the 
othas i^owlng up the legalistic and dilatory character of the 
pxoe«auise* Xnsplte of sharp division in the responses of 
laMymf and adjudioatosy authorities in oertain respeets* 
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thay unmistakably point out that the labour adjudicating 
procadura ia inaxpansiva. It i s in ataxk contrast t o tha 
responses of worKazs and employers who regard the procedure 
gonarally e^^ensive* further* employers and labour olasa 
view the procedure as any thing but single and use fu l . But 
a good number of lawyers and adjudicators treat the procedure 
as simple and as sucVi use fu l . 
Our respondents of a l l three groups gave many 
valuable suggsstions to rationalize the procedure of labour 
adjudicating authorities, which according t o them i s de fect ive 
atJcl, for the rr,o3t part, inhibit ive of rendering quick jus t i c e 
in the labour f i e l d . Tables 1 .7 ,1 .8 & 1.9 show the suggestions 
given by workers, employers and lawyers as well as 
adjudicating o f f i c e r s respect ively . 
From Tabla 1,7, i t may be noted* that the main 
a^ggaations nada by tha working people are thati tha procedure 
ought t o be spaady so that a casa must be disposed of within 
thraa haaxinga*^*' prooadura must be inaaqsensiva, simple* br ie f 
and thara i^oald ba provision for fraa lagal aid t o tha 
Industrial worHara.^ It la olaas from tha tabla that a 
majority of workaza* (57*00 % In f i r s t praferanca) major 
ooncam ia t o gat a caaa diapoaad of as quickly as poaaibla. 
For t h i s puzpoaa , thay hava dasirad f ixat ion of a maxlwum 
l imit of thraa hearings (adjourrmanta) by a procedural rula 
within lAiloh a oaaa raaat nacaaaarily ba adjudioatad upon. 
q 
v ' o 
TabXft 1 .7 . Shoving suggest ions of workers and union 
leaders for stream-lining the exist ing 
procedure o f labour adjudicatory bodies . 
(Flgarea in percetitage)» 
Order of preferqBnce 
l.Ko, suggestion^ (N-256) (N-206) (K«35) 
1. Speedy procedure 
(a case t o be 
decided within three 
or four hearings) 57.04 24.77 14.29 
2. mejqpenaive 6.64 27.18 5.71 
3. Simple 15.23 4.85 14.29 
4 . Brief 15.23 3.74 00.00 
5. Free legal aid 1.56 24.27 48.57 
6. Others 4.30 10.19 17.14 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Apart frcsB above, differatit small minorities o f workers 
suggest ine3<pensive, simple and short procedure and propose 
a provision for f ree legal aid t o the Industrial workers. 
It may be rn«itic»iad that deniand for having ineaqpensive, simple 
and short procedural rules i s intended t o (^isRire the 
ful f i lment o f their chief obj eot ,^ namely* speedy determination 
of indastr ial diqsutes. 
T ^ l e 1*8 oontains the suggestions o f fered toy 
anployers and roendaers'of managerial s t a f f f o r 3treei»-lining 
the prooedure of labour adjudicating authorit ies ! i t can be 
sean that a bulk of respondent-onployers (71.15 % of 52 
onployara making auggastions for improving the procedure) 
l i k e workoSfl* also irant aaramary procedure which w i l l 
f a o i l i t a t a qseedy decisions* However* unlike %rorkers. 
r 
' i 
Tabltt 1 .3 . Showing auggestions of enployars f o r stream-
lining the ex is t ing procedure of labour 
adjudicating bodies (Figs, in percental*} . 
S.iQo . Suggestions (l!»52) (n-28) 
1. Sunsnary procedure f o r 
speedy deoisicms 71.16 25.00 
2. Less e3(pensive 5.77 10.71 
3. Less l e g a l i s t i c GO .00 21.43 
4 . labour courts 3.84 17.86 
5. Procedure should 
provide f o r spot 
decisions 
1.92 7.14 
6. Others 7.69 17.86 
7. tio opinion 9.62 00.00 
Total 100 .00 100.00 
arnployers have not spec i f i ed a particular l imit of hearings 
within which a case must be decided. In addition* a few 
employers have also suggested that the 'procedure be made 
l ess esqpansive* less l e j a l i s t i c and that there should be 
more labouc courts and provision for spot dec i s ions . But 
no tRqplrioal sicpnificance can be attached t o these responses 
as their number is extremely ins ign i f i cant . 
Table 1*9 incorporates the suggestions of the 
lawyers and presiding Of f i c e rs f o r the inprovenent of the 
procedure applied in deoiding disputed labour matters. As 
Is evident frooi the table , the responses of th i s group of 
•ample respond^its about streav-ltning the procedure are 
nore soattered, and consecfJently* nuch of c o l l e c t i v e strength 
9; 
Tabls l » 9 . showing suggestions of lawyecs and adjudicating 
of f ioaxa f o r stxearalining axisting pcoeoduKO of 
labottK adjudicating bodiesXFigs. in percentago) < 
S.liO • Sugg«9itions 
ZX 
(n « 75) (n ? 2 W 
1. PrcHsedure to be niore s inple , 
speedy and informed 33.33 20.00 
2. There should be a common 
prooeifhiral code 10,67 16.00 
3. Prea effitry of lawyers 1.33 12.00 
4 . Mininuro nuRiber of adjourn^ 
raeiits and the period of an 
adjoumraent ought not t o 
axa^ed 3@nr@n days 2.67 20.00 
5. Procedure ought t o embody 
gmarantae of natural j u s t i c e 8.00 8.00 
6. Procedure in c i v i l procedure 
code must be adc^tad 4.00 4.00 
7. Others (auch aa provision for 
f r e e legal aid, e f f i c i e n t 
arocess serving ager.cy, 
provision for more trained 
jud i c ia l clerks) 22.67 20.00 
8. Ho suggestion 
Total 100.00 
00.00 
100,00 
o£ theic ce^ p<Mn0« has Veen diss ipated. Only in ease of c«ie 
sug^^stion^nameiy* psoeedure t o be more 8liq>le« speedy and 
infozmal about ox^ tbixd of the ].«iiyocs and Presiding Of f i cers 
bgve lent their c o l l e c t i v e support. Rest of the suggestions 
such as statutory presoriptiCMn of ndninuin mrnOser of 
adJourzBBemts and period o£ an adjournment, f r ee entry of 
lawyer* incorporation o f natural justica* adc^tion of 
proce<!Kire o f c i v i l procedure code in labour adjudicating 
f i e ld* etc.< have cORqparatively ae<]iired the support o f only 
G8 
a fav rsspondanta in each caaa. Intriguing «s i t ls« son« 
of the suggestions tendacod by the lawyers and Presiding 
Of f i cers f o r rational iz ing the procedure appear t o be s e l f -
contradictory. Thus, f or example* a suggest 1cm f o r having 
more speedy, sinfile and informal procedure i s manifestly 
inoonsistent with the demand f o r adopting cuml.^rsome procedure 
of C iv i l Procedure code and allowance of f r e e legal 
representation before labour adjudicating bodies . 
A debatable question regarding procedure of labour 
adjudicating bodies i s whether i t ia desirable t o evolve a 
general procedural code t o be adopted by a l l labour adjudicating 
bodies in thair adjudicative decision-making. Table 1.10 
presents the results of the responses of three categories o f 
Table 1 .0 . showing the responses of workers, employers 
and lawyers/presiding Of f i cers about 
adopticm o f conmon procedural code &||r labour 
adjudicating bodies . 
S.NO* Kind of 
rMpcMRse 
Worker/ 
union 
leaders 
<n-a5«) 
Employer 
(n - 57) 
Lawyers/ 
Presiding 
O f f i c e r s 
(n«75) 
i . Xm 95.70 91.24 49.33 
2 . KO 0.78 5.26 50.67 
3. Don't know 3.52 3,50 00.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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oar respondents In regard t o adopting comnon procedural code 
in the labour adjudicating f i e l d . Xt can be observed from 
the table that overwhelming majority of workers and onployers 
(95.70 % and 91.23 % respectively) have opted f o r snacting 
a commcs) procedure code f o r d i f f e rent Ijdsour adjudicating 
bodies. Against this« however* only one half (49.33 %) of 
lawyers and adjudicating authorities want comnon procedure 
code for labour adjudicating bodies . I t is enigmatic why 
there is spontaneous and almost uniform cesponse of the 
workers and employers in favour of enacting common procedural 
code; for labour adjudicating bodies as compared t o only a 
slender suj^ort of la%fyers and Presiding Off icers f o r the 
same. Vfhatever may be the exact reasons for putting forward 
unanimously the demand f o r comnon procedure code by workers 
and epiployers* one thing is f a i r l y ce r ta in ; our respcMndent-
employers* and employees* prime concern is evidently t o 
ensure quickest adjudication of industrial disputes. I f the 
general procedure hel^p attain this object* worker and 
«q>Xoyers would naturally be t«npted t o emphasise the need 
fox oonmon proaeAxre f o r labour adjudicating author i t ies . 
OHqployMis and oRqployers favouring adoption of oonnon procedural 
ctode in the labour f i e l d have en^masse •9q;>resaed two major 
reasons f o r t h i s . These aret f i r s t * avoiding mult ip l i c i ty o f 
pcoeedures f o r the labour adjudicating bodies* and seccHnd* 
cdsviatlng operation of peedi lect ions o f Presiding Of f i cers 
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In pxocadearaX roattars* so that proeedur* t o be followad in 
a glvan oaaa is not restad on azbitxaciness OK parsonal notions 
ojr an adjudicating authority. C»» the othec hand, with the 
lawyers and Presiding Of f i c e rs , a summary oonnon procedure 
may well serve t o minimise, i f not t o t a l l y eliminate, d i l a t -
riness and legalism which at presmt characterise the 
labour adjudicatory proce<^re. 
It may be mentioned that the basic procedure and 
pract i ce of labour adjudicating bodies l ike that c^ Labour 
Courts or Industrial Tribunals under the Industrial Disputes 
Act and of authorities under the Payment of Wages Act, the 
workmen's Compensation Act, e t c . , for the roost part, are the 
same. There is doubtless some d i f f erent ia t ion in regard t o 
certain procedural matters, as for example, provisions 
relating t o review of e3<^arte decis ions and legal 
representation under d i f f e r e n t ^actments. But th is does 
not detract £xm the f a c t that the basic procedure f o s 
hearing of paiities, taking evidence, production of witoesses 
•nd doounanta* « tc* , i s the same for a l l labour adjudicating 
bodies . That being so, the reasons stated by the respondent-
wodcaxa and «qE>loyar8 f o r the enactment of ccmson proeadura 
ooda f o s labour adjudicating bodies would seam t o be far -
fatehad and tm suggestIva of making ideal coda of prooeduxe. 
OvaK and abova* thaaa xaasooa may not be consistent with tha 
pslMa etojaot o f Iidboux adjudioating roaehani«n («)q;>adltioua 
aind dlapoaaX of Ittomxt oaaaa) • For, uonawn pcoeaduira 
(»»d« mmy put tha procedural reqairemanta in a s t r a l ^ t 
jacket and? as a rasuIt, may add t o formaligm and tachanical ity . 
Contrarily, tha reasons of lawyers and Presiding Of f i cers f o r 
procedural code sean to be more sound, %riiich aim at ensuring 
prompt disposal of labour cases by the sunsnary process . 
Permissibility or ntxi-permissibility of legal 
representation before l4d3oar adjudicating bodies is the other 
controversial procedural issue. Table 1.11 sets out the 
Table 1.11. showing suggestions of workers oitqployers and 
lawyers/adjudicating o f f i c e r s alxiut regulating 
lawyers appearance before labour adjudicating 
bodies. 
Percentage of regoondnnts 
Workers/ Lawyers/ 
Unicm Presiding 
leaders onployers Of f i cers 
S.Ko. Suggestions (n-212) (n»53) (n=34) 
1. Lawyers' entry t o be t o t a l l y banned 
2. Lawyers' entry to be 
allowed only in cases 
involving points of law 
3. Lmryara aiatry to be 
reatricsted only t o cases 
involviJig 0aN|>licatad 
factual aituaition 
4 . hmtfKm'' entry to be made 
free as thay render 
aaaA&I aacvioas 
5« Lawyasa ' antxy to be 
raatsietad only to oasas 
in which Pzaaidlng 
offloara think naoassary 
6 . Othaiadf their saiyicaa 
are fxaa# thay ahould be 
f saaXy allowed to n^oas) 
7. Ho opinion 
Tofc^ 
68.86 
12.93 
00.00 
13.30 
00.00 
5.18 
47.17 
22.64 
00.00 
30.19 
00.00 
00.00 
8.82 
58.82 
2.94 
00.00 
20.60 
00.00 
M 
Mota 1 
ommm 
hammA 
dmiidoM on 
o r I m « K m 
iamxm 
zoaidiag 
" i S S S ^ g o S S f b i ^ ^ i l i y 
their entry ahould ba wmAm 
thinks that tha sarvicaa 
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Kot« 2. Blwen vozkaxs stated i f the sezvicea of lasyaxs 
are theiz entry should also b® made f r a « . 
spiggeationa roafSe by tha caspondanta aboit allo^^anoe of legal 
repzesentation before labour adjadlcatlng bodies . I t i s 
clear that of 212 raspcKidont workers and urlon leaders In 
'wtiose view lawi'eta protract adjudicating proceedings, a 
handsome majority (68.81 %) opines that lawyers entry before 
the adjudicating bodies be absolutely banned on the ground 
of i t s being counter-productive, since i t invariably hinders 
the expeditious deterninaticm of disputes o On tha contrary, 
re lat ively only an insiqnif icant majority (13.3 %) is in 
favour of allowance of unrestricted legal representation 
before labour ^ jud i ca t ing bodies as according t o there their 
services are useful* and an equal number of workers (12.73 %) 
l ike that lawyers entry be allowed only in cases in which 
interpretation of law i s involvec?. At tho same time, a 
handful of workers (5.18 %) would opt for pract ice ot 
unfettered 1«ki«1 representation i f their services are mii^ e 
available t o them f ree ly , though i t is merely wishful thinking 
devoid of any possibility of being put into reality in the 
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prevailing circsusMBtances. Therefore, fxcni the data 
eonpzising workers* and union laadezs' responses ecmeerning 
l«gal^ representation, i t can clearly be tnpliet^ that the 
working olasa* in tha main* im averse to praotioe of legal 
zepxoseBtatlon In the labour •djudioating field . Probably, 
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thelx oatrlght anrersion t o legal ceprasentation omanates 
fcon their apprehension that legal counaels generally injure 
their interest . 
However« as can be seen froco the table tuider 
referonce employers are not as enthusiastic respectinc? 
banning of legal representation as their counterparts- >K>rlcers 
and unicm leaders are« even though most of them think that 
lawyers appearance inevitably entai l delay in the determination 
of industrial issues. Out of 33 omployers who consider that 
lawyers entry lead t o delay* merely <»Je half would prefer 
total ban on practice of legal representation befoire labour 
adjudicating bodies. It i s s t i l l s igni f i cant in that these 
€ii^loyers constitute single largest group eas i ly outnumbering 
thos-^ (39.19 %)who regard legal representation as valuable 
and useful f or them. Again# i f the employer3(22.64 %) ^ o 
l ike to res tr i c t legal representation only to cases wherein 
points of law are involved are linked up with the advocates 
of t o ta l prohibition of legal representation* they come t o 
oooupY coiaraanding pos i t i on . At the same tiire* i t ought t o hm 
oonoeded that 30.19 % of respondent-on^tloyers viewing aervleas 
of lawyers as being benef i c ia l form a s igni f icant minority* 
whlcfti eonsiderably weakens the force of the ar^unent of thOM 
pxefexsing t o t a l ban on legal representation. On balance* i t 
i s f a i r l y certain that lOxiuit one half of employers' support 
fox t o t a l l y banning Isgal raprssontatlon before labour 
adjudicating betdios pxorido a valuable prop for the 
1 0 2 
protagonists of banning lagal caprasantation bafoca tha 
adjudicating bodias. 2t la part icular ly so oonaidaring tha 
fact that thara la caonon notion that legal representation 
generally benef i t ainployezs« who are f inanc ia l ly strong^ at 
the esqponse o f i i^eoinious oiqployaes and employers ara# by 
and large, mostly interested in engaging legal counsels in 
the proceedings before labour adjudicating authorit ies . As 
a result , i t c lear ly in^lies that a considerable section of 
employers has got dls<^chantn»ent with pract ice of legal 
representation due t o lawyers contributing t o tardiness in 
the conduct of laboir adj iclicatlng proceedings which i s 
Incidentally doterrninental for both the part ies . 
Finally, not anea^actingly, lawyers have sharply 
reacted t o o u t r i ? ^ ban on legal representation in the labour 
adjudicatory f i e l d . One can easi ly coroorehend their 
predicarnimt. They cannot af ford to ccxnnilt their professional 
and aeonomic suic ide . Of the 31 lawyers who f ee l tliat legal 
counsels add to delay in the adjudication of laboir disputes, 
not a single one %»nts t o ta l ban on legal representation. 
2kiataad# « majority o f them (58.82 %) prefer that pract ice 
o§ legal rapraaantaticm be <Sonfin4id t o the cases involving 
points of law and anothax slender group (20.59 %) opines that 
the praot ice of legal reprasantation should be made dependant 
on the daoiaion of an adjudloatory authority ^Aiethar i t naads 
or doaa not naad the sacvioa* of legal counsel in a given eaaa. 
Althoagh theaa raic>ons«fl of lawyass r e f ^ d i n g aXlowaBca or 
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dlaallovance of legal representation do not build up re l iab le 
enpirioal data to help draw an inference* i t reveals u p r i ^ t -
ness and boldness of our respondent-lawyers who do not make 
any bones about itiaking frank admission of the destructive 
e f f e c t s of legal representation on the speedy dispensation of 
jus t i ce in the industrial relations f i e l d . 
Of far more aignif icance is the response of four 
Presiding Off icers who f e e l that pract ice of legal 
representation before them delays adjudicating proceedings. 
Three out of four are in favour of imposing o u t r i ^ t ban on 
the pract ice of legal rep re sent at i<» before then) and one 
ccansidera that lawyers ^ t r y roust be l e f t t o the discretion 
of the concerned Presiding Of f i c e r . Ihiportant as the responses 
of these Presiding Off icers are^ in terms of empirical value^ 
however* much signif icao^ cannot be attached t o them becaise 
of their extresnely small nund^er. But i f they are in any 
manner indicator of the thinking of adjudicating authorities 
in general towards practice of legal repreaentaticm before 
th«nt7they olearly reveal that Presiding Off icers are second 
t o none in giving vent t o the ir aversion t o the appearance 
of legal ooansels before them. Their aevession t o legal 
representation* as also in t^e oase of workers and employess, 
nay naiturally result froa negative e f f e c t that legal 
representatim has on pronpt adjudication of laibour oases . 
Finally* i t Is worthwhile to consider the views 
of our respondents ooneerning reeovery proceedings are 
necessarily instituted oocasionally* if not fre<}i«ntly« for 
i l 
th« «nfocoeinant of decisions o f labour adjudicating bodies . 
The information fron the respondents was sought on v i t a l aspects 
of recovery processt (a) Aether the dec i s i o i s of labour 
adjudicating authorities are usually followed by recovery 
proceedings for iroplemontation; (b) time duration involved in 
ccR^leting recovery process in a particular cases; and (c) 
suggestions of respondents for improving the existing 
recovery procedures. 
Table 1.12 presents the results of the resqponses 
of a l l three groups of our respondents oonceming whether the 
TaMa 1.12. "showing th® responses of workersAinion leaders, 
employers and lawyers/adjudicatijig o f f i c e r s 
about t^ether decisions o f labour adjudicating 
bodies are usually followed by recovery 
proceedings . 
Percentage of respondents 
vwrlcer/ Lawyers/ 
union Presiding 
leaders Etaplov^n Of f i c e rs 
S.No. Kind of response (n « 254^ ) (n - 5 7 } (n « 75) 
1. 90.63 68.42 78.67 
2. Partly 2,73 5,26 18.67 
3. Mo 00.00 8.77 1.33 
4. Can't say 6.64 17.55 1.33 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
deeislons of labour adjudicating bodies usually req^ir• 
initiation of reoovery process for their enforcement. It can 
be noted that massive majorities of all the categories of our 
xespoodsnts aSe of the view that an^loyers axe generally 
xeluotant to Inplsnent the daoisions of labour •djudieating 
bodies voluntasily* CQiui«qMntly« there la, perforce* resort 
lOo 
to Kaoovary pxoo«edinga for g«ttlng the daolalons implenientad. 
Of particular relavaneo is the fact that a great majority of 
respondent-employer3 too admits that amployers* in general* do 
not honour the terns of decisions of adjudicating authorities.^ 
Another noticeable feature of the data presented in Table 1.12 
is that onong a l l the respcmdenta the responses showing that 
ornployera do not avoid iinpleatientation of adj idicative decisions 
are nearly non-existent, thou?^ a s izable nombar of lawyers 
and Presiding Of f i cers (18,67 %) ronark that employers only 
partly obstruct the iirplomentation of dec is ions . Thus, from 
these data, i t can safe ly be inferred that working c lass , 
employers as v;ell as lawyers and acijudlcating authorities 
are mostly aick of various ploys and devices employed by 
l i t igant employers to evade enforcement of adjudicatory 
decis ions. Its e f f e c t on the adjudicatory reir.edy a^ a method 
of set t l ing labour management disputes is pernicious. It is 
on account of the fact that non-compliance o f an emoloyer 
with the decision of an adjudicative authority forc<» the 
applicant to set into motion recovery process, which in its 
turn, tmXma years for effecting recovery in a given case,^^ 
2b this tortuous process the confidence of tiie working class 
in the santity of adjudicative machinery is bound to be shaken. 
It has aivo become the source of dejection for the adjudicative 
authoritlM in so far as their decisions are fre<»i«ntly 
float«di with iiqpunity. Converaely, it brings to fore the 
innate q^tby of employers as a class towards the decisions 
of an ouftsldo agonoy which axe ii^ posed on then against theic will. 
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Table 1.13 makes i t manifest that huge majorities 
of workers and eBnplcyees (92.19 6 80.70 respectively) and a 
Table 1.13. Showing qpinion of workers/union leaders, 
employers and lawyers/Presiding Of f i cers 
on the time involved in e f f ec t ing recovery 
in labour cases. 
Percentage of respondents 
Workers/ Lawyers/ 
union Presiding 
Time spent leaders EJnployers Of f icers 
S.No. for recovery (n-256) (n«57) (n=75) 
1. TOO inuchfeo»t*i«>2yr«) 92.19 80.70 64.00 
2. Normal ^ ® ^ 1.17 3.51 28.00 
3. Less ( 1 month ) 00.00 00.00 2.67 
4. Can't say 6.64 15.79 5.33 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Note. Of the s ix Presiding Of f icers , f i v e statedthat the 
time involved in the conclusion of recovery 
proceedings i s too much, while the other one stated 
that the time spent is only normal. 
decisive majority of lawyers and Presiding Off icers too 
(64.00 %) think that time spent in making recovery of money 
from employers throug^i recovery process i s too much. Only in 
the category of lawyers and adjudicating o f f i c e r s a sizable 
number of respondents (28.00 %) find time esqpended in Making 
recovery normal, s igni f i cant ly , the responses showing that 
recovery takes less time do not find any existence among any 
group of respondents. Similarly, respondents professing want 
of Infoznation about the time factor involved in making 
recovery are extremely ins igni f i cant . Above a l l , our 
respondent Presiding Of f i cers (excepting one) have with one 
volae sodfilbltad anxiety over excessive di latoriness that mars 
136 
the afficacy of •xlating recovery procadurea in the labour 
£l«ld# and t h a r ^ f o f e n t i r e roeehanlam of l aJaour adjudication.^^ 
The abovtt d a t a voild socMn t o c l a a r X y Imply t h a t w i d e s p r e a d 
c y n i o i a n aind d t s ^ a i r h a v e baen g e n e r a t e d due t o f a u l t y a n d 
s l o w m o t i o n o f r e c o v e r y p r o c e s s among t h e p e o p l e who a r e 
f r e c i J i e n t l y p a r t i e s t o l a b o u r d i s p u t e s a s w a l l a s among t h e 
f o r r o u l a t o r a o f a d j u d i c a t i v e d o c l s l o n s t h e m s e l v e s , Tt c a l l s 
f o r u r g e n t m e a s u r e s t o r emedy t h l s m a l a d y o f r e c o v e r y « B i k i n g 
m a c h i n e r y , s o a s t o p r e s e r v e t h e w o r k i n g c l a s s ' s r a p i d l y 
d w i n d l i n g f a i t h I n t h e e f f e c t i v s n e s s o f a d j u d i c a t i v e d e c i s i o n s 
a s w e l l a s i n t h e a d j u d i c a t i v e d e c i s i o n r m a k e r s i n t h e 
l a b o u r f i e l d . 
L a s t l y * a f t e r a n a l y s i s o f t h e v i e w s o f w o r k e r s ^ 
e m p l o y e r s a n d l a w y e r s a s w e l l a s a d j i d l c a t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s 
about the tJjoe f a c t o r i n v o l v e d i n c o n d u c t i n g t h e r e c o v e r y 
proceedings and a b o u t t h e f r e r i n e n c y w i t h v ^ i c h r e s o r t t o t h e 
reeovary prooesa i s e s s e n t i a l l y t o b e made f o r t h e en fo r c<«nen t 
of adjudicative d a o i s i o n s * it will be r e l e v a n t t o e v a l u a t e 
various s u g g e s t i o n s o f f e r e d by t h e r e s p o n d e n t s f o r b r i n g i n g 
about liq;>rovanient in the p r e s e n t r e c o v e r y p r o c e d u r e s u t i l l s c M S 
f o r o n f o r e i n g l a b o u r a d j u d i c a t i n g d e c i s i o n s . 
T«tbl« sets out these suggestions made by the 
respondents* It is evident from the table that workers aliBost 
unifoxnly and vast majorities of employers and lawyers as wwll 
•• Praaiding Officers (77«90 and 64*00 % reqpetively) wpS for 
direct oODf^ roMnt of xmotmmgy t^aking powers on labour 
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Tabic 1.14. Showing suggestions of workacs/inion l««SeX8# 
«ipXoy«s and lawyers/pxssiding officecs fox 
in^xovii^ ths existing reoovexy proeeauxes in 
the laboax f ield. 
woxkexs/ La%^X8/ 
union Presiding 
leaders Epsployexs Off icers 
3.No. Suggestions (n«256) (n«57} (n"75) 
1. Direct conferment of 
recovery making |»wer 
on the adjudicating 
bodies 95.70 77.20 6i.00 
2. Need for rationallaing 
recovery prooedurs by 
l eg i s la t ive measure 0.39 5.26 12.00 
3. Need fox instructing 
recovery e f f ec t ing 
authorities to conduct 
recovery in labour cases 
speedily an p r ior i ty 
basis 0.39 8.77 10.67 
4 . Others 0,78 5.26 5.33 
5. Don't know - . .2,71 8.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Hotel Out of the s i x presiding o f f i cers* f i v e opted for 
d irect oonfexmant of recovery e f f e c t i n g power on 
thea^ and one shoved his inabi l i ty t o raake any 
sttggeation. 
adjudicating authorities,®^ Other suggestions auch aa 
ecndueting xeeovexy pxoeeedings in labcux oases on pxiority 
basis ox need fox legislative measure fox modifying the 
existing xeoovexy pxoeedures have not found muoh favour with 
the xespondents. An obvious infexence that may be dxa«n 
fxoa the data pxesented in Table 1.14 is that i t is a deep 
xooted belief of the paxties to the laboux disputes« as alec 
of the laboux adjudloatlng authoxities, that Pxesiding Offioexe 
oan pexsonally ensuxe Mqpliaaoe with theix deoisioiis by using 
l u n 
sacoir•jcy-proo«Mij7 i f n«ed b(i« promptly and theieJoy «nhanee 
theiz •££ectlv«n9ss aswlX mm c red ib i l i ty of their daeisions. 
Contrarily# these data suggest that revenue and jud ic ia l 
aMthorities;> vho are entrusted with labour cases for the 
purpose Of recovery* being unaware of the sp i r i t of labour 
legis lat ion as well as spec i f i c problems of labour and of 
Industrial relations* roay not take (as i s pres«tfitly being 
done) requisite interest f o r speedy disposal of labour 
matters with any sense of urgency. 
C O M C I i U S 1 0 K S 
First , tharo i s near consensus among the lawyers 
and adjudicating o f f i c e r s that the procedure followed in 
formulating adjudicative decisions i s primarily statutory. 
Two third of lawyers and adjudicating o f f i c e r s further think 
that besides statutory procedure* labour adjudicating 
withorities a lso observe principles of natural Just ice , 
further* according t o majority of lawyers and adjudicating 
officers* procedure followed by labour adjudicating bodies 
under the Xodustxial DiiQMitea Act* the wor)cn«n's Con^nsation 
Aot* and the Paymnt of Wages Act is uniform. On the other 
hand* however* a minority of lawyers and adjudicating officers 
think that the procedure is not uniform. According to them. 
M i s xe|M«na for this procedural difference is that Presiding 
Officer of labour tribunals under the Ihdiatrial Disputes Act 
has Judicial and legal qual i f i cat ions , whaXMS 
no 
iR«nb«r9 of adjudicating bodlas undar the viorkiii«i*a 
Conpanaatlon Aet and the Paynent of Wages Aest are admlnlst cat lira 
o f f l o e r s and do not possess legal qual i f i cat ions or jud ic ia l 
eaqperlance, second* generally workers* union leaders and 
amployers find the existing procedure dilatory* aiqpenslve 
and l e g a l i s t i c and as such unacceptable. They are for shorter 
and flq;>eedy procedure . Particularly* workers and union 
leaders suggest that there should be a statutory provision 
req^ilrlng the disposals of a case within three or four 
hearings. On the contrary, re3p<»ise pattern of lawyers and 
adjudicating o f f i c e r s la divided. On half of this category 
of respondents regard the procedure as tardy and one third 
as l e g a l i s t i c . In contrast* one third of lawyers and 
adjudicating o f f i c e r s perceive the procedure simple and 
useful . Lawyers and adjudicating o f f i c e r s iriio regard the 
procedure cundderscine and slownnovlng favour suiamary procedure 
f o r the disposal o f casas. A fract ion of the lawyacs and 
adjttdleatiJtig o f f l o a c s also want a provision f o r f r M legal 
aid and a nexa Mqpcditious pxoeasa oarving ag«)cy. 
Thixd, workass and 4pq;>loyara unanimusly ymaat a 
oOMon proeaduxa code incorporating basic prooadkiral noma 
to ba fol.loi#«9i by lidxur •fljudioatlng bodies, lb aontxaat 
to this* only one half of lawyers and adjudicating offloers 
opt fox ooMMn pxoaaduxa ooda. woxkaxa* and wpXoyaxa* 
xaMOBS fox ooMHon pxoQedura ooda axa that such a ooda will 
I l l 
elininate vaKi«i9«tad ptoe«%ixes from the Idsour f i a l d andi 
w i l l halp pzevent the oparatlon of pzedilactions of labour 
adjudicating Authorities in procachiral mattaxa. Lawyara and 
adjudicating o f f i c e r s want the ccmnon procedure code f o r 
providing a summary procedure f o r the quick disposal o f 
labour cases . 
Fourth* workers and employers generally be l ieve 
that legal representation before labour adjudicating bodies 
is counter-productive as i t leads t o protraction of 
adjudicating proceedings, A good proportion of lawyers also 
subscribe to this b e l i e f . Therefore, workers are t o t a l l y 
opposed to appearance of lawyers before labour adjudicating 
bodies* but in ccmparison only one half of employers approve 
of ban on legal representation in the labour f i e l d . I>a«iyers 
Who hold the view that legal icepresentation hinders ^oedy 
oonduot of adjudicatory proceedings prefer that lawyers 
ontry should b« confined only to ^ c h labour cases wharain 
points of law axa ijovolvad, 
Lastly« by and large* the resoondcnta of a l l 
the thxsa oatagftxiss feel that litigant omployaxs diahonoux 
the awaxds of labour adjudicating authorities. As a xasult, 
tha xaoorasy pxooaadings usually follow the labour 
aidjudioatiiig daaisions fox iiqplansnting thasa decisions. 
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lUrthar, In the opinion of over-riding najor i t ias of 
%drorker3# «inployttrs# laiwy«rs and Presiding Off leer s# time 
involved in the conolusion of recovery proceedings by 
the exist ing recovery e f f e c t ing aathorit ies is too rauch 
tHiich has greatly sipped the u t i l i t y of labour adjudicatory 
syston. ccnaequtantly, as a ranedial Beasure» a vast 
majority o f respondents opines that power o f e f f e c t ing 
recovery should be d i re c t l y conferrred on the labour 
adjudicatory authorities ii^ich Is at present, in most of 
the ca3Q3# vested In the revenue and jud ic ia l o f f i c e r s . 
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^Alifioa^ifliui psasoxibad fox thaix appointmant. 
57 Aa tiM boen n o M oaxliox* Jamai 6 Kaahwix Sndiiatxial 
DiaputMi* Rulaa tha nuntoar of adjoaxnnante to bo 
ollonad to a to tha adjuidioaltiiig pxoooodln^a «e thxoo. 
mt0 in oatuol pSMtkioa* i t wiU toe aiay a nottox of ohanoo 
if a diaputo is d o o i M witliin thla atatiitoxy l i a i t . 
Sf . 0«m>lto tha dixaotlaro In Axt. 39A of the ^ a t i t u t i e n . of 
ttdia fox pxoridiM fioa lofal aid to tho IlMkiatxial 
twm logal aid to iaduotxlal woxkax ia yot f«x off exy in 
tho 03ii0tlii9 oifOMMtanoaOf m %ha national, loyal 
pxoaiinBO of ffoo logal « l a • -. I'l x !• yift 
oonftmid to aottiBfi itp OMMittooo and «*ieiiealene fox 
oonaidoxltig tho ^ o t i o a of logai aid to tlio paox. Tho 
jroBota eeraxwwt alloootoa a M a n ano&nt of xupoaa ano 
Lakh« atttoao<iMfttly# Mxa* Mdhi*a oevorwMnt iBoxoaaad 
tho kttdgat aU«oa«iatt fox logal aid to 
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tup««s twenty->£iva lakha. O f i i c i a l aaxtoQs claim that lagal 
aid ptogtmmma are being liplar.Qfitod! in tvranty states and 
s ix union terr i t or i es presently. But s i x • there appears t o be 
no iMXBogenelty In these prograBtnes, As fox the s tate of Jimnu 
& Kaahnlr« t o the best of th is author's knowledge no schvRie 
of l igal air? has yet been undertkken by the s tate Oovarwnont. 
Zn<ai«R Express* Chandigarh edru Jaturdey^ .'leptenfcer 20, 1980, 
page It Indian Esipress* Chandigarh ed. Supt^csber 22« 1930« p*6r 
Indian Ra^^ress Chanc'lgarh edn. J\ily# 29, 1980, p . 8 . 
59. Supra,note 58. 
60. Private emrslpyatJi alir.oat invariably Intraralqent t o comply 
v;ith labour adjudicative decis ions. l^ 'Uanaqarn tits of public aQCtor 
undertakings do not have imich hesitancf* t o Iraploreont ad J iddcativ® 
dcscislora. This fact caane t o l i ^ t during f i o l d -^tady, 
61. JantoWi Ram, Hecov. ry 'rocaedlngs and Laboir Adjudicatory 
Bodies (with special saferemce t o JCdK state)* Jtullan mbour 
Journal>vol. 20, t4o. 12 (1979), pp. 2245 - 2255. 
62. It is intorostlnci t o note that during the coirae of interview, 
rT'isiciing Officers gave vent t o thc^ic extreme in'^iqriati<»3 and 
f-:if? 1 lluolonm^nt with the prevalllncT recovery making procetlure 
ar.t YMaahinery; s i rce according t o thor;, for many years 
rocoverv caaos roirain oarstilng belor^ thfs concerned a^thoritiss 
v / i thout any action, a s a r ^ u l t , aggrieved worker i s made t o 
wallow here arid t'nora ( for example, before l^>oir socretary, 
iJ^Aity CORii^isBionar, L^jour comnia iionor, e t c . t o ol:>tain justice). 
63. oat <• f the li^our adjudicating authoritios at '^jresent ate 
not opipowerefS t o e f f e c t ricovery on their own. ihev have 
t o sand oases for recovory to revenue or jud i c ia l sathorities, 
aa the statutcn provide, r.ven under the statutes sucn a*) 
v^rkman*s condensation Act under %4iich recovery eff«»ctlng 
power la d i rec t ly c<»ifarred, adjudicating authorities 
ase unidQla t o nake recoirecy d i m o t l y owing t o the absence 
o f flHM«ntial recovery e f f e c t ing paraphernalia with thetii. 
Cooseq^»«ntly, they are oonstcained t o send oases f o r 
coooviaiiy t o the revenue authorities (lunra l^ o^te 61). 
•ifertiers and tmloa Itt4srt li«v« ai^parmtly tlTtn «eatrAdl«ti9f7 t w pons** Majority of tbm 4e net tew tb« to ba lagallttie* 
B«t at Uia aaM tlaa tbay die not oooaidar tlM t» ba aia^la. 
I t appaara tbay ara nat alaar abeot iiteat tiMy nava atataA* 
tlM raajj^aaa of aorkaMy aa^Xogran, laayara and adjttdlaatlat Offiaarst It la alaar ^ a t raeovary praaaaa takaa oatelir Xang tiaa 
for affaatiAf raawraiy ia a oata* On aa avaragat • raaofwry aaaa takaa tmr yaara tor aoaalaatao«itf-mi. itain^S'tg' jmmfmmmf^- ' ^ is 
akaarvaticMi ia aada aa tha baala oT tba iafernttoii catliarad trm tha flal4. 
CfSWPTER • IZZ 
<immm'§ mi^m^ r 
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1^*1111 OF FT^MFF^FF^ 
k j^mUmti^ mff MMliiA«ry «oBprlslag eo«r%St ^ ^ 
4««trici m i « a « l « | moA oatloiiaJ. tribaa«X uiMe th* XaAamt* 
rlml IHUipatM M Ams not 9999m dir««l Jnritdlctioa to 
m difftttM^ All IndwimaX 4Uf««« hm 
tp rUwwA Hy a^preprittt Oov«raa«at for at j i^omtta* 
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It n a ^ s t o be nientlonad that in countcios l ike Australia^ 
and England^ which have wall astablishad adjudication 
nsschinoziss £or adjudicating on industrial disputes* disputes 
are not referred by the government for adjudication, but 
adjudicatory forums d irect ly entertain disputed matters 
from the part ies . 
A dispute is referred to a labour court i f i t 
concerns a matter spec i f ied in the second schedule of the 
Industrial Disputes Act."* But the industrial tribunal, on 
the other hand, is competent to adjudicate on any dispute 
relatmq to a matter fa l l ing in second schedule or 
c 
third sci^iedule >f the Act. However, a dispute connected 
with a matter in the third schedule and a f fec t ing workers 
below one hundred may be adjudicated by the labour court 
Further, an industrial dispute is referred t o the national 
tribunal for adjudication i f i t involves a cjJieation of 
national in^ortance or industrial establishments situated 
in nore than one state are interested in i t or affected by 
Appropriate Oovernment may refer an existing or 
apprehended industrial dispute ox> i ts own accord or on the 
presttRtation of the application (%fhether individually or 
Jointly) by the parties In this b e h l d f A i ? t e t the 
reference of a dispute, the labour court or industrial 
trllDunal does not aocjiice unlimited powers of adjudication. 
For« thm aonoemed adjudioatory forum mist necessarily confine 
IZO 
adjudicatory prooaading in the dispute to the points 
spac i f loa l ly referred £or adjudication azuithe incidental 
9 
matters thereto. Hence* the labour court or the tribunal 
nuat look at the order o£ reference i t s e l f for the exercise 
of i t s jur isdict ion since i t is only the subject matter of 
reference with which the tribunal can deal . It cannot 
proceed to daciide the matters not referred to i t . Nor can 
the tribunal widen the acqpe of r e f e r e n c e T h e expression 
"and matters incidental tiiereto" appearing in section 10(4) 
of the Act incluc^QS such Incidental or subordinate matters 
as pertain to the noints of the dispute referred. Therefore, 
the matters wiiich recjuire indopenrlent consideration or 
treatment and have their own importance cannot be considered 
to be " i n c i d e n t a l " h o t should the expression "incidental" 
hm so interpreted as t o give vague and indeterminate 
jur isdict ion to the tribunal.^^ 
< The diseiretioii of the government under section 10 
of the Ikidustrial Disputes Act is wide and unrestricted.^^ 
An appropriate govenuaant is empowered t o refer a dispute 
fox adjudioation «#h«n in i t s opinion the dispute has arisen 
14 
or thmf i s nsre apprehension of that . The act of ths 
govemnsnt regarding making of reference i s of purely 
administrative character. The decision of the appropriate 
govsmmsit id:>Qut %fhethar the d i l u t e for the purpose of 
adjudication has arisen or i s being apprehended i s sssantial ly 
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subject ive. The edeqiac.^ ox aaff ic lency o f the meterlal 
on which the Opinion is formed is not subject to jud i c ia l 
scrutiny. Bvan after the sat is fact ion of the government 
about the existence or apprehension of a dispute* i t i s not 
bbligatory on i t t o refer the same for adjudication. This 
is because of tha fac t that the appropriate government has 
f ina l l y to determine the expediency or ln->expadiency of making 
cm 
17 
reference.^® similarly* the failure report of the Concllatic  
Off icer does not obl ige the governro^t t o refer the dispute. 
But i f the governmant does not choose t o roalce reference after 
the consideration of fa i lure report submitted by the 
Concllatlon Of f i cer , It haa t o racord and communicate the 
reasons for refusal t o the concerned part ies . However* the 
courts cannot question the propriety or the sat is factory 
character of the reasons g l v ^ by the government f o r such 
18 declaiona. A atatatory duty is cast on the appropriate 
Government under section 12(S) of the Znaistrial Disputes Act 
either t o refer the d i ^ t e for adjudication or coRRunicate 
t o the parties ooneerned i t s reasons f o r not making reference 
after the subnisslon of fai lure report by the conc i l ia t ion 
O f f i c e r . Writ of mandanus can be issued directing the 
19 
agn;>ropciate Oovernraent t o d i sd^rge th is duty. i s 
diagtistlag t o note that inspite of mandatory character of 
Section 12(5} o f the Industrial Disputes Act, tn Jammt and 
Kashmir s tate there la i^lagxant disregard of this p«9Vision. 
State oovenment(Labour Dspartnent) while deciding against 
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making a reference after the considezatlon of fa i lure report 
stfnt hy the Concil iation Off icer aeldon gives reasrans for the 
refusal tt> make reference, ooverninent issues the following 
order in stereotyped language to the aggrieved worker(s) 
whose dispute has not been referred. 
"This is t6 inform you that the Biduatrial dispute 
raised by you against V i j a ^ r cooperative Marketing ^o 
society Ltd; has not been found f i t f o r adjudication". 
Not infrecpait ly , i t compels the aggrieved party 
to move the H i ^ Ccurt for a direction seeking referaice ajid 
theraiby sertating in motion a loigthy and cos t ly process of 
l i t i gat ion in the higher judiciary.21 i t i s a p i ty that a 
poor worker v*io i s facing the sack has t o bear the cost and 
tort ire of lengthy nrocess of l i t igat ion in the h i ^ e r 
judiciary merely for getting his case referrcad for adjudication. 
It patently runs counter t o the concept of soc ia l justice> 
contanipr'lated under the industrial Disputes Act. 
In two categories of oases wide referral diacretion 
of the govemnent app^axB to be scneMhat circum3crl33«d« First* 
when there is a dispute relating to a public util ity service 
and notice under Section 22 of the industrial Dispute5^Act has 
been givsn, the gavmgxmmt is recpized to make referoneo of 
that dispute for adjudiestim unlMs the notice is vcwstiously 
and frivolously given. Second, when both the parties to the 
dispute apply to the government for reference and if the 
govemMBt is satisfied Mi«t the persons applying represent 
22 majority of each party, i t is obliged to make the reference. 
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But «r«a in essM govcraMiift is «a%itl«4 to d«eid« 
the «X9«dl«ii«y or etbtrwi** of ••QAiaf ditpnU 
for ftdjadieatloa* 
P l x f t t o n !• not »0 ^ mttcUtd ttrbltrwiXy 
Althottgli geTtriiMats* r«r«r«ne« maklag dlterttlea U 
et wld« Mttgaltadti It csnnet )>• «3i«rclt«d •rbUrarily or eap-
rleioutXy*^ Th« dl«or«tlea to b« •xorelsoA oa tbo b«tls 
of aorlt «ad rolovent aatorlsls*^^ Ftirth«y» tbo ditorotloa 
oaght to bo oxoroltod hoaottly aad aot tor oorrapt or aXtorior 
pnrpotos* If It i t oatoroiood la a KalaflAo aaaaor or la bad 
faith, It la UabXo to bo oballaagod la tha court of Uv.S^ Za 
tbo tono aaaaori oxtraaooaa or IrroXaraat ooosidoratlona or tho 
B«ttors fAiioh aro not gomaao for tbo foraaXatloa of oplaloa 
by tbo goToranoat oagbt aot wolgb wltb tbo approprlato (loTora* 
•oat vblXo dooldiag w atklag of a roforoaoo*'^ Botldost tlio 
ap propria to OovortHMat oaaaot rofasa to ooasidor a roXovaat 
•attar wbiXo aaklag a roforoaoo* 8dr can it aiadlroot ItaaXf 
oa a polat of Xa«*i7 hm doolaloa of tbo gororaMat ragardlag 
a roforoaoo ovoa tboagb adalalstratlTa la aatara* oaa bo qooa* 
tloaod by writ of aaadaaaa oa tbo grooad «tiat It la arrlTod 
at wltboat prapor ooaaldoratiaa of tba aatariaX araiXdhXa ba* 
faro i t or oa oxtraaaoaa aoaaldoratloaa*'* Agaiat aXIbaagii 
v r l t a of prombltloa aad oartlorarl aro not isaaod against 
tba govaraaaat aiiiXa aaklag roforaaaot %b«ir Xla agaiaat tba 
•ward Xaboar ooart or ladnstrlaX trlbanaX oa tbo groaod what 
waa rafarvad bjr tbo gavoramat waa aat aa Iniailrtal a t w f t i mSU 
1?A 
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All the categories of ou£ respondents were recpired 
t o t e s t i f y to or counter the fact vjhether influences as 
dist inct from the merits of the case w e i ^ with the government 
while referring disputes f o r adjudication.^® Table 2,1 
presents the responses of respondent workers and union leac'ers 
in order of importance about external factors tainUng the 
exercise of reference power by the Labour Departroant. It is 
Table 2 ,1 , Showing tho responses of workers & union leaders 
about external influences a f fec t ing the exercise 
of reference making power by the qovernmwt 
preference-wise (Figs, in percentages). 
J.IiO 
Kind of 
. influence ( n - k e ) (I>i=l43 
- • 
(K»53) 
1. Union leaders 3.13 2,10 9.43 
2. Pol i t ic ians 43.75 19.58 5.66 
3. iiigh o f f i c i a l s 3.91 27.27 47.17 
4. Money considerations 9.30 51.05 37.74 
5. t o influence 18.36 0.00 0.00 
6. Any other 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7. Don't know _21.48_ 0,00^ 0.00^ 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
evident from the table that of 256 respmdents in the f i r s t 
preference* around one half (43,75 %) have espressad that 
po l i t i e i sns interfere with the liqpartial ttxsrcisa of 
raferanoe d i scret ion . Xn eontrast, a small fract ion of 
rMpondanta (18.36 %) assarts that there is no outsida 
influaiioa« and an aqaal mnibar (21.43 %) shows laok of any 
1 2 i 4 0 
knowledge aboit axtexnal influencas which a f f e c t the exerc ise 
of rcKferial power. £Urther# a aioall mnber of respondents 
(9.38 %) s ta te that money a lso plays part in the reference 
making. However* the response showing the influence o f high 
o f f i c i a l s and union leaders is almost non-existent. It is 
clear from the response pattern of f i r s t preference that i f 
the resoondents denying the exfistcmcp of outside influences 
and those eKhil3itin<3 ignorance about such influences are 
grouped together* they cor 3tita-.e a sityi i f icant proportion 
of the workers. 
There were only 143 responses in second preference. 
The nio3t notable d iaracter iat i c of the re3pon?3a trenr! of 
second preference is that respcaidents (51,05 %) t e s t i f y i n g t o 
tVie inf lu^ice of money occupy the priroe posi t ion as against 
their unimpressive score in f i r s t preference. Further in 
second preference a good number of workers (27.27 anc^  19.58 % 
reapectively) indicate the influence of high o f f i c i a l s and 
po l i t i o iana . Bit those point out the Influence of union 
leaders mxm alnost neg l ig ib le in number (2.10 %). 
In third preference* the number of responses was 
ma low as 53. Of these, nearly one half (47.17 %) show the 
influenee of high o f f i c i a l s / a l i t t l e above one third (37 %) 
of money and small numbers (9.43 % & 5.66 % respectively) 
indicate the influence o f union leaders and p o l i t i c i a n s on 
reference Baking. 
IPG 
The overall* picture that emerges from Tea:>le 2.1 
ia that enajority of respondents reinforces the connnon be l i e f 
that polltlcidjns exert pressure on exercising reference 
discret ion In one way or the other, m the same manner* the 
response patterns of second and third preferences and, 
especial ly of second preference, unmistakably strengthens the 
apprehension that money plays part in the exerc ise of re ferral 
power. However, the evidence indicating the influence of h i ^ 
o f f i c i a l s on reference making is tenuous, though in second and 
third preferences, reaponaea pointing out o f f i c i a l Influence 
secure important po3 i t i on . At the oaino time, those vjho 
predicate the impartiality of ^jabcur ^'epartnv^nt in referring 
industrial disputes for adjadicatlan cannot be ignored l ight ly 
as they are t^nite in good number. It may be reasonable t o 
Infer frcsn this that a sectlfin of working c l a s s f inds no fau l t 
with the exercise of re ferral discret ion by the governm^t. 
Moreover, the ignorance of a b ig nuinber of workers concerning 
working ox non-working of external Influences on the exercise 
of re ferra l diisos«tion indicatee th«t e i ther stark i l l i t e r a c y 
o f these workers Inhibits th®B in knowing things of v i t a l 
liq^ortanoe t o the working ccnmnity or they are rather 
Indifferent t o such important matters as a f f e c t their bMrtAiem 
frequently. 
These f indings can be further corrdtorated by 
reference t o data in Tabla 2 .2 . Table 2.2 the r«»sponsea 
of the %forkers and union leaders have been presented 
157 
fxa<]Lianoy*»wise concerning the extraneous influences on the 
exercise of reference power. The data ir^  the table c l ear ly 
dainonatrate that in terms of frequiency score infliience of 
po l i t i c ians attains the primary pos i t i on . It is c lose ly 
followed by the influence of money. Kext in order of 
IroportancG comes the influence of high o f f i c i a l s . Respor.ses 
showing no influonce and those professing lack of knowledge 
of outside influerico ar« also significant in number. 
TaJjle 2 .2. showing responses of workers and union 
leaders about external influences 
af fect ing refererce making pcwet 
f r ac|i ency~wis e . 
Kind of 
:.fiO. influence Response frequercy-wisa 
1. Pol i t i c ians 143 
2. Money 121 
3. High o f f i c i a l s 74 
4 . ho influence 47 
5 . Jnicm leaders 18 
6, Any other 0 
7 . Don't know 55 
Notes Total mnber of responses shall not correspond 
t o the tota l mniber of respond^ts aa respondents 
h«ve option t o give more than cme response* The 
to ta l o f fre<|iancy score has been worked out by 
adding together the responses of a l l preferences. 
Flnallyf i t is c lear frcm the table that there i s 
not nuc^ aappor1;ive evidence lA&ich proves the influence of 
union loaders on the exercise of reference p«rer . The 
12 o 
inferoncQ that may be drawn froir. th® data in Tables 2.1 & 2.2 
13 that th® exerc i se of reference making d iscret ion by the 
governnient i s not f a i r as external considerations such as 
p o l i t i c a l I n f l u ^ c e and money v i t i a t e i t . 
Table 2.3 presents the results of the resoonaes 
o f ^nployers about whsthor e x e r c l j e of reference dif icretion 
13 a f f o c t ed Dro judic ia l ly by any extraneous cansJdorations. 
It is manifest frcan the tab le that of 57 responses in f i r s t 
profeE^Go, abcut one third (36.84 noteo the influer.ce 
of p o l i t i c i a n s ; nearly one fourth (21.05 %) that of union 
loaders; and only naqlic^ible f rac t ion of carrsployers (5,26 & 
3.51 S respectivr^ly) pointed tho i n f l i e n c o of money and hiqh 
o f f i c i a l s . 
Table 2 . 3 . 'ihowinq responses of anployots about external 
influences a f f e c t i n g the exerc i se of reference 
making by the government preference*-wing, 
(Pigjreo in percentages) . 
Kind o f Order of oreference 
s.tio. Inf luence 1 2 ? 0 3 -v. -
1 . Union leaders 21.05 16.67 13.33 
2 . P o l i t i c i a n s 36.34 43.33 6.67 
3 . High o f f i c i a l s 3.51 26.67 26.67 
4 . Honsy considerations 5.26 13.33 53.33 
6 . No inl fa«nae 7.02 00.00 00.00 
7 . Don't know 26.32 00.00 00.00 
Total 100.00 100 .00 100.00 
Or\ the contrary, the resporsdents v*»o found no outside f a c t o r 
as being a f f e c t i n g the r e f e r r a l d i s c re t i on are only in 
Inaignl f l cant pos i t ion Cl.tX'^^* Howover* the onqployers who 
do not possess any information about external considerations 
v i t ia t ing in^artial exercise of reference power constitute a 
s igni f icant group (26.32 %) and get second important place 
among the responses of f i r s t preference. 
In second preference there are cmly thirty 
respondents, as aqainjt 57 in the fir<5t nreference. This is 
itself saffici'int oviclenca of tho fast declining interest of 
the ensployers in ahowing other influer.ces on the exercise of 
reference rnaXing power. Of 30 resoonses in the second 
preference* slightly below one half expressed p o l i t i c a l 
influence. Ihus, t; oso who see p o l i t i c a l interference in 
the exorcine of reference f'iscretior, got top nosition in 
f i r s t as well ©s second preference. Hesponses indicating 
o f f i c i a l s influence (26.67 %) corno in the second place and 
tnose showing union leader 's influence (16.67 90 ^aln next 
place of importance. In contrast* the respondents (13.33 %) 
h i ^ l i ^ t i n g the role o£ money jjn the referral of disputes 
get lowest plaae« as they did in the category of f i r s t 
preference. 
Iti third prefer«nce mn^er of reapondentfl 
•i^reaaing their response went as low as 15. In this category 
responses indicating influence of money on reference 
discretion surprisingly attain f irst place (53.33 %), 
Responses showing the influence of high officials (26.67 %) 
trail btyhindf and those indicating the influcuice of union 
leaders f^lod politicians (13.33 6 6.67 % respectively) come to 
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occupy In fer ior pos i t i ons . 
Thus, on the whole# from Table 2.3 the influence 
of politicians as outside factor interfering with exercise 
of reference discretion becomes most demonstrable. This is 
so bocausQ tho rasponaen aubsi entiating thV? fact are 
significant in number in f i rs t as i^nll as in second nrefererce. 
Inflaenco of union l-iadors comea next in impottance. But the 
nimljor oi; respondents testifying to the union leaders' influence 
i3 toe in^i nificarit to help make a roliai^le assertion. Same 
i3 tho position of ttie influence oZ high officials ard mcmay. 
nov/ever, it i ; incr-''''ible that i-.any an <=anployer ceo not 
")0s3sas3 loio^ l^adgo of o-itaitlG cf i jdorcit ions whicV affoct 
t iQ iirroartial exercise of rafererco power. It ia paradoxical, 
that despite tneir education antl fanlightonef"? outlook as irell 
as cloae actjiairitaiice with the Droblerr.s of employer-employee 
relationship, employers do not have any knot;Ledge of the 
asesrcise of reference making power. 
The results shown by table 2.3 can be f>arther 
v e r i f i e d by putting the reaponaes of onployera given In 
d i f f e r e n t preferencoa frecixency-wine. Table 2.4 shows the 
canpaxativ« freqManoy aooxe o f various responses in reiard 
t o outs ide Influence cm the exarcise of reference power, i t 
can be seen from the tea>le that p o l i t i c a l Influence acqeaires 
top p l a c e . Influence of union leaders attains second p lace 
of liqportanoe and i t i s fol lowed c l o s e l y by the inf luence o f 
monay* O f f i c i a l inf luence eomes at low p lace In descent^ing 
order• 
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Table 2 . 4 . Showing raspOTses of emplayara^ about external 
influence a f fec t ing r a f e c ^ c e making powar 
f xagii ancy-vlse. 
Kind of Response 
S.NO. influence f recjiency-wisa 
1. Pol it ic ians 35 
2. Union leaders 19 
3. lloney 15 
4 . nigh o f - i a i a l s 14 
5. tco influence 4 
6. Don't loiow 15 
i^otaJ The to ta l of freiiaercy acore has been lArorked out by 
adding together the responsea of a l l Drnferencea. 
Table 2.5 renrer-ents the responses of lawyers and 
adjudicating o f f i c e c s regarding '.^hsthor tho ascercisa of 
re ferral ditioretion is tainted by any extraneois f a c t o r . 
Their responses have been recorded according t o the 
preference shown by thstn. As i s evident from the table . 
Table 2 .5 . Showing responses of lawyers and adjudicators 
aboit external influences on the exercise of 
reference power by the goveminant 
jpreference-wlse (Figures in percentages). 
Kind of P^f ppe^^ry^qa 
3. No. influence (475) (Ni41) (11=70) 
1. Union leaders 14.67 17.07 0.00 
2. Pollticlana 49.32 26.64 0.00 
3. High officials 4.00 39.02 58.82 
4 . Monay oonsldax- 2.67 17.07 41.18 
atIons 
5. Ko Influence 6.67 00.00 00.00 
6. Don't Itnow 22.67 00.00 00.00 
Total 100.00 loo.ob 166.06 
Note I Total nunber of reaponfoa ah«ll not tally with tha 
nun^r of tospondMits foxning s«Bpl« as tha caapondents 
hava baan given option to giva noca than ona anawar. 
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one half (49.33 %) of responses In f i r s t prefersnoe 
substantiate the interference of po l i t i c ians with the 
exercise of reference d iscret ion . Significantly« as noted 
alxyve* the responses of other groups of respondents of our 
sample* v i z . employers and wor)cers indicating p o l i t i c a l 
influence on the exercise of refercmce making discretion have 
also secured loading posit ions in f i r s t preference. P o l i t i c a l 
influence la followed by the inf lu^.ce of union leaders with 
14.67 responses indicating i t . Responses showing the 
influence of high o f f i c i a l s and rooney are extremely 
insigni f icant (4,00 & 2,67 % respect ively) . On the other 
hand, a small number (6.67 of respondont3 deny that aoiy 
eKternai InflueiiCQ a f f l i c t reference making; arKJ a notable 
group (22.67 %) professes to be not having any knowledge o f 
extraneoua considerations which a f f e c t exercise of r e f e r w c e 
d iscret ion . Respondents of t i ; is group obtain second dominant 
posi t ion in the response o£ f i r s t preference* 
In second preference the number of respondents 
has diminished abruptly. Only 41 respondents have chosen to 
eaf>reea theiK eeoond preference. Of these* 39.02 % indicate 
ef f loial Influenoe. Zt ia^ striking oontxeet to the respondents 
pointing out offioiel influence in f irst psefexenee. 
Respondents showing political Influence (26.84 %) occupy second 
place of liDportance. It is significant in that, more or less* 
those who noted other Influences (other than political in 
f izst rank) have indicated the political influence in second 
prefexenee. Finally* the influences of union loedece end 
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money have b e ^ relegated t o the background with 17.07 % 
proponents o f each. 
In third oreferencQ* the mmber of respondents 
Is as low as 17 %ihloh i s in sharp contrant t o the number of 
respondents in f i r s t two preferences. An important feature 
of response pattern of this rank is that# as in second rank, 
responses aff im;ing the influence of high o f f i c i a l s occupy 
f i r s t p lace , v/ith this evidence relating t o exertina of 
o f f i c i a l influence on the exercise of reference discretion 
secures prinary position in second anil third ranks. lUrther* 
in third rank role of money in the reference roakinq occiioies 
'Second place with 41.18 percontr of raijponc'arjts aiipport.ing 
this f a c t . 
From tha analysis of oata in Table 2.5 the following 
picture appears. Majority of lawyers and awijudicating o f f i c e r s 
al lege that p o l i t i c a l interference mars the exercise of 
reference po%fer. h good number of respondents also al lege 
official Interference* ih oontc«st« only a foiw lawyers and 
adjudicating officers Indleat* Influence of union leaders and 
money on reference making* On the contrary, the respcmdents 
dliplaylng Ignorance about the a f f e c t of any outside Influence 
on referral power ace fairly appreciable In number. 
In order to further ensure the authencity of the 
results obtained fron Table 2.5, it is worthirtille to examine 
the xeXsnrant data fre<9i«ney«wls«. Table 2*6 presents the 
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results o f dlffer^mt reaponsas £rec}iancywvlse. It i s c lear 
from the table that the responses indicating p o l i t i c a l 
Table 2.6. Shoving responses of la%r/ers and adjudicators 
regarding exercise of outside influexices 
the reference wtfcing frequency-wise. 
Kind of Response 
S.Fo, influence f recjiency-wise 
1. Pol i t i c ians 48 
2. High o f f i c i a l s 29 
3. Union leaders 18 
4. MoneY 
5. MD onfluence 5 
6. Don't Icnow 17 
ivotaj The t o ta l frecjuancy score has been vrorked out by 
addinq together the rospOT'Sor; of a l l preferences. 
inClience are in an unrivalled posit ion cofaparad t o responses 
supporting other ijifluei^cea. Responses 3hov?ing o f f i c i a l 
inflaer.ce secure second place of importance. The table under 
reference further makes i t Icnown that the responses pointing 
out i n f l u x e s of money and union leaders on reference making 
are snore or less in similar proportions, though placed in 
descending order. From the data contained in Tables 2*5 & 
2.6 i t is inferable that lawyers and adjudicating o f f i c e r s 
mostly think that p o l i t i c a l i n f l u ^ c e i s brouglht to bear on 
the Labour Department when i t refers disputes for adjudication. 
A section of lawyers and adjudicating officers also feels that 
h i ^ off icials too influence the exercise of refersal discretion. 
Moreorer« most of the lawmen and adjudicating offieara 
exonezata the goveriunent from the charge that It Is actuatcKi 
by the pressure of union leaders and monetary consider at l<»ns 
while formulating reference decisl<»is. 
Having knovm the velws of respondents on the 
exercise of reference tnaklnq power by the Labour Pepartment, 
which, as has been seen, is affected mainly by p o l i t i c a l and 
monetary factors* i t was natural to know their further reacticun 
about whether they would l ike t o continue the existing process 
of referring of disputes by the government f o r adjudication. 
Table 2.7 Incorporates the repl ies of workers 
and union leaders in this connection. It is e v i d ^ t from the 
Table 2 ,7 . Showing responses of workers and union leaders 
concerning the aboliticun of reference making 
process (Figures in percentage). 
Kind of Percentage of 
3•Ho, response respondents(N»256) 
1. Yes 97.66 
2. NO 2.34 
3. Don't know 0.00 
Total 100.00 
pattern of response as shown by the table that workers almost 
unaninously (97.66) outrightly want to abolish the proeesa of 
eafmtmoam naking by the govemraent, and theririby* making way 
for the aggrieved party to go directly before a labour court 
ox Indaetrlal tritaanal for the redreasal of his gxlevanees. 
Only 2•Si % of the cespoinsee hatve gone in £«vmr of 
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contlmsation o£ the •xlatlhg syat«io of ctt£«rslng diaputM 
f o t adjudioation. It i s oaf f i c iant iadieatoK of the degrwi 
of disenohantanent of the working c lass with the conbersone 
and exaaperating pxooesa of reference maHing. 
Table 2.8 shows the respco^se pattern of employers 
about the abolit ion of reference process. Here« too an 
over-riding majority (77,19 94) of responses favours the 
Table 2«8. showing responses of employers about the abolit ion 
of reference making pcocessCFigs. in per cot tages ) . 
S.KO, Responses 
Perocmtage of 
respcMndants 
(11-57) 
1. Yes . 77.19 
2. Part^(in casa of 
individual 
disputes only) 
7.02 
3. No 14.04 
4 . Can't say 1.75 
Total 100.00 
ending^referKal process totally. Hoiiever* a handful of 
responses (7.02 %) tend to ^ l i s h this process only partially. 
That Is to say^ Individual disputes are to be allowed to b« 
taken directly for adjudication and colleotive disputes should 
oontinae to be referred to by the govemnent. IVirther* 14,04 % 
of respondents favoured its continuation and emphasised its 
positive aspects such as it contains the Magnitude of 
industrial litigation. 
Table 2*9 presents the responses of lawyers md 
adJudl«ators iii>out ^ l i s h i n g the referral proeess* It would 
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appmmx that mil th« gxwpa of xeiq;>mideiits hanrii n«d« up m 
OBumm in ao fax •• tba qattstlon of twjeBdJMiting th« pcooMW of 
MfttXciMM making by tha govexniMnt Is oonoaxnad* A pxapoodaxant 
najoclty (80*00) of lamyaxa adjudieatoxs also llkaa to do 
anay with pxooasa o f xafarenoe making and fonratxs inataad 
that a l l the dlaputaa ba d l roc t ly allonad for adjudication. 
A flmall nunbax of thaio (14.67 %), howavex* favouxs tha aicaxelaa 
of diaaxatl«« by the <;^exninent and s t i l l a faw othaxs (S.33 %) 
have not ba«n abla t o decide either way. As sudi they did not 
aa«>xass any oplnicna. 
A bxlef oOR^ariaon of the data In Tables 2.7* 2.8 & 
2,9 izrefxagably laakea i t oloax that respondants belonging t o 
a l l the categories of our sanple with an outstanding majority 
countenanoe the taxnlnatlon of refaxral process . 7he respcmdents 
%mo favour the xettfxtlcm of the refexral prooess axe too 
insignif icant in mnber t o deaerve any m e n t i s . This naturally 
iBpels «ne t o go into the reasons «rtiioh underli--e the desire of 
the respond on t a t o eliminate tha stage of reference making froro 
the arena of indastxial xelations. Tables 2.10, 2.11 & 2.12 show 
the ceasona of fexed by the respondents f o r denuding the 
governmttiit of xeferenoe discret ion. 
Table 2 .9 . Showing responses of lawyers and 
adjudicators about abolishing of 
x^exxal prooess (Figs, in pexcmntage). 
S.I30. Responses Frequency(n»75) 
I . YOS 80*00 
2 . KO 14,<7 
NO opinion S.13 
Total IIROT 
Table 2,10 shows tha xeasons given fay the xespondant 
tpodcaxs and u&lon loadaxs in oxdax of l^^xtanoo fox the 
abolition of xofoxxal pxoeass. m fixat pxofoxonce* as is 
obsaxTirisle f xon the table* pxinoiple xoasen given by a 
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T«bl« 2 •10* Showing gesffonams of work«rs and unlcn laadors 
Indicating raasons for abolishing procaaa of 
raf«x«nc« making (Figuraa In paroentaga) • 
Pf, 
3.KO. Class of raason (n-250) (h2241) (N-142) 
1. Delays adjudication 88 .93 6.64 7.04 
2. Misused 4.40 45.23 21.84 
3. Redundants 5.60 48.13 70.42 
4 . Anyother Q0f09 JO ,90 09,TP 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
prepondexant majority (88.83 %) of workers for eliminating 
referral process i s that i t invariably delays adjudication 
of d i s m t e s . A few resnondenta have also shown two other 
causes, namely/ that reference making power i s misused by 
the government and that re ferral stage is redundant f o r 
abolishing the reference process . 
In second preference, the number of responses came 
down t o 241 as against 250 in f i r s t preference. Of these, 
about an« half of the responses (48.13 %) show the refero iee 
Biaklng prooadure as being redundant. Around the smmi niuift>er 
of raaponaas (45.23 94) aff irm that reference procedure i s 
•iaaavd. However, In thia oategory merely 6,64 % of 
XMfi>oodents eoxcoboxate that reference making procedure delays 
•ajudieetion ox In any event poat*>pones i t s a v a i l a b i l i t y . 
thixd yreferenoe, the nus^r of responses hea 
gone doun aubatantielly. There are only 142 responses as 
against 2S0 and 241 in f irst and second preferences reapeotlvely. 
Thtt ncMt r«Rairk«bl« feature of this category responsa is 
that the raAindant char«ctax of reference making procedure 
has maintained i t s lead in third preference also with 70.24 % 
responses ««hich is accjiired by i t in second preference. As a 
result* i t has become second important cause ( f i r s t being 
reference making delays adjudication) with the workecs and 
union leaders t o discard the reference making procedure. 
Furthersin third preference^ only a few respondents (21.83 & 
7.04 % respectively) support the view that reference-making 
process is susceptible t o being misased and that i t delays 
adjucUcation of disputes. 
The main results given y^ Table 2.10 are that 
majority of workers priniarily considers that reference 
procedure delays adjudication of industrial disputes and 
as such i t has become chief reason for their disillusionmcHrit 
with i t . Further* in aec<»id « id third preferences most of 
workers and union leaders take the redundant character of 
re ferral procedure as the important cause for their 
disatisfaotion with i t . Finally* in order of Inpoxtanoe with 
n«ny s xespondent pxanmmmm of referral process to mlsuss is 
another dsaMbsek affecting i t . 
Significantly* if the data presented in Table 2.10 
is t o u t e d fxeqtaenoywise* identical results are available. 
Tabl« t ^ l a t e s the responses under refer«Qoe initems of 
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Table Showing th« r«spon««a of vorkars and union 
lMd«ra indlefttino th«lx xaaaona for abolishing 
th« cofaronctt naking pxoetmm fs«<9i«noy^via«. 
S . N O . Class of reason Response fxequeney » wise 
1 . Delays adjudication 149 
2 . Redundant 236 
3. Misused 151 
4 . Others 6 
5 . CanHot say 3 
Not*I Tha fxec|i«noy acoxe has baen woticad oat by adding 
togethac the xasponaas of d i f ferant prefstancea. 
fra<9t«noy score. Xt can be saan that the resoondenta %Aiieh 
f ind the referral process as the cause of delaying 
adjudication get ton pos i t i on . Responses characteriaing 
referral process redundant attain to next place* 
interestingly, the c i f far tfite between responses which talce 
referral procedure as source of delaying adjudication and 
those that perceive the re ferra l procadttxe t o be redundant 
i s only nasginal Moreover* the reiq;>on8es i^ieh suggest that 
re ferral process i s niausad occupy third place with 
unijqpressive conparativa frequency score . 
Ta]t>l« 1*12 records tha reasons of anployocii fox 
thalx disaatisfaetion with the xefaxanea procedure. Data in 
tha table clasJCXy daDKmatxatas that In f i m t pxofexenea with 
alaoat al l the aaployaxs (93.1S %) tha pxinelpal eausa of 
disanehantaMiit with the xefaxxel pxoeadttxe is that i t dalaya 
« Zn aaoond pxafaxeiica# the mnbex of raNqpondonts 
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has ooB« do«m to 35 against 44 in fixst psafacanea* Among tha 
xmrnpcnmrnm of saeoDd pKa£aranea# a daninating proportion of 
r€MQ>andant8 (80*00 %) find suaoaptibility of cafaranoa prooaaa 
to nisusa aa its chiaf i#aaknass. Tha nuinbei: of raspondanta 
Tabla 1.12. Showing raaponaaa of anployara indicating 
ZMswis fox abolition of tha pzooaas of 
rafaronoa making (Figuras in paioentaga) • 
Ko. Claas of reason (Iii44) (»2I5) (H«25) 
1. Delays adjudioati<m 93.19 2.86 4.00 
2. Misused 2.27 80.00 4.00 
3. Redundant 2.27 17.14 92.00 
4. Any other 00.00 00.00 00.00 
5. Can't say 2,27 00.00 00.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Motat Total of rasponsas a^all not tally with the nuinbar 
of raapondants as the raapondanta have option to 
giva laoxa than one rsply* 
showing third prafaranoa has graatly fallen down. Thara ara 
only 25 raspond«its who hava shown thair third prafaranoa. 
in this oatagory* a prapotant majority (92.00 %) points out 
radttndant natura of rafaranea proeadura as its nain nagatira 
trait* 
Tha BMdn findings of tha analysis of data in 
Vtblm 1*11 ara that with tha Majority of anployars rafarral 
psooaftii* is « Mtia« of dalaying adjudioatii^. Maict in 
li^^xtane* ax« tha ra«p«Ba«s whioh aXlaga that rafarral 
procwdura is saaoaptibla to nisiiaa. Raaponsas ragardlng 
rafarial pmmmm as radttiidant gat Immmt plaea in dasoanding 
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OKdttX. Th«i« xomlta ctm b« further ah«dkad fay making 
r«f«x«ne« to thm tmmpcxmm tzmqxmincY of dlffttswnt kinds of 
roqi^sos. 
Tablo i«13 indioates th« rotQKmsa fracfionoy of 
dl f farant xmmmwia indioatad lay aB«>loyax9 f oe abolishing thm 
prooass of caferring disputas by the government. It is 
tfridant from the table that the employers treating the 
referral power as an instrument of delaying adjudication are 
in prime poaiti<»ii with h i ^ e a t reaponso frequoncyi and those 
showing referral process redundant and i t s proneness t o misuse 
have sijnilar response freciAoncies. 
T ^ l e 1*13 • Showing re3p<»ui«» of conployers indicating 
reasons iHr abolishing the reference 
making process freqiiency-wisa. 
s.Mo. Class of reascm Response frecpienoy-wise 
1. Delays adjudication 46 
2* ReAindant 30 
3. MimiMd 30 
4 . Oali*t My 1 
Hotel TIm fieqaaDoy •eese hm been wDiked oit lay adding 
to«ethex the tmapmrnmrnwi diffesant preferanoM* 
T ^ l e 1*14 gives an idea of the lawyaxa* and 
•flilitdiaatiMM* rewoiui fox their diaeatiafaotion with tli« 
xaCesanaa pcoeeduxe. Data in the t ^ l a makes i t man if eat 
that majority of lawyocs and adjudioating offieaxa (CS.OO 90« 
like waskora moA mttXofmxm* aaqphaaiaa that raferenee making 
pxoeodaxa dolaya adjudieatlaii* At the a«M tl«M« noasly 
Tabltt 1.14. Showing xesponses of lawyors «nd «djudioatox« 
Indieatlng thols CMOons for tfaoliahing tha 
prooass of rafox^nca making (Figs, in parcontaga) 
S.Ko. Class of reason (K-60) (N242) (N224) 
1. Delaya adjudication 
of disputes 65.00 14.29 00.00 
2. Misused 31.66 64.29 4.17 
3. Redundant 1.67 21.42 95.83 
4. Any other 00 .00 00.00 00.00 
5. Can't say 1.67 00.00 00.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
l^otai lha t o t a l shall not cozcaapond with tha to ta l mrobac 
of raapondants as the respcxndanta have opti<»i t o give 
more than one reply. 
atxm third of raapcmdanta (31.67 %) Indicate pronenesa o f 
rafezance procaaa t o misuse as i t s major dra%ibaclc. As part 
of gecxezal tr«nd of our sample* there i s ocnnsiderable zeducticm 
of the zesponaes in second prefarenea* There are only 42 
responses in second pzafetence against 60 in f i r s t preference. 
The re8p<»ise pattern of aeooid prefaranoa shows that mcntt of 
lawyers and adjudicating officers <64,29 %) consider the 
vulnerability of referttnoa procedure to being miausad to be 
its major defaot. MoraOirer« one fourth of respondents (21*43 %) 
in second preference also indicate that referring procedure is 
redundant. Zn third preference there are only 24 responses. 
The most distinguishing feature of third prefer«noe is that 
here alaost a l l the respondents (95.d3 %) identify redundant 
tfharaotar of refaranee pxooeas as its main flaw. 
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Tho ocncluaion can be drawn fzcn Tidsle 1*14 
ia that t o a handsoBKi majority of raspondonts referral prooedura 
i s a oause of delaying adjudication. Secondly* a good nundser 
of reaponaes in f i r s t yreferance and an over-riding majority 
in aeoond praferonca point cut the vulnere^i l i ty of reference 
procedure t o ndsuae ita aerioua f law. Lastly* the place of 
laaat importance* aa i t ia* ia s^ '^^ a^^^by the reapondents %<ho 
regard the referral procesa aa redundant. 
The reaulta of Table 1.14 are v e r i f i a b l e by working 
out the individual reaponae fre<|Acmcy of various reaaona adduced 
by the lawyers and adju<^icating o f f i c e r a f o r terminating the 
governroanta' direction t o refer d i l u t e s for adjudication. 
Table 1.15 presents the results of the responaea frequ^Kr^-wiae. 
Table 1.15. showing the responses o f lawyers and adjudicators 
indicating their reasons f o r abolishing the 
reference process* frequency-wise. 
Reaponae 
S.Mo. Class of reascm f xeqitency-wise 
1. Misused 47 
2. Delays adjudication 4S 
3. Redundant 33 
4, Can *t say 1 
Kotei The Fcogaam aeore has been^worked outstay adding together the responses of diffttrwit praferencas. 
CUSniosJLy* the respondents in whose opinion the referonce 
prooedure is capable of being misused get the highest fnquienoy 
aoore. According to preference-wisa analysis of the data; as 
•aan above* the responses that regard the referral procedural 
•s souros of delaying adjudication haive aegulrsd priir.ary 
position. Bat thsy hwm hmm pushed doisn to 
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soeond placMi* Zt can be further seen from the table that 
the responses vhlch a how the reference process as re<^»ndant 
f a l l in an infer ior hieraschioal pos i t i on . 
It has been considered above that overwhelming 
majority of respondents (belonging t o a l l the categories) 
support termination of the process of referring disputes by 
the governroont for adjudication. The chief reason for their 
disillusionment with the emrc i se of reference power fay the 
government is that i t inevitably perpetrates delay in taking 
a matter t o an adjudicatory forum, and consequently, in i t s 
adjudication. It wi l l be relevant t o corroborate the assertion 
of resporjdants that exercise of referral discretion by the 
qovernment delays adjudicaticm of disputes by the Labour Court 
and industrial Tribunal with the help of s t a t i s t i c a l data. 
Table 1,16 indicates the time spent in roaJcing reference by the 
government from the <^ate of submission of fa i lure report by 
the Conciliation Of f i cer t o the date of sending the reference 
by the Labour Department t o the Labour Court or imduistrlal 
Tribunal* Delay in the present conteset denotes the time qpwit 
by th« Labour nepartment in prsparlng and sending the reference 
order over and above the normal t ine reqMired f o r that purpose. 
Itodastrial Disputes Act and mdis t r ia l Disputes (J&K) Rules, 
1973# do not mention any time limit for making a referenoe 
osdoK by the Labour Department. Mor do the Central ihAistrial 
Disimtes Axloo lay down any time limit during which appropriato 
Oovemnent mst formlate the reference decision* Therefore* 
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Taibl« 1.16* showing the t ine spent by the government in 
loaklng reference of oases fron the date of 
ceoeipt of fa i lure report to the date of 
issuing reference order. 
3.K0. Time in m<»nths 
Percentage of cases 
(n « 68) 
1 0 1 00.00 
2. 1 - 3 20.58 
3. 3 6 30.86 
4. 6 9 13.23 
5. 9 - 12 4.81 
6 . 12 - 15 11.76 
7. 15 » 18 8.45 
8. 18 - 21 2.94 
9 . 21 - 24 2.94 
10. 24 - 27 0.00 
11. 27 - 30 0.00 
12. 30 - 33 1.47 
13. 33 - 36 0.00 
14. 36 - 39 1.47 
15. 51 - 54 
TOTAL 100.00 
by taking a l l the related oonsideiations ( e . g . f o r processing 
relevant reference docuin^ts at the o f f i c i a l level e t c . ) into 
aoooantf thtmm months period i s dc:stral:>lcfor formulating the 
deoislon of making £eferenoe« 
It ia manifest fron the table that the Labour 
Departnent spends inordinately greater anount of time in sending 
industrial disputes for adjudioation. Out of 68 oases 
contained in the tdble under referenoe« only a snail proportion 
of thsn (20.58 %) have been sent by the Labour Department for 
adjudioaition by ap«nding?p«riod below thx«a aonths. m shaxp 
/ 
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oontxast* in a preponderant majority of oases (79.42 X) 
time involvad in making reference deciaicxis ranges fron 
3 iMMiths t o 54 loonths. Again« £roio these 79.42 % of the 
cases i^ ich have been referred f o r adjudication af ter spending a 
period above three loonths, re lat ive ly only in a less number 
of them (30.88 94) references have b e ^ made I elow s ix months. 
On the whole# nearly one half of the cases have been referred 
for adjudication by expending tha tii. e period l:>etween 6 t o 54 
months. It is highly disgusting that occaaicKially governn]ent 
(Labour i apartment) spends as many as 39 t o 54 months for 
referring disputes f o r adjudication. At the sonoe time« i t i s 
s igni f i cant t o note that not a ainqle case has been referred 
f o r adjudication by speanding the period of one month or lesil^ 
L i t t l e surprisingly, i t i s tynlcal of tha bureaucratic s ty le 
o f functioning of the o f f i c i a l s of the Labour Departroont. 
Thus9 these data ^ead t o an inefvitable inference that tha 
process o f reference making i s an excessively time-consuming 
and has becatieTpc'^^ii't cause < 
f 
through adjudicative method. 
of delaying settlement o f disputes 
Following conclusions anerge fron the discussion 
cngarding d i f f erent aspects of the exercise of re ferra l 
d iscret ion by the gorernment. First , the exercise of 
sefestfioa fBoking pomtx i s not absolutely liiq;>artial and 
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untaivfW . Zt h«s ba«n aiqply d«nonfltzat«di by tha analysis 
of data In this . Al l the gxaapa o£ our reapondonts 
with an appreciable majority have c lear ly established the 
faot of p o l i t i c a l interference with reference making* As 
regards other influences* such as influence of money« h i ^ 
o f f i c i a l s and union leaders on reference making* there i s 
not enou^ ev id^oe (excepting ev id^ce of workers ccmceming 
influence of money) which suggenta the wielding of these 
outl ine influences on the exercise of re ferral power . There 
are variations among tho response patterns of d i f ferent groups 
of reaporideBts. liiaa, with our workars and trade union leaders 
p o l i t i c a l influeTiCo ac iuiros top . josit ion. It i s follov/ad by 
influence of ir.onay# hig^ o f f i c i a l s and union leaders. "JQn ease 
of aav^loyers politxcaX inf lueice has been followed by the 
influence of unic»i leaders, ironey, anf^  high o f f i c i a l s * and 
among the responses of lawyers and acljudicators p o l i t i c a l 
influence has been followed by the influence of high o f f i c i a l s^ 
money* and union leaders. Further* while there i s su f f i c i ent 
amount of evidence f o r corroborating p o l i t i c a l and monetary 
influence on the exercise of reference power (however* only 
•mall fraotions of employers and lawyers t e s t i f y t o the 
monetary influeooe}* the avidenoe indicating the inf luerce o f 
high offiolala/ trade unions is not reasonably su f f i c i en t which 
may be ade<ii«ta M^ir ioa l basis fox drawing an 
•uthantie iafacanoa. 3ki addition* there i s a good number of 
14Si 
responstts showing no influence oz pretending lack of information 
on the exercise of outside influences on reference power . 
Kext an over-riding majority of a l l the categories 
of respondents have unequivocally e^ressed their disapproval 
for the continuation of referral process iri the industrial 
relations f i e l d . More in^ortantly« there are no variations 
in the response patterns of various categories of rea5>«tident3 
concerning t h i s . 
Finally* the reasons given by the respondents ^ o 
wish t o abolish the referral process, in the main, are that 
reference making delays adjudication; i t is orone t o misuse; 
and that the stiige of referring disputes for adjuclication in 
the area of i n m i t r i a l relations i s redundant-. These reasons* 
in creater or lesser dagreo, have been adcSuced by a l l ths 
classes of our respond-nts for their d issat is fact ion with the 
reference process. There are, of course, certain ^ 
variations among three groups of reapcmd«uits with regaxd to 
the d«gxee of Is^Ktanoe i^iioh they attach to differant 
defeots In the r«for«nce making proooM. Thus, anong tho 
workoxs. «Bd union leaders those alloging that coforoneo 
pzooosa delays adjudication secures primary position. Thoy 
mtm foUoMod by tho cosponsos showing rofoxral proooaa 
redundant and those pointing out its pronenoaa to niauaa In 
descending order. The same la the cespcnse pattern of 
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But th« lawyaza and adjudicators ragazd 
pzcn®r.@9s of re ferra l process t o inigii??^ as l t » ohi^f 
de f e c t , Sacorid de fect shown by tha lav/yars aPd 
adjucUcnitlng o f f l c a r a la that la fatra l procasa dalays 
adj xc'lcatlcan, Anrl the third rlc^ f^ c^t in ths i r opinion 
in tha rafesenca c iacret ion is that i t i3 juaceptibla 
t o misu'^e. 
tha analysis cf s t a t i s t i c a l fiata alr.ow^ 
that tVie i-aJboar iii^artitios.t apoTittij anjJoasonabiy larq^r tlina 
curat lor. •(j'hiie iriaking a reff>c<3i;Ga. 
*fi«*pOB4iiits of a l l tut ItuTM croups to th« poUUoaX 
i a t o t f m o o o in IHo o i o M i s o of rofaronoo dlaeroUea tb« 
OoTOfOMat vltli an a c i o r i l y * Bat l a ^lOior rospoots 
^ do M t appour to b m g i v e o e i i e o t l v e eplo loa . flMM» H O l o 
workors wid tialoii U t O ^ n liltii*Uflit tlio r e U of m n tHo 
M i J i f , o^ploirarg liie pay tiio m ^ hvrm M f f t ^ ^ s l y 
« v « l M t o m a m A M X t f this f M t * m t l w r , vhl lo 
tlM ianttOQM of m l e a U a d o r t , on tlio •acoroisa ot 
r a f a r ^ a dlaaratioa, m k a r i dam this faat* baoaasa aaiea 
l a a d a n iaflaaaaa i s wiaUad i a thair faroar . 
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DSLj^ Y t A Vm«AIM0J3 TRAIT OF DSCISIOH » 
MAIOMO Hi THl nJSUD OF hKBOUR WtlDICATIOW 
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Nona of tha labour anactmants (Zhdustrlal Dlaputas 
Act, Paynant of Wagaa Act and Workman's Conpensat ion Act 
ox tha rulas nada under than) lAileh ara aubjaot of tha prasant 
study lay ^ down any statutory parlod within whieAt a diaputa ot 
a elain is t o ba disposad o f . as has baan notad aarl iar « 
Jttt In^ atrial Diaputas Rulas, 1972, prasoriba tha nunibar of 
•djournMnts (naiUauiii miiisar of thraa to aaeh party) and parlod 
sC an adjournsant (ona r^nuOO for tha adjudication of a disputa 
J 5 4 
by tlw UHwiaf Cmrt or InAimtriA m b o i i a * S i a i U f l r f 
I t •P—UU9 tUt t l M liMlt « vitliia t U 
li«amif of • CM* l i to n^tmmm*^ M tli« JTi 
mai. Kaslnir Xndntlurltl oispotM B b I m do set lajr down iny 
p«riod withia vliicli an laAastrlftX Aispat* ! • to 
Aleatt«A by tiM Court or th« Xndiistrlia. Trlbvaal* 
Xlio c«ntrftl Xadnitrlal Dlapntos Rtilss f i x tlio p«rlo4 ef 
8 
3.« mtikB for t1i« tAladieatloB of l o d a i t r l t l Alspi>t«i • 
XodQstrial Bolstioas B l U , 1978« alse proseribod 
tb« poriod of 90 days and 180 dayt t w adjndieatloa 
of Industrial diaputaa by tba labour eourta and indust-
r i a l tribunals raspaetivoly*^ I t wi l l not ba irrala* 
•aat i f soM guidanea i s sought from tho previsions 
of tha Cantral Xndnstrial Dispatas Ealas and lapsed 
Xndastrial Eolations B i l l in fixing the t i M U a i t for 
assessing the delay in the adjadieation of iadastrial 
dispates ia the state of Jasm ead Kashair* Beaeof 
after eoasideriag a l l the relavaat feetorat Hm 
period of six aeaths i s f ixed i o aaeartaia the delay 
in the adjadieatioa of iadastrial d i i ^ t e a i w Hm 
paryeae of thia stady. Xf the t i M apeat la tha 
aiJiMtiaatloa of aa iadaatrial dispatd la aara thaa 
a i s aaatha* i t a t U be regtrdtd as delay* Siailarlyy 
i a thia a t a ^ tha period of alx aoattka U 
adapted to f i a d oat dalay ia tha datendaa-
t&aa af diapatea aad elalaa aadar tha MICMMI*8 
CwEifeeeetlaa dat aad tha Fayaeat af ffagM A«tt w^m 
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thcNif^ ttie provisions of tho rulos of these statutes 
inplledly emphasise the need f o r disposal of oases by 
1 
WAthorltlea uzsdec thea within extrsinely short period. ' 
The normal time l imit for the disposal of labour 
disputes by the labour adJa<iioating bodies having been f ixed ; 
the task of determining fitncticmal e f f i cacy of these bodtes 
vlth respeot to their deoision making may well become easy. 
Table 3.1 provides cc»EQ;>arative picture of the time spent by 
Table 3 .1 . Showing the time spent for adjudication of labour 
cases % the labour adjudicating bodies under 
di f ferent statutes . 
: irr<Q spent 
S.Mo. (in months) 
Labour Court/ 
Tribunal 
(I.D.ACt) 
n-129 
Pfgq^fitagft Qf ffff^ffg 
conmissioner i^thority 
(W.C.Act) (P.U.Act 
n-92 n-110 
1. 0 - 6 32.80 67.39 62.72 
2. 6 > 12 22.48 17.40 24.55 
3. 12 - 18 15.51 6.52 7.27 
4. 18 - 24 13.86 5.43 4.55 
5. 24 - 30 5.43 3.26 00.00 
6. 30 - 34 3.90 00.00 00.00 
7. Sf - 42 00.00 00.00 00. q^  
8 . 42 - 48 00.78 00 .00 00.00 
9 . 48 • 54 3.10 00.00 00.00 
10. 54 - 80 00.00 00.00 00.00 
U . 40 . 88 00.00 00 .00 00 .00 
12. 48 - 72 1.S8 00.00 00.00 
13. n • 0.78 00.00 00.00 
Total 100,00 100.00 100.00 
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•AJnAiottinf WBOmr tli« thr— stmtatM (ZadBi«n«X ms* 
pntM M»tf th« WeviOMa** Coaj^iitatloii mni ttM PajMiit of 
«•<•• Aet) for aidjiidieatiiig ea labour issaos aad elalos* It 
Is avlOaat tbat oat of 1S9 eaaot doelM Hy tl^ L«lioar Coart 
aad th« Xadastrlal 7rilMiaaX» oaljr oao tlilr4 (38*60) bava baoa 
decided within tha period of six aoQths* This mmber tlao la-
oladaa thasa oaaot idiloli have aot eoapIataXy aa^^rgooa tba 
proeaat of adjadieatioa bacftusaHiasr liava baaa breagbt to aad 
at a rosolt of ooovromlsa tattlaaiaQta*^  Xt la aXaar that an 
ovanrlialaiot majority of a seas wara daeided tbroagb adjudlaa* 
tlva prooetA ^ rlng tha pariod of six aoatba to tao yaara« 
It Is slgalflasat that aoaa of tha easaa hava takan as aany 
as thraa to foar yeara for datamlnstloa* What is aora iapor* 
taatf a faw easaa got adjadiaatad aftar tha apaa of fiva yasrs 
aad six paara* 
Xa aaatrast to this, of 808 aasas daoidad by tha 
Goaslasioaar aadar tha Wexaliaa*s Conpaasatioa Aat aad tha 
dathority naOav tha FayMat of Wagaa Aat» good aajoritias 
af tha* ( m M aad raapaatlYaly > hava baaa daai-
dad wimm six Mtatha trm ttia iaitiatian of adladiaativa 
praaaadiaga* Of tha raMiadar» * raapaativaly 
gat diapasad of batwaaa six aoaths sad oaa yaav* A Xittla 
pjN^^anioa of aasas (15«88 * ia*W)t hoaarar, taak aara 
thaa aaa year far diapaasl* Wtm idiat haa baaa said i^vat 
a faaaitsila iafaraaaa aaa ba dvaaa that tha I»8ibattr Caart 
aad tha Zaiaatrial M b m a l ttica aara tias fav datandaiag 
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ditpatM throttgti tlM adjadlofttory pro«Mi la oeaparitoii t9 
tli« Cemltsioatr nnder tb« WorkHM't CeMp«xisatioii lot aoA 
Attttaority under tli« Payavnt ot Vt««i Aet« SMoodly, d^tw 
Bination of Indnttriai diapatas throagh adjadieativa proaaaa 
haa boaii, toy and large, Titlatad by delay, for, rarely a dia-
pota nnder the Indaatrial Dlsputea lot , if i t la to be aettled 
tbroagh adjadlcative process, la adjadioated by the Labour 
Court or the Induatrial Xrlbaual before the period of two yeara 
or Bore tine* The dlspotea vhioh are determined before thia 
period during the oourae of adjudicating proceedinga are gen* 
erally settled by reaching eonproBiae settlements* Adjudiea-
tion of eompensation and waga claims, though for the most 
part, has not been tainted by delay, they (Commissioner and 
Authority) can not be entirely absolved of the charge of 
making delay. For, in a significant number of caaea they 
have spent longer period (from six months to 36 months) which 
Is wholly inexcusable* 
Table 3*2 bringa out the conneetioa between the 
nature of tlie adjadleative deeisions and the time spent 
in making siielb deoisiens* Quite ezpeetedlyi eempromise 
settlements acquire prime position in terms of less tima 
utiliied in the detendnmtien of labour diaputes* Oat 
of total narnber of 113 eempromise settlementst mere than 
one half have been effeeted within the period of 
i months from the start of adjadieative preceas | aad an 
1 fT J Oc-i 
iaqprassivtt nlnorlty of oORqoroaise daclsions (26.55 %) hau^ 
b«an iMda during tha parlod ranging frora s i x months t o twalve 
months. Casparatively* only an insignif icant niueber of 
ooBQ>ronis« s«ttl«Rienta vara roads after spanding one y«ax and 
nore. In oon^axiscn, awards made as a rasult of f u l l y going 
through adjudicative process presents soRie-%ihat cortrasty 
picture . Of 95 awards against non-c^plicants^ about cme half 
(47.71 %) were made within 6 months from the coramencement of 
the adjudicative process and cwie f i f t h (17.89 %) betwa^ s i x 
months and one year. However# in this number proportion of 
thQ awards of Laboar Court and Industrial Tribunal, vrtiich 
comparatively involve nreater time duration^ is only 
insignif icant (having the rat io of 1»3) . Rest of the awards 
in th is category (nearly one third) have been made during the 
period stretching from one year to four years. Awards against 
applicants^ more or less# fol low the same pattern in regard t o 
t iae involved in making them as is noted in case of awards 
against noiwapplicants. Kot une^ectedly , out of 45 ox parte 
awucds* a vast majority of then (62.24 and 17.78 % respeotively) 
have b««n tendered within s i x months and from s i x months to 
one yeex. Only m tmt ex parte awards have hmesn made after 
spending one year or nore ti«e» It appears t o be primarily 
due to the fact that at the stage of beginning of adjudicative 
sproeeedings, non-applieants in most o f these oases (espeoially 
in ease of private ennployera) evade the process of i^e 
edjadioative authority on one pretaxt or the other. As a 
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con9e<|i«na«« adjudicative authority is constcalnad to resort 
to ex pacte proceedings which ultimately culminate in ex parte 
avmrds. 
Finally, a large majority of cases in whidi the 
applicants did not pursue adjudicating proceedings after their 
init iat ion have been f i l e d within s ix mcmths and s ix months 
t o on& year (47,32 % axir^  28,26 % res>octively) . However, in 
good number of cases (23.92 %) the proceedings %fere « l30 
dropped after tiie elapse of one to two years* There seem to 
be two possible reaswis for the early dropping of adjudicative 
proceedings fey the applicant aroployees. One, the resoondent 
^tioloyers on having cane to know that the claim or dispute 
against him has bean taken before the adjudicative authority 
for adjudication mioht persuade the applicant to withdraw the 
proceedings by making s<»na sort of comproinise with him. Second, 
applicant employee after coming before the adjudicative 
authority, and Especially after witnessing the protracted 
cou^-se of adjudicative process, may f ind the adjudioetive 
remedy t o be too tortuous and e s ^ n s i v e to be of any utility 
for hin, and^  consequently^ may forgo hia claim or right in 
sheer desperation• 
The data presented in lable 3.2 lead to two 
inportant conclusions. First, the awards made as a sesult of 
exhausting adjudicative process - whether in fevour of 
applicant or against him or only partly in his favour - usually 
I G l 
«aip«iAl]if of aer* «!•• than tli« oeaproMli* wrarAs or 
031 porto owordi or tho ootot in tvbleli proeoodliigo oro torai* 
ootoA dao to not ^ l a g porsaoA hy tUm oppXloont oaployooo* 
Soeoadlyt ooaproHlto sottlononto woaXd oj^ poor to te proforoblo 
to tbo portlot OS ofoiaft odjiidloativo aottlosoflts ovoa aftor 
f t art of adjadioatlitg proooodlaga it tho partioa aro aoao* 
bow abia to roaob tbaao aottlanaati• 
Tabla 3*3 sbows the klnahlp batwooa roprosoatatioa 
before labour adjadleatlag bodlea aad tine apact la fonwUla* 
ting deoiaiona* It can be obaerrad fron the table that rala* 
tlvaXy the casaa lo vbiob lawyera or rapraaofltatlvaa of tba 
partlea represent botb the partlea take sore time for edjudloa* 
tlon aa dlatlnet from the oasea In efaloh partlea are not rep* 
reaented or only one party to the dlapute baa boon rapraaentad 
by hla rapraaentatlva* Of n eaaaa la whloh lavyera appeared^ 
only a alaorlty of tha«(a9*iag(; #aa dlapoaad of within tha 
period of als Aoatha froa tha atart of the procaadlaga and reat 
of the oaaaa wmm datliad dnrlag the period of alx aoatlHi to alx 
years* f««a lha hlghar parcaataga of aaaaa whlah hara baa* rapre< 
aaatad by lavyara aod aodlag at ao earlier ataga aliovld M t be 
aaaatrtttd that legal rai^raaaatatloa befora MANHif aA|idiaa%lwa 
badiaa faalUtlaa aarly detarftlaatien of dlapataa* TiM i» 
other way vamd* It la ao baaaaaa In the tahla oadev r«f«raaaa 
«aay aaaaa apparaatly dlapaaad of wlttd^a ahort H m villi 
the partlalpatiOB of lavyera hava aat attdargoM iMl wMia 
proaaaa of ad|ttAiaa%ioB« fbay iMiva baaa aa«pfaiil9«A tm Hm 
i B 2 
•iA*vtyr l o r shoald i t l«ad to th9 ioitroaoo that oatry of 
I««yort in tb« proeoodiocs ^otoro l « i o « r adJadiottlTO kodiot 
eoB|>rails« s«tliMi«iit0 «ieQf ttio dispataatt tlaoo 
•utiial ••ttlOMots aro ••inly M d t m • rota l t of n t a a l 
• f forts of ptrt los with or without boiog aidod hy m outiido 
body*^ I t i s aOlso oianifost f ro« Tablo d«3 that tho easoa ia 
i^ioh both tha partias ara rapraaaotad by ttiair rapraaanta* 
tivaa ara tha othar typa of aaaaa that aoaiparatiYaly aotai l 
Mora t iMfl»r disposal* Zn this aatafory only ona third of 
oasts (30*49^) h«va baaa daoidad within six aentbs froa tha 
ooraaneanaat of adjodiaating prooaadiaga and ona fourth in 
tha pariod batwaan six aoaths sad oaa year* What i s nora 
imK>rtaat about tha daoiaiona of this aatagory i s that oaly 
s l ightly balow ona half (40*11^) of thasa daoisioaa vara 
givan in tha pariod of ona yaar to fiwa years* I t «ay 
ba priaarily attribatabla to tha faot that tha raprasan-
tatiwas of tha partias ara gaaarally legal ly traiaad 
partoaaal and hardly d i f f a r frosi thair brathara Isnqrors ( l a 
aaaa of werkarif lawyara who ara o f f i o a holdart in wariotta 
tvada aaima aad in aasa of sMployersf U g b U y traiaad aad 
9 « a l i f i a d paraonaal apaoifiaally appoiatad to attoad to 
lagal aattara}* 
Hot ably I aa i s awidant froa labia 8*9 t aaaaa wlMraia 
diaptttMita paraoaally paraaa adjadiaatiwa ptoaoadiagt or ia 
wliidii aaly o&a of tha partiaa of «ba diapata appoars tAuroiifli 
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hia rapreaentatlva axa« on the whole, determined in shorter 
tii6«« It la part icular ly so In regard t o tho oaaas In nhicfti 
parties thomsolvM pl«ad Idieir casaa be fore the adjudioating 
authorit ies . Thus* of 71 cases given in the Table under 
reference* a vast niajority (83.10 %) have been decided just 
within s i x iBonths* and of the remainder* 8 .44 % within s ix 
reontha t o one year and an eqaal mr^ex within one year t o 
thEee years. The ccmclasion emerging freai the data contained 
in Table 3*3 is naturally that the la%#yers and professional 
representatives appearing on b ^ a l f of industrial worKers and 
esnployers lengthen the adjudicative proceedings* and^as a 
I 
reaalt, the -^as^ in which they appear take more time for 
decision . On the other hand* se l f representation by the 
disputants i^ ; cotiducive t o <iaiok rendering o f adjudicative 
decisions and conclusion of l i t i ga tory process . 
Table 3*4 deals with the type ^f organissation 
(pyiblia aeetor or private sector) in ^ i o h disputes haive 
arisen and i t s bearing on the t ine fac tor involved in the 
d«ft«ni|jtatioii o f the disputes. It i « c l ear ttom the table 
that under the Ikidustxial Disputes Aot and the WorlOMii** 
Conpensation Act there i s no s igni f i cant d i f fersnoe betw—ii 
disputes and claims aris ing froM the i ^ b l i e eeetor tmdectaklngi 
and thMe from the private establlahnanta ooneexning the tlsMi 
ejvended f o r the ir disposal* Dispates belonging t o both the 
seotors under both these Aots lunre been* aore or Imum* m m l y 
NS b under d i f f exent o lasMS o f t i n e intexvaXs* as labOMil in 
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the t « b l « . How«ver# in contrast t o th is , th« posit ion under 
thm PayiMnt of w«g«a Act la a l i ^ t l y d i f f a rant . Undar thia 
Act wags claims o f oRiployaaa of tho public aactor undaxtakin^a 
i«ould aaan t o taka laas t ina fox disposal by tha Mthor i ty 
than the claims of the amployaas of private astablishnienta • 
All tha 15 disp^ites of public sector have been decided within 
tha tinia l imit of one and a half years . On the other hand< 
although raajor poxticm of wage claiina of workmen of private 
employers (92.63 } have been decided within the period of 
one and a half years# some cases (7.37 %) have markedly taken 
TDUch larger duration of time f o r decision than that of any 
of the wage clalxos of an employee of tha public sec tor . But 
keeping into view the limited number of cases of public 
sector establishment3« an authentic ascertion cannot be mada 
that wage olaijns of workmen in public sector undertaking 
under the Payment of Wages Act naed l€»3 time f o r adjudication 
by tha Authority than the wage claims of emplcyaes o f private 
aatabliahmants. Thus^ from the data set out in Tabla 3,4 i t 
can be patently inferred that the type of the organisation 
(vtMthax publ io or private sector) giving r ise t o a diapota 
doss not psxforoa ahortan or lengthen tha tima during whloh 
tha dlsputs la adjudioatad on.^ 
Jn Table 3*S data h«va been presented t o aaewtain 
tho oonnaotlon* i f any, betiiaen tha oonau^ptlon o f t ina fox 
•djudioatian and tha typat o f d i s p u t a ^ o X ^ s t o bo adjudicatad 
upon* AO la obvloua fxoai tha tabla , undor tha Voynant of 
Wogoo Aot, xagaxdloM of tho type of woga oloHidndiTlduol ox 
JG7 
ooll«otiir«) thtt t ine spent fox adjudioation Is the s«ne. 
Sxoepting one individual clalir of wages which has been decided 
during the period between 36 months and 42 months* a l l the 
oases under the Paynent of Wages Act have been decided below 
the time l imit of two years. But the posit ion of adjudication 
of disputes under the Tndiistrial Disputes Act would appear t o 
be somewhat otherwise. Out of 107 Iridlvldual izv^u"Atrial r'isputes, 
caily 4 minute fract ion (3.73 of these cases have been 
adjadicated In the period of 42 months t o 72 months. In 
striking contrast t o this , of 22 to ta l c o l l e c t i ve Ind iatrial 
diapatoa, quite a alsable prc^ortion (18,20 got ^ jud lcated 
during tha par loci rariQlng from 42 rnonths to 72 months and more-
It i s quite possible that had the number of co l l e c t ive 
indajtr ial disputes eqiial to that of individual disputes, which 
have been shown in the table# the quantum of c o l l e c t i ve 
disputes larger aanount of time f o r determination would 
have been greater. Thus^it may be implied from Table 3*5 
that type o f dispute/alain (individual or co l lect ive)respect ing 
payMwnt of wages under the Baynent of Wages Act is not 
determinant o f the t ine required t o adjudicate on than by the 
Authority. But the c o l l e c t i ve industrial disputes would seen to 
SMNseasitata lasgex time dusation fox adjudication by th« 
Laboix Court and mdustrial Tribunal than the t ine n«ad«d fox 
detexmiaing individual industrial disputes, jathou^ in view 
of avai labi l i ty of l i » i t e d nuabex of oo l l eo t ive industxial 
disputes fox the puxposes of pxesent study ths va l id i ty of 
the above oooextion cannot bo xogaxdod as uniHpooohiflolo* i t i s 
JR o 
Table 3«S. showing the type of labour disputes and the t ine 
spent for adjudication of such disputes • 
Individual Collaqtlva 
disputes / elalaa disputes / claiins 
3.Ho. 
Sine spent 
(in months) 
Z.D.Act 
(n-107) 
P.W.Act 
(n - 94) 
z.D.Aet 
(n «• 22) 
p.w.Aet 
(n-l6) 
1. 0 - 6 35.52 60.64 31.79 68.75 
2. 6 - 12 21.50 24.47 13.64 25.00 
3. 12 > 18 19.63 3.51 9 .09 00.00 
4. 18 - 24 13.08 5.32 9.09 6.25 
5. 24 - 30 3.74 00.00 13.64 00.00 
6 . 30 - 36 2.80 00.00 4.55 00.00 
7. 36 - 42 00.00 1.06 00.00 00.00 
8. 42 - 48 00.00 00.00 4.55 00.00 
9 . 48 - 54 2.80 00.00 4.55 00.00 
10. 54 - 60 00.00 00.00 00.00 00.00 
I t . 60 - 66 o.oo 00.00 00.00 00.00 
12. 66 - 72 0.Q3 00,00 4.55 00.00 
13. 72 + 00.00 00.00 4.55 00.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 100,00 100.00 
Motel In the con^Mnaation oases of the wrkmen und^ the 
MorHm(tfi*s Coaipensation Acst which form part of 
this study- there was no case Involving oo l l eo t i ra 
ocMpsnsation claliii. 
a-A 
ttiMistalcably^indlaator of the possible faiot that ao l lsdt lve 
industxial dUkSputes take more timi than ijidlvidual industrial 
disputes for adjudioaticm under the Xn^istrial Disputes Act. 
Table 3.6 i s designed t o osiploxe whsither d i f fer«Rt 
kinds of oases under the Ihdustrial Disputes Act such as 
refeioDoe oas«s# oosiplaints under aeotlon 33-^ (2)» ete*. involved 
di f ferent periods of tliee for adjudioatimi by the Labour Court 
and XndistxiaX Tribunal. It i s patent f m the table that xef«gsB«a 
J e n 
SftbXt «•< anewliiff tiM tOaA et iotettrlaX ditpaUt 
•04 nm tim s fMt for 
9t mill AltMiUtt mnUr Vcm ZatatttlaX 
<in •enliii) ^ • a — U ^ ) j d ^ ^ W m m awydg ( • » i ) 
iio*oo 1* 0 - d 87.87 86.84 
t* d • X2 8X.80 8X.06 
XS X8 X8.X8 M.88 
18 • 84 X8a8 7.08 
a* 84 • ^ 7M S.8X 
d« 80 - 3d 4M X.74 
7 . 3d • 4S OOM 00*00 
8« 4 8 - 4 8 X.88 00.00 
9* 4 8 - 6 4 9M 8.8X 
XO* 84 - dO OOM 00.00 
Xl* dO • dd 00.00 00.00 
X8. dd * 78 8*08 00.00 
X8* 78 • X.8B 00.00 
toUX 100J» XOO.OO 100.00 
••••s aii4«v tiM lii«asm«X OUmtm Mt eenpuiat 
md typUoatimis Mltlaf Mid* «« pdHd m r d t rdlJi* 
wMd ff«««dv U m dirdUM for ddtdfiiiwitiM tauPMili td* 
Jddiddtivd MtlMd* Ottt #7 w p l e t o t ddtddf • t l f d U i d u t 
Bority «f tlMM (MtNII) «•• d i tpmd df vitliia nm tpm df l ix 
•ddtH* Mid m m ttMB m li«U(fd«M|l) W d adldditatcd ddrlag tlid 
ytriod df slJE mliui t« td rnam^ Only d m O X of 
oddfiaiat doaot b«ro Imoa dddidod dydddldf BdTd ttida 8d aontlM* 
OA ooAtrAryyMvoly end fddF«li(a7«f9)() df tofdrdddd OMOd lidwd 
%doa odjddiootod aaddt tbo poHod of d dddttid'aAd lid|f(01«iG||) of 
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xefexanoe oaaes %fttz« adjudlaat«d batwMn £ months and 24 
months and a s isabla mnbaz (21.23 %) got adjudleatod in a 
oonpaxatively nwic^ i largaz span of tlma start ing fcom 24 months 
to 72 months and more. As regards tl'm 4^:q;»lication8 f o r 
rescinding ex parte awards* a l l these s i x applications have 
b e ^ disposed o f within s i x nxxiths. Therefore* by any 
reckoning/ reference disputes ur^dar the Industrial Dispute Act 
as d i s t i n c t from complaint cases and the cases seeking 
resc iss ion o f ex parte awards take more time f o r ad judicat ion . 
0enoe# from the data incorporated in Table 3.6 i t i s c l e a r l y 
ii^ferable that the varied kinds of industr ia l disputes have 
a bearing on the time daring which they are adj id icated in as 
nuch as reference disputes take more time than other kinds o f 
industr ia l d isputes . 
Table 3>7 contains the responses o f lawyars and 
adjudicating o f f i c e r s which indicate t h e i r opinion on the time 
involved in adjudicwtion of oasas by the labour adjudiaating 
Mithor l t i es . Xt i s evident that larga iiiuA>er of lawyers and 
adjudieating o f f l o a r s (37.34 %) po int out that labour o a M 
•ro disposed o f kqr the m t l i o r i t i e s betiieen the posiod o f 9 and 
13 nonthe. Homwres* anothor slaaible psoportion o f coapondants 
(ai .34 %) thiidc that the labour oasoa aco doolded In ooiq>atatively 
Imam tiMe (between 5 t o 9 moitths) from tho stuuct of adjudicating 
ptoooodlngs* But two othor groups o f lawrors and adjudieating 
o f f l o o t s (19 . iS % eaoh) otate that tho labour oasos take Moro 
202 
Tablo 3.7.Showing rasponsaa of lawyars and •djudicating 
authozltlas about the tijno at 11 lead for the 
diaposal o f a case . 
of reapondenta 
S.No. (In months (n •• 75) 
1. 0 3 2.67 
2. 3 - 5 0.00 
3. 5 - 7 10.67 
4 . 7 - 9 10.67 
5. 9 - 11 34.67 
6 . 11 - 13 2.67 
7. 13 mm 15 18.67 
8 . 15 - 17 00.00 
9 . 17 - 19 00.00 
10. 19 - 21 00.00 
11. 21 - 23 00.00 
12. 23 & above 18.65 
13. KO pption 1.33 
Total 100.00 
Motet Of the aix adjudicating a i t orit iea* one did not 
eaqpzesa any opinion and the remaining f i v e stated 
that oases are decided w i ^ i n one year fron the 
date of the start of the proceedings. 
time for adjudication by labour adjudicating authorit ies . One 
of these groups states that l ^ o i r eases are decided between 
the period of 15 t o 17 months and according t o the other (xne 
labour oases get adjudicated after spending period of 2A 
months and even more time from the start of the adjudieetlng 
proeess. The above data leads to an liq;>ertw)t infercmoe that 
eren according t o the opinion of lawyers and adjudicating 
o f f i c e r s adjudication of labour issues by the labour adjudicating 
bodies i s a f f l i c t e d by delay, Zt i s so because according to 
an orerwhelming majority of respondent lamyers and •djudicattlng 
1 7 2 
o f f l o o r s (74.68 %) labour o«««s are decided through the 
adjudioatlng process by spending the period of aldout one year 
or imic^ larger time. Henoe# the views eaqpressed by the 
lawyers and adjudioatlng o f f i c e r s substantially aocord with 
the findings derived fron the s t a t i s t i c a l data relating t o 
the time consuned for adjudicating on labour cases. 
lO;>ove analytical aooount of the s t a t i s t i c a l data 
unec|ilvocally affirms the fact that adjudication of Industrial 
disputes and claims by the I^abour Court «nd Tnckastrlal Trllaunal 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
under the nidustrlal Disputes Act and by the 
Conrolss loner «nder the MOKkmen's Compensation Act as well as 
the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act marginally has 
been tainted by delay which is a re^^lar feature of the 
determination of disputes by the jud i c ia l courts , m fact* as 
has been ^ earlier « the prime factor that had actuated the 
creation of l ^ o u r adjudicative bodies In nodern times was 
the urgency of determining labour cases ea^Midltlaasly. Mow 
that very object of labour adjudioatlng bodies i s being 
defeated by Amla^t which mark the c cm^ct of adjudicating 
proeeedlnge by tliaae bodies fox i t s own* Hence* i t w i l l be 
f r u i t f u l to loeate the causes o f delay in the Idbour 
•djudicatory £ield# so that af ter the saextainnent o f these 
causes* e f f e c t i v e rvaedisl measures could be suggested t o 
prsvent further srosion of the u t i l i t y of labour Adjudicatory 
systsM, 
1 7 3 
Aa^oityiwatg wiA P l^Mr 
Xf tlitr« is mj potmt oatit« oi protrMtlag pre* 
••tf of sdJiiAleAtloii e m i t A en by My aAJadleatory fei^t It 
I t «s%r«v«g«iit •djoanmeiitt thmt f onserapleosXy teoflil 
and leoeely granted* T)ils i t the root eante that haapert 
speedy eonelution of adjudieative proeeedlngt in any sphere* 
One wished Xi^onr adjudicatory field would hawe been aade 
IfliBuae to this rainous nalady* 
fable 3*8 sets out the adjottrnnents that have been 
granted in the eaaes foMing part of the saaple* It ean be 
seen that the eases deeided under the Zndastriel Disputes Aet 
fable 3*8 Shoving the relationship between the statute and 
total nuiiber of adjournttentt sought under then* 
Ro* of cases sought 
s*iro* Statutes (n • 831) J^rjoTT*)^ 
1« Xndastrial Dispute Aet i m 4ft«ii 
ft* M k M a U Cempeasatlen Aet 98 19*77 
t « reyaeat of faget M 110 a4«il. 
fe ta l 100*00 
by tiM I.a)»ear CearVXadustrial zribaaal oeeapy prisaty pesltiea 
in reepeet of aAJottraaents granted la tbm. Of 4»077 
total aAJouroMati a l l m i in m eatoa iaeladed in the taaple» 
aeavly mo half havo beeo graated la m eases alaao 
1 7 4 
froa d««l0iea* of Labottv Coort asA Xii4iistvi«X 
TrilMaiial* Tims on an «fMPic«f M adloa^iuwiits lunr« 
g r u i M in 0Mli of XS9 this mrago It aero ttiaa Iho 
doabXo of tho aaxiaaa anabor of 9 aAieoraaoaU vliloli coolA tea 
10 
ttatatorUr without assigainc taf vaaton ia witiat* 
la t«nit of Aajra, ISO days arc vaatsd in aaoh oaaa daa to thasa 
adJoillBaanta, fort rwoly aa adjottraaaat of lata thaa 16 days 
dnrttion ia grantad ia a oaaa* It ia iatrigalng to aota that 
ia ona aaaa aaoag thaaa 129 eaaaa aa aaay aa 106 adjoaraaaata 
hava baaa graatad* It ia folloaad by fi^a othar eaaaa with 
66f fi7t 66t 60 46 adjoaraaaata raapaativaly graatad ia thaa* 
Xhaaa ataggariag aairiiara of adjoaraaaata graatad ia oartaia 
aaaaa axpoae tba futility and irralaYanea of adjudioativa 
aathod for aattliag labour diaputaa* 
Ia eontraat, tha traad of pamlttiag adjoaraaaata by tha 
Coaalaaioaar under tha wonoMa'a Coapaaaatioa Aat aad ^ a 
Authority aadar tha Faynant of Wagaa Aot appaara to bo oaly 
alightly diffaraat trm that of Ubour Court aad Zaduatrial 
Tribaaal* Xa 9S aaaaa dtaidad aadar tha HoitaaaU Caaipaasatioa 
Aat 19«773l(i06) and ia 110 aasM daaidad aadar tha Fayaaat «f 
Wagaa Aat 84«6]^ (1,411) of total adjouraaaata hata boaa aUowad* 
Takaa togathar ia eot aaaaa aalaatad froa ttka daaiaioaa af tha 
Coaalaaioaar aadar tha lorkaaa*a CoMptaaatlaa iat aad 
tha Authority aadar tba Fayaaat of Wagaa Aet aa 
of tha aa^pla a i i tt la abova oaa half (64«46^} af tatal 
adjoaffaaaata af al l tha aaaaa of tha aanyla hata baaa graatad* 
On an «verage# aadh of 202 oaaaa comes t o ba daoidad with 11 
adjourniTiQnta. In respect of days l os t in adjournraants, 165 
days have bean spent on adjoumniants in each case. Even thou^ , 
unlike the Industrial Disputes Rules* the Workman's Conpemsation 
Rules and the Payment of Wages Rules do not speci fy the mmbex 
of adjournments that can ba granted in a case^ in^liedly the 
flp^haais i s an much early disposal of casoii. The above data 
roa}ce i t irrefragably patent that adjournments granted in the 
oases whether decided under the Industrial Dij^utes Act or 
the workmen's Compensation Act or the Payment of Wages Act are 
much excessive in number, and at rata, more than what i s 
statutor i ly intende*!. Clearly, granting of the superfluous 
adjournraants adds substantially to the delay which unfai l ingly 
hinders the speedy cor^duct of labour adjudication proceedings* 
Table 3.9 shows the nature o f awards and the 
adjoumnenta granted in then. As is c lear frcct the table* the 
T«bl« 3 •9. Showing the celatioiwlilp between the netate ef 
the a%Nirda and the edjouxnnanta granted therein. 
Ko.of Adttoiimeents sou^t 
OMiee liB penentage) 
S.No. Typm of mmxA (ii«33i) (n-4077} 
1. Ci^pfonlee 113 
2* Awesds p a r t l y In fatvoar 
ot qpplxoante 6 
3. AMWEis egainat noiw 
•pplioeiit 95 
4* Awucda egeinet 
iXiCMBt 26 
S* Sx paste anrarda 45 
6. Applieetione aionissed 
Aie t o net being paxaueA 46 
(laae) i 8X«iO 
(41) I«00 
(119«) 
( 448) x o » w 
(430) mm 
1 474) 
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th« h i ^ a s t proportion o f adj ournroents (17 per oaso) i s in 
the awards against applicants. It i s followed by ex parte 
awards (14)« awards against norwapplicants (12)» compromise 
settlements (11) # dismissal of proceedings due t o want of 
pursuing them (10)» and awards partly in favour of applicants 
(7) . Thus from these data It i s c lear that barring a%fards 
partly in favoir of applicants in which comparatively the 
average of adjourxanents i s small, in a l l other types of 
awards which have bean made on the completicm of adjudicatory 
process, the average o£ adjournments i s hi<^ar. ^^ s a result , 
they take raore time for adjadication. m coinpBomise awards 
an'l 'lisniissai of applications dae t o not being pursaQ-^ ; the 
averag<5 of adjournment3 ia only ' . l ight ly less and therofore, 
they are also not f ree frc«Ti the Xaint of superfluous 
adjournitU3nt3 • 
The granting of extravagent adjournments in labour 
cases being establishsoA, i t i s ncKsessary t o go into the reasons 
by adducing which these adjoumm^ts are sought, so that i t 
could be Judged whether these reasons are genuine or otherwise. 
Table 3.10 ia indicative of the grounds on which the 
adjudication proceedings are frecfuently adjourned. It i s 
<d3vioaa from the table that major grounds of securing or 
grwt ing are< tanaining absent by the part ies , avoidance o f 
service o£ surnnons, In stat€roant of demands and 
rejoindars, f o r tendering evidence* producing witnesses, 
preparing arguments* i l lness of the part ies , making e f f o r t s 
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foe oonpronlstt s«ttl«n«nts. Presiding Of f icsxs out of tho 
station oc busy with othar woxk or on and adjoucnnonts 
made as part of incanplote hoajcings. I t ia further (ivident 
from the table that the employers are the principal adjourn-
nents seekers before the labour adjudicating bodies . Xn all# 
they have s o u ^ t nearly one third of the t o ta l adjournments 
granted in the cases under study. This does not include 
adjoumnents %^ioh they j o i n t l y sou^^it with the other party. 
Their prime ground of seeking adjoummfioits* or t o put i t more 
bluntly* of sv'Oiding adjudicatimi proceedings ia t o del iberately 
reinain absent cm the date of the hearing. Doubtless* this 
ploy (remaining absent) is conpletely devoid of legal imprimatur. 
Of the t o ta l adjournments (1301) s o u ^ t by en^loyers* one half 
(51.57 %) are on account o f their being absent. I t is indicator 
of the fact that how l ight ly they take the adjudication 
proceedings and are in a posit ion to. f l o u t authority of 
adjudicative foruns with laipunity.^^ Akin t o theix del iberately 
keeping from hearings before the adjudicative «ithoxitiea is 
their pract ice of avoiding receipt of sunaons oi mm pxmtmMt 
or the other ^ ^ and as a necessary oonseqpienee of this being 
able to postpone the initiation o f adjudication pxoeess or 
the oonduot o f hearing^ as the ease may« for a eonsidttrablo 
period. Respondent esfployers hanre prooured 16«19 % 
•djoianiaents on aooount of anroiding servioo of suMMfui of the 
total •djoamnents sooisred by then. Other iaportant subterfago 
•doptod by tho eaployers to mrtOm adjudioatlvo pieeeedings ia 
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to Intentionally delay the £lling of written statements and 
in the pxooess t o get s<Hiie adjoacnments foz the sane. Against 
38 adjousnnents got by the applicant omployees f o r su1i»nitting 
their clalns/statoinants of demands In the eases under study, 
non*-applicants have secured 104 adjournments t o submit written 
s t a t ^ e n t s . further^ qaite a s iz«^le number of adjairnments 
have been sought by the employers on the ground of i l l n e s s . 
Other groucls of seeking adjcurnmoonts with the employers arei 
t o adduce evidencsf to produce witnesses, inabi l i ty of the 
lawyers to appear due t o one reason or the other and inabi l i ty 
of the adjikdicative forum to serve suinnons on the party. 
I t has been seen that with the enployers remaining 
deliberately abserit on the date of hearing i s the main source 
of evading adjudicative proceedings. Sane is the case with 
the workmen, Thus« whem adjudicating proceedings do not 
apparently serve their purpose or they are not s a t i s f i e d with 
adjudiaative me^od as a ifieans of redressing their griiviences« 
they start disza^^ding the proceedings by keeping th<«n8elv«i 
ibssnt OB tha dates of hearings. Oit of e04 to ta l adjournments 
•oit^t by tho more than one half of these are on 
aoeoant at thoic x«Mining absent. This also aaqplains 
eaqfmxativoly hi#i proportion of dismissal of applications 
by tho adJudioatlBg aatl iorit ios . Sooond la|>ortant ground on 
aoooant of whioh ippl ioants s o ^ most o f the adjoummonts i s 
tho pgodaotiSB «£ witnoooos. 2f ,49 % of tho •AJoaznmonts 
ttMm by tlio ipplloanto axo ato t o th is roason* 
1 r-H 
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»mxt, of the Joint adjoucnnsnts (598) securod by 
th« parties* more than one thlzd (36.12 %) ware s o u ^ t to 
isake e f f o r t s for compronlse settlenenta* This appears to be 
one of the genuine grounds for getting adjournments* Other 
grounds in this category are* remaining absent (34.11 %) t 
preparing arguments (10.70 %), non-servioe of suioBons(7.36 X), 
and producing documents and witnesses (2.17 % St 1.67 % 
respect ively) . 
Finally* Presiding Off icers of their own accord 
also adjourn proceedings quiite frequently. This i s due t o 
their being out of station (7.32 %), going on leave (4.20 %), 
being busy with other o f f i c i a l work (2.86 %) and slackness 
in making epx>ointiaent3 and transfers of Presiding Of f i cers 
(1.34 % & 1.78 % respect ive ly ) . Besides,most of the 
adjournments (more than one third of a l l the adjournments 
granted in the cases under study) have been made on account 
of lncanq;>lete hearings. The oirerall picture emerging f0on 
these data i s that the most handy and freciiently wielded 
ground* especially by the l i t i g i ous employers* is that of 
not appearing befoxe the adjudicating authority to attend 
the hearings. This* ooipled vlth deliberating avoiding 
reeelpt of m—fwa ox pxosess servers by the employees* leads 
to an incvlt^bU Infexenoe that esipXoyers* thou^ wortaen 
m not fiiUy txm ttm the ohaxga of Ignoring the •djudieative 
proeoM if i t « i l t« ttim* have l i t t le faith and reverence 
for aijiidiMtiv* Mthod for solving their disputes, sooond* 
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••akln^ of graatar nundoar of adjournnants by tha Kaspondant 
aBq[>loyars f or patting In cajolndara olaaxly shows that tha 
flii^lo3r«r« start adopting delaying tact i cs in tha eon<&iot o f 
adjudicating procaedings r i ^ t from tha baginning. Third, 
tha naedfor malcing stupendous number o f adjoamments as part 
of incanpleta hearings« seeking of nujnerous adjoumraents by 
the part ies f o r adducing evidence* producing witnassaa* 
preparing argunents, e t c . Obviously leads t o the conclusion 
that formality of procadures, «^ich is typ ica l of the functioning 
of ordinary courts* also plagues tha labour adjudicating 
proceedings. Finally, raany an adjoumroont is^of necessity , 
made because of Presiding Of f i cers being busy with other worlc 
or the ir being out of stat ion or on leave or keing under 
transfer order or not being appointed. Therefore, the 
inference is that the Presiding Of f i cers as wall as government 
are also partly responsible f or perpetration of delay in tha 
adjudication of labour cases . 
Tabla 3.11 represents the responses of employara 
wall a* o f workmen and union leaders indicating roasona 
•dhranaad by th«n t o aacuxa adjotimnents from tha labour 
•djttdieaiting bodiaa. Zt i s obvious ^ a t major ground 
indicated by an overwhelming majority (73.68 %) o f employers 
t o aaoura adjoummiints o f adjudicating proceedings is that 
o f malcing e f f o r t s f o r conqprOTiise se t t laments. On tha other 
hand, with majority o f workers and union leaders (65.23 %), 
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as with 4Mq;»loy«xs« th« pzinclpal ground for SMking 
adjoaxnments i s also t o ina)so of f o r t s f o r oon^roniao 8«ttl«Bfunts. 
A few workers and union loaders have also shown attending 
Table 3.11. Showing responses of oiRployers air^ workers/ 
union leaders about reasons advanced by thsBi 
for 3e«^ing adjournments (Figs, in percentage). 
S.K'o. 
Class of reasor. 
f or seeking 
. adj^mments 
Ekiployers 
(n - 57) 
v/orker/Jnion 
leaders (n»256) 
1. For sett l ing disputes 
fay mutual negotlati<wis 73.69 65.24 
2. For attending other businessl2.28 16.41 
3. For attending legal 
proceedings in other courts 00.00 1.56 
4 . Kon-availability of 
lawyers 00.00 8.59 
5. Others 1.75 2.34 
6. D<Mi't know/no opinion 12.28 5.86 
Total 100.00 100 .00 
other business and non-avei labi l i ty of lawyers (16.41 & 
8.59 % respectively) as the grounds for getting adjoumwents. 
:biterestingly, there i s glaring contradiction betwe«D the 
groimds g^own by respondent employers w d workers f o r 
securing adjoumnittits and those in fact put foxvard by 
them before loibaur adjudicating bodies. Saaeopting one 
grotnd (seeking adjoumnents for nutually set t l ing the 
dljqeMeif^ i) a l l other f recpeiiA^ wielded grounds wach as 
*«»aining iktsent on the date hearing, avoiding service 
of suMMBs, filing rejoinders, producing witnesses, etc. 
hsnre not bean divulged by tlie parties. 
J 
Tabla 3,12 reiatas to the Kespcmsea of wockess 
and union laadexs regardlnQ the Sinalcing of un jus t i f i ab l e 
adjournments by the employers to protract adjudicating 
proceedings. It can be seen that workers and uni<») leaders 
Table 3.12* Showing responses of workers and union 
leaders ^ o u t whether «Riployers s e ^ 
un just i f iab le adjoumnients t o delay 
adjadicative proceadinys. 
Kind of Percentage of 
3.No, response resp<widenta (n«256) 
1. Yes 91,80 
2. No 2.73 
3. Dtwn't loiow 5.47 
Total 100.00 
almost uniformly (91,80 'A) are of tha view that employers 
seek unjust i f iable adjoarnnjents for intentionally d<=»laylng 
tliQ adjudicatory p r o c e e d i n g T h i s outright condem-nation 
of employera by the workers ray be part ly betraying the c lass 
prejudice of tho labour against the ernployers and partly 
r e f l e c t ing bitterness and desperation of the workers caused 
by d i f f e rent delaying t a c t i s adopted by the employers t o 
prolcmg the labour adjudicating proceedings. Un any case* 
the assertion o£ the workers (seizing of un jus t i f i ab l e 
adjourniaents by the wployera) Is imbued with gseatec 
measuxe of v « r i ty as^ in actual psactioe/ enqaloyers* do resort 
t o d i f f e rent dwrieea <|iite frec}Aently f o r prolonging the 
adjudicating proceedings. 
Table 3.13 indicates the suggestions tnade by the 
workers and union leaders for preventing the esqaloyers f rcn 
J 8 u 
T«bl« 3 . IS . Showing auggeatlons iB«d« by the %iorkers/ 
union laadecs t o dheck pract ice of seeking 
unjust i f iab le adj ou rwnants by the arnployers. 
S.Ko • Class of ^ggest ion 
Percentaga of 
respondents 
(n - 235) 
1. Only genuine adjournments are t o 
ba granted 15.32 
2. An adjournment t o be granted <sily 
i t is ajssolately necessary 63.83 
3. An adjournm^t to be granted only 
there is supportive evidence 
f o r the same 
8.94 
4 . Only tnree adjournments in a l l t o 
be granted t o the employer 6.81 
5. I^ o suggestions 2.98 
6, Others 2.13 
Total 100.00 
seeking unjust adjournraants. Most iraportant suggestion 
made by the majority of workers (63.83 %) is that an 
aajournRicMTit is t o be allowed only i f i t is indi-spensably 
recsiisite, i ,a.# the Presiding t^fficar should not evince 
l ibera l i ty in raspect of granting adjournments on f l imsy 
grc^nds* A number of respond^^nts have also made other 
suggestions for checking tho grant of un just i f iab le 
adjoumments* Th«se are that only genuine adjournments are 
to be gxantadi that adjoununents t o be permitted only ^ e n 
thaxa la suppextiva evidence (medical c e r t i f i c a t e etc.) for 
tha Sana and that thara ^bu ld ba l imitation of thraa 
adjoanmants to ba allowad t o the zespcmdent ofoployers in a 
oasa. 
Zt baoonas claax fcom Tablaa 3*12 6 3.13 that 
i#orking alass has Innata faalings that enployars generally 
taka adjttdioating proooadings £ll|^»antly and resort t o 
ISG 
various oa^adlenta t o protract the proceedinga. 
The vi«wa ejqpresaed by the workers eonoernlng 
adjournments s o u ^ t by the oonployers in the proceedings 
before labour adjudicating authorities are also echoed by 
the lawyers and adjudicating o f f i c e r s . It is manifest from 
Table 3.14 that majority of lawyers and adjudicating o f f i c e r s 
TaJ l^e 3*14. Showing responses of lawyers and adjudicative 
authorities a^^out a party seeking more 
adjournments on fr ivolous grounds. 
Percentage of 
Parties seeking resoondents 
S•I^ So• fr ivolous adjournments vn <" 75) 
1. Employers/Managerial s ta f f 58.68 
2. Trade union o f f i c i a l s 8.00 
3. Litigant workers 5.33 
4 . Presiding o f f i c e r s grant adjournmants l ibera l ly 4.00 
5. Presiding Off icers adjourn 
proceedings frequently on their own 4.00 
6 . Ho party seeks privolous adjournments 1.33 
7. Ko opinion 1.33 
8 . Presiding Of f i cers grant adjournments 
only on legitimate grounds 8.00 
9 . Others 9.13 
Total 100.00 
(58.417 %) feel that inployers and managerial staff seek 
gSMtec mnbex of redundant adjournments on fxiTolous grounds. 
It is also clear from the table that in the opinion of lawyers 
and adjudicating officers litigant workers and union leaders 
do not seoure adjcuma«nts on ifrivolous grouiada. Nor do the 
data presented in the table under cefeKenee oorctiborate the 
faat that Presiding Qffioecs «rinoe liberality in granting 
xoAundant adJoasniMnte. 
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Tabltt 3.15 shows suggestions made by the lawyers 
and adjudicating offioecs for ref lat ing the grant o£ 
adjournments in proceedings before lid^our adjudicating bodies. 
As is clear from the table that a sieable fraction of tha 
respondents (36.1 %) have refrained from making any suggestions, 
T ^ l e 3«15. Showing suggestions made by la%fyers/E>residing 
Of f icers f o r l imitlna the number o f adjourn-
ments t o be granted in a 
Class of suggestion 
Percentage of 
respondents 
(n - 75) 
1. Adjournments only for gamine 
grounds 22.67 
2. Fixing maximum number of 
adjournments (8) in a case or 
maximum period for disposal 
(6 mc^ths) 
29.32 
3. sunniary procedure for disposal 6.67 
4. Fixation of adjournments not 
possible 5.33 
5. Ko suggesti<»is 17.34 
6. Others 18.67 
Total 100.00 
Of the remaining respcHi<tents» 22.67 per c«Hnt 
suggest that adjournments should be allowed only on genuine 
grounds, and 29.32 per cent opine that maxiraim of 8 
adjournments should be fixed for the oonclusion of proceeding 
in a case of alternatively six months period is to be leid 
down for the disposal #f a case, i^ggestions offered by the 
lawyers and adjudlo«ting officers clearly indicate that they 
feel concerned over the unjustifiable and unnecessary 
adjotsnneRts sought by the employers in labour adjudicating 
prooeedlngs whloh ln«<rltiibly rwmlt in the prolcmgation of 
•djudioatlmi •£ ciasM. 
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A debatable qaeatlon is whether lawyers appearing 
before labour adjudioating bodies protract the adjudicative 
proceedings conducted by these bodies . Table 3.16 shows the 
relationship between the repjaisentation before labour 
adjudicating bodies in the cases under study and the 
adjounur nts s o u ^ t therein. It is manifest that the 
Table 3. f6. Showing the relationship between representation 
in the cases and the adjcxirninenta s o u ^ t therein, 
""" Percentage of 
Ko. of adjouminents 
No. R^resentation cases(n«331) nought(n=4077) 
1. Lawyers 92 43.98 
2. Trade union o f f i c i a l s 15 4.42 
3. Employers representative 
only 71 14.69 
4. Representatives on 
behalf of both parties 82 25.26 
5. SeIf-pleading 71 11.65 
Total 100.00 
largest number of adjoamroents (only marginally below (me 
half of the total) have been grantcKSl in 92 cases represented 
by lawyer*. In contrast to this* in 71 cases wherein se l f -
plMding has hmm made by the parties only 11.65 per cent 
adjournments have been sought. Further, in 71 cases where 
only one of the parties ia ceprasentad by a representative^ 
14.CO par oant of adjournments have bean granted and in 82 
oasas in which both partiaa waxa repxaaantad by their 
represantativtts 25*26 par cent of adjournments ware given. 
Tms, tha oases xapraaantad by lawyers* in terms of 
I P , : , 
adjournnjonta, patently get the >^ >etter of other casas where 
self -pleading la made or representatives of oart ies s p e a r e d . 
However* as is avidant frcro lab le 3,10 (supra)« overal l share 
of laviyers* personnel adjoarrunents is only meagre (1,84 % of 
the to ta l adjournments). Therefore, i t is not clear whether 
the huge number of adjournments in cases iii which lawyers 
participated were sought becaise of lawyers a?>pearar:ce or 
becaise of parties tVian.selves. But since the adjourninents 
heqppened t o be in the cases represented by lawyers, the''' 
cannot foe ccnpletely absolved of the responsibil ity for 
causing tl o grant of extravagent adjournm^rts. therefore, 
the inference is that legal repre'^sentation before labajtr 
adjudicating bodies contributes to the delay in the disposal 
of cases . 
Table 3.17 shows the responses of a l l 
Tabla 3.17. Showing responses of workers^ employers and 
lawyers/Presiding Off icers about lAiether lawyers 
have interest in delaying cases before labour 
aidjudloating bodies. 
w o r k . , . / ^ 
Kind union oyers adjudica?-
o£ iMdara (n«57) Responses o f f l -S.No.CMpons« (n^SST ^ oecs(n»75) 
1. Y«a 82.82 92.98 Strongly agree 17.33 
2 . Mo 8.59 7.02 Agraa 28.00 
3. Don't Icnow 8.59 00.00 strongly 18.67 
disagrae 
4 . 00.00 Disagree 30.67 
5. 00.00 Can't say 5.37 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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r«spondents about whether lawyers hove interest in delaying 
a case before an adjudicating authority. It i s manifest that 
over-riding aa jor i t i es of both workers and employers (82.81 % 
& 92.98 % respectively) f e e l that lawyers intentionally delay 
labour adjudicating proceedings« because i t some-how furthers 
their interest . In contrast, only insignif icant minoritdkes of 
workers and employers (8.59 « 7.02 % respectively) think that 
lawyers do not deliberately seek t o proloncr labour adjudicating 
J 
proceedings and,^ any rate« i t does not in any manner serve 
their interest . Response pattern of lawyers i s , however, 
3C3me d i f f e rent . Only 45 % of lawyers and the Presiding 
Of f icers think that delayiriq labour adjudicating proceedings 
is in lawyer's interest . Against this , in the opinion of one 
half of lawyers and adjudicating authorities, lawi'ers do not 
havq any interest in delaying adj idicat ing proceedings. Kor 
dc they in their opinion resort to delaying tac t i c s t o 
prolong labour adjudicating proceedings. Interestingly, the 
response pattern of adjudicating authorities resembles 
substantially t o that of workers and employers. Of the s i x 
labour adjud.imating authorities, four agreed that lawyers 
have interest, in delaying labour adjudicating proceadings 
and they# in fact , do i t . Alid remaining two did not eatress 
any opinion on th is matter. The data presented in Table 3.17 
isi unmista)cable evidence of the fa c t that exoopting a 
proportion o£ lawyers there i s near unanimity among e l l the 
respondents that lawyers cause delay in the adjudication of 
j a i 
laboux: oases and as such their s«rvlcas are countei^roductive. 
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It Is stated earl ier that there is one standing 
Labour Court-cunw.Industrial TrllDunal for the "i^ ^ole state of 
JanoRiu and Kashmir. The si^e person acta Presiding Off icer 
of both Labour Court and Ihciuatrial i ribunal. By any reckcMilng, 
the adjudicative work to be discharged by the Labour Court and 
Industrial Tribunal in the state is not heavy. Two Presiding 
Off icers of the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal (one acting 
and one ex-presidlng o f f i c e r ) emphatically stated tViat there 
is no over case-load for the Labour Court and "tribunal. 
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According t o them the work-load is cpiita normal. m fact , 
they jHit forward the demand for transferring the adjudicatory 
work of the Assistant Labour Connissioners under statutes sadti 
as the worloofun's Compensation Act* the Payro^t of Wages Act and 
the Payment of Gratuity Act t o the Labour Court arid Tribunal. 
At present the oases pending in the Labour Court 
and Sodustrial Trilaunal also, do not show that the Labour 
Court-oun Industrial Tribunal in the state has t o cope with 
larger amoant of work. All this indicates that the adjudicative 
work of the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal is not 
unnanageabltt. But Inspite of this* Labour court takes its own 
ticae to ttdjudioate on industrial disputes and, as already se«n» 
Lsboar Coart or findustrial Trilunal rarely gives its decision 
before the esqpiry of two years from the start of adjudicative 
prooeedings In m i^ivsn case. 
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on the other hand, the posit ion o f vior)&-load of 
Aaslatant Labour ComnissicHnara who ace adjudicating authorities 
undei: the woictenen's COB^^aation Act, the Pavment o£ v^ agea lest, 
the Payment of Oratuity Act, e t c . , in the concerned d i s t r i c t s 
la not aini lar in a l l the d i s t r i c t s . In rlistrict^ 1 ike Doda 
Assistant Labour Commissioner is heavily loader' with adjudicative 
work. At oresent more than 350 cases involving claims to 
conpansat'b)^ under workmenV^Compensatlon Act alone are oending 
before hin..^^ On the contrary, adjudicatory work under the 
Payment of Wages Act and the workmen's Compensation Act i s 
extremely slender in d i s t r i c t s l ike Kathua and Rajouri; 
whereas case-load under these statutes is Just normal in 
d i s t r i c t s of Jammu and Srinagar. On the whole, barring 
d i s t r i c t of roda, the work load of Assistant Labour Commissioners 
under the Payment o f Wages Act and workmen's Compensation Act 
in normal (their adjudicating work may get m l t i p l i e d after 
the tnqpl^naentation of the Minimum Wages Act v^ hoae process of 
lmplaroent4tion i s under afoot)• Thus fac t has also becm 
attested t o by the Assistant Labour Comnissioners Deputy 
Labour Connissioners'. 
Table 3.18 makes it manifest that the majority 
(54.67 %) of lawyers and adjudicating officers think that 
work load of the •djudloatlng ^i^thorities under study is 
normal. Only a snail fraction lawyers consider the existing 
cuuie-losd to be heavy. Against this^a sizable mnber of 
Xawyexs and a^judioatlng offloejcs (22.67 %) find the week 
load to ba laaa. 
Tabla 3 . IS . Showing taapiMnaes of lawyers and adjudicating 
o f f i oeca about the oase-load of adjudioatlng 
author i t i a » . 
Poroentage of 
3.No. Kature of raapondants 
oaso-load (n « 75) 
1. Heavy 14.68 
2. Kormal 54.67 
3. Lass 22.67 
4. Can's say 8.00 
Total 100 .00 
^!otel Of s i x adjudicating o f f i eara intervlawad« 2 statad 
that tha %ioz:kr-load i s lasai 3 as normal; and 1 did 
not eaqpceaa any opinion. 
Sxistanca of single Labour Court and Srjduatrial Tribunal 
Hinders the 5-paedy Adjudication of Industrial Disputes. 
One factor v^ich appears t o swallow Labour Court 's 
a good amount of time i s the pract ice of holding monthly 
ampa at Jamnu for attending t o adjudicative work of the J^ mnui 
Provijice. Hence, v^enever the Presiding Off icer of the 
Laft»our Court/Tribunal goes t o Jananu for deciding oases* two 
days axe wasted (one for coining t o Jammu and one for refturning) 
on travailing moaxt fron owising jouznay axartion to tha 
Frasiding Offloar. Yaaxly* this paried ootiias to about ona 
•oDt^* Thaxafosa* ona %ihola month fron tha yaar is 
outri^tly waatad without any work. This one month; whan 
tttlllsad fox odjodioativa worK would auxaly atiaqp up tha pmam 
of discharging adjudicative woxk. Hanoa* tha naad fox 
setting up more labour courts in tha state. 
19'I 
0«i«3r owing to Coajoialiif of A4|ii4ie«tlv« waA Atelaistr«t lv« 
yanoticat la ttm A f l s t u t Labcw C c — l f i n t 
la ragard to diseharga of adjadlaetlag work oadair 
tha wertcsaa't Conptasation Aat and tba Fayn«at ot vagaa Aat 
an iayportaat faator ^fibXeh greatly oonttiBaa tlie tine ot 
Assistant Laboor CoBinissloners and, aa a result t helps prolong 
tha disposal of easea tinder thaaa statataa Is that under tha 
esrlstiag practiae the Assiatant Labour Comnlaslonar attanda to 
adjttdiaativa work daring sons of the days of the waaky depan* 
ding on his eonvenienae* East of the «aek*s tiaie is darotad 
to the disaharga of adsiiniatrativa vork« this is so bee^asa 
the Assistant Labour is not azclusiTaly an adjudieativa autho-
rity* Ha is also entrusted with the taak of anforeemant of 
various labour statutes (as for axasple Shopa and Hani Control 
Aat)« Therefore, if the adjudicating and adainistratiYa fane* 
tiona are aagregatad and inaaabanta are axalusivaly appointed 
to disaharge respeative fanatioaa, i t will greatly spaad np 
tha adjudiaatioo of eases under the worksian's Ceapaaaatiea 
Aat and ^ a FaysMat «f vvtgaa Aat« 
Salay at ttia atart of Adjadiaativa Proaaadiaga 
daa to Pafaativa Proaaaa Scfylag Agaaay 
Zt haa baaa aonaiderad above that a aoasideri^la bob* 
bar of adjoarnaeats ara allovad to aeaara ttia praaaaaa of tha 
aoQ«appliaanta* Sisdlarlyy a aiaaabla propiMrtiea of adjour-
aaaats havay of aeaaasityt baaa aada baaaaaa of tha failnta af 
•djadiaatiag aatteritiaa* offiaaa to aaaaa tha aarviaa i f 
v ' U 
auramons pcoiiq(>tIy, It ahculd be noted that, for the nin<;t 
part* no dlatlnction be nade between non»applioant 
intentionally evading the process of the adjudicative authority 
t o appear before i t and Inability of the process server t o 
aervQ because both reach an understanding after payment by 
the respondent aroploier of acxrse money to the process server 
for his simulated non-avai labi l i ty . Table 3.19 gives an idea 
about the time lag between the institution of claims/applicati(»is 
by the ^ p l l e a n t employees and the convnenc eRient of hearing 
process as necessary seqaal to i) . Of the 117 cases 
Table 3.19. Showing time froro institution of claim t o 
f i r s t herring before the adjudicating 
aathorlt'€S(Figures in percentages). 
Percentage 
Time of cases 
J.Ko. (In weeks) (n»117) 
1. a 3 34.18 
2. 3 - 6 16.24 
3. 6 - 9 19,66 
4. 9 - 12 5.13 
5. 12 - 15 8 ,55 
6. 15 18 2.56 
7. 18 21 3.43 
8. 21 - 24 3«42 
9. 24 - 27 3 ; it 
10. 39 * 42 1,71 
11. 42 - 48 0,85 
12. 48 - 51 0,85 
Total 100.00 
oontSwed in the table* It i s evident that only in one third 
of these oase« (34•IS the proceedings have started withisa 
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fairly tlma within thraa wtteka frora the data 
of pxeaentation of claXma. iUsthec^ if 6 iraeica time as laid 
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<5owi in th@ Jamrra £e Kashmir Industrial Disputes Rules is 
regarded as notsnal time f o r the start of f i r s t hearing from 
the date of aqpplieation before a l l the adjudicating authorities 
under study, merely in one half of the cases (40,42 %) f i r s t 
hearing has commencQc' within the stipulated time. In rest of 
the cases much longer period has elapsed betwo^ the dates 
of institution of claim applications and holding of f i r s t 
hearing. From the remaining cases/ in one third (33.33 %) 
f i r s t hearlnc fcook place between 6 weeks t o 15 wee)cs« in 
12•02 % beftwean 15 to 27 weeka; arc? in 3.42 % between 39 t o 
51 weeks. It i s h i ^ l y disgustlnq t o f ind that in some cases 
as many as 10 to 12 months have passed sirT>ly for commercing 
the hearing process. From this data i t ray bg inferred that, 
by and large, the t ine consumod f o r tho commenctiment of 
hearing process in the adjudication of cases in mudti lavger 
than the normal tl-xie* Conaeqpwitly, i t i s one of the inhibitive 
factors that slow down the speedy run of adjudication of 
olains and disputes. 
at tt^ time of pronounceiiient of deciaieps 
Hone of the three labour «iaotiaents under discussion 
•peeifies tine for arnioinemnt of doaiaion fr«a the date of 
Xaet heading* Ita the oiroamstanoes* i t is^ therefore* left to 
the diaoxetion of the oonoerned edjudioative mthoxity to 
oonnunioete decision to the pestles within wioh tine as i t 
1 Q -1 / 
thinks pxqpec aftoz th« conclusion of hearing process* The 
practice of British Bidustrlal Tribunals la that adjudicative 
decision i s non&alXy Insnedlately given after the c l o se of 
hearing. It Is only vihooi a case involves exceptional 
coiqplexlty of lav or fact that a tribunal may decide t o 
reserve decis ion. In such a case* as It were, a few weeks 
necessarily elpase before a reserved d e c i s i o n i s communicated 
t o the part ies . One learned authority on Industrial Tribunals 
has esqpressed his dissatisfacticm with the pract ice of 
reserving decisions* and has opined 
(•.• and i t i s therefore/ preferable that where at a l l 
possible a decision should not be reserved, but should 
b e given to the parties i m r o e d i a t s l Y at the conclusion 
of hearing 
This opinion appears t o be o f Immense u t i l i t y and 
relevance for pronouncing decisions by the labour adjudicating 
authorities In th is country. 
Table 3.20 provides the statistical snridence 
eonoeming the tine utilised for giving decisions after 
the Closure of last hearing, xt is evident that of 331 oases 
oontaiAed in the table* In about one half (44.7t| %) deolalona 
honre been handed down within two weeks fron the last hearing 
whloh iMor be tiiken aa faix timm for announcing deolalons. lb 
37.IC per oent the tlae ttirni in between 2 to 4 umtSm, In 
per cMnt 4 to 6 wwrics* and in 6.94 per oent the tine 
tmgm ttm • to w«eka fox announcing deelalona after the 
raolttsiioii 9it prooMdings. Finally* in a tiny fsaotien of 
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oases (2.1C %) the time e3«>er}dad Is exeoptlonally large(20 
weeks and more) • I t Is shocking tofflnd that in some cases 
as lengthy period as 20 weeks t o 26 have elapsed b«tweaan the 
conclusion o£ hearing process and the raridering o£ dec is ions . 
The position o£ time t a k ^ £or making and coinnunicating 
decisions after the end of hearings as revealed by these 
data i s none too happy. In more than one half of the cases 
the tiiOQ is langor. It i s thus infer able that labour 
adjudicating authorities are rather slow in formulating the 
awards, after the completion of hearing process. Therefore* 
the laxity of presiding o f f i c e r s to announce decisions 
imraediately after the end of hearing process has become a 
delaying factor which retards prompt adjudication of IcJr^ our 
disputes. Besides* th is period (time between the conclusion 
of hearing process and del ivery of decisions) i s extremely 
important from one more angle. The party again?it wh«a the 
decision has gemm may well become suspicious of the integrity 
of the presiding o f f i c e r by virtue of his (presiding o f f i c e r ) 
being inflaenced by the other party during intervening period. 
AociK>fbilitv of the Labour Mjudicatorv Machinery 
I t has been observec) that the resolution of 
industrial disputes t h r o u ^ labour adjudicative machinery i s 
far from ss t i s fac tory . The object of creation of labour 
adjudieative machinery of speedily resolving l«a:>aur managem^it 
diaputc» has not been realised as the d i lator iness mcNitly 
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Taibl* 3»20. 3howlJag th« tima fcon last hearing to 
tha data of daoiaion. 
Tina Pacoentaga o£ 
S.Mo. (in waaka)ea3aa(n«*i31) 
1. 0 2 44.74 
2. 2 - 4 3f .t6 
3. 4 mm 6 9.06 
4. 6 - 8 3.32 
5. 8 - 10 1.51 
6. 10 - 12 0.60 
7. 12 - 14 1.21 
8. 14 - 16 0.30 
9. 16 - 18 0.00 
10. 18 - 20 0.00 
11. 20 - 22 0.30 
12. 22 - 24 0.60 
13. 24 - 26 1.20 
Total 100.00 
roars the adjudicating proceedings ecmdfeictad by the labour 
adjudicating functicmafias. The underlying eaasas of this 
dilatorinaas have also been analysed. 
xn this context, it ia appropriate^ aa indeed 
valiiabl.a« to sarft cut the views of the users of labour 
adjudication machinery about its uti l i ty and working 
•ffioaoy* 
Table 3.21 shows the view-, of workers and 
«q>loyers oonoeming %«)ather snploye^s mm a class are 
satisfiad with the daoisiens o£ labour adjudicating 
bodies* It is manifest that groat majority of workers 
2 0 0 
Tabic 3.21. Showing tasponsss of woEkeca/Union leaders 
arid onployees about whether onployera are 
satisfied with the deoisions of labour 
adjudioating bodies. 
Perotfitage o f respondents 
3.NO 
Kind Of 
response 
worker s / in ion 
leaders (n'"256) 
1. Strcmgly agree 1.56 1.75 
2 . A g r ^ 17.58 26.31 
3. Strongly disagree 8.20 17.54 
4. Ddbsagree 65.63 47.37 
5. Can*t say 7.03 7.02 
Total 100.00 100.00 
(73.82 %) think that anployers are generally not happy with 
the awards of labour adjudicating bodies. Against th is , only 
a small proportion of workers (19,14 %) f ind that the 
employers are sat is f ied with the labour adjudicative 
decisions. On the other hand* Bost of enqployers (64.91 %)» 
a slsable nunber (17.54 %) of then; strongly, also feel that 
they are not content with the deoisions of labour adjudicating 
authorities. At the sasw* hoiMNreKt i t is interesting to 
aetiee that a good pcopoction of onaployera (28.6 hanre 
eiVreMed their happineas «nd aontentii«at with the Ua>our 
ttdjiidioative deeisions* On the wiioIe« the preponderance 
of opinion of workers as well es of eBq;>loyer8 testifies to 
the tmaet that ataployers generally do not weloone the awards 
of ltf)Our adjudieating bodies* The resultant inference, 
theteCoxe* is that enployoi^ as a olaee do not am»rove of 
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tha •xlating labour adjudication nachinery f o r adjudication 
of their disputes with vorkmen and that they aco6|>t the 
A 
decisions of these bodies grudgingly asi necessary snril and 
due t o ncm-availability of more convenient and acceptable 
alternative rockchanisn to set t le their disputes. 
From lab ia 3*22 reasons given by vrorkers and 
employers f o r the dissat is fact ion of employers with the awards 
of labour adjudicating bodies are d iscernib le , workers almost 
Table 3.22. Showing reasons of workmen and enployers f o r 
employers d issat is fact ion with the decisions 
of labour adjudicating bodies (Figures in 
percentage). 
s.hiO, Class of reason 
Workers/ 
union 
Class of reason rs 
1. Decisions usually 95.23 Decisions usually 37,84 
against enqployers in favour of 
workers 
2. T lme~consuining 2.65 Lengthy process 35.14 
involved in 
adjudication 
3. Binding decisions 00.00 Decisions are given 16.22 
with<^t proper 
understanding of 
i n ^ s t r i a l background 
4. Others 2.12 Decisions strain 2.70 industrial relations 
Total 100.00 100.00 
unaniiRously feel that anployers* displeasure with adjudioative 
Awaxdc mainly stems from the fact that these cwurds are usually 
against thsm. On the other hand* majority of «iipXoyers h«ve 
shoMR two principal reasons for their being sore about tho 
deeisions of labour adjudicating Mithorities. Thmam are that 
tha daolaiona are uaually in fairour of workers (17*89 fO and 
that the process of adjudloatlve dao i s lor;-making i s 
tine-eonsaning (35.14 %) • A negXlglbla nunbar o£ aiiq;>loyers 
also think that failura of labour adjudicating aathorlties 
to understand the industrial background of labour disputes 
and influenced decisions of these bodies account f o r the 
unhappiness o£ eir^loyars with labour adjudicative decisions* 
Conclusion «^pearing frcxn the above data i s that two factors 
have primarily alienated labour adj idication machinery from 
the employers: f i r s t , labour adjudicating authorities 
frecjiently give pro-labour decis ions; second, the process of 
adjudicating on industrial disputes lengthy. 
Table 3.23 indicatas whether labojr adju'^icating 
bodies discharge their adj idicativa functions impartially. An 
Table 3.23. Showing the responses of workers and employers 
alaout whether labour adjudicating bodies act 
Ijnpartially. 
Workers?^^^^^ tgPPQPgqntS 
xxnian 
Kind of leaders Ettrployera 
3«Ko, response (n^ase) (n^S?) 
1. Strongly agree 00.00 3.51 
2. AgXM 74. «1 33.33 
3. strongly dlsagrae 00.00 8.77 
4 . Dlsagsae 17.19 40.35 
5. No opinicm 8.20 14.04 
Total 100.00 100.00 
appreciable majority of workers and union leaders (74.61%), 
as is evldMtt fron the table, Qpine& that labour adjudicative 
bodiea function Impartially* In contrast, an insignificant 
fraction of workers and union leaders (17.19 %) view the 
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funetionlng of labour adjudicating £UnotlGnari«ia as b«lng 
mt Impartial. Majority opinion of tpi^loyers* how«nrer, in 
this connaction i s contrary. One half of en^loyars ( i f the 
oraployers hove •39}res9ed no opinion are included* th is 
numbar goes up to 63.16 %) regard the functioning of labour 
adjudicating bodies as par t ia l . About one third of employers 
(36.84 %), however* consider that labour adjudicating bodies 
decide cases inipartlally. On the vfhole* the picture emerging 
frcm the data presented in ^able 3.23 is that workers and 
union leaders* by and large* find the decisions of labour 
adjudicating bodies as Imoartlal. But the majority of 
eitiployers (though tha majority i s t e m o i s ) think otherwise. 
Table 3.24 presents the results of the responses 
of workers and union leaders concerning whether there are 
Table 3•24. Showing responses of workers about working of 
outside Influences on labour adjudicative 
authorities. 
Kind of 
Percentage of 
xeqpond«aits 
S.Ho influence (n«25C) 
1. 3nfluene* of unioii leaders 
2, Znflaienoe of poXitlal«n« 31 .M 
3. Znfluenoe of eff ieials 0.78 
4 . Money consider«tl«n 3.13 
5. So Influenoo 32.81 
Don*t know 30.47 
7. Others 00.00 
Total 100.00 
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any outtalda Influaneas on the formulation of dooiaions by 
th« labour adjudicating autthoritias• It i s obvious that 
tha vorkara who saa no cutsida influence on the labour 
adjudicating authorities in regard to their adjudicative 
decision^ making and those pzofeasing ignorance about having 
any knowledge of the exercise of the outer influences on the 
labour adjudicating bodies (32.18 & 30.47 % respectively) 
constitute important majority. However* i t i s Important t o 
note that a s igni f i cant proporticm of workers and union leaders 
(31.64 %) t e s t i f y t o the fact that po l i t i c ians influence the 
decisions of labour adJidieatinq bodies. It is Intriguing 
to note that scxne of the workers and union leaders have given 
contradictory responses. It has been seer in Table 3.23 
that only 44 workars/inion leaders have divulged that labour 
adjudicating bodies do not functicun impartially. But now i t 
i s double tha number of these workersAinion leaders (81) who 
have atatad that labour adjudicating authorities are 
suscaptibla to the influence of politiciana in their 
adjudioatiira daoiaion-naking. It oan ba infaxxad from tha 
abova data that votking class* on the Whola« axonacata tha 
labour adjiadieatlag bodiaa ixm tha ohajtga of thair amenability to 
oKtoxnal Influanoas in their dooision-naking* thou^ a rantarkabla 
•inosity ctf this class affinns that labour adjudicating 
fupotitmarXaa are not immune to political 
t o - •  o ••'.] a-iicat- iv. • ' ir ; or , 
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Tabl« 3.25 8«t3 out the ceaponsas of lawyers and 
adjudicating o f f i e e c s about the axazelao of outside Influence 
on the discharge of ^ j u d i c a t i v e functions by the labour 
Table 3«25. Showing responses of adjudicating authorities 
and lawyers about working of outside influences 
on labour adjudicative authorities (Figures 
in percentages). 
Percentage of 
Kind of reapoTidents 
S.l^o, Influence (n "" 75) 
1. Money conaiderations 24.00 
2. Influence ot admlr.i~ 
strativa o f f i c e r 1.33 
3. Po l i t i ca l influence 32.00 
4 . Influence of union 
leaders 1.33 
5. Influence of leaders of 
employers associations 2.67 
6. ^o influence 24.00 
7. Ko opinion 8.00 
8 . Others 4.00 
Total 100.00 
adjudicating bodies. It is manifest from the table that 
according to cme half of lawyers labour adjudicative deoislons 
either get vitiated by political interference or by iMiiietafy 
considerations (32.00 & 24.00 % respectively). Against this* 
24*00 per cent think that there is no outside influemie en 
l^e daalsloR-making ^ labeue adjudicating bodl«s# %^lle 
a «nall fraction (8.00 %) expressed no opinion regarding this. 
It la clear fron these data that deelsions o£ labour adjudicating 
bodies axe not always based on merits and monetaxy oonaideratlflna 
2 or. 
or p o l i t i c a l Influanoe may at times a f f e c t these dec is ions . 
Table 3,26 presents the suggestions o f fered by 
the lawyers to stop outside interference in the adjudication 
of labour disputes^ Of 51 la%fyttcs ^ o have made sug^st lons . 
Table 1 .26, Showing suggestions of lawyers and adjudicating 
Of f i cers to eliminate outside Influei ces 
a f fec t ing the dec is ions" of labour adjudicating 
bodies• 
Percentaqe of 
respondents 
3 .FO. lugqestlors (n = 51) 
1. Persons of character and 
integrity t o be appointed 
as presiding o f f i c e r s 
25.50 
2. Labair adjudicative functions 
to be transferred to ordinary 
courts 
11.76 
3. lucrat ive e^noluraents f o r 
presiding o f f i c e r s 
15.69 
4 . •JOTOQ impartial highar body 
be set up t o check the 
functioning of these bodies 9.80 
5. Sooe statutory provisions 
should ban outside intrusion 17.65 
6. Others 15.68 
7 . Ko suggestions 3.92 
Total 100.00 
one fourth (25.49 %) want that only persons of character 
and Integrity are to be appointed as labour adjudicating 
o f f i c e r s ; 11.76 per cent are in favour of transferring 
labour adjudicative ftinctiona to the ordinary courts; 15.69 
per cent plead f or paying lucrative araoluinents t o the 
Presiding Of f icers t o check thsw frcra f a l l i n g prey t o 
temptation; 17,65 pet cer t want some stat^itoty gaurantee t o 
j. 
stem outalda Intrusion In labour adjudicatory sphere 
and 9,80 per cent suggest ' m setting up, some higher body 
f o r auperviaing the functioning of labour adj idicatlng bodies* 
Ijf^ortant aa these »igg-ationa are# no conclusion can be 
derived from them daa t o slender number of respondents who 
raade these suggestions. 
qoi4Cii.r3ioKS 
To sum up^by and large, determination of laJ:>out 
cases throac^ adjudicatory process is af fected by delay as 
the oases are not disposed of as quickly as envisaged under 
the statutory er actnier-ts. But this delay a f f e c t s the disposal 
of cases in varying degrees under d i f f e r ^ t statutory enactmerta. 
Both s t a t i s t i c a l avidenca and responses o f lawyers and 
adjudicating o f f i c e r s corroborate the fa c t that delay i s 
conooml-tant t o the sattlmaent of labour oasas through 
•djudioative inathod, Thua:»the adjudication of cases under 
Xnduatxial Disputaa Act talcaa nor« time ooiqparad t o the t ine 
required f o r the edjudication of easm under the workmen's 
CoB^ienaatlon Act and the Pairiaent o f Wages Act . Probably^ i t 
Is owing t o the j u d i c i a l baekgrcxtnd o f the Presiding Qff loers 
of Leboux couct end industrial Tritatinal and non- judic ia l 
baAkgraiDd of the presiding Off ioers of labour adjudicating 
£orams under the workmavi's CoR^pensation Act and the Payment 
of Wages Aet. 
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s«condly# deolsiotis i«hlch ar« made after going 
through AiXly th« prooess of adjudication« tAiathai; against 
tho applloaiiis or non-applicants* n««d mora tlffa f o r 
adjudication than the t lna a p ^ t in making consant awards* 
ax parta awards or dlsnlasal of c la ln i ^ l l c a t l o n s due t o 
not being pursued. 
Thirdly, the representation on b ^ a l f of the 
parties has pos i t ive ocmnaotlon with the time factor Involved 
In adjudication of cases. If the part ies are represented by 
Xaiifyers or by their professional ropresemtatlves, grcHiter t ine 
duration i s s p ^ t in the adjudication of cases . Ccmtrarlly* 
i f the party makes self-pleading or only one party Is 
represented by a representative* decisions are given In 
oofnparatively less time* 
Fourthly* type of the organization (public or 
private sector) does not have any appreciable intact on the 
time needed for adjudication of claims/disputes arising 
therefroM. But* on the other hand* type of dispute (Individual 
or eo l l e c t lve ) appears t o have sone affeot on the tine 
seciilzed f o r adjudication. Howwrer* It is true oiiXy of 
aidjudlcatlon of disputes under the findustsial DispiitM Aot 
and not of determination of olaims under the Pmymmt of ^trngem 
Thus* eolloetlve disputes ooMpaxatiVttXy take longer 
period of disposal than the Individual disputes under the 
andiistrial Disputes Aot* But under the PaMnt of itegw Aet* 
thore is no aueh distiBOtien fos the detetnination of individual 
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and ooll«otiv« olalns. similarly* undar tha IMsxattX^X 
Disputes Aot« differant kinds of disputes (refacanea disputas* 
ooBqpi&ints under section 33 (c)->2yetc«) reqfuiixe different tine 
periods fox adjudication, Referaf^e disputes invariably take 
more time t h a n coB| ;> l4 int3 oases for disposal. 
Fifth* principal factor that causes delay in the 
speedy conduct of adjudicatory proceedings i s the granting of 
superfluous adjournroants by the labour adjudicating authorit ies . 
Needless t o in«nti(»n, grantur^ of superfluous adjcurnrnents by the 
adjudicating authorities i s a flagrant v io lat ion of statutory 
provisions regarding the allowance of adjoumroents. Kot 
unea^eotedly* employers seek roost of the redundant adjournin^.ts. 
Important grounds on %^ich they frequently seek adjourrmints 
aret del iberately ramaining ^ s e n t 6n the date of hearing, 
avoidance of process of the adjudicating authorities* f i l i n g 
of writt«i statements* producing witnesses and tendering 
evidence. On the other hand^with the Ji^plicant workers like 
amployera* najor ground of delaying adjudicatory proceedings 
is to remain aba ant on the date of hearing. Besides* they 
seek nany adjounnafits for producing witnesses. Main grounds 
of seeking joint adjmmneiits by the parties are to make 
efforts for mutual settlements* remaining absent and preparing 
argiMORts, On many oooaaicms* pioeeodin«p are adjourned by 
the Presiding Offioezs thenselvea on grounds of being out of 
station* hisy with other work* under transfer order^ifcc. 
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Lawy(ix«« Pxoaldlng 0£f io«rs as mil l «s wozlcexs 
uii«<iJiivooally oocKoboxat«d tho fact that onplayaes soeurs 
unjust i f iabla adjeurrnsctnta. Thair suggestion fox pxeventlng 
th« aR^loyexs £xom seeking unxeascmable adjouxninenta ims that 
only on an extxeiaely genuine gxoand an adjouxnin^t is to be 
ipeanted. Prefexably> they favoux l imiting the number o f 
->-. 1 0 {It 
adjournments granted in a case# ox the tirr.e within i«hich a 
case must be decided. 
Sixth, legal representation appears to l^gthen 
the adjudicating proceedings. In the cases represented by 
lawyers, largest nunibax of adjournments have been given, 
uorkars, aB^loyers and Presiding Of f i cers with near unanimity 
point out that lawyers have interest in delaying adjudicating 
proceedings. Host surprisingly* half of the xespondeoit 
lawyers also support this assexticm. 
Kext« by and large, the work-load of cases of the 
labour adjudicating authorities under study is normal# i f not 
l e s s . Ihspite of this , i t i s eni^natic as t o why these 
adjudicating authorities are slow in turning out adjudicating 
deaisions. Xn the ease of Labour Court and ikiAastxial TxibanaX 
one faotox which evidently slows the pxoeess of adjudie«tiflB 
is that the Presiding Officer has to travel fxom Sxinagax to 
Jawnu for holding oam> at Jama, Assistant X^ abaix CflHPiissieMr# 
on the other hand, has to discharge much adninlstxative work 
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apart fron his adjudicative functions. This unquestionably 
retards the speedy discharge of adjudicative functions. 
Ineff ic iency of the process serving agency t o serve the 
process of the adjudicating authoxity pron^tly also causes 
considerable delay in the comnenceinent of adjudication 
proceedings. Many a tiine^ i t taJces not only weeks but numerous 
months f o r the start of hearing process from the date of 
f i l i n g aqpplication or claim, belay is not cor fined only t o 
the hearing stage but adjudicating authorities take l o t of 
tiJPT.e in writing and announcing decis ions . Delay at this 
stage is wholly dua t o the laxity of adjudicating authorit ies . 
Lastly, working c lass la generally happy vrith the 
settlaiaents of labour cases through adjudicative method since 
the workers regard the decisions of labour adjudicating 
authorities impartial and Just, However, they do not approve 
of delay made in the adjudication of cases. Bat employers do 
not brook decisions of labour adjudicating <|txthoritl«0 with 
pleasure. Their main grievance against labour adjudication 
iDachlnery is that i t is t i l t e d in favour of the labour. 
They also do not l i k e the timei-consuniing procedure of liOMur 
adjudicating authorities. Labour adjudicative raechanian aloe 
does not acquit itself well with the lawyers because the 
majority of lawyers view the functioning of labour adjudioating 
bodies aa being affected by political influence and 
monetary considerations. 
2)2 
Foot Votrna 
1. Supra* p* 7c 
2. M t o / note le 
3. P.O. Krlahan* 2Et* fil^*' 
4. industrial Relations l i l l * 1978,S®ction 119(2) ( 3 ) . This 
b i l l has b««n lapsod. 
5. Rula 31 of the Workmen's Conpsnsation Act* 1972. This Rule 
reads t If the Comnissioner f inds i t intpossible t o dispose of 
an application at one hearing^he shall record the reasons 
^ i e h necessitate a post»pon«mient. See Also Rule 8(1) (2) (3) of 
the Payment of Wages Act (Procedure)Rules* 1972. This Rule readst 
If the application is entertained* the Authority shall c a l l 
upon the employer by a not ice in Fom P t o aqppear before him 
on speci f ied date together with a l l releirant docsiroents and 
witnesses* i f any* and shal l inform the ^;^licant of the date 
30 s p e c i f i e d (sub Pule II) . If the employer or his representa-
t i v e f a i l s to appear on the spec i f ied date« the Authority may 
proceed to bear and determine the application ex parte (sub 
Kule 2 ) . If tlie applicant f a i l s t o appear on the spec i f ied 
date, tiie Authority may dismiss tha application (sub Uiila 3) • 
6. These compromise settlonents are reached by the mutual e f f o r t s 
of the parties daring the period %fhen the adjadicating 
proctBedings are carried on. 
7. 7ron the interviews or the non-participant obsecvation of the 
proceedings of labour adjudicating authorities no •vidcunse 
became available %A)ich lands credence t o the inference that 
lawyers actively help the parties for making mutual agreemaBts 
t o s e t t l e their dis^Mtes. Latwyers would generally sesm t o 
become disinterested in the dispute settlement prooess af ter 
extracting ^ fera from the part ies and look after the 
pxooeedings only per functor i ly . 
8 . However* in a study^ namely* "The Adjudicative Process under the 
M i s t s i a l Disputes Aot* 1947** conducted under ZCSSA the 
finding on tlie poijit is contrary i There it has bmmi found that 
sefereaoe disputes f son the public sector axe disposed of by 
the Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court cougar at ivaly within 
^ ^ •» aoM^ered to the reference disputes from the 
private seetor; see pp. 121*122 of the Report* vol .1 . 
9 . supra* Ch«4pter Z. 
10. Supra* ps7Q 
2jr> 
11* Concerned adjudicating authority as a matter of pract ice orders 
ex parte hearing only af ter the respondents employer constantly 
for four times or more keeps himself from the hearing* 
12. Respondent wqployer can easi ly elude the service of the process 
of adjudicating authority by paying a paltry auin t o the process 
server. Zn order to ejqoedite the process of starting adjudicating 
procaedinga* the adjudicating authority inevitably takes recourse 
t o publication of summons in national or local newspaper^ 
d«!^endirig upon the c i r c mstances of the case* Prom the date of 
publication of summons one month's time is given to appear 
jsefore the authority. 
13* Supra* pp. 
14. During the caarae of interviews they put forward the demand f o r 
transferring the adjudicatory work of Assistant Labour Commission-
ers under statutes l ike the Payment of wa^ss of Act, the 
VK>rlan^*3 Compensation Act# the Payment of Gratuity Act, etc* 
t o them* 
15* The cause of greater numl er of adjudicative cases urder the 
WOrkmesi'a Compensation / c t i j that this d i s t r i c t is f i l l e d 
with dense forests* Most of the accident cases involvinq 
compensation are of the laboarera employed by the fores t 
lasses having their contracts in these f o res ts . 
16. See Rule 10-B(3), Industrial Disputes (Jammu & Kashmir state) 
Rules, 1972; mcir'entally, there i s no statutory provision under 
the iJorkroen's Coipensation /iCt and the Payment of v/ages Act or 
the Rules rr.ade um^er then which lays down the time for holding 
of t i r s t hearing f o r the adjudication of the case from the 
(jiate of the presentation of the claim. 
17* hlchael , J . Goodman, Ihcbistzlal Tribunals Procedure, 1976,pp. 
51,52; the Author was a Chainr.an of Industrial Tr ib inals . 
18* The cases Involving c o l l e c t i ve claims t o compensation under 
the workmen's Ccnpensatlon Act ware not available. 
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There i s no unlfozm pattann of examining the legality 
of the deoisions of laboux adjudicatory bodies. Xn the oaae 
of deoiaiona of some of the lebouc adjudicating bodies no 
right of appeal ha a been provided.^ Their dcKSiaions are 
reviewed by the High C90urt and the Supreme Oourt (ry ^ -
exercise of writ and supervisory jurisdictions^ln them under 
the Oonstitution.^ (m the ccmtrary* the deoiaions of many 
labour adjudicatory bodies have been expressely made 
2i:: 
appoalabls by the s t a t u t e undex vhioh thoy futncticm.^ 
Hoira(ver# the fozums to which appeals ftm the decis ions 
of these bodies l i e ace of d i f f e r i n g stature and many hues. 
ThuSj, the leQality of the decisions of certain adjudicatory 
bodies is considered in appeal by the h i ^ e r d^artmental 
o f f i c e r s . For instance, appeal from the decisions of 
Controll ing Authority (Asstt , Labour Commissioner) under 
the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972/l ies t o the Deputy Labour 
4 
Comnsissionar; under the ; actories /ict appeals frc»o the 
orders of chie f Inspector of Factor lea are t a k ^ to the 
state CSovarnrnent and frar. that of Jtate Government t o the 
Gontrai iJoviirrariai.t/ an^ under the Uaternity Baanefit Act, 
appeal from the orders of mapector in certain cases are 
preferred to Labour Consnisss ionerWhi le in other cases 
appeals are f i l e d in the Higher Judic ial Courts - > i s t r i c t 
Court and the High Court.^ 
Furtharmore, there i s greater degree of variat ion 
in respect o f the aeope of the r i ^ t t o appeal provided by 
YAxiouis labour maatmmtm againot the deaisions of labour 
•djudioatosy bodies . Sa •am* oa8«3# fulflodgwS right of 
appMl i . e . , both on i n^dts wad law has been granted, while 
In sane oases only restr ictad ri#yt o f appeal (on point of 
law only) has been bestowsd on the aggrionred party . Thus, 
f o r •aMsmile, the saploy«9-SAXnsi>Kano« Act permits i^peal only 
mi anibstantial point o f law fzen the orders of s tate a^loyee-s^ 
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8 Znauranoa Oouct . But* an tha othaz hand, statutes l iks 
ths Payasnt of Okatulty Aet, ths Xnduatrial snqploynont 
(Standing Aflt) # vto»# allow iq(»p«al8 or^  ^ as 
ea on lav fxcea the oxdezs of ths adjuaioatozy author i t Isa 
9 sat up undac than. 
As to ths dooisicKtis of adjudioatozy bodiss s«t 
up undQC tha thrss labour enaotnients vhioh are subject of 
thia study* no statutory right of aqppeai Is availabls 
agalnat the awards of Labour CJourt and industrial Tribunal 
which hava been established under the Industrial Disputes 
Act t o adjudicate s on industrial disputes.^^ Previously 
upt i l 1956, however, appeals from the awards of industrial 
tribunals were preferred t o Labour i ^ e l l a t e Tribunal whidli 
was abolished by the Labour i\ppellate Tribunal (Abolition) 
'•'J 
Aot, 1956. Now in the abssiioe of remedy of appcml a person 
a^r ieved by the award of the Xiabour Oaurt ox Industrial 
Tribunal has, of necessity, to avail himself of the remedy 
profvided by the High aoazt under Articles 226,227 and by 
the Sapiane Oourt under Article 136.^^ 2h JtfC state an 
mmKd of Laboir OMCt or industrial fribonal nay not be 
•aMnsnfttXly questioned under Aitiele 227 mm the nor responding 
provision of J & K Oonstltation (sec. It i ) does not contain 
word trltaitnal in i t . 
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Under Aztlola 226« th« H i ^ Court, Inter alia^ 
n istiUtt writs of cert lorarl f prohibition and nandasus t o 
scrutini!!® the decisions of admlniattrativ® tribunals and 
quasi--judicial a^ithoritias. The grounds on which the High 
y^jjjfiy 
Ccxirt . ^ 'intervenes are I jur isdict ional errors, v io lat ion 
of principles of natural just ice , errors of law apparent 
on the face of record and vio lat ion of seme mandatory 
statutory provisitai. The H i ^ Court may also intervene 
under Art ic le 226 vrtien the findings of facts are based on 12 no evidence or on irrelevant evidence. 
Art ic le 227 vests in the High Coirts the power 
of superinterK3enae over a l l courts and tribunals in their 
respective Jurisdictions.^^ The power under Article 227 
is exercised only by the High Courts t o keep the subordinate 
courts and tribunals from transcending the bounds of their 
14 authority. 
An aggrieved party may also directly approach 
the Suprene court in s o c i a l leave under Article 136 of the 
Constitution for seeking discretionary remedy. The '%ipre»e 
Court, doabtleas, possassas wide otmstitutlonal discretion 
under Actlole 136 for rectifying the injustice perpetrated 
by the decisions of courts or tribunals.^^ It nay In the 
•3a»rol«« of thla jurisdiction omiidne any Issue of fact or 
law and may grant any relief which it considers to be 
•ppxoprlate m the However, the auprone Court la 
2} ^ tj 
generally oicaunspttet in «x«rolaing i t s Jurisdict ion unc^er 
Art ic le 136* though in labour matters i t has evinced -gener^ty 
in entertainlTi^ iq^paala from the decisions of labour 
tribunals in the wake of iJx>lition of l&abour Appellate 
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Tribunal. The Supreme Court has taken the view that 
power under Art i c le 136* i s t o be exercised cmly sparingly 
in extraordinary aitu-^jations v ^ r e d i e t o I l l e g a l i t y or 
irregularity of procedure or the v io lat ion of pr inc ip les 18 
of natural,gross miscarriage of Justice i s occasioned. 
Nor wi l l the suprone Court in esoerdlise of th i s d iscret ion 
confer a right of appeal vihare such a r i ^ t i s not granted 19 by the ordinary law. 
Birthar, when an award of the ijabour Court or 
Ihdu3trial Tribunal infrinofes a fundamental right of the 
aggrieved party, he is entit led t o invoke the writ 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Ar t i c l e 32 of the 
const i tut ion . However* the Supreme Court rarely interferes 
with the decisions of quiasl-Judicial bodies under th is 
Article.^® 
In stark ccmtrast t o tdie f i n a l i t y attached t o 
the awards o f Labour court and :&idu3trial Tribunal, 
ttarterminations of the Mithorlty under the Paynent o f Wages 
Act are appealable t o a D i s t r i c t Court and those of the 
Conn iss loner under the workmen's Con^pensation Act t o the 
Hlfllh Court • There i s a l so « pxanriaion foe ease stated 
PJCi 
proo«aire und«r the Wozlaaen*a CaBQ>ans«tion Aet thereby th« 
Conniaalonec can auloinit any quiostlon o£ law £ot the dec Is ion 
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of the High Court. I t would appear twin r e i n a d - t h r o u ^ 
appeal and casa stated procedure » against the awards of the 
v^orkroan's Conpensation CcRnissioner are superfluous as one 22 of thew^would have s u f f i c e d . 
The orders passed by the Dis t r i c t Court and 
the High Court in eppeal from the awards of the Authority 
'Jader the Payment of ifages Act and the Ccnmissioner under 
the workmen's Cotnpensation Act respectively do not seem to 
be f i n a l , ^fhere is poss ib i l i t y of the aggrieved party taking 
the decision of tlie Dis tr i c t Court or Authority before the 
High Court either under Artic le 226 or 227.^^ A curious 
practice, would seem to be emerging regarding questioning 
the legal i ty of the directions of Authority before the H i ^ 
Court. If the onployer f a i l s to secure aqppellate remedy 
before the District Court due to his own fault (e.g. M^ mn 
•n «q>loy«s f i les ^peal against the direction of the 
Mithority without dapositing monay with tiie Authority which 
is ordered against him in the direction)« he may approadh 
the High Court for availing the remedy of writ. This writ 
is dlceoted against the oKdec of District Judge as well as 
direction of the Authority.^* 
In addition« m party aggclafved by tha deeiaion 
of the Diatxiot Cosxt in anpMl fje«n the osdar of Authority 
2£0 
may £11« « r«vlslon p « t l t i on In th« H l ^ Court und«r saetlon 
115 of Civi l Proottdura e^da against such daeision. Althou^ 
revision l i a s against tha appallate orders fron the directions 
of Authority« i t doaa not l i a against tha ocdar of Authority 
under the Payment of Wages Act as i t is not a c i v i l court . 
In a r e c e n t case* t h e Jaranu & Kashmir H i ^ Cou~rt by a f u l l 
bffltich decision c ia r i f i ad this position tihile Ijftterprating 
section 17 (2) of tha Paymait of Wages Act thust 
The world f ina l (in sab-sec.2 of 3ec . l7 of the 
Payment of Wages Act) in my view not only prohibits 
a further a p p e a l but also a revision t o the High Court 
from the directions of the authority. The aggriavad 
could f i l e an «$>peal against the order of authority 
in certain c o n d i t i o n s / and t h e order o f t h e appellate 
court being "case decided" within the meaning of 
section 115 o f the C.P.C. and t h e a p e l l a t e Court 
i t s e l f being under the supervisory Jurisdiction of 
tha High Court* the revision against i t s order was 
maintainable under Secticni 115 CPC.«. bat tha 
Mxthority under the Act not being a C iv i l Court i t s 
Airaotiens or orders ara not 'casa decided * In 
taena of Sac. 115« CPC and therafora« tha orders of 
tha authority w«ra final awbject only to appeal to 
Diatriet Judge or t o any other given authority. 
Moraovar* whan a Distziot Court antartalas an 
appaal under tha Faynant of Wages of Aiot« it is anpo«fas«d 
to suitanit a (fiastlon of law for the daeision of tha H i ^ 
Court.^^ In tha Mitfi court if the natter has baen deoidad 
by single Judga, L«tt«xs Patent An^aal lias to tha 
Division Sanoh. Aftax thl«« mppmml nay ba pxafarxad to 
tha Siprans coust undar AXtiolas 133 or S«fBa is 
tha p«sitimi of appasl ttm thm oxdars of Conaissionar 
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undsr the worlonen's Condensation Act and writs frcn tha 
awards of Labour court and Ihduatrial Tribunal undar tha 
Industrial Disputes Act. Under l ^ h the Acts ultimately 
a disputed matter nay reach the Supreme Court either under 
Artic le 133 or Artic le 136 of the Constitution of liidia 
(as considered abcve^ the awards of labour courts and 
industrial tribunals are d irect ly appealable in tha Suprene 
Court under Art ic le 136 of the constitution) • These 
provisions suggest that a labour matter under adjudication 
get enmeshed in endless l i t i gatory process, which may 
at tiroes conclude after the death of the part ies . 
It should be noted here that remedy before the 
appellate forum in con^arism to that obtained throu^ writ 
is more ef fective ' ' respect of scrutinizing the decisions of 
adjudicatory bodies and providing adecpate re l i e f t o the 
aggrieved party. In the f i r s t place* granting of relief 
in the axaroise of writ jur isd ic t ion by the Court i s h i ^ l y 
disazetionary «nd as such is wrapped ijn uncertainty.^^ But 
the r i ^ t to appeal is a creation of the statute. Therefore* 
yhmam^x an MuictsBent provides for a rlgjht of appeal* it is 
acvailed of as of ri0it subject^of eourse* to thm conditions* 
if any* laid down in the statute for the oxsroise of that 
r i ^ t . Clearly, dlsoretlonary element is loss in the 
alXowanoo of appeal by the court than in the case of writ. 
2P2 
S«o<mdly« the grounds <»n t^ich a wdt i s Issuad 
«Z9 limited. As has been stated earliar# the writs of 
eertiorari* prohibitions and mandanus generally l i e f o r 
correcting errors of jur isd ic t ion , errors of law apparent 
on the face of record* breaches of principles of natural 
Justice, e t c . It is %rall established^^ that a court while 
I 
iswiing a writ cannot act as appellate court and as such 
cannot go into the merits of the case.^^ But on appellate 
court possesses wide powers; i t can take cognizance of any 
point (whether relating t o law or of the case in 
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question. ' ' EVen when aqopeal is relatoc; to the point of law* 
appellate body has wider power. It can determine any (71 est ion 
of law - whether latent or patent - as d ist inct from patent 
error of law.^^ And the dist inct ion between law and fac t 
being tenuous* appellate body may review factual issues 34 while apparentXy confining i t s e l f t o the point of law. 
Hext as to the grant of relief, the coarts will 
sinply qaash the unlawful order in the emrcise of writ > 
jurisdiotioBf they cannot grant other relief ; whereas 
appellate court n«y may substitute its 
decision for that of the lower authority which makes the 
oiiglnal M l s i o n ps may send tiie case back for re-haarlng 
with any diraetion.'^ Ito Xkidia, however, the Suprana Couit 
and tha High Caurts wOmt Actiola&32 and 226 raapactivaly 
aiy ocHbina "eonaa^iantial xaXlaf" with thair ordaxal^ 
2?; o 
fox, writ juriadiotioni as Incorporatad In th« Ccmstitutlon 
. l a t e l y fxoe fcon prooaduxal technicalItias to %fhloh 
c*> subject In Bngland,^^ 
Zn sane respects, hoifonrer* wiit zeinody i s note 
advantageous than right of appeal. Limitation period, f o r 
exan^le, f or f i l i n g an appeal is mch shorter. Bit the 
l imitation period for f i l i n g a writ i s coeqparatively longer. 
A pet i t ion f o r writ may be f i l e d within s ix months and even 
after th is period deoending upon the circumstances of the 
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case, from thd dat& of cause of action. Besides, writs 
are cor.stitutlonally guaranteed remedies in this country. 
They cannot be curtailed by any measure, short of amendment 
of the const i tut ion. In recent past, the Supreme Court has 
held that right t o jud ic ia l review is a part of the basic 
structure of the Constitution , which i s unalterable.^® 
On the contrary, the origin o f right t o appeal being statutory, 
i t s contimad axiatesK^ on the statute book depends upon tha 
lihims of the legis lature. 
In the above dascripticyn legal f r m e work of th« 
powers and jurisdicti^s of higher Judicial courts to esMnina 
the legality of the datsisions of labour adjudicatory bodies 
has been set out. As sequel to this, it will be %iorthwhilo 
to aaeoctaln the ralavanoa and affioaoy of the higher 
judioiary with zegard to rendering justiea in the eonplox 
indaatxial rolattiona timiA, Thm Ainotional affieaoy of tho 
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higher Judicial oourta w i l l a h i s f l y b« detexmined in tecma 
of th« tin^e ap«Rt by t h ^ f o r diaposal of laboui: casas . Along 
with thia> i t w i l l also b« aaaful to set forth the views o f 
the a f fec ted pec^le aa well aa others who partic ipate in tha 
resolution of etnployet - employea disputes t h r o i ^ adjudica-
tory procesa regarding the exercise of powers by the Judicial 
courts in the labour f i e l d . noRiainlng part of th i s Chapter 
i s denoted t o th i s aspect , 
Adjadieati<^ o f labour cases by the labour 
adjudicating bodies is just the f i r s t stage of a long time 
consuining l i t i ga tory process which ultitnately ends in the 
3upramo Court. Although every decision of a labour 
adjudicating iwthority does not reach the Supreme Court or 
f or that matter oven to the High . Court, yet a case ii^icAi 
i s brought t o tha Supreme Court ox to the High Court f o r 
f i n a l disposal* ravaals how extcacialy c o s t l y and long 
Journey i t i s to aa<Mre legal Justice? indeed, f or an 
indigent worker soc ia l Just ice aa contesr,plated under lnJxiux 
l eg i s la t i on i s unattainable i f he has t o kno<Sk at the dooxa 
o f hi^i^r oourta for securing t h i s , considering the eaqpanee 
and lengthy delay involved in the disposal of cases in the 
Hig9n Court and the supxetne Courts. Eaq>ense and exasperation 
fox hin w i l l not be l ess i f he i s involuntarily dragged by 
the a f f luent party (Capital) in the l i t i g a t i o n in a higher 
eouct f or the defence of his caae which has bean adjudieated 
2?, 
in his £«vour by a labour tcibanaX at the lowax I m ^ l . 
Table 4« l shows the eoeaparatiire picture of the 
time spent In (different higher courts f o r the determination 
Table 4 . 1 . Showing the time spent in the h l ^ e r jud i c ia l 
courts f o r the disposal of labour cases* 
Kind o f t h e 
decision of Tlire spent (In months) 
3.Ko.higher court 0-12 12-24 24-36 36-48 •e-t- N 
1. Appeal be fore 
d i s t r i c t Judge 
under payment 
of Wages Act . 8 2 1 0 0 11 
2. i^peal In the 
High court under 
QTorlcm^'a Cunpw-
satlon Act . 1 4 4 3 4 16 
3. Writ in the High 
Court under 
mdastrlal 
riaputas Act 1 4 9 2 5 21 
4. Revision In the 
High court froRi 
the orders o f 
D i s t r i c t Judge 0 1 0 1 1 3 
5 . ^ e a l in the 
Sttpr«s>e Court 2 8 2 3 11 26 
of labour c a s i s . Xt la c lear fxcm the tab le that re la t lva ly 
a D i s t r i c t court , that s i t s in appeal over the decis ions of 
Auth^lty under the Paynant of Mages Aot« spends less t i n e 
in deciding labour eases conpared t o the H l ^ Court or the 
Sttprene Court, o f the 11 decisions o f D is t r i c t Judges* 
Majority of thesi haire been given %iithln «ne yeas of the 
institution o f appeals. Only in one O « M period involving 
M x e than t m yeass has been spent. 
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In contrast, th« High Court takes mora time f o r 
d o o l d i n g labour Dr>atters« ^diether i t i s a reivision pe t i t i on 
against tiie ocders of r i s t r i o t Judge under the Payment of 
Wages Aot or an appeal from the awards of CoBamisa ioner under 
the Workmen 'a Condensation /ust or a writ against the awards 
of Iiabour court or Industrial Tribunal. Front i t s 40 d i f f e r e n t 
types o f dec is ions # a substantial majority (29) have been made 
a f ter aparsding the jjeriod ranging frcan two years t o four years 
and iQore. At presarit a b o u t one h u n d r e d cases o f labour and 
jnanagement are ;>erjding in the Court o f Jansriu & iCashmir 
s ta te . Many of those c a s e s h a v e been pending f o r m o r e than 
4 y e a r s and longer per iod . In fa c t , the p r a v a i l i n g t r e n d is 
that a writ or an appeal in a labour matter takes at least 
four years f o r disposal .*^ But i f f u r t h e r a p p e a l is f i l e d 
in the H i ^ ^ Court from the decision o f t h e s ingle j u d g e , 
the s a ^ e afnount o f time w i l l b e s p e n t f o r t h e d i s p o s a l of 
42 appeal by the Diviaion Eench. 
Position in the suprflne Court about u t i l i s a t i o n 
of time f o r the decis ion of labour cases more cr l ess edh 
the trend in the Hi^ jh Courts, on an average, in the Supreme 
Court a osse does not take leas than 5 years f o r decis ion 
It is* howsver* heartening t o note that in sone cases* s s i s 
c lear f r «n the table under reference* the Supreme Court has 
httDdM dOMn i t s decis ions within the period of two years 
ixm ins t i tu t i on . 
2 ? 7 
Obirioualy/ on the baais o f data in Tabia 4 .1 
no f irm assert ion can ba tnada in view o f axtt«naly amali 
number of cases ropzasantad by i t . Konorthalaaa* tab la 
serves t o asdbibit a p laus ib le trend in respeot of inordinate 
delay oouaed in the h i ^ e c oourta f o r the adjudication o f 
disputed labouc roanagament <|Li«stions. It can be stated v i th 
some conf idence because oving to nof>»«vailabil ity of adequate 
minber o f decided eases z ig ra i s c p e r y was made f ron the lawyers 
s p e c i a l l y deal ing with labour cases in the Hlg^ OOirt 
regarding the time duration involved in the dia];>03ai of labour 
oases by the H i ^ Court • At the same tixm, the avai lab le data 
w u l d seem t o indicate that* by and l a r g a # no d e l a y i s made 
by t h e D i s t r i c t C3cxirt i n d i s p o s i n g o f a p p a ^ l a f rora the 
d i rec t i ons o f t h e A u t h o r i t y a n d e r t h e P a y m e n t o f tJages Act . 
Konnally, b e f o r e t h e P i a t r i c t Ooutt, a s a nsldered above* an 
appeal f r o m t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e m t h o r i t y i s disposed o f 
in l^e period between one and two years . This per iod , by any 
account* cannot ba regarded as greater* t h o u ^ shorter per iod 
for diq^osal o f ^ p e a l s i s h i ^ l y des i rab l e . The rewi l ts 
shown by the Table 4 .1 are a lso supported by the f i e l d 
anridenee. 
Table 4*2 presents the raaults o f the response* 
o f a l l the three oategorias of our re^ondwits concerning 
whafther liJfte exaroise of appel late and supervisory powers by the 
higher Judic ia l courts - D i s t r i e t court*High Court and • CMdb-
2?o 
laboas matters adds to dalay in the adjudication of labour 
oasaa* % is manifest that over-riding majorities of «fork«rs^ 
tfoployers and lawyers as well as adjudicating o f f i c e r s (94.14%; 
85.96 64.00 % respectively) in unmistalcable terms t e s t i f y 
to the fact that District Court (Distr ict Court i s only 
an appellate court from the directions of Authority under 
the Payment of Wagas Act as noted abov<^ the H i ^ Court and 
the Suprone Court, by virtue of exercising their appeal and 
writ Jurisdictions in labour matters, contribute t o delay 
in the f i n a l determination of labour cases. Only in case 
of lawyers and adjudicating o f f i c e r s a sizable number(33.33 %) 
thinks that hi#ier courts do not perpetrate delay while hearing 
appeals and writs in labour matters. Notably, but quite 
naturally, majority of workers and union leaders (56.64 %) 
f e e l rather sorely about the delay occasioned by the h i ^ e r 
courts in the labour f i e l d * f o r , tihey ill<-afford to spend 
numerous years in the eiq;>eot«tiOR of getting Justice from 
the judicial courts throuc^ the expensive litigatory process . 
More sl^ifioantly* «Bployere tmd lawyers idto are apparently 
considered to be the baoeficiaries o f higher Judicial courts' 
jarladlotlons in Uiboui nattexa also to haive beeone 
diaUlttsioned with the jadieiasy's sole in the industrial 
ralatlona field as majoxity of then readily afSknit that a 
eaao Inovitably gets caufilht up In lengthy proeem of litigation 
onoe i t is taken bmfoxm a higher court. The data contained 
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T«bl« Showing wh«th«r aupasvlsosy, appellate powers o f 
thtt h i ^ e x judielaKy ^ Diatciot Court* High Court 
and tha Suprana Court - over labour adjudicatory 
bodiaa prolflpg adjudicatiwni of labour eaaoa* 
Pageentaoa of r 
Kind of 
S.No.rasponsa 
workers/ 
union 
l«Mders 
(n->256) 
Qnployera 
(n-57) 
Adjudi-
cating 
o f f i c e 
(n-75) 
1. stzongly agree 56.64 40.35 24.00 
2. Agree 37.50 45.62 40.00 
3. strongly 00,00 00.00 13.33 disagree 
4 . Disagree 2.73 5.26 20.00 
5. No opinion 3.13 8.77 2.67 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
ih Table 4.2 thus to an inevitable inference that 
the Jurisdictions of k i ^ e r courts t o « i tertain appeals and 
other pet i t ions from the labour adjudicatory bodies have 
beconm potential cause of lengthening labour adjudicatory 
process and as mxdtx are counter productive* 
It i s mmtm knowledge th«t getting Justice frosi 
the jud i c ia l courts i s an eactr«aely eiqpansive a f f a i r . There 
•re exorbitant fees of lewyers* ooitit f ees , e i q ^ s e involved 
in the prepaxaticn of petitions* Money paiA as transport 
charges on the dates of hearing* t o t a l l ess o f the woi^ and 
the wages therefor for the day of hearing, e t c . ^ lAiich 
make proeeedings of Judicial courts ^M^ensive. Pastiaularly* 
Justice is unbearably costly (01: rather b«y«nd the seadh of 
SoO 
con iinpttcainiotia party to tOia proceedings before the H i ^ 
Court or the Supreme Court) In view o£ ea^ense involved in 
l i t i g a t i o n . Considering this* i t was essential t o know the 
vioMs of the respondwts as t o li^ether adjudicatory procee-
dings before the h i ^ ^ r jud i c ia l courts help the oarty 
havinc? resources, i . e . * proprietors and irienage!r<ent<> t o the 
aetarj-fnent of weaker side* 
Table 4.3 presents the responses of the respondents 
in this behalf . It is bbvious that workers and union leaders 
almost unaniJBOusly nurse the fee l ing that higher courts ' mode 
of ccaif^icting appellate and writ proceedings i s c o s t l y . 
Consequently, their Jurisdictions in industrial relations 
fielri Inadvertently batiefit the ric^ eroployerg. Majority of 
workers and union leaders (56,65 %), indeed, strongly 
believe in the ver i ty of this f a c t . Strangely eaiough, roost 
of th© employers (75.44 %) also go the worker's way in -
subscribing to the view that higher courts* Juriodiotbions in 
labour matters favour the on^loyers by v i r tue of their being 
ric^ party to lidE>oar dis|Hites, However* lawyers and 
adjudicating officers are almost evenly divided in believing 
and diabeliflNTlng the above f a c t . One half (49.34 90 of then 
opine that di^penaation of Justice by the higher courts helps 
wqiloyers hmm^m of their strong financial position. On the 
04mtfary# only s l i ^ t l y less than the above mBdoer (42*66 %) 
tiiiiik othaiwiae.tliat is* hiclier doucts* l^xi»6ixitlmm in labour 
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Taibl« 4* 3. Showing «h«fth«z aupecvi80zy/«pp«Xlat0 pow«xs 
of Judiciary over labour adjudloatoxy 
author It las favour financially strong party 
to tha dispute* i.a«# proprlators and 
wanagaioant* 
union adjudicating 
Kind of laadars aoployars o f f i ears 
S.No. raaponsa (n«256) (n«57) (n»75) 
1. Strongly agree 56.es 24.56 16.00 
2. Agree 37.89 50.88 33.34 
3. Strongly disagree 00.00 1.75 13.33 
4 . Disagrea 2.73 X4.04 29.33 
5. t o opinion 2.73 8.77 8.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
oases do not necessarily favcwr the rich party. The above 
data c lear ly lead to an Important c(»icluaion that h i ^ e r 
Judiciary#though outwardly adjudicate^on cases in appeal 
and writ prooaadings iaipartlally* imperceptibly help^ a party 
having batter f inancial resources because of the e^csnae 
involved in the conduct of prooaadings by thorn. 
It is« generally* baliavad that Judges of Judicial 
courts deciding oases and diai^aa of a l l huaa axe not 
adequately equipped to adjudicate upon matters requiring special 
ii 
iCBowladga and oiCMrtiM. ZniMOdam state a gxaat variety of 
muAi nattate have sprung up lAiieh naad apaoial Mohinary and 
skill to be dealt with. Oiaatlm relating to anployar -
•qployaa ralations>that nany a tima vitally affaot tha 
intaraat of antisa ooBmsnity aa wall* belong to this oajMery. 
It WM natural* tharafexa* to Xnow %ihath«; In tha opinion of 
MS raapondants Judioial oourts axa appxapriata iomma to 
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ad Judicata on induatrlal dlapatas and Issues, In view of 
special character at labour problems. 
Table 4.4 relates to the results of the responses 
of reapcmdents in this regard. It can be seen from the table 
that employees and employers (97.27 %) and 92.98 % respectively) » 
almost in uniform voice e3q>ress their disapproval for the 
ordinary courts to decide labour management disputes because 
of inadequacy of knowledge and s k i l l in the labour matters 
and problems in them. Like en^loyeas and enployers^ a handsome 
majority (66.67 %) of lawyers and adjudicating o f f i c e r s too 
findu the ordinary courts not t o be suitable forums t o decide 
labour matters can account of absence of oxportlzo to dealwith 
them. Against this , a sizable group of lawyers and adjudicating 
o f f i c e r s (26.67 %) findiithe ordinary courts to be ( j i i ta 
oonpetent and well equipped for deciding labour cases. Thus* 
there appears t o be general aversion in a l l qiarters for the 
ordinary courts t o adjudicate upon industrial disputes. This 
Tatole 4 .4 . Showing whether ordinary courts are not attuned to 
adjudicate on labour matters due to technical nature 
of lebour lltiqatlen. 
Percentage of r—pondente 
Workers/ Lawyers/ 
unletB adjudioactlng 
leaders Bsqoloyers offioesa 
(n«25«} (n«S7} (n«7S) 
Kind of 
ftJMo, rs^pieiiM 
X» strongly mgtmm 
Agzett 
3. Strongly dlsegri 
4 . Dls«gxe« 
5* Mo opinion 
Totia 
44.14 
53.13 
00.00 
0.78 
ioi iW 
39.09 
57.89 
1.75 
5.26 
i M 
26.67 
40.00 
2.67 
24.00 
viM 
avaraion pxlntarlly emanates from the inherent lack of special 
knowledge of indastrlal juriapiuderee in orriinary courts . An 
inevitable inference that can be drawn from these data is 
that Judicial courts do not seem to have acquitted themselves 
well in regard to adjudicating on labour matters, as a result , 
they have i o s t the approval and sympathies of the isers of 
their services in the labour f i e l d . 
In Table 4.4 i t has becm seen that a large majority 
of lawyers and adjudicating o f f i c e r s regard ordinary courts as 
unsuitable bodies tc solve labour managements conflicts owing 
to absence of requisite e3<pertize necessary f o r dealing with 
Industrial problems. But at the same time these lawv^ers and 
adjudicating o f f i cers* as wi l l be seen herein~after/ also 
exto i l the valuable role played by the higher Judicial courts 
in the Idoour field through the exercise of sppsllate and writ 
jurisdictions over labour adjudicfttory bodies. Further* because 
of the usefulness of the services of higher courts in labour 
nstters* they favour the reteniion of the courts' jurisdictions 
oirer labour adjudicatory bodies. It would seen that they have 
unwittingly contradicted themselves by giving patently 
incongruous infoxmation pertaining to the same subject matter. 
Tables 4.5 & 4.6 present the responses which 
f 
reveal the above said incongruity in the information given by 
the respondent lawyers and adjudicating offioers. It is 
6bvious from table 4.5 that an orerwhelning SMijority (73.33 %) 
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TeBolm 4 . 5 . Showing the s«spona«8 o£ lawyers and adludicatlng 
offloera about leather supenrlaozy/ippallata 
powers of the hi^er Judiciary in lab^r matters 
serve useful purpose and should be rtrt^ained. 
Kind of Percentage of respondents 
S.Ko. respcmse (n-e9) 
1. Yes 73.33 
2. Ko 18.67 
3. Cant' say 8.00 
Total 100.00 
£^otet Of the 3ix adjudicating o f f i c e r s Who 
were interviewed?four stated that 
higher Judiciary plays useful and 
constractive role in the labour f i e l d 
and such the ir Jurisdictions should be 
retained. Two gave contrary opinion. 
Table 4 . 6 . Jhowing reaperijas of lawyers and adjuriicating 
o f f i c e r s aitoiit v/hetVier superv isory /^pe l le te 
powers of the higher Judiciary in l ^ o u r matters 
bout uniformity in the application have brought al^oof l eg is lat ion . 
Percentage of 
Kind of respondents 
I .No. response (n«69) 
1 . Strongly agree 14.67 
2 . Agree 56.00 
3. strongly disagree 2.67 
4. Disagree 16.00 
5. Can't say 10.66 
Total 100.00 
Kotai Of the six adjudicating offieerSf four agreed that 
Juriadletlona of hi^i^K judicial oourts in labour 
mattexs hove brou(||ht about uniformity in the 
applioation of labour legislation. Prow the other 
two adjudicating officer a» one did not agree with 
with this and one did not eifsreas (any opinion. 
of lawyers and adjudicating officers divulge that appellate 
and supervisory powers of higher oourts in the labour field 
axe serving tts«£ul paxpose and as suoh shoald be kspt ixk-.taot< 
Only a small nvmt>mx o f thain (16,61 96) think «thecwis«. 
Takl« 4.6 ijadloatQS a pasticular exampla of salutary use 
of the a|)pollate and jsupsrvlsoxy jucis<^lctlons of h l ^ a r 
courts in the labour dphere. It can dbaasvad from 
this table that a large majority of lawyers and adjudicating 
o f f i c e r s (70,67 %) consider that higher courts ' jurisdications 
over labour adjudicatory bodies have brou^fht about uniformity 
in the enforcer'-^t of c U f f e r ^ t laboar enactn.ents. Contrary 
to this^ only small proportion of lawyers and adjudicating 
o f f i c e r s (16.00 %) do not swbacrilse t o the above view. 
of tho data presented in the foregoing 
discussion has revealed that our respondents perceive many a 
glririr.g defect in the appsilate an<? supervisory Jurisdictions 
of the higher courts in tlie labour adjudicatory f ield. In viemr 
of the peroeptiOTi of these defects (whether real or not) by the 
respondents in exercise of jur isd ic t ions by the higgler omrta 
in the labour fields i t was in^ortant to aak thmn about whathdr 
t^ey like total eliminaticm of courts* powers fson th« iiOsour 
field ox allow their intsrfsrwne* in restricted only 
(on points of l«ir) or they au#it to have unrestrainod pow«r to 
seiviev the findings of labour adjudloatory bodies both on naxits 
and law. 
T«bl« 4.7 sets out tho results of the responses of 
our rsspondants in this oonnootlon. It is manifost that woxkszs 
and union l«adars are alarast united (92.19 %) in confining th« 
lilghoK oouxts* jurlsdletions in tti« labour £i«ld mXy to thm 
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Tabl« 4 .7 . Showing the c«apon««s of wockers-vnployera and 
l«ify«rs/adJudloatlng o f f i c e r s about whetheK 
supetvieoxy/appellate poiracs of higher jjudlolary 
in l.-.bout matters should be retained only in 
oaaeg»/here point of law ia involved. 
lawyers/ 
union Employers adjurlicating 
Kind of leadets (n»57) o f f i c e r s 
S.Ko. response (n^ase) (ns75) 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Can't 3ay 
Total 
92.19 
0.39 
7.42 
100.00 
80.70 
15.79 
3.51 
100.00 
61.33 
36.00 
2.67 
100.00 
(lueationa of law decided by laJjoir a(3juf"'icatory bor iea . A huge 
majority of eitioloyers (30.70 %) also want that higher c a i r t s ' 
poi'jQra of Qxaniining thr? decisions of labour a '^iju "icatirq }x)die3 
ou'^t t o be liniitcjd to the polnt;3 of law. Xti contraat, a 
slender number of ©nplo^era (15.79 however, favour that 
courts ' power t o rewiaw the decisions of laboar ar^Judicating 
bodies should be extended t o a l l aspects - whether merits or 
law. Interestingly, majority of lawyers and adjudicatirig 
o f f i c e r s too (61.33 %) l ike that higher courts should decide 
only qu«stlon!=t of law %^ile scratinizing labour adjudicatory 
bodies deols ions. A sizable minority (36.00 %)» on the dfthec 
hcmdy pjcefex that judiciary ought t o possess unfettered powers 
to reconsider a l l the issues (^ whether factual or of law) 
involved in the decisions of labour adjudicating bodies.These 
data help to ccme t o an important inferanee that there i s 
general consensus f o r substantial curtailment of h i ^ e r c o u r t s ' . 
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powers of intexferenca with the awards o f labour adjudicatory 
bodies. 
It has been seen that our respondents mostly 
desire that higher Judicial courts ' power over labour 
adjudicatory bodies should be retained cmly t o consider the 
points of law. Therefore, impl ic i t ly they have f e l t the 
imperativeness of keeping some avenue open for correcting 
arbitrary decisions of labour adjudicating authorit ies . At 
the same time, they also expressed concern over the delay 
that necessarily ensue from taking a case (Whether in appeal 
45 
or writ) before a judic ia l court . Keeping theae appar^t ly 
diverqart attitudes of the respondents into view* i t was 
necessary t o ascertain whether they want t o adopt some iraasare, 
so that the delay caused in the jud i c ia l courts in the 
adjudication of labour cases is minimized. 
Table 4.3 shows the responses of the respondents 
about the measure they want t o adopt for ensuring speedy 
disposal of labour eases In the judicial courts should their 
Jurladlotlona be retained In labour matters* It oan be 
observed that vast majority of workers, es^loyers, and lawyers/ 
adjudicating officers (92.97 %, 75.44 % & 80*00 % respectively) 
agreed to the suggestion that there should be a nandatory 
directive for the judicial courts to dispose of labour cases 
speedily on priority basis, cmly among the «oployers, lawyers 
and adjudicating officers, small fractions of respondents 
(19.30 % <• 17.33 % respectively) es^^reased their disagreenent 
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Taibl« 4 .8 . Showing the r«spon3os of worlcars, onoployera and 
lavyera/adjudloatlng offlcaxs id}Out trtiethor 
Judicial courts n«ad to be diraoted to daoida 
labour cases sp«<idlly on priority basis in ease 
their Jurisdicticvm are retained in labour 
matters . • 
Percept<^qf yeappndqn^^g 
3.NO, 
Kind of 
response 
workers/ 
unicm 
leaders 
(n-256) 
Sn?>loyers 
(n=57) 
Lawyers/ 
adjudicating 
o f f i c e r s 
(n»75) 
1. Yes 92.97 75.44 80.00 
2. Ho 00,00 19.30 17.33 
3. Can't say 7.03 5.26 2.67 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
I^otei Of t'le s ix adj idicating o f f i c e i s , four opined that 
higher courts ' Jurisdictions in labour matters should 
be confined only t o points of law# while two said 
that powers of tiie coarts should be unrestricted over 
labour adjudicatory^; bodies. 
with the 3iiggG3tion that d irect ive need be given t o the courts 
to decide the laJ our isaaes on priority basis for speedy 
disposal. What these data inply i s that vAiile higher courts' 
some supervision over labour adjudicating bodies is 
indispcmsably requisite* there is utter sensitiveneaa to the 
protracted eourae of litigation in the courts. As a remit* 
there is an Imperative need for taking some practical meaaurea 
to cut short the delay in the adjudication of labour oases 
in the courta. 
Our respc^dents have made it auffioiently cleaz 
that labour adjudicatory bodies* determinationa ou^t not to 
be taktfi aa final and that there eu^t to be aone cftieek of 
higher Judicial courts over then. Tttolm 4*9 incorporates 
th« data irfhlch help t o corroborate this view fxcni yet anothez 
angle* Reaponaes contained in this table indicate whether 
Table 4 .9 . Showing the responses of workers-employer a and 
lawysra/adjadicating o f f i eora about whether in 
the absence of supervisors/aqppellate powers of 
the h i ^ e r Judiciary in labour matters appellate 
labour tribunal needs t o set up to hear appeals 
from the decisions of labour adjudicatory bodies . 
Percentage of resptcmdents 
s .tio. 
Kind of 
response 
Workers/ 
union 
leaders 
(n - 256) 
anployers 
(n»57) 
Lawyers/ 
adju-
dicating 
(n«75) 
1. Yes 92.58 80.70 69.33 
2. Mo 00.00 14.40 26.67 
3. Cant* say 7.42 5.26 4.00 
l o t a l 100.00 100,1 J 100.00 
general Labour Ap-)allatP3 rifcunal ne'=?ds to be <3et up t o 
hear appeals from the decisions o f labair a<?Judic tory 
fh 
bddies in case of t o ta l removal of hi<^Qr c o i r t s ' jurisrdctions 
(appeal as well as writ power) fran the industrial relations 
sphere* It ia manifest that substantial oroportion of employees# 
enployers and lawyers/adjudicating bodies (92.58 80.70 i> 
€9*33 % respectively^ respond posit ively to the suggestion that 
there should be Labour Appellate Tribural for hearing appeals 
from adjudicative detenr.inations o f labour adjudicatory bodies 
inHase of ellminaticm of a p e l l a t e and supervisory 
jur isdict ions of hli^er courts from the labour f i e l d . Bi 
contrastp «aall minorities of employees and lawyers/ 
•djudioating o f f i c e r s (14.4 % and 26.67 % respectively) do not 
d 4 i j 
find favour with tha opinion of the majority, that i s , they 
are wholly for Judicial Courts for reviewing the decisions 
of labour adjudicating bodies. Data presented in Table 4,9 
lead to an inportant inference tiiat decisions of labour 
adjudicating authorities must not be deenped t o be sacrosanct. 
Whether i t is jud i c ia l courts or LaJ:oiir Appellate 1 ribunal, 
there nust necessarily be a foraro for scrutinizing the 
decisions of labour adjudicating bocUes, and thereby, 
rect i fy ing their i l l a o a l i t i e s . 
In order to know further the choice of the 
respondents concerning whether they prefer Ijabour Appellate 
Tribunal to one penr.nnent Judge of the High Court so le ly 
deciding labour matters or the other way rounr' f o r roviewing 
the awards and orders of labour adjudicatina authorities, 
their response was e l i c i t ed in this regard. Table 4.10 shows 
the results of tViese responses, .^ s is c lear from the table, 
Tabla 4.10. Showing tha responses of workers, employers and 
lawyecs/adjudicatlng o f f i c e r s indicating their 
<dioio« between the l^^our aq;>pellate tribunal and 
• jud9« of the High Court dealing cmly with lid^ouc 
l i t i gat ion t o hear Appeals in labour matters. 
wotlcM/ SSiiyers/ 
union adjudicating 
Claas leaders Aaployers offioezs 
S.Ko. of pxeference (n-256) (n"57) (n«>75) 
1. Labour appellate 25.39 
Tribunal 
45.61 12.00 
2. A Judge of the H i ^ 
court dividing laJxur 0.38 
caaea only 
31.58 32.00 
3. No opinion 74.23 22.81 56.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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majority of workets* lawyers and adjudicatory offIcera(74.22 % 
and 56.00 % r«apectlvaly) desistadi from axpraasing any opinion 
aJoout tha forum uhidi i s to axamlne the deoisicMns of labour 
adjudicating authorities. Only one fourth of responderit 
workers (25.39 %) IndlcatQ their preference for Labcwr 
/Apellate Tribunal. But of the lawyers and adjudicating 
o f f i c e r s showing their preference* main group (32.00 %) opted 
for a permanent High Court Jidge axclasivaly deciding labour 
matters. Against th is , only a tiny fraction (12.00 %) preferred 
i j^our Appellate Tribunal. In striking contrast t o the 
response pattern exJiibited by the workers, lawyers and adjudi-
cating o f f i c e r s , a large majority of employers (77.19 %) have, 
however, shown their preference in one way or the other. Thus, 
about one half of the employers making known their choice 
(45.61 .i) l ike the setting up of Xjabour Appellate Tribunal 
against relat ively lesser number (31.58 %) vrtio are in favour 
of a permanent Judge of the H i ^ Court a t t ^ d l n g t o only labour 
eases. The Inability of the large proportion of two main 
oategorles of our respondents to respcnid* as i t were, has 
defeated the very object of the attempt at ascertaining the 
otioiee of Kespmidents cegasdlng the forum to be adopted for 
heexing petitions from the parties aggrieved by the award;,of 
labour adjudicating bodies. Nonetheless* of the 143 respondents 
(belonging to all the categories) responding to the <saery in 
<|ttestlon, big majority (69,79 %) wanted Xjabour Appellate 
Tribunal and a snuill runber (30*79 %> fanroured a Judge of the 
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H i ^ Court dealing pannanantly with labour casas. The 
Inferanoe anierging from the above data Is that status <|;ao 
(existing arrangcnnenta for hearing iqapeals and writ petitions 
frcjm thQ decisions of labour adjudicatory bodies) appears to 
s t i l l conntend i t s e l f to the users of adjudicatory machinery 
as well as t o others vho partic ipate in the ex^3uti<»i of 
adjudicatory process. 
Finally* the t^inion of the ra3pond€«it3 was s o u ^ t 
about whether they favour the creation of separata cadre of 
labour judiciary* so that existing untidy lai^our a'^'jufUcating 
syatom, comprising administrative o f f i c e r s* jud ic ia l o f f i c e r s , 
and higher courts* is brought to an ^ d and in i t s place a 
more harmonious and homogeneous structure of labour courts 
should adjudicate upon labour management disputes. Table 4.11 
presents the responses in this regard. It can be dbservad 
Table 4 .11. Showing the responses of workers* enployers and 
lawyers/adjudicating o f f i c e r s concerning the 
establishment of separate cadre of labour 
judic iary . 
Percentage of respondents 
3 .Mo. 
Kind of 
response 
Worlcers/ 
leaders 
(n«256) 
BRi]|l0|er8 
LaMyecs and 
adjttdioating 
offioera 
(«-75) 
1. strongly agree 60,55 52.64 53.33 
2. Agree 38.28 29.82 29.33 
3. Strongly disagree 00.00 00.00 6.67 
4. Disagree 00.00 15.79 8.00 
5. Mo opinion 1.17 1.75 2.67 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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ftoro the table that there is almost unlforni pos i t ive response 
from a l l the three groups of our respondents for the 
establlshinwit of separate labour judiciary for determining 
disputed labour matters. Uniform support for labour judiciary 
is indicative of exasperation of the respondents with the 
existing slow-moving adjudicating systorv:. It is thus clear 
that present adjudicatory mechanism has been acceptable 
only for want of more e f f e c t i v e and ea^eclitious alternative. 
The main ccMiciaalons of ttilg chaptGi: arc; 
summery labour adjudicatory procecTures were nrimarily designeri 
to ensure expedition in the sattlomant of indiiatrial labairs ' 
grievances, ant l i t t l e thaightwaa bestowed on the fac t that 
i f legal i ty of the decisions made by the adoption of summary 
adjudicatory procedures was que?^tionable in the jud i c ia l 
courts in the eaearcise of their appeal, revision or writ 
jurisdictions* the object of eaqpeditious settlainent of worker's 
gri«v«nce3 would not materialize. The available data in this 
oonnactlon c lear ly l«nd credance t o the apprehension that 
higher jud i c iary ' s appellate a n d writ jurisdict ions in 
indurstiral relations f i e l d has negated that paramount object 
of the eraatlon of l^our adjudicating bodies. This f a c t i s 
not only attested t o by the available s t a t i s t i c a l data but an 
ov«r»rlding majority of kll the eatagorias of raspondants 
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have readily divulged that delay caused at the highec courts* 
level In the disposal of labour matters has rendered the 
adjudicative method irrelevant for deciding labour disputes. 
Second, i t need hardly be stated that dhie t o 
extremely expensive character of conventional l i t i g a t o r y 
process tt^e jur isd ic t ions of h i ^ e r j u d i c i a l courts in labour 
matters imperceptibly benef i t the rich party (proprietor)to 
the dispute, and employers mostly endorse th is view. 
However* lawyers' support for the v e r i f i c a t i o n of th is f a c t 
i s only p a r t i a l . 
Thirf% i t is geriatal b e l i e f that judges of jud i c ia l 
coartn are "jacks of a l l trac^os" Disputed labour manageroOTt 
questions rectuire socio-economic orientation anci soec ia l s k i l l 
arri leiowiedge of industrial jurisprudence f o r settlement, 
Conseq^aently, courts are not appropriate forums t o take 
cognisance of labour matters. overwhelming majority of a l l 
the respondents reinforces th is b e l i e f : 
Althou^ lawyers and adjudicating bodies regard 
h i ^ e r courts as not c i t a b l e forums f o r deciding labour.cases 
because of their being not adequately equipped f o r th is task, 
at the same time, they characterise the ro le of higher courts 
as being u s e f u l . Particularly, in their opinion, higher Courts 
have brought about uniformity in the application of lidoour laws. 
They have unoonsiously given apparently inconsistent information. 
Jurisdict ions of the h i ^ e r courts in labcur aattexa, 
de fect ive as they the respondents do not want t o t a l 
•llnination o f their Jurisdiotions fxcn the labour f i e l d . Foe, 
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some meaauc« of Judicial control ought t o remain to check 
arbitrariness of labour adjudicating bodies . Preponderance 
of opinion of a l l the rcsapondents prefers the limiting of 
Stiver courts Juriadiction to consider the points of law 
involved in the decisions of labour adjudicating bodies. 
However, the respondents are prepared t o accept even this 
limited ro le of higher courts in the labour f i e l d only i f the 
maAiatoty diroctiVQ is givai t o jud i c ia l courts for determining 
labour cases pronptedly on pr ior i ty bas i s . 
Fourth, evidently, respondents desire soma control 
over labour adjudicatory bodies. In the event of t o ta l ouster 
of the jur isdict ions of higher courts from the labo>ir f i e l d 
they would l ike labour /Apellate Tribunal t o hear appeals from 
labour adjudicatory bodies. Between Labour Appellate Tribunal 
and a Judge of the High Court dealing exclusively with labour 
matters* majority of workers and lawyers appear t o prefer 
neither of t h ^ and instead would ccmtinuation of the exist ing 
arrangeBMriat. But in remarkable contrast, a good proportion of 
employers stEMS on setting up of Labour i^ppellate Tci3Mn«l 
fox «MiBlnlng the deoisions o f labour adjudicating bodies. 
Finally* as a panacea for rectifying al l defects of 
the existing adjudicatory aystsn (labour adjudicatory bodies «nd 
higjher courts) as labour dispute settlement mechanism, 
respondents almost unanimously «mpha8lze the need for 
establishment of separate cadre of labour judiciary. 
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CHAPTER - V/ 
|«AB01IR WXTUDXCiCIOII 
24.J 
Bq[>loy«r * disputea «c« th«i most 
difficult and l&mtm» to XMolva in tli« huwan society• 
Conflisting •ooncnio i n t « m t s of labour «nd aanaginant 
M wall aa aansitiva prdblama of human ralationa axa 
eaeentially ixnrolvad in than. Vot un-oftan. vital aooiatal 
intaraat ia alao affaotad by tha iniSuatsial diaputaa and 
oonflagrations. A naohanioal ok ayllogiatio iipproadn towaida 
C u i j 
the solution of industrial prctolons is not a3«>odiant.^ Mor 
az« zou^ and reiidy methods applied for solving industrial 
oonf l l o ts capable of making ade<]iate dia^os i s of the real 
causes that underlie labour and capita l issuer Therefoxe# 
any search into evolving or f inding out a satisfactory method 
for the e f f e c t i v e soluticm of labour d i s ^ t e s nust, o f 
necessity* make rational evaluation of various factors and 
considerations involved in them. 
2 3 Voluntary negotiation3# and aoinpulaory adju<iication 
are two comnionly ut i l i zed roethodsj for resolving labour 
roanagamant dispiitas. Doubtla33» botli thase modes of ciiapute 
aettleroont possess relative merits and demerits. Howovgr, 
the question that needs t o be considered i s whether these t%io 
methods iixe mutually exclusive and inimical to each other« so 
that adoption of one obviates the need for the other or 
necessarily hanpers the growth and operation of the other. 
Or/ are they oonfileiaentary t o each other and constitute more 
•f feot ive ^ d satisfactory dispute settlement mMdianiwi if 
both mxm nmAe to oparate In haxnony f or the coaolution of 
Xaboai: managsnant disputes. This question aaounoo opoeial 
signifioanea in ooantriea like M i a where eas«t ia l conditions 
(fos oMeeple, hoalthy trade union i«i) for the suoeessful 
operation of the institution of oolleotive bargain:Un^ and 
prooosa of imtual negotiations mxm aonspiououaXy lading, 
IVirthor» should the state whidh la oustodian of public Interest 
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remain « h«lplMS spttctator if In a dispute dua to supax-
olXiouanaas of the « a p X a y e c or reaaloitrant attitude of a 
trade union# espeoialXy with political affiliation, a l l 
attonpts at reaching negotiated settlement are thwarted. 
In the light of these questic^s it i s desirable to ascertain 
the possibility of caconcil iation between mutual negotiations 
ard G o n p u l a o r y adjurlication as labour diap ite settlanont 
procedures, so -tiiat both act as imtually dependent and 
supporters instead of being ccsnpetitors of each other f o r 
the soluticffi of labour disputes* 
Canparative advantages and disi^dvantages of 
Voluntary KeaotXations and Compulsory Adjudication 
Chief advantages of nutual negotiations arc that 
they enable the parties to the dispute t o s e t t l e d i f ferences 
themselves without being aided or interfered with by an outAide 
agency. The dispute ia s o l v ^ c|uickly, amicably^inexpensively, 
informally and without undergoing botheration and hardship 
which are invariably involved if the dispute is taken t o an 
adjudicating forum. Above all* since voluntary negotiations 
are eonAioted with the spixit of reaching nutual settlamentf 
both the parties tend to opprooiate and aoeonnodato each 
othox*** viowpoint for eottliiig dispute within the faotosyf 
farther, settlenent of disputes by natual negotiations being 
voluntary and reached through goodwill of the pastios* thoxo 
is no victor ox vanqyiiithod paxty and oonao^iently no 
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blttaniMa oz oauss of fciotlon rcRnaln behind* This 0K««t«8 
p«a0eful atmosphere within the estebllshiBent «nd helps in 
bxinking flft>out oiM»8ure kinship between the eti^loyez and the 
•nployee.^ It will in its turn ensure unstlncted turn out 
of production and ecnisequsantly betterment of the industry 
and national economy. Voluntary negotiations also forge 
unity in the working c lass as their e f fect iveness and 
oatcoine depend* for the most part# upon the co l la c t ive 
strength of the workers in the face of formidable bargaining 
power of the anola/ar r^ie t o his control over tha nieans and 
7 resources. 
On th»i other hand> roaiii flaw in the direct 
negotiations i s that i f negotiations do not calrolnate in 
agreaKJ«^t# the c o n f l i c t between manageraant and labour w i l l 
unfai l ingly result in str ike or lock out, and 
t 
stoppage of work, ] 
Again« 
for the successi&ii working of Institution of oollectlve 
bargaiiilng as well as for carrying on direct negotiations 
the woidcers nust be organised because in individual capacity 
worker is in^weak bartpaining position.' Therafore* «ntpXoy«M 
fzoi unorganised sector can derive l i t t l e benefit fcen 
voluntary negotiations in regard to settling their diaputee 
with the e^loyer* Besides^ fox the bettex operatioa of 
bargaining process there ought to be healthy trade unionisM« 
that is« these is no nultlpliolty of unlfins or uni«n 
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10 ^ ^ xivftlazies as th« unions oonvanlsntly aetjraspxsssntativsi 
of woxJcnen fox oarsying on nsgotiations on thoijr behalf. 
Wh«n thaco are compafting unions In the sane establlirtwient 
with their attendant xlvalsy* the problem of detecmlnation 
of bargaining agent will always be there. Therefore* In 
countries not having haaltly trade union moireeeiant# there is 
l i t t l e chance of voluntary ne^pstlatlOTis being e f f e c t i v e 
remedy f o r solving labour disputes, lieedless t o state , 
the problem of mult ipl ic i ty of trade unions and their r ivalry 
based cm party - p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n s i s a special feature 
of the industrial relaticms scan© in this country. It appears 
to have seriously Viainpered the grovjth of institution of 
collectiva bargaining and negotiated justice in the labour 
field In.,- the country.^^ As with^eat of the country, state 
of Jaatinu arid Kashmir is not Immune to trade unicai r iva l r i es 
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and frequent eruptions of industrial violencejoo that account, > • 
Finally, m^m actual process of carrying on 
negotiations is far £son being atxai#it and simple. Zt xeciJilKea 
a great deal of skill* ea^rienoe* txlokery and preparation. 
AS PxQfeMOS Kenedy has pungently put i t , " i t (eolleotive 
bargaining) involves a oonplioated fern of iiitesohange* 
aendaining axguBMnts* hor8»»txading* bluff* cajolery and threat". 
Zn oonparisen to voluntary negotiations* ooopalsmey 
adJttdioati4m is Mbjeot to saathing oxltieisn of varying nature. 
Major eritioisn of adjudioatlen as dispute s«ttl«aent method 
is th«t i t is •xtKfliB«ly dilatory* wens ivs and Xagalistio 
rsRHidy, Zt is also oonsidared to hm antlthatioal to oolloetiva 
bacgaining* dastxuetiva of tcada unitmisn* and xastriotivo 
of tha right to strika which has baw attainad by tha labour 
after long and bloody struggles and deprivations.^^ Zt is 
also fait that adjudicatory awards being superiitposad by the 
third party, will necessarily make the losing party discontented 
and^aa a result* leave behind a trail of bittemeas wttich is 
inimical to industrial peace and harmony. Baaidea* easy 
availability of adjudicatory remedy* it is feared* temots a 
party t o take trifling matters and untenable claims before 
adju<^icatoty forums* and thereby* inofi^catea litigious 
sp i r i t in 
It would appear much criticism of compulsory 
adjudication in the labour field is devoid of substance and 
mostly reflects the predilections of the critics of 
adjudicative process. Thus »the cOR^laint that adjudication 
sti f les the proccMS of collective bargaining* trade unionism* 
and suppresaes the r i ^ t of the %«orkeES to strike seams to 
have l i t t l e nems with actuality. Jn the psesant study out 
of 331 cases selected from the decisions of labour 
adjudicating bodies* in around one third (113) oasas there 
iwuta consent awards* ^^ adjudicatory prooass Is antithetic 
to voluntary negotiations* this hi^icoportion of disposal of 
of labour oases through consent awards would hanro hmn 
iiqpOMibi*. On th« oontcary* it beings to £ox« «n ovex-
ganazous attitud* of the adjudicatoxy bodias in fanroux of 
voluntaxy settlements. 
The trathfulness of this fact can be fUxthox 
Judged by looking at the extra oxdinazy nanber of adjouximmits 
gxanted by the adjudicating aathorities in cases ending in 
consent awaxds* Obviously, most of these adjoucnnients were 
given t o make e f f o r t s for reaching mutual agreoinents. Fran 
4,077 to ta l adjoumnianta allowed in 331 cases* one third 
( h l ^ e a t number of adjournments 31.59 %) have been gxanted 
in the cases ten~..inating in consent awards. It unmistakably 
derives honie the point that the perscais adjudicating on labour 
disputes axul grievancea are second t o ncma in preferring 
voluntary aettlamenta to other modes of sett l ing labour natters. 
I t would also seem that a labour adjudicatory foxum would giva 
i t s decision only when a l l the e f f o r t s fox conproiaise 
settlements have proved f u t i l e . The following observations of 
the Labour Court of Janaiu and Kat^mix state serve to show the 
attitude of laboux adjudieatoxy foxiims towards nutual 
sattlanentsf The paxtiM consented when again an atteiiqpt 
was made (by the paxties) to oone to a s«ttl«Bent. This 
txiSainal also Izidicated that any nutual settlanent betwoan tha 
parties will be ^iawad with favoux baoausa i t anauxes lasting 
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paaoe as held by the 3apx«na Couxt Tha Labour Ceuxt 
itt slMllax vein obsexvad again t tha paxtias having 
•attlad the dii^putea tmaag thsmaalTaa aMieably, no dispute 
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fox ad judication i« X«ft. This «mioabX« 8«ttl«iRent haa to 
hm psafaxxad ovmt ali othar nodaa of aattXamant beeauso it 
ia a pointex towaxda thaza baing goodwill and lasting paaoa 
18 batwaan the ac^loyers and oroployaas. 
Tha highaz Judicial courts have also fsaciaently 
appreciated and anphaaiaad tha co le of c o l l e c t ive bargaining 
and mutual negotiaticms in industrial f i e l d . Thay have takan 
tha viaw that the workmen have the r i ^ t of c o l l e c t i v e 
bargaining with regard to various matters in whidi they are 
interested; their pay* their wages/ their bcmaa, e tc , « which 
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Inpose reatrioticms on tha r i ^ t s of the employer. The 
Supreroe Court has repeatedly underscored the need f o r the 
adoption of process of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining and voluntary 
negotiations f o r resolution of labour disputes* It has 
(^served thast "Mn element of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining triiich 
i s tha essential feature of modern trada union movement i s 20 necessarily involved in industrial adjudioation*" 
in a ceoant case the suprama Oourt again indicatad 
its pre-kliapositiiNa for Voluntary negotiaticma fox 
tha xmolution of labour disputes. Tha Court absarvadt 
"•••Tha goldan xula for tha judicial saaolation of an 
iaduatxial dispute is f irst to parauada fighting 
paxtiaa by Judicious auggaaticHna* into tha paao«-> 
MakiiKr aona* dioantangla tha 6lt£mx9»emB* naxxow tha 
•istuzat and convert than* through consanaual 
atapa* into negotiated Justice. Law is not the 
laat wexd la Juatioa* aapecialXy social Justice. •• 
So it is that negotiations f irst and adjudication 
nei(t« is a welccae fomula for the Bench and the 
Box* Manatmnt and Uniona.^.*)'^ 
Q (ZO t 
H«nee« from %fhat has bean statad abova* It 
baooraaa unacjiivoilal t^at ccnqpulaory adjudication has not 
hindared the snrolution and gxowth of process of collectiva 
bargaining or mutual negotiations. But# ins4iead« i t is 
oonscio^isly pramoting the voluntary negotiations as a means 
of set t l ing labour disputes. Therefore, Involuntary 
adjudication and c o l l e c t i v e bargaining appear t o be inter -
twined instead of being mutually exclusive. Both are 
intended to realise the saine objects* v i z . , preservation of 
industrial peace and securing iroproveroent of the l o t of the 
worker. The a9q;>erience of other countries which have adqpted 
coinpulsor/ arbitration arir^  c o l l e c t ive bargainirwf f o r the 
resolutilon of an^loyer - en^loyee disputes shows thiat these 
two methods go hand in hand for resolving the inaastrial 
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c o n f l i c t s . Thu3# in countries such as Australia and 
K«fw Zealand oaqpulsory arbitration and c o l l e c t i v e bargaining 
operate in unison and hanpn^^ and have acquitted themselves 
coomendably in solving labour -ananagement c o n f l i c t s as vpell 
mm in •ffeeting sabatuatial improvement in l iv ing ccmditlons 
of the working 
SInilacly* eaqMlsory adjudication does not amm 
to retard trad* union d«7«lopsMRt or militate against workers * 
r i ^ t to strlXa in any eonoeivable manner.^* Trad^Union 
offioials fxaaly rapraaent aggriavad werkaza bafora adjudieatory 
fOKiana. As aaan abovat thara ia no saatriotion on tha paxtiaa 
~ I • c> 
t o carry on voluntary nagotiations during pendwoy o£ 
adjudicating proceedings, /adjudicatory forums, and especial ly 
Supran© Court, have scruploualy refrained from laying down 
any r igid or general principles in accordance with which 
I ' 
disputed labour nianagwient questions are t o be adjudicated on< 
They have confined adjudicatory process to the oart icalar 
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factual situations. I t leaves considerable scope f o r imitual 
bargaining by the par t i es . 
It is true that industrial I'^isputes Act, which is 
mora important for c o l l e c t i v e bargaininn and trade unionism, 
do«« not oerrcit a str ike or lock out during the pendency o f a 
case f o r adjudlcptlcan nrd f o r tv?o morthg after the conclusion 
of adjudicating proceedings. A strike or lock out i s a lso 
prohibited c^-iring the period an award remain in o p e r a t i c in 
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ccmnection vrith any matter concerntsd with the award. These 
revstrictions on strike and lock out are only designed t o 
ensure smooth pperatioa of adjudicatory process and maintenanoe 
of industrial peace. By any stretch of iroagination/ th is cannot 
be regarded aatsubetantial curtailment of the right t o s t r ike . 
Zt is only a reasonable restr ict ion on the legitimate ac t iv i t i e s 
of a trade union in the wider interest of the caominity. 
Incidentally, the Constitution of India does not 
xeoognlme any r i ^ t to strike. Nor doM it |»iarantee a ri^fht 
of oolleetive bargaining as part of freedon to fom aesooiaitions 
27 and unions. It simply ccmf«ues the right on the labour to 
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fom tzada unix^ na and the exaroiaa of this is subject to 
the iiqpositlon of Eeasonable restrictions in public interest.^^ 
m any evert, there cannot be any absolijte rlaht 
t o str ike in a democratic po l i ty goiremed by the rule of law. 
Over and a b o v e , r i ^ t to strike Is not an end In i t s e l f . I t i s 
t o be u t i l i eed f o r the fUlfi lmait of a purpose. The purpose 
is t o It^orove upon the l iv ing And working conditions of 
workers by legitimate struggle. If ^ ^ in a given case 
recourrie t o strike is for u l ter ior or disraotive purpose, 
where does i t lead t o 7 Surely t o v i o l ^ c e , stoppage of 
work arid production, and occasionally i t may bring untold 
hardship to society as wel l . In such a situation i f there 
i s no provision for conpulsory adjudication, the result w i l l 
inevitably be chaos. Therefore, in a way, conpulsory 
adjudicati(»]i may act as safety valve f o r the lawful and 
I 
responsible trade union activity. 
However* against what has b«en stated, the Suprcnoe 
CoiKt of India has avlnoed a fairly liberal attitude towards 
workers' right to strike as weapon to strengthen their 
bargaining power. While delineating the bus is and scope of 
the right to strike, the Court atatodi 
'S*. The right to unioniae, the right to strike aa part of 
oQllaotive bargaining and, subject to the legality and 
tsananlty of the situation, the right of the weaker group, 
via . , labour to pressure the stronger party, v iz . , oapital, 
to nogotiate and sender justioe, axo prooessM reoognisod 
by industrial jurisprudonoo and aupposted by social •lUstioo. 
miXrn aooiety Itsolf, in Its b«sio noads «icistm«« 
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may not be held t o ranscxm In the nwoe o£ 
the right to bargain and atrlkera nust ob«y 
oivilisad noma in the bat t le 4UEui not be 
vulger 6t violent hoodlums* Ikidustry* cflpcesented 
by intransigent Managiament0« nay widX be made 
t o real into reason by the s tr ike weapon and 
cannot then 8«aeal or wail oomplaln of loss of 
profits or other i l l - e f fec ts but must 
negotiate ox get a reference* The broad basis 
ia that workers are weaker although they afe 
produoers and their straggle t o better their 
l o t has the sanction of the rule of law. Unions 
and strikes are not more conspiracies thadi 
professions and p o l i t i c a l parties are# and« 
being f o r weaker, need succour of course/ 
adventuristwi, extr«MiTiist# extraneously inspired 
and pueri le strikes* absurdly insane persistence 
and vio lent or scorched earth p o l i c i e s boarorang 
and are conathema for the law. Within these 
parameters the r i ^ t t o strike i s integral t o 
c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . . , " 2 9 
In another case the iupreme Oourt observed* 
M • • • that c o l l e c t i ve bargaining f o r securing 
inprovcHoent on matters l ike basic pay, dearness 
allowance/ bonus, provident fund and gratuity 
leave and holidays was the primary ob ject of a 
trade union and wham demands l ike these %f«re put 
forward and thereafter/ a str ike was resorted t o 
in an atten^t to induce the ofliq>any t o agree t o 
the deroarids or at least to open negotiations the 
strike must prima f a c i e be considered justif ied. . . "30} 
These observations of the Court clearly indicat* 
that workers have right t o t ^ e reeourse to strike within 
reasonable limits that is* wh«n strike i s not violent or 
deiMnds of the strikers are absured or it la not aotivetod 
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l^ y extxajieous consIdecations, a t e . , 
Henca# i t i s c lear that adjudicating forums do not 
adWacaely a f f e c t the growth of trade unions or the ir mcnt 
potent weapon of resorting t o f i iract action i f the lawful 
denands o f the workers ar-a a u p e r d l i o i s l y brushed aside by 
tha intransigent employer. 
Kext* the apprehenaicm that easy a v a i l a b i l i t y o f 
coiRpulJOry arLitiation genaratoa lixiyious toi.crncy alTO seem 
to be unt'ounciad, Worker who is woaicor party -co ti'O dispata 
cannot a f f o rd to revel in tha long ar.d costly course of 
l i t i g a t i o n . Indeed, the f a c t other way rous).^ .. het is 
to sa.-, i f tho vrorker fa i ls to r'eciaicr ir. hi-^ f ".ivo-ir 
from one adjudicating forum, he is dissaarlacl b^ - the* flraralal 
constraints t o talce the matter in appeal or writ lefore tve 
higher forum, i-^ any, indeed., do not stf itt liti(}ation at a l l 
on account o f their poverty ev<an i f they have lost thoir 
job.^^ A l t h o u ^ , unlike workers, employer gar.3rally is not 
hindered t o make use of adjudicatory mechanisin on the ground 
o£ coat of l i t i ga t i on^ in actual p r a c t i c e , he Is exasperated 
with lengthy adjudicatory process , Ae a result , he ckies not: 
r e j o i c e in reckless ly indulging in labour Xitit^tioari. Xt 
would seem that extremely lengthy character o f l i t i g a t o r y 
process checks both employer and employee t o take recourse 
32 t o adjudicatory proceedings unthoughtfu 1 l y . 
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On the othax hand# • v ind io t lvc «iq>ley«x nay, 
how0vor« d«xlv« tall wSvantag* of thm «nd writ 
Jus lad l o t ions o£ th« Hlg^ Ooairt arid tha 3ipc«mi Ooart in 
labouK mattasa. To cuKb thla tandaney of aaq;>Xoyara« 
aaltabia changaa naad t o ba roada In tha axlartlng prooaduxM 
of reviewing the deal a ions of labour adjudicating bodiaa* 
iilstabllalunant of jj^boic /tppellate Tribunal oan tialp t o 
bslng s^aady conclusion ot procacKllnga In labour raattara. 
Aftor the constitution of Labour Appellate Tribunal* suprana 
Oairt aliould not l i ght ly Interfere in labour oases under 
Art i c l e of 136 of the cx>nstitutiori of Iridia. 
As t o tha assertion that laboar adjudicatory 
nechanlatn has not been able t o establish in<\istriauL peace 
and harnonlous relations between two sides of tha industry, 
opinion evldenco seams t o lend support t o i t , t h o u ^ widar 
s t a t i s t i c a l Information concerning work stoppages on aooount 
of adjudicatory awards i s more relevant t o e s t a b l l ^ tha 
hypothesis that tha awards of Ic^Dour judicatory bodiaa 
generate industrial unrest . Table S . l shows the viaw of 
workers, anployers and lawyers and adjudicating o f f i c e r s in 
th i s raopaot. Zt ia c lear fron tha tab le that r e la t i ve ly 
sn^loyars are noze discontented with the deds iona o i labour 
adtjudloatory bodiaa* though di f farenoa la only Marginal 
batwaan tha aoployers ' discontenmant with labour adjudieation 
and that of woskara** Mora than ona half of enaployaxa 
outr ight ly eondann adjudieatoxy jBachaDian aa being ganarativa 
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of industrial disooritant. I£ tha «nployaes v^o considax 
that adjudioativa sattlesaents (Miily part ly eausa discontant 
bat%raan the parties are also takcm with tha annployers who 
t o ta l l y discard adjudicatory mechanism an the ground of 
causing industrial unrest, they constitute substantial 
majority (78,95 . 
On the other hand* one half of workers also think 
that adjudicaticm adds to industrial unrest. These workers 
with those ii^o think that adJudioati<m only partly causer 
disccxitent between the parties t o the industrial d i s ^ t e s 
make up s igni f icant majority (63.23 %), Signif icantly , only 
minority (29.J3 %) of lawyers and adjudicating o f f i c e r s f inds 
that adjudication perpetrates industrial disharmony. But i f 
these iawyera and adjadlcating o f f i c e r s and thoso in xrt\os9 
opitiion labour adjudicative mechanism only partly contributes 
to industrial unrest are taken together, they form substantial 
majority (72.00 . On the contrary, only minorities of 
workers* en^loyers, lawyers anr^  adjudicating o f f i c e r s absolTa 
tha labour adjudication from the charge that i t leads to 
Induatrlal uniast. FrGn these data i t can be c lear ly inferr«d 
that* by and large* users of labour adjudication machinery m» 
MmXl as lawyara and adjudicating o f f i c e r s do not find favoir 
with adjudioativa daciaiona bacvisa they cannot satisfy tha 
p«ctitta to tha ixtduatrial disputes. 
T«bl« S . l . showlBg th« xmapenama o f %roxk«rs« •nploywcs 
and I«wyaxs/adjudlo«ting o f f i c e r s aboat vharthar 
laboiis •djudloatoxy iradianlan i s sucKSttWiftil in 
establ ishing industsiaX paaoo in th« s t a t e . 
workers/ L a w " and 
uni(») adjudicat ing 
Kind of leaders fiiqployers o f f i e e r s 
S , No. response, (n»25«) (n»57) {n»75) 
1 . Yes 30.47 19.30 25,33 
2 . No 48.44 56.14 29.33 
3 . Part ly success-/ 14.84 22.81 42.67 
f u l 
4 . Can't say 6.25 1.75 2.67 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Finally* that the labour adjudlcatoiry process Is 
alow-moving and oroductlve o f long <?olays in the adjudication 
of cases appears t o be pr inc ipa l and inexcusable de f e c t in 
CCTTipulsory adjudicat ion. It has been ae&n elsewhere that 
settlement o f disputes through adjudication involves delay 
in varying degrees at d i f f e r e n t stages o f ad judiost ion . The 
deday be fose labour adjudication bodies sucdi as Itisour eourtf 
tribunal* adjudioating authorit ies under the Payment of Wages 
%<i 
Aet and \iotimm *s Conpensation Act i s r e l a t i v e l y l ess cminpared 
t o the delay at the H i ^ court anri the Supreme court l e v e l . 
Lengthy delay in the H i ^ Court and the Supreme Court i s 
unavoidable in view of rapidly mounting arrsaifi erf eases b e f o r e 
then. Mainly, procedural and structural d e f e c t s aeoount f o r 
the tardiness o f adjudicatory process • Therefore* given 
auitabJl* ohvngui in th« pcoe«duix« and atxuetuce of labous 
•djudioatoxy £ojcuaw« d«lay ean b« substantially curtailad. 
if cannot hm altogafthax obviatad. 
with all the defects In ccxapulaory adjudication 
it cannot be denied that this mode of deciding labour cases 
naads a word of ccxanandation for its valuable role in bringing 
about sane degree of security tai^v workers*. . Today a 
worker cannot be -Vu-x^hJ. out of his Job with the same case and 
flijppancy as he could have been before the Induction of 
ooBciulaory adjudication.^^ The Supreme court has closed the 
doors to reanageinanta which would retrench snployees as a 
ca<rer for outrl^t dismissal. ConiMilsory adjudication has 
also suoceeded a great deal in securing economic benefits for 
labour In terms of olaln» of social justice. '^ 
Suwnlng up* no body ought to doubt the wisdom of 
adopting and promoting collective bargaining and proooM of 
direct negotiations for the solution of Industrial pMtolems,'* 
But a do^ pRatlc or emotional approach towards It nooda to bo 
ahiannod* while «rery possible effort must be mado to ooXvo 
industrial disputes through voluntary negotiations* eevuleory 
adjttdloatlon must be retained as the ultimata rsnady fai tlia 
dataiminatlon of oasaa whleh have not baan ooapaaad aa a laaialt 
of voluntary negotlatloiia . '^ At tha sane tlma# aasnaat affogta 
naad t o ba mada at a l l lavala for the lapld gsowth and 
MPMlarlty of ottlaotlira bargaining* so that thla aattMid af 
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sett l ing •iipXoyax-«q>Xoy«e dlsputas w i l l hmomm m S M l i t y , 
Thcin is also uxgmay of •ffaeting a stxuetasal dhangm 
(chang»-ov«r from pr«s«nt naehaftisn o f sdjudiection t o 
separata labour JudiaiaKy) for making th« oonvalsoxy 
adjudication a spaody and more aoeassible ramady. 
Inadacyac V of Statutory Basis f o r Voluntary Haqotiations 
Daspita the «nphasis of declared labour po l i cy 
on voluntary negotiations for set t l ing labour management 
disputes as well as frequent talX in the concerned quarters 
for taking\he voluntary negotiations* nothing pract ica l 
has betti done t i l l this day for the attainment of th is 
object.^® Incredible as i t i s . It has not been made mrm 
mandatory by a l eg i s la t ive measure t o eaduust b ipart i te 
negotiations f o r the settlement of a d i l u t e by the parties 
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before resorting to other rtfaedias available under the Imr. 
Of the three anaotnants Itodtstsial Disputes Aet, tlia 
mtkmma* Compensation Aot and the Paansent of uages Aot • 
whieh axa the aitbjafltt of the pri—ftt Anvastigatioii* tlM 
ZBAiatiial Diaptttae Aat haa aeia lelavanm f o i eoXlMtiva 
bafgalAiiig and witiial iM«oti«tians» The «tait«MRt oC abjaets 
and iMsana of tha Aot ttadaraaefad tHa naad f o i Mttual 
MktlaMant of industrial disputes* for , i t was f a i t tha 
p « « M faondad m voluntary aiMlMaiits wiXl ba mgm anduxiag, 
Tha MBrks a«Miittaaa waM intended to ba mm of the ohief 
inatEiiMHits f a t the p x m n t l e n and renanral of owsaa at 
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fr lot ion b«ewMD thm partio*. Hotmrmzt oontraxy to 
«if>«otatiar.3« tha Hocks CoBnlttooa oouW not prnttoxm tho 
40 oonteiaplatod for them undac tha Aot. Tha failara of 
wocks Conaittaaa to disoharga thalc intandad cola 
priinaxUy owing to tha caoOBieanaatoryahacaotac of thaic 
dalibacatiotis a)»d thois noTN-aco^pt^^iXity to Tcada 
•Inlonn aa ti^e iinicii^ s c^gat^ 'iaa l^o oatcying ok^  of bareiaininig 
proc«H93 aa their sola pcaaacva.^^ Tha ineibiXity of voXuntaty 
Begcitiatioi'a to eiRacga as priciary diapiit® settXoaant pcocadkica 
ahifta^i tha an s^hasia on oORfxiXsoey adjudication ard 
cc^cillation for resolving irv^atrial dispataa* 
l aMt* lr<3 iatjcial t ia':»ito3 m originaXly 
^actad did iKit aoaortl any atatitocy ractogr.ition to tha 
iRituaX mttlmmt agcaa^ita. It was only in ii956 that 
t ie aqtwm&mtm antarad into by tha partias aa a raautXt of 
mtuaX nagotiaticf^s vara toada binding or. thais. wan this 
waa a faabXa and haXf haartad att^opt at propping up and 
prcnotion of vuXantary nagotiationa aa a naana of aflfetXlng 
iiiAaatciaX dlapataa* Thia ia ao baoauaa tha aanotity af 
•Mtttal mgtmmmf m 0enfin«d only to tha partiaa t o tha 
agieewite ttat* in oOBtraat* agtaammt inada la o^mwBm of 
ooMil iat ion pxooaadtnga or anacd of tha httaaxt Goait OE 
indiaatciml I I k U m m X ia binding not only m tha pactiM b i t 
aXao on tha of tha e e t i b l i * e a n t nnd ttia 
%e ba lb—<|>antXy ippointad m tha aatablialawBt # 
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Finally, Rula 3(«) of th« J m u & Kashnlr Xnduiatxlal 
Dl«put«s Rtil«s« 1972 (It 1« K«plle« of Rala 3(«) of Cantsal 
Zndu atrial Dloputas Rxlos) mora positive in rogaxd to 
resoKting to nutual nogotiationa fox aottling a diaputo* 
though Its application is llnitod. This Rila lays down that 
if th& paxties to a dispute «^ply for refercal of the dispute 
to tha OovernRient for adjudioation, they mist furnish a 
stateRiOTt setting forth, inter alia# efforts made by th«n 
to adjust the dispute themselves. The aiiplieation of this 
provision is 1 limited in the sense that Joint application for 
getting a reference for adjudiaation is only one of the %fay8 
to move the Oovernnent for making reference. It is <»ily 
rarely when both the parties agree for reference. Hi most of 
the oases the Oovernment has to decide about the e3f>edienoy 
of referring a case for adjudication on its own on tdie 
submission of failure report by the 6onoiliatian Officer. 
Undoubtedly, i t is implied in the failure report of the 
Conciliation Officer that efforts for mutual settleMant have 
failed. But not infJDe<]uiently enployer talcea the pl«a thftt 
tfoiknan has approached the conciliation Offieex disvetly 
without even infostlng him idscut the gritnrano*. Slailaxly, 
when a dimmte relates to a public uti l i ty aesvie* and notice 
itndor aeotlon 22 of the Act has been served, qprenwiant haa t« 
a«0id« OB the eiipedieBcqr of making refexenCM i tsa l f . Xt ia 
not wheithex in these oaa«« OovenuMnt wa&t siitiafy 
i taelf t b m t m t a a l effosta of the pasties t o teaah «oi4 
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imiilMifindustxial Diapatas tha 
M»t ia aoia and doiiandiiio about mutual 
aa(fetl«aant of dlagputad qumtimu calating to ooBqpMaaatlon by 
tha paztiaa. Saotion 19 of tha Aot pcovldaa that i f thaca 
i s any cpiastion aonoarnlng the liability of a parson to pay 
ooR^ansation or whathar injured parson ia a tforkman or about 
the amount of corapanaation, ato*« the qaaaticm shall in 
default of agroomant be settled by the Ccmniaaionar • Thus* 
seoticm 19 c lear ly ijai^sea a duty on the parties t o make 
e f f o r t s f o r sett l ing the disputes themselves f i r s t . It i s 
only When their e f f o r t s t o reacAi agre^nent have fa i l ed that 
Commissioner shall entertain tha qpestion for adjudication* 
Seotion 22 o£ the Act further brings home tha necessity of 
making direct negotiations by the part ies t o s e t t l e disputed 
oonpansation qiiaations. It requires that an application 
SMking Coaniasioner *s intervention f o r determination of a 
oompanaation olalm shall be made t o the Connissianox only if 
i t oontaina a qpaaatlon on lAiloh the parties hanra baon unabia 
to raa^ •gsMMHot. audli appiioation* vaong other things* 
m a t e«n%«in a bsiaC stataoMMt of a««tax8 on «hieh tha paxtlaa 
hanra rngBmaA and of tlMW« on whioh thay hero d l M ^ i M A . Hewwrar, 
mmKvtim has baan mada If tha ippliefttion fos ooMpanaaetlaii i s 
mAa fey « dapandant or dapandants*^^ 
^xprla ingly , tKa Pagpant of Mages Aot ox tha Rulas 
itmmA vaMmx i t do not aalca any provision «liic*» sacyilra th« 
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pasties to « « t t l « di^^utM ooDoarnlng d«l«3MI wmgmm OK 
j^lsgal d«Aiotlon fron the i f w a by voluntaxy negotiations* 
Therefore* irrespective of whether an ag^ieired worker has 
made efforts for raatual sottienent of disputed wage elaln 
with the eropXoyer* he may approach the Authority undoE the 
Act for the determination of the sane. Although the Act 
does not grant statutory- mcoqnltion t o sett laments reached 
through voluntary negotiations* i t does not presoribe any 
prohibition either if the parties ae t i l o disputes through 
voluntary negotiations. In actual practice* nunercus cases 
are sett led by parties by informal negotiations «nder the 
Inaistr la l i Isputea Act, the Workman's Goroponaation Act as 
well as the Paytaant of Hagas Act . 
Sri the above analysis i t has been seen that 
voluntary negotiations and eoR^julsory adjudicattion as 
dispute sefttling methods are not ininloal to eesh other. 
Both Mil flmotlfln hameniousXy for the sottlomsnt of eavloyor 
#ap]«yoo diigpotos. Itogftl <r<ie woKk of Mutual nogotlationo 
M provldoi IIB4os tho 2&aaotrl«kl DiopiBtoa Aot« the M»iaaMfi*a 
eovoBsot ion M t and tho VayMwit of ffo^oo Aot hoo oloo boon 
Aolinootod. Xt io . isoofol now t o OMPIBO tho viewo of tho 
toopondeats oboat the oAoptioti oC li ouitablo aothod f o r tho 
ooltttiofi of lidaour wwnogswant prebloMo and about tho oauooo 
o i oloir psogiooo of witool nogOtiotloM im tho s t a t e of 
Jfmtm ond 
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S.2. slioifiAg XMponsM of woxkcxs ind union iMd^ra 
idbeat th« method to bo ftdcpitod fox oottling 
disputes i^ofoxenoo-wiso. 
(PigujCM in poxoentago) • 
S.KO. X (n«256) 
11 
(n-227) 
ZZZ 
(n-i74) 
1. Labour 
adjudication 
i 
0.78 17.62 97.70 
2. Voluntary 
negotiations 
% 
99.22 1.32 00.00 
3. Voluntary 
arbitration 
• \ 
00.00 00.00 00.00 
4. Conoiliaticm 00.00 81.05 2.30 
Total 100.00 99.99 100.00 
tTotei Total of responses shal l not correspond with the 
sample as the respondents* had option to give more 
than one answer. 
Table S*2 presents the respc»ises of workers and 
union leaders oonoeming the des i rab i l i ty of a method t o be 
for the S€M«lution ckf labour disputes. The reaq;>onses 
halve been presented in order of inportanae which indicates 
relative reianranos and efficacy of a method for settling 
labour MsnagiMnt isauee. I t i s oanifest f ra the tidt>le f/i ^^  ^ 
o(f 2t« xmpmmmm of f irst preference* a l l (99,22 %) with one 
•eiee pointed out voluntaxy negotiations as the aost siiitablo 
fox the settlanent of olaias and issues of working 
e l M s . 
d ( (t 
scKSOikl ps«fttK<Ki€Mi* ttittCQ m s o only 227 
KmpdOBmB, Of thma», a Imxgm majoKity (81,06 94) peofoxtad 
ecmeil lation as a method foe satt l lng labour dlsputas. A 
s l ight pcoposticm {l'7.d2 %), hanmvox:* Sesvoaced laboar 
adljudleation in thla category. Jn thixd pxctfeKanoa* these 
13 duibatantial xeauctlon in the responses • There are only 
174 reaponsea in th is prefereoice. It has s igni f icance in 
that iBoat of the respondent ijforHecs and union leaders only 
l i k e voluntary negotiations and conc i l ia t i on f o r deteffroining 
labour disputaa* ^ iirportant feature o f the resrponse pattern 
o f third preference i s that almost a l l the respondents of 
th i s preference (97.70 %) have favoured labour adjudication 
f o r the settlement of labour disputes. Ihus* according t o 
the preference-wise analysis of data in the table under 
reference voluntary negotiations occupy place of prteary 
inportanae. Interestingly* there i s not even a single 
response in any of the three preferrc^ categories of responses 
in favour o f adoption of voluntary arbitrati(»i f o r solving 
the lobous o o n f l i e t a . 
Jn artriktng c<^tra9t« i f the data presented in 
Table 5 .2 i s talsulated fxecp^ney-wi^e* order o f i f ^ r t u i o e 
of differerc^ RietVods i s disturbed. Table 5.3 brings out 
the fEeq^enoy^vise positicm of each method. Xt i s c lear 
fzcn the tab le that in terns of freqaeney score voluntary 
negotiations gat top position* as was their pos i t ion aoeosdiag 
t o ipsefereno^-wistt analyaia o f t h i s data . Voluntaxy 
T«bl« S.3. Showing Msponsas of wotkcxs «nd union loadors 
•k>out the nothods to bo •tSootad £oz settling 
s.Mo. 
Method of 
sett l ing disputes 
Response 
f re<|tiam9y>wise 
1 . Voluntary negotiations 257 
2. Labour adjudication 212 
3. Conciliation 188 
4 , Voluntary arbitration 0 
Notes Total nurober of responsaa shall not corxaspond with 
the t o ta l mnibar o f respondents as they have option 
t o give laoxQ than one anawex. Total of freqpwiey 
score has been worked out by adding together the 
resq;>an3es of a l l the given preferences. 
no^jtiations are followed by labour adjudication %ihicb has 
.second highest fre^iuency responso and conc i l iat ion i s pushed 
down t o third place. 
Tal'le 5 .4 aho«rs the results of the rosponaes of 
eni>loyers in order of iinportanoe indieating their c^oiee 
Table S ,4 . Showing responses of employer about the mathods 
to be adcpted f o r sett l ing labour disputes 
preference-wise. (Figures in peroentafi^) • 
Mettii^ Order of preferenoe 
i ^ t t i l & g 
s*lio» dispute* 
X 
(nil87) 
ZZ 
(n-45) 
zzz 
1* X«at)oax adiudiOBtionU) 00 ,00 00,00 100«00 
2 m VQ^t^iry negotia* 
100.00 00.00 00*00 
3. VolMntaxy 
•xbitxstiMCx) 00 ,00 00,00 00.00 
4 . c m a i « t i « i i ( K } 00*00 100.00 00.00 
Total 100*00 100.00 100*00 
mwr .•will mm^^mmtmt mww mm 
iMlUBdmts hmrm option to give motm than en* x ^ y 
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fox Bi«thods t o b « adosyted fox tn« d«ttfmin«tlQn of onployvc -
m p l o f m disiMtoa. xt la onrld^dt fxon the table that among 
the xasponses of £lcst prefex^nee aXI the xespondenta (100.00 %) 
unifoxnly pointed out voluntaxy negotiations ma the moat 
deaixablQ method t o solve the laboux disputM* In second 
pxe£ex<»noe* thexe %rexe only 45 xespondents indicated 
theix choice foe the adc^tlon of othex methods fox set t l ing 
laboux disputes. Zhtexestingly^ a l l the xespoi^ents (100 %) 
xespondlng In second pxefexence indicated conci l iat ion as the 
suitable method for solving la):>aix disputes. In thlxd 
pxefexence^the miribor of responses remains the same as in 
sQcor.ct prsfarence. Al l the respondents ctf third pre fexwce 
point out labour adjudication as otiiax motle f o r deciding 
labour issues- s ign i f i cant ly , as is the case with workers 
and union leaders, thexe i s not a single votary of voluntaxy 
axbitxation fxcm the an^loyexs a l s o . 
Xntexpxeting these data (xeapo(^aes in Table 5.4) 
f xe<iaenay««ise xesalts axe nuoh the aaarn* Table 5.5 tabulatea 
the d«ta £xe(3iieiiay-^iM« Zt ctfi be Men from the table that 
h i ^ e e t fsecfianey oooxa ge«a in ftfroix of voluntaxy negotiationsi 
ecmoiXlatlon and laboac aajudie«tion txa l l behind with even 
nuHbex. 
oux xespondant anployexs fuxthex gave valucO^le 
infoxnation xegaxdlng voluntaxy negotiatlcais as dispute -
sattlament method when th«y ifexa asked t o stats th« pxoooduxe 
they fel lo ir a f ter the aelsing a dispute ox ELALM with hoxImmr 
2 7 5 
Tabltt 5«9« Showing xespons«i of tho 
n«thod« to b« adoptod for swttllng labour 
d l s y i f s 
Mothod of Response 
s«No. s«ttlii»9 disputes fravuteRcy-wise 
1* Voluntary negotiations 57 
2 . Concil iation 45 
3. Labour adjudication 45 
4 . Voluntary arbitration 00 
]^ote: Total of frec|itf^cy- score shown in the table has 
been viorked out by adding together the resporses 
of a l l the prefer^sioes* 
in their establishments. Table 5.6 shows the results of 
relevant data in this regard* As Is evident frcra the table* 
the en{>loyttrs uni fomaly have no hesitation in stating that 
Table 5.6• Showing the responses o f en^loyers about the 
freqBLiency with which they adopt mutual 
negotiations f o r resolving disputes. 
Kind of Often Occasionally Rarely 
S.KO. response (n*52) <n«3) <n=2) Total 
I . Mitual negotiations 91.23 
(90 
5,26 3.51 100.00 
2. Ho n e g o t i a t i o n s 0 0 , 0 0 00.00 00.00 00.00 
3. Any other (%> 00.00 00.00 00.00 00.00 
th«y Imediately resort to autual negotiations with disputant 
woxloBMHi or worknen i^ cHnerer a dispute arises in their 
•ftablislinieRta* Interestlngly« not oven a single enq;>loyer 
stated that they did not adept SMtual negotiations foxth-with 
27 V ) 
ox that thay Instcact tha disputing workaxa t o taka recairsa 
t o other xamadlaa t h w mutual negotiations • It givaa an 
inlcling into the maasure o f oiq^tloyars' confidanea in mutual 
negotiations as dispute set t l ing procedure. Baaides* as can 
ba saan frcm the tabla under xefarance« an overwhalming 
majority of enployers (92.23 %) pointed out that t h ^ taJca 
frecpant recourse t o nutaal negotiations itfheiiever disputes 
ar i se . On the other hann, those who did not adopt mutual 
negotiations frequoritly and adopt them only occasionally or 
rarely their resporoas are too ins igni f i cant to <Us,a-Wany 
raention. Hence, these data provide an uniinpeachable ewridence 
of tha fac t that mtua l negotiatiprs are the most preferred 
method of s e t t l ing labour disputes with tha employers -
whatever n;ay be the causal factors underlining th is ai>proach 
of employars t o w r d s voluntary negotiat ions. 
/Vgainst the response patterns of aRq;>loyars and 
workers about the adoption of d i f farant methods f o r deciding 
Idbpur disputes* tha rasponsa of lawyars and adjudleatoca in 
th is eonneetion prasants ^lita a oontzasty apaotaola. 
Tablo 5.7 givas acooant of tha saaponsas o£ saspondent 
ItMyars and adjudioators conoasning oq^pliaability o f vaxloua 
methods f o r the resolution of diaputos of working class* Tha 
zaaqponsas h«va baan raooxdad im exdax o f pxafaxanoa* I t i s 
nanifast from tha tabla that in f i r s t pxafaranoa a majority 
<S3.33 %) of tha rasponaas goaa In favour o f adopting 
voluntary nagotiations. Of tha remaining rasponsas* 25.33 % 
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Table 5 .7 . Showing xespons«a of lawyers and adjudicators 
about the nethodatB be adopted fox settling 
«qC>loyer - onployee disputes preferancc^>wise. 
(FigurM in jilexeentage). 
3 .NO, 
Method Of 
sett l ing 
disputes 
Z 
(n«75) 
wwa* i, 
I I 
(n-50) 
H I 
(n«=37) 
IV 
(n-11) 
1. lAbour adju-
dication (%) 12.00 14.00 64.86 72.73 
2. Voluntary 
negotiations 53.33 6.00 00.00 9.09 
3. Voluntary 
arbitration 
i%) 
Conciliation 
(%) 
9.33 18.00 21.62 13.18 
4 . 25.33 62.00 13.51 00.00 
Total 99 .99 100.00 99 .99 100.00 
Kotes Total shall not accord with the sample as the 
respondents had option to give more than one answer. 
support conc i l ia t ion ; 12.00 i labaar adjudication and 9,33 % 
voluntary arbitration. In second preferaxsa the number of 
respondents has ccroe down t o 50, as against 75 in f irst 
prefer«ice. Zn this category out of the total responses* 
a good majority (62,00 %) supported conciliation. Responses 
fox conoiXisitian h«ve been fcOiowed by those suippoxting 
voluntary arbitration (18,00 94), Labour adjudication trails 
bshind voluntary axbitratiw with 14*00 % of xesponses. 
There is alnost negligible support for voluntary negotiations 
In this preference (6,00 %). m third preferanee, the nunber 
of responses have further gone donn* There are only 37 
responses. In this preferenoe, labour adjudication gets the 
hmtfx of other methods with the support of 64«86 % of 
responses. Zt i s fo l lowed by voluntary arbi trat ion(21 .62 %) 
and o o n c l l l a t l o n (13.51 %) . Sn fourth preference* there are 
only 11 responses. Of these (72.73 %) wont In faivour of 
labour adjudication* with t h i s i t acquired f i r s t p lace in 
fourth preference^ as was i t s pos i t i on in thir<^ prefer«snce. 
Overall p i c ture of tVie data set out in Table 5.7 
i s that a l l the foxt methods - labour adjudication, voluntary 
nagotiat loii!3# voluntaty arb i trat ion and c o n c i l i a t i o n - have 
been favoured by the respondents for s e t t l i n g labour disputes 
in varying degrees. Although voluntary negot iat iors have been 
prafarret' in the f i r s t preference by a narrow majority (about 
50 %) 0 conc i l i a t i on has taken over lead ftm thesr. by i t s 
bet ter perforiDance in second preference and by i t s not 
Ins igni f i cant score in the f i r s t pre ference . Overall 
•v 
performance of labour adjadlcat lon Is a lso bet ter thkn 
voluntary negot iat ions . This i s t o t a l l y contrary t o the 
p o s i t i o n o f voluntary negotiaticxns in other two categor ies o f 
xe^;>oiidenta (above considered) where they ' ave got pcipeiul«x«itt 
flMPpert o f the respondents. The most renarkable feature o f 
Table 5 ,7 1« that voluntary arbitrat ion has a lso been ab le t o 
rece ive mmm mxppott by whloh i t oan Jus t i f y I t s ex is tence as 
a relevant method f o r solving Industrial d i sputes . This i s 
desp i te the faot that I t has reoelved only marginal backing 
o f the xeependents in a i l the pre ference . This i s do because 
affong the xe^ponses of other t%ro groups of reftp^Midents 
voliiDtary axbitxatloo has not reoeMred mm s ing le xrnmpotmm* 
2 7 : o. 
Data pjrea«ttited in Table 5.7 i f viowad fr«qM«noy -
wia«# nore ox Xaa9# the above f indings axe coxroborated. 
Tti^lm S«8 gives £seqfiei:oy»%«ise xeaults o€ the above data . 
I t can ba obssrvod frcra th© table that in xespect of 
fxequency sooxe# conc i l ia t i on as a method o f s e t t l ing l ^ o u x 
disputes secuxes pxecodenoe ovar a l l other methods. Laloour 
adjudicaticm followa concil iaticai by the d i f fexence of a 
naxxow margin; voluntary nagotiations corao to occaipy third 
place# t h o u ^ the d i f f e rence between their freciiercy score 
and that of labour adjudication is very small. Ant^  the place 
Table 5 .8 , Showing responses of lawyers tai^  adjudicators 
about the methods to be adopted f o r s e t t l i n g 
etnployor - eroploy€>e disn iten freciiercy-wise. 
Method of Response 
s . i . o . se t t l ing disputes freQuency-wise 
1 . conc i l iat ion 55 
2. Labour adjudication 48 
3. Voluntary negotiations 44 
4 . voluntary arbitration 26 
K^otet Total of frec|iiercy-«ooxe has been worked out by 
adding the reiqpenses of a l l the preferences . 
of l east importance* as i t wore« f a l l s t o the l o t of voluntary 
•xbitxaticMni* But# on the contrary^ i f only f i x s t response 
o f the xespwidents i s tabulated, results axe ^gain c|iite 
d i f f e x e n t . Aocoxding t o t h i s method of tabulatlcm of datau 
•oluntaxy negotiatloiui have bean favouxed by a narrow iwjox l ty 
(S3.99 %) of lawyexfl and edjudieatoxs in oompaxieon t o other 
netiioda* 
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After hsvlng Icnown the oho<te« of tiie raapondwts 
cegardinigr appropriate methods t o be u t i l i z e d foe resolving 
labour disputes* i t waa natural and perhaps necessary to 
ascertain the reasons adduced by than f o r their se lec t ion 
of d i f f e rent Methods. l liere could poasibly be d i f f e rent 
relevant factors triiich might have induced d i f f erent 
respondents f or l ikinq a method tc redress the grievances 
of aggrieved workers. 30id@ persons speedy removal o f 
griaivarces i s more lJn?>ortant; with some s implic i ty and 
informality o f a method may be relevant considerations and 
yat with others i»cp«nse involved JLn avai l ing of a r^»edy 
or the inconvenience which is necessarily entailed in taking 
racourae t o a mode for the redreasal of grievances may 
r^etermine the ir cho i ce . 
Table 5,9 gives the results of the responses 
indicating reasons of three groups of our respwdents f o r 
their seleot ion of d i f f e r e n t methods f o r determining liO^our 
dliiipites^ Zt Torn seeoi frcm the t ^ l e that respondent 
workers and union leaders favour voluntary negotiations In 
ocnparisOR t o o ^ e r method s f or se t t l ing the ir disputes with 
the sBRployers; bacause, in their opinion nutual negotiations 
are speedy neams f o r the redressal of the i r gxievanees. 
Httsponsss suggesting that voluntary negotiations are « spssdy 
method attain prime pos i t ion in terms of frequency response. 
A vast majority of workers and union leaAecs also l i k « 
voluntary negotiations s ince they regard them as convenient 
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Table 5 .9 . Showing reasons of workers/inion leaders# eunployers 
and lawyers/aajudicatora f o r preferr ing a method to 
deolde labour oases. 
Worlcerai^nloB^ Lawy 
Class of 
S . M o . r e a s o n 
respon- c lass of 
dents reaoon 
t/y 
reapon-
derits 
Icators 
Class of 
reason 
respon-
dents 
1. Jpeedy 255 CcajverjioTit 
to both 
p a r t i e s 
52 Convenient 
t o both parties 
59 
2 . G o n v a n i e r t t o 
t o both 
part ies 
250 Speedy 50 Speedy 58 
3. Jinple 229 sinple 50 Jlmple 50 
4 . Less 
es jpens iva 
228 
Qj^jensive 
40 1^ 633 
exj^enr. i v e 
48 
5. In .orrr.al 103 Infoxreal 46 Infor.Tial 35 
6. Others 3 Oth'^ra 2 Othi^rs 2 
Note: Total of r e a p o n s e s shal l not correapontj t o tho t o t a l of 
re3pond€^nts as tuo respondai to havo ootion t o rf^ve more 
than one ansv;er« Total frQqfLi®"^ cY has been workafi out 
by adt3ing together• the responses of a l l the given 
prefartM^ces. 
t o both the Dartias Involved In a dispute. At the saint time, 
a l€u:ge majority of workers and trade union leaders prefer 
voluntary negotiations on account of their being airople and 
ine3f>en3ive mode of set t l ing disputes. Frequency response 
o f the workers and union leaders who consider voluntary 
negotiations t o be slntple and less eacpensive is the a w e 
(229 & 228 respec t ive ly ) . Finally^ a good segnent of workers 
union leaders f or voluntary negotiations cm tine 
2 8 2 
gKOitnd of th«iE informal eharaot«r of canadylzig the woxkora '^ 
gci«vai)OQs. Howaver, In respect of frequency response thety 
H e at the lowest hlerazohi4iel pos i t i on . 
As has been above that omployers, l ike workers 
and union leaders* have pr«iferred voluntary negotiations t o 
other remedies available f o r deciding labour disputes. Their 
reascms for preferring voluntary negotiations are also the 
same as those of tiie workers and unic»i leaders. Bat the 
preferential order of reasons of ferred i s s l i ^ t l y d i f f e r e n t . 
While with the workers and union leaders speedy disposal of 
labour disputes throu^ voluntary negotiations i s the prime 
cause for thel t l iking f or voluntary negotiations* convenience 
resulting from set t l ing disputes by negotiations i s principal 
factor that has induced etnplAyers t o prefer informal negotiaticms 
Proni>t diaiposal of labour cases t h r o u ^ voluntary negotiaticms 
i s the 8«ooiid i iq^rtwit reason %A»ioh has l«d the maployta t o 
pjsefar negot is t ions . Other raaaona given by the s i^o^ara 
fox adopting Mutual negotiations have the sana order of 
Ijqportanoa •• h«M been shown by the reasons given by the 
workers and union leaders* One notable feature* however* 
o f the oauses shown by the employers f o r the adoption o f 
negotiations i s that informality which i s dhaxacteristio 
of Butual negotiations has iA>out the sane measure o f iRippost 
a« othes reasona. Butoas i s plain from the table undex 
zefoxenoe^ informality as reason for adopting nutual 
(i ( ) . > 
n e ^ t l a t i o n a has been xe lat lve ly given by only a small 
pcopoztion of %fOEk«za and union laadazs. 
Although, lawyars and adjudicating o f f i c a z a have 
shoim conc i l ia t i on as being the beat Method - wozkezs and 
oi^loyazs pre fer zed voluntary negot iat ions^ their reasons 
f o r adopting th i s r.athod are prec ise ly the same as were 
shown by workers and einployars for p r e f e / i n g voluntary 
negot iat ions . Most strangely* as i s manifest from the table 
under reference, the order of iiT5)ortance of lawyers < and 
adjudicators ' reasons f or preferrii^g c o n c i l i a t i o n is exactly 
ident ica l t o the one evinced by the reasons given by the 
employers t o aoc^t voluntary negot iat ions . It appears t o be 
cur4ou8 coincidence. I t would a lso seetn t o be scxnewhat 
perplexing why th i s well knowledgeable group of our respondents 
(lawyers and adjudicators) have reposed their overziding 
confidence in c o n c i l i a t i o n as against voluntary negotiations 
f o r s e t t l i n g labour disputes , imdoubtedly, c onc i l i a t i on i s 
s stretohed form of nutual negot iat ions . That i s t o say, 
mmoi l iat ion i s a node of Motivating both the part ies t o the 
diaq^te t o agree t o a nutually acceptable sattlesnent and i t 
i s don* through some ejctacnal ageney. But the very fao t 
that dispute i s , o f noesss i ty , brought t o a third patty f o r 
brlsiglng about oonproroise indioates that spontaneous ucga 
and i n i t i a t i v e which axe so assantial f o r raaediing nutual 
agr««n«nt been fiilly aadiausted. One poss ib le e « i«e f o r 
ad judicator / and lawyers* preference for c o n c i l i a t i o n ovex 
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voluntary nagotlationa would app«ar t o b« that they ase not 
as intimately acquiainted with the oond i t lms and racjilsements 
of the part ies to the labour disputes as the en^loyers and 
workers themselves are. And th i s Is more ^o in case o£ 
prepcMnderant majority of lawyers fozining part of our sample 
who are g ^ e r a l l y pract ic ing Iom as d i s t inc t from having 
special ized pract ice in labour matters only . 
Kieedless t o state that settlement of labour 
management disputes througiri mutual negotiations has become 
connTion and most ramarkable feature of industrial ly advanced 
countries such as America^ Snglandyetc. In fact» the 
vary scope and conditions o f workers* industrial employment, 
in these countries are determined by the terma of c o l l e c t i v e 
bargaining agreements made by the two aides of industry, m 
the l ig l i t of suceeoaful oi>«ratian of the inst i tut ion o f 
c o l l e c t i v e bargaining in other countrlea* our respondents 
were s p e c i f i c a l l y required t o divulge as t o whether they 
tiould l i k e t o adopt process of voluntary negotiations* keeping 
in view the ir fluecess and e f f e c t iveness in othez c our t r i e s . 
Table 5*10 shows the results of the responses of three groups 
of our xeflq;>ondents i^bout whether they liked mxtual negotiations 
f o r se t t l ing dlasmtes beoouse of their success In other 
oountr ies . I t Is p la in from ttm tab le that on overwhelailng 
Majority o f woxkers (83.98 %) would pxefsr the aaoi>tlon o f 
voluntsxy i iegotl«tlons beeause o f the i r success in othez 
countr ies . On the other hsnd« a snai l nunber o f workers(16.02 %) 
2 8 Ti 
Tabl« 5 .10 . Showing th« responsea o f work«Z8/tnlan l««d«xs« 
tfqployers and lawyars/adjudicators about the 
adoption of voluntary nagotiatimis due t o the i r 
suooeaa in other indastrialXy advanced countries . 
Percentage o f reapondanta 
s.i^o. 
Kind o f 
respcmse 
workers/ 
trade union 
(n«256) 
Btaployers 
(n-57) 
Lawyers/ 
adjudicators 
(n-75) 
1. Yes 84 M 84.12 54.67 
2. No 00.00 14.30 25.33 
3. Can't say / 16.02 
don ' t know 
1,75 20.00 
Total 100.00 99.99 100.00 
displayacl the ir inab i l i t y t o say any thing regarding t h i s 
matter. Notably, not a s ing le worker or union leader stated 
that voluntary negotiations are not t o be adopted on account 
of the i r success in other countr ies . VJorkers and union 
leaders* i l l i t e r a t e as they are« have p r a c t i c a l l y l i t t l e 
knowledge of the rmoedies avai lable f o r the rfimoval of 
the ir grievaneea, as a lso o f nuiserous other matters o f 
the ir v i t a l concern* in the industrial relaticHns system of 
t h e l s own oountry* l e t alone their knowledge of industr ia l 
re lat ions systcfos of other countr ies . It seems that workers* 
by and large* have predispoflitian f o r mutual negotiaticms 
dua t o convenience and speed involved in the settlement of 
Idbouc oases through nutual negotiations^ given* of course* 
V t goodwill and s p i r i t of g ive and take on the part o f both 
the part ies* Besides* i t i s innate convict ion of workers as 
w«I l as o f employers and a l l other ooncerned with the welfare 
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of industry that voluntary settlement r ea l l y p a c i f i e s both 
the parties^ and/thereby/ eradicate the root cause o f the ir 
c o n f l i c t * 
Table under reference further makes i t evident 
that l i k e workers and union leaders an overriding laajority 
of employers (84,21 %) a l so wish t o opt f o r voluntary 
riegotiations on the ground of ttieir success in other 
industr ia l ly advanced countr ies . Only a handful of 
respondents (14.3 %) do not want adoption of voluntary 
negotiations because of other countries successful eaqoerliaent 
with tham in respect of seti-ling la lour management conflicts , 
employers' propongity for voluntary negotiations i.g but 
natural. They have atvory advantage in taking recourse to 
negotiated settlcBnents f o r the ir disputes with workers. First, 
they invariably possess superior bargaining power to that o f 
the aggrieved workers. I t is « s p e c i a l l y so i f the aggrietved 
workex i s being represented by himself alone on the bargaining 
tab le OK where the union ass ist ing or representing the worker 
la an e f f e b t ox puppet one. As has been considered aibav^ 
inti^-anion z lva lx i es are proverbial in t h i s country 
Utoian r i v a l r i e s eat into the v i t a l s o f workers' organisations 
as the l z potent baxgaining representatives* Not infr«qpiently« 
union x l v a l r l e s axe fos tered by «Dploy«ra and managements 
thomselves i f i t fuxthexa theix i n t e r e s t . Secondly, i t I s 
generally Against the interest of s^ployers and managsmwnts 
i f a d ispute i s not ssfttlod within the pxeoinots o f the 
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the fac tory and has per force t o be entrusted t o an outer 
agency £or oompoeition or decis icm. At any rate* i t 
evidently hurts the f ee l ings of an egocentr ic employer 
whan a dispute i s put into the hands o f a th ird party 
f o r settlement^nuch against his wish. 
In contrast with the response of ornployers and 
workers, small majority of- lawyers ar^ adJu<^icators(54.67 %) 
responded p o s i t i v e l y that voluntary negotiat ions ara so lv ing 
disnutes in other countries a f f e c t i v e l y and as 3uch they are 
to be apol ied in the state of Janarai anc* Kashmir for s e t t l i n g 
ind ig t r ia l d isputes . On the cortrar\', a good number o f lawyers 
and adjudicating officers <25.38 disagreed t o af^o->ting 
iwitual negot iat ions on t h i s score on ly . I'Virther, nearly an 
equal rainiber o f lawyers and adjudlcatinr o f f i c e r s (20,00 %) 
showed lack c f Icnowledge of t h i s matter. Therefore* if the 
respondent lawyers and adjudicators saying that voluntary 
negot iat ions cannot be fol lowed on the s o l e ground o f other 
countries* successful experience with tham and those re fusing 
t o express any opinion are taken together* they cons t i tu te a 
f a i r l y s i g n i f i c a n t n inor i ty (45.33 of t h i s group o f our 
respondents. This var iat ion in the response patterns o f 
d i f f o r e n t gzoupa o f xospondenta i s e a s i l y e3Q3lieaA>le. vforkexs* 
d i spoa i t i on f o r voluntary negot iat ions may well be attr ibuted 
t o «iq;>«nse# time,) botheration involved in other methods mxdti 
m» aemoil iation and adjudication fox reso lv ing the d isputos . 
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To enployara thera i s no other mors conveniaot and handy 
method avai lable than b i p a r t i t e so lut ions f o r their diaqputes 
with the workers. Lawyers and adjudicators comparatively 
educationally and in te l l e c tua l ly being bet ter oquiprvad, roight 
not l i k e t o make blind Imitation of other countries* 
inst i tut ions and methods without assessing the f e a s i b i l i t y 
and d e s i r a b i l i t y of adopting them t o l o c a l Conditions. Thus* 
of the 19 lawyers and adjadicating o f f i c e r s ii^o stated that 
mutual negotiations cannot be ar^opted because other indastr ial 
countries have adopted therr., 3 6 . 8 4 % yave this reply <»» account 
o f d i f f e r i T i g c o r i c i i t i o n G and e n v i r o n r o a n t n ir. Int.ia anc' t h e 
s t a t e ; 2 6 . 3 2 /l p o i n t e d oxt low mora ' - c h a t a c t e r o f people in 
I n d i a and 1 0 , 5 3 I n d i c a t o d v / i d o - s p r e a c ! i l l i t n r a c " a s t h e 
c a u s e . It i s , h o w e v e r , not s a t ® t o draw ar.y inference with 
n e c e s s a r y degree o f reliability from these figures as t h e 
data ropra3«ntad b y tham i3 extr«Mm«ly insiqnificant. 
Finally* our caapon<)ent8 transmitted valuabla 
information iron theix axparionea conoexning the reasons 
f o r the unpopularity of mutual negot iat ions in tha atata 
o f J m m 6 Kaahnic. Tha atata of Jamiu & Kaahnlr la ana 
o f tha most baflkwazd stataa o f tha e o m t r y . fia induatxlal 
aphaxa^aa m othars, i t haa not nada any notabia pxogsaaa. 
Aa notad aaxl las , only rooantly tha s tate haa ambarlcad upon 
tha pKOoaaa '^ o f industr ia l isat ion in modern aanaa. 
Naturally* undar auoh eixouaatanoaa thaxa warn Mmmx labeux 
isauaa and pxoblaMs t o ba tacMad. Coxxaapondingly* tha 
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l999 w«8 th« n^md f o r adoption o f various raathods f o r 
daoiding labour diSjpHJitda* The result waa that there was 
no oooasion f o r getting ade<fiately ^gutAintad with the 
re lat ive itHirits of the available loethods f o r set t l ing 
labour disputes* 
Collective bargaining in a real sense - in the 
senae of regulating ai^ determining the terms and ccmditions 
of enployment by colleotive agreera^ts - is» by and large^  
toknown in the s t a t e E v e n where the voluntary negotiations 
are applied for resolving individual or collective disputes* 
they operate in haphazard and unconcioua manner without their 
trae spirit €ind Import being imbibed by the raajoiity of 
working class. For the effectiveness of voluntary negotiations 
or for that matter of the institution of collective bargaining, 
unity and collective str^gth of %forkers is indispensable* 
There is perceptible lack of adeqMiate <»Qpirioal ovidmice to 
demonstrate this fact. Data produced in Table 5.11 provide 
enpiriaal support for some of the above observations* Putting 
the data » data indicating reasons for the relative 
u n p w l a r i t y of volantary negotiations in the Jamou and 
XMlwlr state -> fse<]ti«noy-%ri3e,as i s shoim in Tabla i t 
i s aleax that with workers and union leaders nost important 
o « i s e fox unpopularity o f voluntary negotiations i s the laok 
of d«reiap«d trade unionisn or al^ ^senoe of healthy 
47 
growth in the state* Zn terms of fsecpeney score t h i s 
o « i « « fOK UBpopulaiity o f voluntary negotiattions in the 
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s t « t « oocupisa t<9 pos i t i on . Kext Inportttat factor aooountlng 
fOK unpopulacity of ncigotiations according t o th« fro<|i«noy 
xesponao i s the govexmoffita' cal lous att itude towards 
negotiations* that i s , abswxse of any p o s i t i v e e f f o r t s on 
the part of govemnaent t o pc^ularise the u t i l i t y and 
desireDsility of adopting voluntary negotiations as a means 
o f set t l ing labour d i i^utes . Again* easy ava i lab i l i t y o f 
adjudicating remedy and Uliteracy respect ively are other two 
reasons (in descending order) which in workers* and union 
leaders* view are respcvisible f o r ^ e alow growth o f 
voluntary negotiations in the state . 
with (anployers* l i k e workers* absence o f development 
of trade unions or healthy growth of trade unions and 
government's callousness towards voluntary negotiations 
respectively are the two leading causes f o r the lack of 
popularity of voluntary negotiatiems in the s ta te . I l l i t e r a c y 
and easy aivailabil ity of adjudicatory remedy respect ively 
are the other grounds shown by the employers %A)ioh inhibit 
the growth of voluntary negotiations. 
Like workers and employers with lawyers and 
adjudioating o f f i c e r s too. absence of development of unionism 
ez i t s healthy growth i s the d i i e f cause o f unpopularity ef 
voluntary negotiations in the s tate . I t has been followad in 
downward ocdac by the i n d i f f e ranee of govenment tonacds 
volttntazy nagotiatlona; i l l i t e r a o y and o f f i c i a l p r e d i ^ ^ i t i o n 
pCio 
fox ad judication. Among the cssponaes of thla gsoup of 
xttspondant3« availability of adjudicating cemady has baen 
jHiahed down t o an Infer ior place with lowest fxeqtiency 
score . An Inportant feature of the responses of lawyers 
and adjudicators i s that o f f i c i a l pra-dispoaition t o 
adJudication>v»hich^;no response from other two groups of 
re3pc»ident3;.accfalrQ3 acjtne ir.easare of recognition f o r being 
a possible cause f o r the ui^popularity of mutual negotiations 
in the state from the lawyers and adj idicatory o f f i c e r s . 
Other variation emanating from the responses of d i f f e rent 
groups of respondwts i s in regard t o the contribution of 
i l l i t e r a c v in slowing down the process of voluntary 
nagotiations. ^^ile with employers as wel l as lawyers and 
adjudicating o f f i c e r s * i l l i t e r a c y has got thirc' nlace in 
tenns of the frequency score, csnong the responses o f workers 
and unic»i leadars i t has been pushed down t o forth p lace . 
However, i f only tho responses of the respondents 
in f i r s t preference are tabulated, a d i f f e rent responaa pattam 
appears to onnerge. Table 5.12 below tabulates the sai^onaas 
given by the respondents in f i r s t preference only. Tha 
resultant response ftattem as shown by the tab le i s unifomi 
ciMng a l l tha oatagoziea of xeapcmsaa. iTi o thw words, 
oauaas that hatva baeooe known f o r unpopularity of voluntary 
nagotiatlims in the state by the rasponsos of thraa groups 
of raspond«Rts asa the s«na and have tha amm ordar o f 
li^portanoe* At tap, i i « a the aboanea of trad* union 
o 
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dcvolopsMnt ox haaXthy growth of unionism. I t 1« fo l lovwl 
by ilXitttCttoy «na govexmants* indi£f«x«noa t o negot i«t iona. 
Th« most CQvaaling cftiazMStociatio of th« data prasantad in 
Tabla 5,12 i s that llXitoxaoy haa oaaa up as aa<iorid gxcanfl 
( f l xa t being tha abaonca of tcada union d«valop«ant) 
aeoouRting f o r ooRQiarativa ui^popularity of voluntaxy 
nagotiationa in the state as a raault of tabulation of the 
f i r s t X asp on 36 of the respondents on ly , As haa b a ^ seen 
above* a l t h o u ^ i l l i t e r a c y has been found t o be one of the 
oaaaaa of the slow growth of voluntary negotiations as a 
result of fraqiaancy-wiae tabulation of the data In q e^sti<MEi« 
i t waa lying at lower hierarchical pos i t ion in ccnparison 
t o other oausea* Moreover, other reasons* naiaely* easy 
ava i lab i l i ty of adjudication and o f f i c i a l disposit ion t o 
adjudication* espec ia l ly the former* which have freqaency-
wiaa s igni f ioant position* have received praot ioa l ly 
neg l ig ib le raaponaa in tha f i r a t prefaranea raflqE>on8a of tha 
raq;»ODdanta. 
Table 5 .13 Indioataa tha ti iM apant in raactiing 
mtokmX aaifctXaManta by tha paztiaa aftar tha oflnmanaaMant of 
adjudittatoiy pxocMMdiiiga bafofa tha •djadioattng w t h o r i t i a a . 
Xt ia ahooking to find that aoHa diaputaa have takan aa aany 
as twantyaatvaB and aoxa Mntha for oanpepiiaa aattlsBMuita 
aftar tha Initiation of adjudiaatory prooaadinga; wharaaa* 
aa ia olaar f roai tha tabXa« a noabar of oa^proiiaa 
aattlaiNlita hanra baan affaotad daring tha pariad 
batvaan alavan and twanty»<hraa nontha* l\irthar« 
T«bX« S .13 . Showing th« t l M •p«»t in making ampsomlmm 
wnrnxAm uttrnx th« instittatlon of easos bofoxo 
loboux odjiadieating «Mthoxit4««, 
a .Ho* 
Timm apont fox 
Making oonsant 
awasds 
(in iMOths) 
Nunbex a£ oasoo 
(n-113) 
1. 0 - 1 7 
2 . 1 - 3 23 
3 . 3 - 5 17 
4 . 5 - 7 12 
5 . 7 - 9 18 
6 . 9 - 11 4 
7 . 11 - 13 9 
8. 13 - 15 4 
9 . 15 - 17 3 
10. 17 - 19 3 
11. 19 - 21 7 
12. 21 - 23 3 
13. 23 - 25 0 
14 . 25 - 27 1 
IS . 27 and abora 2 
Total 113 
« majority of OMOa Mliiiliatlng in nutual sett laments hsiro 
hmm doeiAod witliiii nino Months fiosi tho start of adjudiei^ 
t ing pMoaadings* Cenpze*leo MliitiOBa axe* doabtlaas, the 
bast KmmOY arailahla In induistxial talaitions f i a l d t o s«Iva 
a i ^ ^ l W i • «q»l«yae Aisputaa. Vha tttiiity of this easMidy 
fox tha naladios of indaatxial oonflieta.>aa saan aaxliax# 
has toaan xapaatadly saiphaaiaad by tlw lii#iaat judialal oouxt 
of tho ooantxy as iiaU as Taxioita. aiJttdi«atoiy Ainotionaxiaa 
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48 in ttm laboux mm.gmtmnt fimlA* Y«t« I f th* eanpsonistt 
•gxttsnoDta XMOhad aftax wMt« and Mpandintr of 
ooD0ld«x«l>l« t l » « « QiMXgiM and iBon«y« i t xa f laets h i ^ l y 
unlnaginativa apd feeble-ieinded ippxoaoii of thosa oonnaeitad 
with th« industxial re lat ions ayatera towasda voluntary 
negotlationa aa an idaal narthod o£ aatt l ing disputaa. 
The main conclusions of the diaciussion o f t h i s 
chapter axe thatt our xesp«nd«nt woxkaxs* aRiployaC8# lawyaxs 
and adjudicating o f f i c e r s l i k e three methods* namely* voluntary 
negotiations* conc i l i a t i on and adjudication f o x so lv ing 
lakaoux disputes* These methods have* of course* been 
favoaxed In vaxying degxaes by the respond ants . Thus* 
voluntaxy negotiations have been aioooxdad pximacy anong 
the xespensas of voxlsexs and aRq^loyaxs. c o n o i l i a t i o n and 
labwr adiudioation sa^iaetivaly folloir vo luntary 
negotiations. On the othar hand* aecording to response of 
f i r s t praforanea* lawyors and adjudieators alao aeoord 
prlMxy position t o aatital nagotiatiena* Bat in taxns of 
froqtaonoy roopoMo (roaponoa of a l l prafaraneao) o o n e i l l a t i o n 
•o<|iixoo top position. Iiabour adjudieatien gata second 
proforanoa* i«iarao« voluntary nagotiationa attain third 
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stxangcly «dtvoaat«s of voluntasy 
arbitxaition ace wosfully laoking aPNifig wockars as v a i l as 
anqpXoyaxst though among lowyaca and adju<lioatora thia 
mathod haa baon abla t o saeuKa aona aanblanca o f aBv>icl<sal 
baala fox i t s jus t l f l oa t i tm aa a ramady foe xesolving 
labouz Xt voald appaaz that zoaponaanta« by and 
large, are prepared to accept labour adjudication only as 
an unavoidable course avai lable t o their. %ihan voluntary 
negotiations and conci l iat icm have f a i l e d t o solve a diaqpute* 
Conse<9i«itly, given congenial environnant f o r the conduct of 
voluntary negotiations* spontaneous seal and good w i l l cm the 
part of the parties t o resolve their disp'ites thesnselves and 
the presence of imaginative and dynanlc neutral agency t o 
break deadlock of the disputing part ies by bringing hone t o 
then the u t i l i t y of mutual settlements and f u t i l i t y o f 
l i t i g a t i o n , the need f o r u t i l i s i n g adjudicatory r ^ e d y would 
be rare and nlninal* i f not t o be f u l l y obviated. 
Raascms ^loun for tAte prefecanee of voluntary 
nagotiationa t o other nathods by the majority o f a l l gsaapa 
of raapondants ace speed, eonvanlanoa, s i^plioity , 
inajqpansivenaaa and infonaality tililflh have Ismm aasooiatad 
with voliuitasy negotiations as diaputa sattlenent pcooadura* 
thoitgh relatively lAfosnaXity as ground for adoption of autaal 
nagokiatiens has saoaivad laasar dagsae of aappart eaqiaxad 
t o othas grounds* JMMording t o «irailiA>la arldanqa thaia la 
no diaoispaney mmg the tihsaa gieiips of mx laapoodanta in 
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segttxd to plaoing mora «»q?tMuiis on ona seaacH) agalnat tha 
othar mmmpting a Minor ona« I t i s regarding tha apaad and 
oonvanieRc® as o h a r a c t e r i s t i o s of voljuintary nagotiations* 
Thiis^%A)iXa workara and union Xaadars have aaoocdad primary 
inportanca t o apaad in compaciscm t o oonvanianea f o r 
ptvtm/ixxg negotiations* eni^loyara* lawyers and adjudicator a 
have placed before cffnphasis on convenience than cn apead. 
Apart f rem tha above reaeona offarrad for choosing voluntary 
negotiations for sett l ing labour d iaputas , there seams to be 
instinctive fondneas for volurtary negotiaticms of tha 
respondents* Zt i s an innate oonviatixHi of every body 
concerned with inc%iatrial a f fa irs that mutual agreements* 
whether reaohad thamselvea by the parties or brought about 
by the mediation o f a third party* are the most af fect ive and 
amicable way of bringing a dispute t o an early and and 
eliminating root eouaa of animosity between than. It ia 
generally f e l t thait mutual agraemsnts help generate harmomloua 
atmoaphara lAioh ia aaaantial for the establiahmant of more 
lasting IMuatsial pea0« and for turning out uninterniptad 
liaict« a piapondarant majority of workers and 
mtfXoymxm and mi^Mity of lawyers and adjudisators too a3i>ia«aaa 
thais wUliagnaMi t o aeleet natikal negotiations in prafesanee 
t o «th«c matiioda for daelding labour di«putas en aoeount of 
tiieijc suooaas ia other mduatrially developed oomitrias* Miilo 
worlwra and at any rata* tand t o pnfar voliantaiy 
negotiations fox thalr own dlvaxgont xo«sans« rogaxdloM 
o f iih«th«x h«vo roquls l te knowlodgs o f laboux dlaputo 
dottleinent proeeducov of othor countries, a s lsabla minority 
o f la«fyer8 and adjudloators did probably rl^i^tly point out 
lOiat mutual negotiations o u ^ t not t o be adopted because 
of the i r being successful in other countries since conditions* 
enviroranents an<3 teanpararaonts are d i f f e rent In d i f f e r e n t 
countr ies . 
Finally* the respondwits gave varied reasons f o r 
the s l o w p a c e of the progress of voluntary negotiations In 
t h e s t a t e . T h e reasons given by them ware mainly t h e absence 
o£ development of trade unlonisRi or absence of i t s development 
on healthy lines* I l l i teracy* government^ Indi f ference towards 
voluntary negotiations and easy ava i lab i l i ty of adjudicating 
remedy. The avldenoe t o corrcdaorate the deterJsnental effect 
of want of developed trade unionism or Its healthy growth and 
of l l l l t e x a c y on veXuntaxy negotiations Is Impregnable. But 
the mmm does not appmrnx tqAxue of two othex reasons* namely* 
govexiMent'a oalloasnass towaxds voluntary negotiations and 
easy «vai labl l l ty of adjudloa:tory xenedy as the «vldenoe t o 
prove the negative iaqpaot of these reasons on the promotion 
of negotiations Is t«ra»ous« so as It would not be safe t o dxaw 
a credible Inference. 
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In itdditlon to aboiro, «aployttS«* 
hif^-handttdnms, •go->e«ntKlam and tseating worlcaxa m 
mmxm non-«ntlt iM (••paaially In aaaa o£ pxivata mplCY&zal, 
dlslnte£aatadnaaa and oaaual b«ri^avloui: of managesial s t a f f 
of public saotos undertakings have also hindered the 
rqpld auooeas and gsowth of voluntasy negotiations 
In the state* 
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X. Wttaterp. Xndiam watceh oo. Ltd/ v s . Thaic workman* A.Z.R.* 
1964, 3 . a « p . 472. 
2 . For t h « purpose of t h i s study tarn voluntary negot iat ions 
d«not«8 th« laothod of s«ttl i i>g issues and clains o f labour, 
whether Individual or oolIeotive# by d i r e c t negot iat ions 
between the snployees and onployer without the interfercmcse 
of a th ird party . As sueh t h i s term does not enoaiqe>ass the 
iriioie purport of the <tonoei^t of ooXleotive bargaining i ^ i d i 
envisages agreement between the o ^ i t a l and the labour 
laying doMQ the terms and condit ions o f on^loynent. 
3 . Adjudication i s a J u r i d i c i a l method of s e t t l i n g d i sputes . 
Zn Zntemational Encyclopaedia o f the Soc ia l s c iences (p.508, 
v o l . 8 ) adjudication has been def ined ast **••• a mandatory 
settlement o f industr ia l disputes of courts of j u s t i c e or 
administrative tr ibunals with spec ia l i sed j u r i s d i c t i o n in 
the labour managsiRant f i e l d . Adjudication i s used e i ther 
f o r ascertaining the l ega l riif^ts of the part ies under 
regulatory statutes or f o r interpret ing and applying the 
terms of o o l l e c t i v e agroMnents . . . " . 
4 . Ludwig Te l l e r has def ined c o l l e c t i v e bargaJjiing ast "an 
agreement between a s i n g l e et^loyer or an assoc iat ion o f 
es^loyers on the one hand and a labour union on tiie othmr* 
which regulates the terms and condit ions o f employment * . 
(Ludwig T e l l e r on Labour disputes and o o l l e c t i v e bargaining 
V o l . l « p . 4 7 6 ) . Ool lect ive bargaining as def ined in 
industr ia l Relations Handbook, 19€1« p*18 i s the term 
"Ool lec t ive bargaining i s applied t o those asrangmnents 
under which wages and condit ions o f ssqployment are ssfttled by 
a bargain in the form of an agreement made b«t%rm«i siqployers 
or assoc iat ion of ssq;»loyers and workers o r g w i a a t i o n s " (as 
(lAOtated in the worker and Law, 19iS, p . 101 by K.w. Wedderburn). 
ttkile del ineating on the purposes o f colleoftiire bargaining 
Kkhn • Fswnd has stated tliust **••• by bargaining o o l l e e t i v e l y 
with oxganiaed laboux# managmeRt mmtfiitm t o g ive e f f e o t t o i t s 
l eg i t imate eaqpeotations that the plaBBlng of preAiotioii« 
distxi lMtion* ete«« should nmt be fxiastsated through 
iatexrupitions o f work, ay bargaining ooXleefcively with 
manafMsentf e rgmieed labour seeks t o g ive eCfMt t o i t s 
l e g i t l m i t e eii^eotations that wages and other oondit ions o f 
wofk should be s a ^ as t o guarantme a atddle and aAe^site 
foxm of eMistemos and as t o be oo^patlble with the physieel 
iategsity and moxal dl^Eiity of the individual* and also that 
jgbs slMUld be wmmmMY aeeuxed* (Otto xatai^rKeuBd, Labeur 
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CHAPTER . %X1 
3or, 
XlM ••in •enetra of %tait ttttdgr it to ••••vtain iAm* 
thtr th» ebjMt of tlureo labour oaMtaoato - tho IndiumaX 
Pltl^tos Aotf the ffofloMMi't Coi^ oiisatioii iM% aoA f«|Muit 
of W«c«s Aot • fOfoHiliic oxpo41tioiit dityoaal of oaoot 
tlio Jjtboor aAJa4iea«onr «i«lM»ri%Ua ooaatitiitoa ««•» 
thoM stotatof 9 iMt tioM roalisoA* tlio prlM tooaldo* 
ration that MotlTaM m to ondlortakt tkia study mtm ttm 
wi4oifi«od aaA «iuroloiito4 oritioiai of oAittdiootloa § 
it !• oxtMoly motoTf anA oxpoMlv* 
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A i a ^ t * — M t U m a t Mthod imd as t i i ^ i t i t inapproiMriaU 
t e * vtBOfiag fri«T»ae«s of th« laioiir* tmqiiMtieiiAbiyt 
•^••Ay MttlMMOt of Aifptttoi and dispengatioa of jastioo 
in tiio iiidastrial rtlationf f i o l d i « tho osttirao of a l l 
lalwar I m * Any dtX«y in this oonttxt i t atnifostiy 
dtt tmetivo of th« int«r«tt of tho partiea to tho d i t* 
puto at volX as of tlia indnatry and ooHBiuity* this 
• t a ^ oonsoioatly attaapted at aakinc raf'ottt assaatBont 
of tha axtant of daXay i^iab Might ba parpatratad in tlia 
adjadieation of Xatoai' easaa by tba It^oor adjudieating 
antboritiaa and at higbllchtinc tba undarXyiog eansaa of 
daXay* 
At taan in tba introdnotioa » tbia study bagan with 
tba fonniXation of aartain bypotbaaaa* AnaXysit of tba 
data and tba findings darivad tbavaffoa a f f i n i aoMa of 
tbaaa bypotbasaa aa «aXX at nagata ao«a of tbaa aXae* 
Fiarttf tba aaaartion tbat tba axiating procadiura of 
Xaboor ad^ndiaatory autbojritiea apaady aattXaaaat of 
Xaboor diaptttas ia not aapportad by faota and atidaiiM* 
MbtXaaat ttnday tba atatntory proviaionat tba pro«adwr« 
baa boon aaviaagad to ba tmrnawf* Bttti in aataaX practiooi 
i t baa batoM diXatoty aad aopotttiva* l o t b statiatiaaX and 
fiaXd afvidanoa taati fy to tbia* A raat aa^ority of wvekm 
and aafXoyova ragard ^ a proaadwro aa tiaa - aonamiag aad 
axpaaaift* Aa aiMb i t i t not aMopttfbXa to t b M as tb«y 
want abovtar ptoaadora for fnialear d i ^ a a X of tbair aaaot* 
3 0 8 
A pvefortloB of l a v j r m u A •AJaOlofttiiig o f f l « « r t 
(eii« hal f ) hat aXte and«rXlii«4 tht tard^r aharaelar of 
tha preeadara of Ukattr adjodlaatlag aatlierltiaa and a 
•aatloQ of tha«(efia third) traata I t at l a g i l l a t l a aa wall* 
Tha Bala raaaona iihlab have nada tha pro«adara dila* 
tory and eottnteropredaatlYa ara i iieii*eoMpliaQaa with tha 
atattttory provliieaa in ragard to grantlug of adjoarananta 
and eondaoting of proaaadlnga | laxity in following tha 
statQtorjr proviaiena ahoat taking raoooraa to ax parta pro* 
caadinga i f a party dalibaratoly avoida tha bearlog proaaaa t 
defaotiva prooeaa aarving aganoy and inabil i ty of adjadiea* 
tory authoritiea to aaenra proapt praaanaa of raapondant 
anployara for carrying out tha adjadieatory procaaa { legal 
repraaantation and rapraaantation of tha diaputwta by tha 
profaaaional rapraaantativaa | fai lura of tha praaiding 
o f f i a a r a to 4eliTar doaiaiona quickly aftar tha eloaa of 
hearing proaaaa and laik of powar and aaehinary with tho 
adindiaatory anthoritiaa to eondaot raaorary proeaadiaga 
diraotly* Aa iaarittfbla raault of thia dilatory prooa« 
d m i s that i t ia f a s t eroding tha fanatioaal affiaaay 
of laboar adjadiaatory fonwa* 
Soaoad hypothaaia that govaraaantU rafaraaao 
diaerotion ia aiaaaaA aad dalaya piirpoaolaaily 
tha aoaMnaaaant of adjadiaatory prooaadiaga aadar 
tha Indaatrial OiapattM i a t hat haaa aapportad i y tha 
raaa l t s ahoaa hy tha data* Majority of vorkarat aavlayara 
mm ««11 mm lawyers and adjudicating offixsaxs p la in ly 
••tabliah tha faat of p o l i t i c a l intarferanoa In tha 
foxmalation of safaranoa daoiaions by tha goYQcninant. Kaarly 
ona half o f tha woskara fuxthas Indioata tha r<Aa of nonay 
In tha axaxcisa of Kofaranoa powar. On tha othac hand* ona 
third o f employars show that union leaders influonce tha 
aMCoiaa o f raferanoa powax; %)haxeas a l i t t l e over ona third 
of lawyara and adjudicating o f f i c e r a point out that high 
o f f i c i a l s o f the governmant influence the exercise o f 
reference power* At the same tline« nore than one third of 
workers and around ctfia third of en^loyers and lawyers either 
sea no exterior £a«:tor a f f e c t ing reference discret ion or did 
not have any knowledge of this matter. Therefore* they ae«n 
t o regard the exercise of reference power as f a i r and iiiq;>artial« 
Aa a mark o f their disapproval o f the exarciaa o f 
xefaranea diaoration by the govexiwent* aa cnrexwhalaing najority 
of wexkaxa* eiqployara and lawyers as wall as adjudiaatlng 
of f ioazs favour abolition of tha pxoeass of rafaxanoa naking 
tfid pla«d that paxtias ba dixaetly alXowad to ippKoaoh tha 
adjudication a a ^ i n a i y fox tha aijudloatioB of a dlsputal 
RaMOBS artdiiffiad by than fox tftia taxnination of xafaxxal 
pxoeass axe that i t usalassly and iiia3t»xd»ly delays ex danias 
tha avai labi l i ty of adjudieatoxy xssMidyi i t i s susoeptlbla t o 
nisusa and is redundant. Analysis of st i i t ist iaal data too 
attests t o the f a s t that govemiaBt aaloss inoxdinata daisy 
in taking daaiaions iox xafaxxlng disyatas fox aajudleatioii* 
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«iii«ii i t fBt«iitiir M a t w r %• ^ i M t ma tyirit tf 
Xatetvial. DispvtM A«t« 
« « i t lqrp««lMtit m tiiat » Hifb^y |ttdl«ltX ttottirts* 
a y t l M 9 t Just lM i s Mtlt lMtieaX to ^riag 
•oneliisleiui to Xctosr and M mmIi I t l a i s i t t X 
i Q t t r t t t of nerkUig t l t t t * t\m w i t l f t i t of anrtilti lt t « t « 
t i t t i o a l d t t t la thit oontait (daoidtd and f paadiiif eatoa 
IQ tfao High Coiiirt of J m m and Katteir) t u f f a t t t tho o o r m t ^ 
aat t of tlilt pvopotltioa* Tho ralavaat data thov that 
l a tba Blgh Court • vliatbar i t la appeal or writ • laor* 
dloata dalay oooara la tlio dlapotal of l a ^ r oatat* A 
eaaa takaa about four y«ara f o r diaposal in tlia Ei fh Court* 
Za tbo SQprana Conrt tb l t pariod la alNMit f i v o yaart« Bat 
i t la Int^rattlfif to f ind tbat In rafrotbliit ooatyaet a 
D l a t r l c t Coort «nUa tMarlag appaala f r e » tha dlroatloiit 
of tim Aatiiorlty f o r paynaot of wagot ro lat lvoly t i iwt 
l o t t tl^ ^^ o f o r daoldlaf appaala* f i a t porlod la gonorallar 
t « o yoars* 
Apart twm ^ t t a t i a t l o a l avldaaoof tlM vlovt 
of W f dtort ( w i f t e a tad i t ^ y « r » ) t f adjodiaatovf 
ayatoK aad tlwao of laafort and a ^ a d i t a t i f l i o f f l d o r s 
a l t o aorttkerato tba foot ttitt h l ^ M t J id lo la l aoarta 
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ttttji^iidoiii «al«3r dMldiat Ubonr CMM* A 
hag* Majority of «erk«rsf Mplogrmt XMjrors as wXX 
•I aAJndloatliig ^ f i a a r a ambaarlbaa to thla vlaw* A 
•aat majority of naara of tba adjudloatliif ayatas alao 
antartaiiia tba ballaf tbat Xitlgatioo In tba hlghar 
Judlaial eoiirta loadvart«itly halpa ttia f inanoiaXlj 
atrong (aa^Ioyar) to ttaa diapota. A good pro* 
pm&tlosk of lavyara and adjodioatlog ofXiaara alao aeaapt 
t h l a Tlav* Farthar, workara and asployara alaoat ttoa* 
QlMoaaly and a good aajorlty of Xaayara and adjudlaatlng 
o f f l a a r a too anraa tha ballaf that hlghar Judicial ooorta 
ara not adaiinattljr aqalppad f o r daaUng with lakovr aat* 
tora* TlMroforat t b ^ vaat waif Binlaal I n t a r f a r m o of 
hlglMr ooarta la tlM M m t adjadlaatory fiaXd aad novo 
oxfToaaod daalro f o r glTlag aaadatory dlraativa to tboa 
199 tha diapoaal of Xakoar aaaaa axpaditioaaly on priority 
baaiat yiurthavt la ordat to aUalaata tota l ly tha Jariadlo* 
t iaaa of hlglMr aoarta frea tlM laSMut f i a l d aad artrim 
lakaar adjadlaatory ayatw aata aalMalva aad faaatiaaally 
a f f i i a a i a a a tiMy aai fa ia ly favaav tlia aatting ap af aaparata 
l a M w Jadtaiaty* 
3.12 
Lastly^that voluntary negotiations aco the beat 
suited method f o r so lv ing employer-employee disputes %fas 
the other hypothesis %ihich was to t e s t ' by the study. There 
i s a great deal of a f f i rmative evidence f o r corroborating 
t h i s hypothesis, workers and employers unanimously favour 
voluntary negotiations f o r s e t t l i n g th^ir disputes in 
preference t o other methods. They prefer c onc i l i a t i on and 
involuntary adjudication only when d i re c t negotiations have 
ent i r e ly f a i l e d in rosolving their d i l u t e s . One hal f o f 
lawyers anci adj idicat ing o f f i c e r s a lso give tho ir f i r s t 
profereflice t o voluntary negotiaticaig f o r the solution o f 
lal>our disputes . Conall iation gets 3econ<^ -nraferencR from 
workers and employers and labour adjudication la acceptable 
only in case of t o ta l f a i l u r e o f voluntary negotiat ions and 
c o n c i l i a t i o n t o resolve a dispute . On the other hand, lawyers' 
total response frecjuiency accords primary pos i t ion t o c onc i l i a t i on 
foUowed by labour adjudication and voluntary nego t ia t i ons 
respectively* A majority of a l l reap<»ndents has also given 
the reasons for the adoption of mutual negotiations in 
comparison to other methods of dispute s«ttlament. These 
reasons mainly arei oonvenienoe* sin|>licity, ine3«>«n^ 
slveness and informality which are considered to be 
charaoteristies of voluntary negotiations as dispute 8«ttl«Ment 
prooess* Moreoirer* I t i« deeplyingzalnad faith o f anrexy body 
oonneoted with industrial telatlons f i e l d that only voluntary 
negotiations oan really aKtlafy both the pasties t o the dispute 
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and th«c«by. •stablish » o s « lasting paoo* in the industiy, 
Th« pcesvnt study r«vs« ls that «h«fthox I t la tha 
ZndustrlaX Disputaa Aot or the Morlanctfi'a Conpansation Aot 
oc tha Paynant of Wagos Aot# contrary t o tha intent and 
s p i r i t of these labour statutes, determinaticm of employer-
enployae disputes by the labour adjuclicatlng authorit ies 
under then is v i t ia ted by delay because of their slow^noving 
procedures* processes and l e g a l i s t i c mode o£ :^nct ioning. 
The study a lso showai that in comparison t o adjudicatory 
authorities under the worknedn's conqpansaticai Act and the 
Payraent of Wages Act adjudication machinery under the 
Industrial Disputes Act relatltr^Ly gponds more time f o r 
adjudicating on labour disputes. This apoears t o be mainly 
due t o l e g a l i s t i c and Judicial background o f the Presiding 
Of f i cer of Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal and non-
Judicial background of adjudicating authorit ies under the 
workmen's condensation Act and the Payment of vteges Act . 
This i3« however* not t o suggest that determination of labour 
oases Isgr the Qosvaissionex f o r oonpensatlon and the Authority 
f o r paynant of v g m i s not af fected by de lay . As i s shown 
by the study* the ir procedure i s a lso tardy and l e g a l i s t i c 
and they do nofk turn (Mt adjudicative dec is ions quiolcly as 
eontei«»X«t«d undar tha statutory provis ions . 
Ml asieeptionally singular causa o f parpetration of 
dalay tn tlie adJUdioation o f labotir oaaaa i s tha laacity 
shown toy the adjttdioatliig authotitiaa ^ gsantlng 
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v«Aaadaiit and ttnJuitlfialiX* •dJonriiBMitt viiiit li««riag 
T I i m « a A j e a y i M M a t t up« • e t t l y lottglit %f u t ^ l o f w on f r l w l M W 
grotindi* 1% i f hifiajr disgnstliif m imU. m lom^prtlHiiitlbXc that 
in lilatant d i tngtrA et l « g a l prevlsloot rtgarAlog grant of aAJoa* 
rattonts Xabeiir aajadloatlag aottaorititf allow iMiga aaabar ot ad* 
Joaraaants for tba dlapoaal of a eaaa* For axaaploy tha Indiiatrial 
Oifpotaa Biilaf tiava l i a l t a d t|w noBbar of adjoarnaanta to |braa 
wbiah can ba grantad to a party ta tha eoorta of adjadieation of 
a dispata* Zn aatual praetiea, Labour Coart and ladnatrial Tr i -
bunal go to tha axtent of peraitting as aany aa thirty adjoarnnanta 
In aany easas and aora than f i f t y ooeaaionally f o r tha diapoaal of 
eaaaa* Fartiaa saak mmaroua adjoarnnanta for prodiielng witnaaaatf 
tandaring avidenea, praparing argmnantai making afforta for aoap* 
roffliaa sattlaaants, ato* Similarly, aany tinaa proeaadinga ara ad* 
Joarnad baaaaaa of Praaidlng Offioar baing busy with other wotk or 
out of station or ander transfar order| eta* A l l this inavitably 
draga on tha hearing proaaas of a eaae f o r aonsidarabla pariod*^ 
Another faator eontribating to delay i s that laboar adjadi* 
aatiag antluiritiaa ara iaordinataly laniaat and baaavolent towards 
a l i t i g a n t aaploy«r aha iataatioaally avaida tha proaaas of tha an* 
thority and fraqaaatiy kaapa Masal f away frosi tha hearings of tha 
eaaa* fwrthari la tha aasa of {.abaiup Caart and Zadaatrial frihansl 
delay a « i partly ba attyllwtahla ta tha aiiataafp of only ona I*a* 
bear Caarti^awi^IadBatrial fvibaaal in tha atata* On tha other haBd* 
in tha eaaa of CaMiasioBar f o r ea^paaaatiaa aad Aatherity f o r p a y 
•ant of wages delay i a tha adjadiaativa daaiaioa««akiag ia partly 
aaasad en aaaoant of tha faat m a t tlMwa adjudlaatiag anthoritiaa 
baaidaa diaahargiag adladiaatoty faaatloaa 
•'J 
atatatas ara ra<eirad ta p a f f f m a im% of adMiaiateratiwa lHaatloQa 
aaaigaad to thaa aadar warte«a labour laws* 
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Xt i s Mq^ly Ammmtxt^mA by t h « study thc t 
labour •djudloat lon has b«eoiM an axtxaiMly laitgth^ and 
Mp«(uiiv« nathod o f dispute aatt lanent. Tha dalay ^ tha 
adjudication o f diaputoa i s coenitted at a l l tha s tagas -
at tha t ina o f aaking rafazanoa i f tha disputa ia t o ba 
adjudicatikl by tha Labour Court or Zhdustrial Tribunal; 
during tha procass of adjudication bafora the adjudicatory 
ttithoritias and at tha Xaval o f h i ^ a r Judic iary . Many a 
tina* tha parson t o ba btfuafittsd by tha outoona o f l i t i g a t i m 
u 
doas not ranain a l i va t i l l the f i n a l dec i s ion o f tha c a s e ; 
Clearly* f o r the lowly placed worker - both s o c i a l l y and 
econo i i ca l ly - the adjudicatory raroady has becone inaoceasble . 
Indeed# the labour adjudicatory aystam has f a i l e d t o attain 
the ob jec t ive f o r the rea l i zat ion of which i t has been 
p r i n a r i l y devised ( t o deal out speedy s o c i a l Just i ce t o the 
worXing c l a s s ) . Tharafora# the systera as i t i s operating 
prasantly i s not conducive t o establ ish industr ia l peace and 
t o arolva batter industr ia l re lat ions syataB. 
Surprisingly* tha anrils i4iloh ware s o u ^ t to ba 
rwairad by tha oxaa(tion of apaoial labour adjudieatoxy bodioa 
hcva^parpatnatad by than also* Labour adjudioatery bodies 
tiara baan «rt(iMLiafeiad with tha praelaiiaad objaot of Majudi-
eating m the disputes and o l a i M of tha labour <picdcly moA 
ohaaply by avoiding foiMal* lega l i s t ic and lengthy pcoaaAiraa 
of judiaial oourta* Sat thaaa Tory dafaeta of judioial oousta 
new a f f l i e t tha daoialen-w*i»g of thaao bodiaa. This haa 
happanad owiag t o t o t a l JudlAlaliaaftloii of %ha 
adjudiaaitery pxoeaaa. 
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Tha raasons which hava l «d t o the jud io la l i sat ion of mmmmry 
pKoeadiAses not far t o In most of th« oas«s tha 
spaoial labour adjudicatory fonuM ara asanned by jud i c ia l 
odffieara having f u l l j u d i c i a l BMpmxlmem and lagal b«:kgraund. 
The result was that they oontinuad t o act in the ir accustoned 
way quite contrary t o the ob jec t of the i r functioning in the 
new cffpacity. Bv«n whara administrators vara witrustad with 
th i s task, they unwittingly adopted formal and l e g a l i s t i c 
ways of ordinary courts in the ir cfiast f o r showing fairness 
and justness in the discharge of adjudicatory functions* 
Above a l l « a l t h o u ^ spacial^labou r adjudicatory bodies vara 
created to make p r a ^ t adjudicative decisions* at the same 
teana* they %rara roada subject t o the jurisdict icms of the 
whole hierarchy of j u d i c i a l courts f o r examining the 
correctness of their decisions* L i t t l e thought had been 
giv«A t o the f a c t that whatever pronptnass was t o be displayed 
by the special forums I t was bound t o be nautralisad in the 
hifilhar j u d i c i a l courts i f their decisions ware l i ^ l a t o ba 
taatod In tha j u d i c i a l courts . Ml th i s has defeated tha 
whela puxpeso of tha creation of labour adjudicatory bodies . 
H«ioa* ttnlOM ttsgant ranadial naaauiaa are undartakan fox 
toniAg up the systsn and making i t aaqpaditiou*^ I t w i l l 
i x r o t x i o v ^ l y loaa i t s ralovanoe and u t i l i t y f o r tha solution 
o f laboax-MnagaMsnt problams. 
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B « t o w n d » t i e a » 
On thm b M l s of th« flodliigs of ttaajy felXovlnf 
roeoMttoodations ar« mtAit to iaprovt apoii tlio oxlstiJig lardjr 
l«tootir adjadicstory syitoa* 
fboro ought to bo Modatory statatory provlsioaa laylag 
dowa tbo poriod of tbroo moiitba for tho dlapoaaX of Xaboor 
easaa throucb adjadloatory proeoai ondor tbo IndaatYial 
Oispat^f Aotf the Worioaoii*! CoHpcasatlon Aot and tho Fay«-
•ont of wagoa ikot* fho s m tlao U a l t Hajr ho froaorlbod 
In oth«r laboitr statatoa iitiieb provide for dlaohargo of 
adjiidloatory faaotiena aador thoa* Adjadleatonr aathorl* 
tiaa aaat eoofom to thia atatatory tiAa l l « i t uhllo ad|«* 
dleatlog on labour dlapotoav SowoYor, f o r tho oolXootlTO 
XndBstrial Diapatoa inrolring eonpXaxity of law and aooial 
and ooonoBle oonaiderationa tho anggoatad poriod of throo 
aontha may aaitably bo roXaiod* 
8« Sxiatiog proviaion of tho Indaatrial Diapatoa fUiIoa l i a i * 
ting tho minbar of adjonrnaanta to throo in oaaa of aaoh 
party daring tho proooas of ad|iidieation of a diapttto bo 
a t r i o t l y foXXowad* On no aooonnt tharo ia to bo any dovia* 
t ion froa thia atatntory Ximit of granting adjoaraaonta by 
tho Laboar Court or ZnduatriaX TribunaX dnring tho ooiuraa 
of tho procoodinga of a oaao* SiaiXar aandatory proviaiona 
Xiaiting tho nuabor of throo adjoaraaanta to oooh party oaght 
to ba onaotod f o r othor Xaboar adjndioatory authoritioa* 
AXtomativaXyi a ooaaon proooditro eodo oabodyiag amaiafy 
proaodara ahoaXd bo aaaotad • I t ahaXX bo aado appXioabXo 
to aXX adjadioatory aattioritioa in tho Xabeor f i o U # X« 
oaght to f i x iho amibor of adloaraaoata (pvaforabXy «*o to 
oaoh parit) tdiioh aaqr bo aXXovtd to a party aad apooify 
thFoa Boatbl^ poriod f o r th« AiapoaaX of a XaMor oaM* U a 
proaidiag off iaoF faiXa to iiapoao of a oaao withia tlM 
proaoribod Xiait of adJoaraMantat i t ahoaXd bo dawid •• 
aa aot of doXla^oaey on hia part aad aaat bo r a a i a f t t aaoaa* 
tabXo f o r laia*. fhia aay ba oatorat in hia aaaatl 
ooafidaatiaX vapovt • Boai^St a ragaXar rai loa b « M rtwOd 
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b« ttp to •xaalQ* tti« fumtieaiJic of Xtfloar oAittAl* 
eatoiT antheirltlM* Labour Klaiitoyy SooMttffjr of 
Labear 0«por%Miit moA Labour CoMilaaloaor oaii bo 
•pf>olo%oA OS I t i MBbor. fh lo board alioalA partloaXarly 
addraas I tso l f to tiaa task of anaitrliig qaiokor dlapoaaX 
of labour oaaaa and m a t a o ^ an aooooat froB ttk9 
adjQdloatory aotliorlty alioao twrn oat of adJadioatlTO 
daelalona la alow* 
8* In aplta of tho statutory provlaloaa viiloh prohibit 
tbo f loating of tba adjodloatorjr prooasa If a party 
dellbarataly avolda tha proceaa of a labour adjadloatory 
authority or Ita proeoadlngs, ax perto proeaedlaga or 
dlaalasal of tbo olala applleatlon, aa the oaaa may bot 
muat forthwith f o l l o v for brinfiog tha easa to a apaady 
conolusloQ* Ho laxity or laniaQoy la to ba avinoao by 
tha authority in thia ragard* 
4* HofaroQea making ataga undar tha Industrial Disputaa Aot 
naads to ba allninated and partlas should ba allowod to 
hsYa li irect aooaaa to tho Labour Court and Induatrlal 
Tribunal f o r sattling tholr disputes through adJudloatlTo 
mathod. But s f tar tho abolition of rafarral proooaa» tho 
Labour court and tho Induatrlal Tribunal auat hold a 
prallalfiary suMiary hoariag f o r aoroonlng whothar tha oaao 
l a profor f o r odjudloatlon or I t InvolToa a frivolous, 
balatod or i M f i n a i y o l a U which doaa not wanrunt adjudi* 
oatioB* r«rth«r> I t tlMMild ba nada atatutorily blading 
OA tho dlapatiuf paHlot that aftor tho f aUato of 
voluntary aogotlntloM and ooaolUatioa proooediagsi thoy 
• u f t aoooMurily bring tho dlaputo boforo tho Labour Court 
or tho Indnotrlal trlbaaal f o r ad|«dleatiOB aad wiit not 
roaort to i tr lko or look out* 
Adjudleatory aad ooaolUatory funotloaa aood to bo OOB* 
biaod la ^ labour adjudioatiag anthorltloa to proaoto 
•olantary aottloaoata botvaaa tte partloa* flMro la a 
groator probability of tho partioa asroaiag to a oaapmiiaa 
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•«lii«iMi tef^M aa •Ajudioatory MllMfity I f tbm 
iJMiital t f f«ets of ptol.oQii«4 i l t igattMi m Urovflit 
lioB« to tliMi by i t * I f thU taggMtioB i t f i v M • f f M t * 
i t wi l l aataraUr M t a i i tht tomiofttioa ef oeatiUatioB 
pfM««4iiifs «li« CttMlUatioii Of f i ««r witer IIm 
XQdas t r i a l Diffataa Aot« 
llaiidfttory itatatory jpferiaiona englit to b« •iifiet«4 in 
tlia lalioor atatotM^ viiieli provide for aottloMant of 
dispntoa bf adjndioatorf prooaaii for sakioc i t obligotoriT 
on tlia partial to anttr into diroot nagotiotioaa f o r 
aagotiatad aattloffiaat baforo a diapnta ia takan baforo 
tbo adjadiaatory anthority for aattlaaaat* An agroaaant 
raaebad by tbo partiaa aa a raaolt of amtoal nogotiationa 
•aat ba aooordad tba aaMO aanotity aa an oward of an adja* 
dioatory antbority* Tbia aaaanro wi l l naeassarily plaoo 
greatar aapbssis on nagotiatad Jnatioa* 
7* At praaant tbera ia only ono Laboar Coart^ooM-Induatrial 
Tribunal in ttio atnta of Jami A Knabair* Ono mro Labour 
Coart*oaa*Indttatrial Tribiuial aboald ba oatabliabod for 
apoo4^ adjndiaation of Indmtrial diapatoa in tbo atato* 
Aaaiatant Labonr CoMiiaaioaora wbo aro adjadiootory 
fttttboritiaa andar laboar atatatoa snob aa tbo workMnU 
Co«poflSfttioB Att| tiio PafMst of wagoa iiotf att#t tboald 
aot bo Miairod to disobargo ai^ adBiaiatratiwo fanotions* 
m y t l l m U bo fo^Ovod to dU«bait« ad|adioatevy aork only* 
§ • liOgA royroaoatatlas bbatld bo totaUy barnod boforo tbo 
Ibboar adjadiaatoty aatlMritioa* Xt v l U bo ooadsaiya to 
aako apoal^ adjadlaftftfo daalilom aad to provoat tba 
adjadiaatory aatlMritioa froM b a a f t a g aoto U g a l l a t i a * 
10 • tbo daoiaiona of M o a r ad^MioatMy aattoritioa aa f a r 
aa poaaiblo tboald bo tyoatod aa f i a a l in ordat to Mko 
adjadiaatiwo raaMdy f t a i t f a l aad apaady* I t ba ia 
tbo iataraat of aarkiag olaaa U ^mto ia rt«t»al U t a t * 
foroaaa ia tbo aa«rda of lbba«r aijadioatory « i « M r i t t o t * 
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Tli«r« shoulA b« only on* rlgbt of appeal from th« daolaloo 
of • labour aOjadieatory authority moA tb« right of appoaX 
•110024 bo wrolloblo osJi OB • Mbotootlol point of lav* 
JarlapTttdaiiea of dlstruat of dlf foroat adjndloatoty f o m a s 
Bttst bo dlaoardad. Short hiararshy^^adjadloatory foroBo 
laatoad of ajlons ouo for tha datomlaatloQ of labour dla* 
putaa la a naoaaalty la vlav of tha apaalal natura of labour 
dlaputoa aad Klaarabla plight of ladlgaat worker* 
I I * For tha ptirpoaa of f i l i n g appeala a aaparata Judga or 
Judgaa ahould be pamanaatly appolatad for daeldlag labour 
oaaaa la ^ a High Court* Six aoatha' parlod nay bo f lxod 
f o r tho dlapoaaX of a labour oaao la ^ a Blgh Court* l3io 
daolaloa of tha High Court Judga auat ba ragardad aa f l a a l * 
I t ahould aot ba aubjaot to aay furthor appaal althar 111 
tha High Court or la tho Supraao Court* 
AlternativelyI aa Appollata Labour Irlbunal at tho 
State lovel ahould ba aot up for hearing appeala f ro* 
labour adjudicatory authorltlea* There ahould ba ao right 
of appaal or Judlolal review agalaat tho daolaloa of Labour 
Appellato Trlbuaal* Labour Appollata Xrlbuaal auat also 
glYO Ito daolaloa wlthla alz a i e a ^ * 
18* M a r Artlolo Idd of tho CoaaUtutlon, tho SuproM Court 
ahould latorraaa oaly whoa a ooaploj polat of labour lav 
liaa arlaoa uhlah aooda to bo dooldod by tHo hlghoat oourt 
of tho laad or when thoro aro ooofl lotlag oplnloaa oa au^li 
• polat of lav* 
18* Aaalataat Labour coMlasloaori ought to possoaa ual fom 
^uali f leat loas* I t la daalr«bU that thoy poaaoaa apeolal 
kaowladfo of labour tmA aoolal loglalatloa aa v o l l aa of 
tbo probloM of laduatry aad ladaatvial volotiom* 
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14* laolsMiitt of A0«is%itii« L«1»oaY CoMdss ionm omA to bo 
•altobly oidiwiood, so tliot thoy oro paid oooordlof to 
tlioir stotiis 004 aotnro of diitloo* Xt will plooo tboa 
in • position to disponoo Juotloo ovon hoiidoA oad aajr 
roftroiQ tbon foXling proy to toaiptatloas* 
X6* Labour odjadlootory aatlieritioo nay bt roqairod to fano* 
t ion on tho pat torn of o lrcait oonrta* Thaso aatlioritiaa 
abould bold proooadiaga at tboaa apots or plaoaa ablob aro 
nora prona to XitigatioQ* Xt wiXX ba an attampt at bringing 
Joatiea to ona*a own door* I t vlXX aXao mlnlmlsa tho dolay 
and axpanaa InToXvad in l i t igat ion end tbaraby banaflt tbo 
workar who la in a voak flnanoiaX poaltion* 
X6« taboar adjndleatory autliontlaa ahonld ba veatad with tlio 
power to ravlav tbalr ovn daolaiona* This wilX in aany 
easas obvlata tha noad f o r going t o tha High Court in 
appaaX o r writ* Bosidaa, tha Xabonr adjodleotory antbo* 
r i t iaa ba givan powara and provided vith naeaasary naebi* 
nary to InplaBant thalr daeiaiona on thair omi aa at pra* 
aant aoatXy anpXoyora, aapaoiaXXy privato anpXoyarst do 
not hononr ttia airarda o f Xabonr adjndloatory aatlmrltias* 
ftayanaa and Jndloial aatborltioa imieli ara imraatod witli 
tbo taak of offootlnc rooovafy taka yaara togotliar to 
•oapXato rooovavy proooodlnga* 
tha awarda of Xi^onr adiadlaatoty antiioritlos nood to bo 
inplaaaatod fortli»ltii« AppoUato or a r i t ooart aaat bo 
d o b a m d froa iaavlag stay ardara agalaat tba awards of 
Xabonr adjadioatory atittu>ritias« I f tba daaisloa of tba 
appaXXato f o n w la la favoar of tba raapaadaat a^pXeya»| 
aaoant paid ta tba aorkar in tatas of tha award of tba 
adjadlaatovy a a t h ^ l t y i s ta ba raoovorod trm ids vagaa* 
li an award of tlia adjadiaatory antlierity la f o r 
raiaatatmai i t i vorkar also&ld h9 raioatatad fertbvit l i 
and t a m a a t l o i i e i bla aawlaaa abould talca placa oaly 
a f t e r %hm f l a a l JodgMaat of tiia ^^pallata f oroa aphoJLd* 
lag tlia tafmlnalioa* 
XS* Bafera tha appelatnaat o f a J^diaial O f f laar aa Praaldiag 
O f f i e a f o f a l i^oar adjadleatory f e f i w i ha should ba ra* 
qalrad'^'aiidargo a br ia f tralalag f o r aaqaaiatiag hla 
ajpaeiaUjr with Xiiboar Jariapmdaaaa aad protolaaa o f tha 
labour aad ladaatrar* Ba alioald Ha attaoliad t o a norklag 
Praaldlag Of f l ear f o r a pariod o f s ix aoatlis* 
19 • Xa ordar to raotlf ir Boat of tha defaota o f tha az l s t lag 
Xaboar adjttdleatory aaobaaluiy sapariita laboor jad le lary 
naads to ba sat For th i s {mrpoaa labour eoarta should 
ba eoQstltatad at two lavala «»ooiirts of o r l g l a a l Juris* 
d l e t l o a aad appallata eourts* Appallata labour eourta 
may ba eoastltutad at tha stata l e v e l or f o r tha d l f f a r a a t 
Zoaea of tha aoaatry* A aa l fora stumary prooadara should 
ba followad by thaaa aourta throughout tha couatry* Ifo 
ordlaary eourtf laaludlag tha Suprana Court t should po* 
asajis aar Jurladlot loa to aamt la l sa tha daolsloas o f 
> 
the labour eoarta* 
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1* dl*or«%ioa hai pr imtt i l f wl%b ^ 
Qm^rmwt to •asorc s«ttl«B«iit of Zii4tiftinsl 
Disputes I97 avtrtliic s tr lkss weA loek«*eats cad to prsYsat 
•g i ts t loa of f r lTo lo « s sod nntontfblo o l s l a s W o r o •d4«* 
d l o s t i n f fonuui* As bas boon slioini by tho rosa l ts o f tbo 
datsy tha OovaraMat has y l a a gfaatar Masarat silsBsad 
rafarreX preaaat* Xa aay avaat* tafavraX proaass Has 
baaosa potaatlal soataa o f ftipriTlag tha tiaalaas vovkar 
o f tbo a^ttdlaatlva raaady f o r radrasslag his grlavaaoa 
at tba aad faaelas of boraaaeratar * 
S* Laajrars* prafaranaa f o r eonal l lat loa aad adiodlaatloa 
In aoaparlsoa to Yolantary oagotiatlons woaid pr laar l ly 
appaiir to aaaaata fron tha profassloaal eoasldaratloiia* 
Tbay w i l l aatarally Xlka tba agltatimi of aora e la la» 
and dlspotaa bafora tba adjadiaatory foroas as I t 
fartbara tbalr aeoaoala latarast* 
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6 . BoiRbay Unicm of Journalists v s . stata of Bombay* p«121. 
7 . DaJjBia Jain Aiz ways v s . sukumai: Mtkhacjea* p»2 i7 . 
•• Dhakswal Ootton Mil ls Ltd; v s . C.X.T., w.B. p,2X8. 
9 . Blaotrio Moc^anieal Znaist£i«9 Ltdy v s . md^strial TxibunaX*p.1^. 
10. JKMBCutiva Bnginaac# Raevl Carnal Div. v s . Lagal R^xesentatlvas 
of Di l Sagax and woothai:* p«70. 
11. BaipKaas Naws Papaxs Ltdi v s . Thaic wocHsrs* p . 120. 
12. Oh. Rasool wml v s . <ii. Mohd. Wani« p,220. 
13. oujarat Staal E^Ubas Ltd. v s . Its Masdoox Sabha, lip.223,256,260. 
14. Haxivli^m v s . Ahmad# p . 222. 
15. Hindustan Tin VK>rka Pvt. Ltd. v s . Tha BiQ>l<»yaas of M/s 
Hindustan, p . 218. 
16. Hocditiitf Qmmm v s . 3tata of ocissa^ p.123. 
17. Xnpaxial Tabaooo nq»leyaas Assooiation v s . Stata o f wast Bangal 
p .123. 
16. mdian Gjeygtm XAd. vs . Tliair mKlmm» p*2S. 
19 . Jalptix Spinning and Mtaving M i l l s Ltd* vs« Jaiux g i n n i n g w d 
tiatnring M i l l s Masdooi union* p , i 2 0 . 
20 . Jaswant sin#» vs* Hanagwwit of Raj Tltaafcxa^ R*s.pufa«p,25« . 
21 . <7«X» QB^tm Hfi imim ne^ Wumfim Mi^l* M i v s . Laliour 
JVpttllalM Tsi]Miaal» p . I S # . 
aa . Xannan nmmm mXXm ygo*i«a as* v s . M a a t x i a l Tribunal* 
taalBilaM* p*2i«« 
a s . X a i a i t i X*al v s . Assistant Laiaous O f l s s i o n a i and Mio«hax#p.220. 
24 . KM^evananda Siaxati v s . Stat* of Xaxala* p.aas 
as . itotteyan Plywood i f o M mUrn v s . CMramnant of Karala* p . 1 2 3 . 
a # . x^alcl^ PaX v s . ifnioii mdia* p . 2 2 a . 
27 . MaOxas Diotxiet MtMObi lao and Otfnaral a^»Xo!r«os onion v s . 
fttata of Madras* U S . 
a t . Motal nyBfioatdcs (India) v s . B.B. ospta* p . M . 
2 9 . MoImS. Mftq^bool P« jc i inoo i r .S i i«cut iV9 B n g i n m r E X « e t t l e Bamin«f 
Oxid 3t«tion« p . 2S5, 
30* N.K. a m V8« LabouK TKl]3un«l« p . 2Se. 
31* O.K. Ooah vs* S.X. Josoph* p . 258. 
32. Pottary msdoor Pai^ahayatvsPacfact CSoy p . l 2 0 . 
33# Punjab MationaX Baidc v s . A l l India Punjab M«tlonaX Fad«sation«p*25. 
34. Rai Bhadux Diwan Badcl Dasa v s . ZnduistriaX Tribunals Punjab* 
yp . 2S8*265. 
35. Rotitaa Ibdustxias ht6t v s . 3.D. Agarwal* p . 123. 
36. R.S. OiApta va . Assistant i^ abauE ConraissionaE Doda and others* 
p . 219. 
37. R.V. KorthuiRber Land oonrosnsatictn i ^ e a l Tribunal* p .222 . 
38. Sangrain Singh v s . Election Tribunal* p . 222. 
39. Shiusbu Nath GoyaX v s . Bank of Baroda* p . 120. 
40. SitaX Sukhiram v s . OantraX aovecnmwt BidustriaX TribunaX 
mm-Labour CXurt JubaXpar* p . 216. 
41. s tate of Bomaby va . V.K. P . Krishnan* p . l 2 1 . 
42. s tate of Janm &. Kashmir va . Anwar Ahmad* p . 222. 
43. State of Madras v s . C.P. Sarathy* p . 121. 
44. s t a t e of fiadras v s . The swadesonltrata Labour Union and 
others* p . l 2 1 . 
45. Swadeshi Industries Ltd. I t s workUKtfi* p . 260. 
46. T«ra Cband va . (ShuXaro RasuX Sftiat* p . 220. 
47. Vasijc SuXtaR Toba«sooo oanpany Ltdt Hyderabad v s . State 
of Aiidhsa PxadMh. p, 123. 
48. Maatem India Matoh oo/ litd. v s . The Maatern Indian Match 
iforkajcs Uktion and othejra* p . 123. 
49 . worka Managas va* 0»M. Pradhanit p . 220. 
O O n o ^ b 
Additional Tabl«a 
Tatol* Showing a ^ uf respondont «#0£k«£a and 
union laadors . 
Aga(in y a a r s ) MUBdDac o f z :a3p<mdanta 
X<aaa than 20 13 
20 - 25 45 
2 5 - 3 0 60 
30 . 35 40 
35 > 40 30 
40 - 45 26 
4 5 - 5 0 21 
5 0 - 5 5 10 
5 5 - 6 0 3 
6 0 and a b o v e 3 
Tcjftal 256 
Tab la 2* Showing oducational cpa l i f i ca t i cms o£ tha 
zaspct f idant w o c k a r s and union l a a d a r a 
B d ^ o a t i o n a l HiUDbar of 
<3iallfleaticm3 
Zllitaxata 87 
MiddXa and laaa 73 
Hatxio and laaa 55 
oadar gxadaata 15 
draduata 8 
Foat»«xadkiata » 
M l m i e a l <|jiaIifi«ationa 16 
Total 256 
TiOala 3 . 31ioiiring saxviea «a«»axianoa of saapondants 
• ^ • « S®^ Sl'^ i®!^  - - -
Langth ^ aaxviea 
( i a mutomx of jnwpaodanita 
Ziaaa than S yaars 84 s - io 7i 
10 - 15 37 
IS - 20 2 i 
20 - 2S iO 
21 anA atooira 2f 
. . . 
Tabic 4 . Showing «nployii«nt statu* o f th« 
- « - • _ 
Opa catos/Toohri ioal 
Aaaistant 36 
liiorkax 172 
MjiBbar of oXarlcal s t a f f 23 
Ko.of lowar 
saparvlaory ataf f 3 
Attendant# stewaxd 9 
Othaca 13 
Total 256 
Table 5 . Showing union and ncm-Hinlon respondent 
workers of the sample. 
Whether member of 
the union Narob-jr of respondents 
Trade union tneiobera 136 
I^on-union workers 70 
Total 256 
Table 6 . Showing ordinary nopibera and unicm 
o f f i c i a l a of th% SjUi^le. 
P«Bt hald MuR&^ iar of reapondants 
Fresidant 16 
v iea Fxaaidant 10 
Block pxaaidant 4 
SaoxafteJiV 13 
CashiasAxaaauxaJC 8 
HmtBoBt of tha asiacutiva 4 
Ocganisos/Chiaf ojcganisox 2 
Mo poa« 124 
Total 186 
O O 
Tatols 7 , siMwing iiatuxa «nplo]pant o f th« 
ZMpondant woirksra* 
N«tur« o f onpXoynent FKmcfxmcY d i e t s ilaution 
Vmxmmmt 181 
TttqpoxaZY 43 
QmmmX 32 
Total 256 
Ta)3l« e . Showing sax of the cespondent ««ork€ira 
8«x Fxoqaomcy Total 
'Male 224* * 
Female 32 256 
Table 9 . ;^owing aae of the cespond^t ontplayers 
Age in years Ko« of respondents 
Leas than 20 1 
20 . 25 4 
25 - 30 7 
30 - 35 13 
35 - 40 19 
40 - 45 5 
4 5 - 5 0 3 
5 0 - 5 5 3 
5 5 - 6 0 
60 and above 2 
Total 57 
Table 10. Showing educational c ixal l f icat iona 
of the respondent enploysra. 
Bdaeation qpial i f ications Ko. of req^oiulents 
ZlXltexate 
Middle and below 
Hatcio and below 7 
ixiidex guAiattt 12 
20 
Doib l « gxaduacte 
3 
geohaiqaX (y ia l i f i ca t i ons 15 
illpliWa 
3 ? 0 
Tabl« 11. Showing •ai|>ttKi«no« o£ l ega l pxaot lo« 
of th« zflHipondcnt la%ryera. 
E3i|>«xianea of legal 
pzactica (in yeaca) ItaiabaE of zaspondenta 
3 years and lass 10 
3 - 6 24 
6 - 9 17 
9 - 1 2 2 
1 2 - 1 5 4 
1 5 - 1 8 4 
1 8 - 2 1 4 
21 and above 4 
Total 69 
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mw^^- I 
L l a t Of t h « • o t ^ I l i r t M i t a f x o i w h l o h 
workers wa& ma^oymxm 
1 . Shiv shankax Bclek Kiln R«y« Mox« Pstty 
2 . H/a Mathua ataal Roll ing MUXa* HatXl nox 
3 . BMkland D i s t i l l a s s Pvt . Ltdi Bail BzahwianaUaiBBu) 
4 . Katto t#c»xatad Spinning NovsharaCsxinagar) 
5 . UttaiB FlQuE Mil ls , Jemau 
6 . S.K. GhenicalSf Zaina Xota (srlnagax) 
7 . H/» Zkido Kaahnix Oaxpat Faetoxy (Sxinagax) 
8 . Akkxix woXlen Milla# Zaina Kote (sxinagax ) 
9 . Deivan*a Modem Bxawaxiaa Ltdi Talab T i l l o « Jama 
10. M/a J.M. Ptoduota Pvt . Ltd (Kowahaxa) 
11. H/a Bxoadway Snterpxisaa (Hotel)« scinagax 
12. iVs^^imal small Axna Faetoxy* Katlua 
13. H/3 CUmtaD Text i le Milla (Kathua) 
ym)lic p f ^ f 
1. Kaahnix Millow dovexnnenta * ss>oxta Faotoxy Mixan Sahib -
Unit of JtK znduatxiea Ltd. 
2 . doPtrexxMant saw Mill shalteng (sxinagax) 
3 . OovexiaMBt XMMbaxing UndextaJcing (wexk8hap)Shalteng(8xinagax) 
4 . HiBdaatan Ooatoing w o l l w MlUa« Baxi Bxahi«iana(JaHna) 
5 . JaMM M i a ii luxpantina Faotoxy* Hixan sahib tJmmn) 
• • ootvt. J M M I Ii Kaalwix NOtOX 0»ZpOXatlOB« 
7 . oem* m i t t i a g raotoxy Jmam 
8 . Oort* Joisaxy Milla Baxi Bxahanana ( J a m ) 
9 . pgoeaata Ooooxato Faotoxy (J«K Minaxala lAd.) Baxi 
BxahMMM iJ&mm) 
10. oovt . Matoh Faotoxy Baxawilla 
11. o o f t . 9oinaxy MUla (Fn^poxa) Sxinagax 
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12. 09ir«xiin«nt ^ i imi i ig Hills* HamYimtm 
13. ommnmuat Brl<|A«tting plant (shaltang) 
SziiiaQftz 
14. oovvrnmnt s i l k i«tt«iriiig Faotoxy* R«i Bagh 
(sxlnagax) 
15. H.N,T. watch Faotory Zaina K&t«« srinagar 
16. Vijaypur* Ooopoxative Harkaiting sooiaty(J 
o o o O I' C 
XI ( « ) 
A, 3CHg>ULB fOR APJPPlCAgQRa AWP LAWSffflia 
1.1 H 
1.2 Ag« 
1.3 3«X 
1 .4 Marital statusi 
Maxrlod 
3l9gl« 
Divozeaa 
1•t rather * b/Oxard ian * a oooupat ion 
1.6 To which family do you belong? - Joint - Kuolaar(single) 
1.7 Mumbar of laambers in the fani ly 
1.8 Total inoorae of the family (from a l l sources) 
1.9 H i ^ e s t aduoational qcialif i cat ionsi 
Oanaral 
Professional 
fOR jtf>Jl|DICAgORS OMLY 
2.1 Designation 
2.2 Mature of the appointmenti 
PeKMenent 
2*3 SeJLafy (In«2u41iig 0 .A 6 other allowanoes) 
2«4 Duration of pjcesent eeploynent 
2 . 5 Previous j«ib(«) 
Designation 
Salary 
iXtration of the previous j<^(s) 
•OK LAwyiRs oKiar 
3 .1 Hew many years have you put in as preotising lawyer? 
i*2m DO you pxaotioo oaialusivoly in labour nmttmxm? 
- ~ ffo 
rnn m m> mrm 
4.1 • iftittt i s fc^lOMttd by the XabouE txlbunals / 
•dJudieaitoKy withositltts in th« diaehasgo of 
•djudiostoxy funetlona? 
> Tho proaoduxo as laid do%fn in the status 
and xulas made thaxvandax 
- The yr inolples of natuxal j u s t i c e 
- Any othex (kindly ^ e c i f y ) 
- No 
4 . 2 . Is thm proaeduxe followed by the laboux txibunals / 
adjudicatory authorities in the adjudication of liiboux 
cases unifora? 
- Yes - No - DOn*t Icnoir 
4 .3 . If no« what axa the reasons f o r adopting the procedural 
variatic»is7(If more than one« please rank theis) • 
I . I I . I I I . IV. V, 
4 . 4 . Please eatress your opinion on the following s tat on ant at 
Xtabour txibunals/adjudioatoxy authoxities always give 
xeasons for adjudicative dec is ions . 
-> Agree -Disagree -Mo Opinion 
ZI . Labour trUMntls/edjudleatery m t h o r i t i e s f i v e reasons 
for •djiidieative deoisions only when either party t o 
the Adjadioatory paocMnadings aakes a ro<iA««t for tho 
• A0IM -DiMigioe -Mo opinion 
4*9. Mhsft i s tmM opinion on tho proooduro adopted by the labour 
trlbnnals/najuAloatory ns^lioritieo in the diaohax«o ^ 
•AJitdiooioiy fttnokiinsT 
- Ik i s too logaliotif l » I t i s s^pwoivo 
» Zt i s dilatory • Zt i s s l n p ^ a n d 
- I t noeds t o be <^angod ^ i i r ffiir i- im 
« Any othex (kindly sp^nify) * pKoaodaiaS*oote appUoSk' 
- iHUM t o o U tho Isbsor 
- Don t m ^ trlbanals/odjudloatory 
(I f noro than onot pXooso «ttiioxi«ioo « o e i f y in ordor of pxiority) • 
4.i. Would you l ika to o f far any mggmatitmiu) t o straanline 
the pKOoaduxo? 
I , Xt, m . W , V. 
( I f more than ana, p l«as« rank than) • 
4 . 7 . Xt Is ganacally f a i t that dua t o long jud i c ia l background« 
tha natabars of labour tribunals/adjudloatory authorltias 
tand t o be too l ega l ia t l c in the discharge of adjudicatory 
functions, what is ymr opinion coiMiarning th is? 
- Strongly agree - Agree > Strongly disagree 
- Disagree - Can't say 
5 .1 . It i s often said that the part of tha lawyers i s no mean in 
delaying a case before a labour tribunal/adjudloatory 
authority, DO you agree with th i s ? 
- Strongly agree - Agree - stronaly disagree 
- Disagree - Can't say 
5.1 (a) . Zt strongly ag^ee or agree, %#hat are your suggestions in 
this connecticffi? 
- Lawyer's entry should be altogether banned 
- Lawyer's entry should be perwittGd in those casea only 
whore a law point is involved. 
- Where complicated factual situation is involved 
- Lawyer's etfntry dKould be permitted in those oases <»nly in 
which the labour trlbunals/adjudicatory authorities 
consider their services necessary. 
- Any other (kindly i^ec i fy } 
- Ho opinion 
( i f nore than one# kindly sank thm). 
<•1. Yxoi ymx eaqpexienQe* yleaae t e l l us leather there i s /are 
any etitside inflttene«(a) other than the merits of a ease 
upon the labour tribunals/ad judicatory authorities which 
influeiMie dseisions one ««y or the other. 
« Menaqr aaaslde rations 
- Pol i t ica l influence 
• IhfluaKiae o f h i ^ sdainistrative o f f i c e r s 
- ZBf luenoe of trade UBiefi leaders 
« Znfluenoe ef leaders of m^loymta associations 
- Miy othex (pleaso speoify) 
• Mo Inf luenoe - Mo opinion 
S o 
( i f t iwM i « moim than mm, plmmam Uaiaatm th«a in oxAmx 
of pfiAJCitr)* 
MMtXd you l i t e t o »«lco any suggootionCs) t o •top thia 
outaido Intmaion in labcMX adjudloatory pxoooadisiga? 
Z. S . ZZZ . 
(If motm than one, plaaaa sank than). 
7 . 1 . I t la aa«n that a l o t of adjournments are sought in the 
adjudioatlon of a oaao* rron your •]f>ori«nea« plaaaa t a l l 
ua «fhix:h pasty aiMika noza ajouminents on frivoloua gsounda 
duzing adJtidioatocy prooamilinga? 
* OnployaKa/managarlal ataff 
«> Txada ur l on o f f i c l a l a 
- L i t i gant wockara 
- Labour t r l b u n a l s / a d j u d l c a t o r y a u t h o r i t l e a grant 
adjoucraaenta l l b a r a l l y 
«• LalxMr t r l b u r a l a / a d j u d i c a t o r y a u t h o r l t i o a adjourn 
proeaadings f rec j iant ly o f t h e i r own aooord* 
- Kaithar p a r t y t o the l i t i g a t i o n aaaks f r i v o l o u s 
adjoumnanta 
- LaJDour t r i b a n a l a / a d j u d l c a t o r y a u t h o r i t i e s grant 
adjouzrments on ly f o r l e g i t i m a t e purpoaaa 
* Any othar (plaaaa s p e c i f y ) 
- Don*t know 
( i f aora than onot plaaaa rank than) • 
7 . 2 . Do you h«ra any suggestion (a) t o l imit the number of 
adjonxnaanta « o b e grantad in aaah oaaa? 
Z. XZ. ZZZ . Tf, 
i U aofa €han «ci«« kindly rank th«n}. 
8 . 1 . Hoir Utah t l ira la uaually takan by a labour tribunal/ 
adJudiMitoiy aiatlioxity to dt^poaa of a diaputa/olaln? 
* hmtm than 1 awnth 
- 1 * 3 nantha 
3 • 5 nantha 
S • 7 aontha 
- 7 - 9 nentha 
* 9 »11 nontha and ao on 
••2. On an «rara9o* how ngRy oaaaa aia daoidad by a labour 
tribonal/odjttdioatory nathorlty in a month :4 
'i r o o o 
8,3• iti«t is youx flpinioti about tli« pxmmrnk %mtk load of « 
laboux tzil3its»al/aAjualeatoxy mthoxity 
4 .Xt 19 haanry 2 , Xt la n o n a l 3* Xt i a laaa 
4.0an*t aay 
8*4• Do you naed any ohangaCa) In the ooiiq;>osltion o f l«boax 
txibunaXa/aajudicatory authori t ies that w i l l f a e l l l t a t e 
the dlaoiiaxga o f funotlona with apaad? 
1. Yaa 2 . MO 3 . Mo opinion 
8 ,4 (a ) Xf yes^ aqpaoify the oAiangaa In order of ifQ>ortanoa 
X. XX. XXX. 3V. 
9 . 1 . Fxobi your eaqparlenoa* pleaaa t a l l us« nAiether aRq^loyera/ 
managerial s t a f f readi ly supply the information, records 
required f o r the adjadlcat lon o f labour dlspatea /claims. 
1 . Yes 2 . no 3 . Can ' t say 
1 0 . 1 . I t la a general iapxeaalon that the aH^loyers/nanagerial 
s t a f f xesoxt t o d i f f e x e n t delaying t a o t i e s t o avade the 
isoploinantatlon of awards/deoi a ion a of labour t r i b u n a l s / 
adjudioatory s u t h o r i t l e a . Do you agree with th la? 
1. strongly agxae 3 . Agree 3 . s t rong ly Aisagxaa 
4 . Disagxae S . Don*t knoir 
11.1 .Xt i s a gt^aral in^ression that the employers/hianagerial 
s t a f f xeaoxt t o d i f f e r e n t delaying t a o t i e s t o flraAa the 
i i^lenentation o f tfeoislons o f the higher Judiciary in 
labour naUtaxs. Do you agxee with t h i s ? 
Stxongly agxoo 2 . Agxoa 3 . s t r o n g l y disagxaa 
4 . Dlsagxaa •• Don't know 
12*lJDO j m MMk guiidanoa fxosi the proirisions of d ixeot iva 
pxiii«l|^aa of the oonatitution relating t o laboux w«lfaxe 
while dlaeauutging adjudioatdxy functional 
1* OftoB OooaaionaXiy 3 . ftaxely 
4 . ItaiTer 
12.1(a) Do you have any suggeationCs} t o make in this connect ion? 
13*1.rxoH youx aiqpexianea* pJL«aa« t a i l ua whathax influanoaU) 
othax thm MXlta of a oa«« waigM with the Qanrt. lAilla 
Xafaixing a eaaa fox adjadieatiaii. 
» XAfluanoa of eaxtaln ttnion laadaxa 
- XAf luanea of p o l i t i a i a M 
<- ttfluanoa of o f f l o l a U 
• Manay oanaldoxationa 
3 ^ 7 
- Mo inthxwam 
• Uont% Tmmi 
(If m>f than onm, kindly rank than), 
19*3 • Mould you XDce t o «bollah th« proe««s of making xofoxoneo 
of a d l i ^ t o f o s adjudleatlon by tha gonrairnMnt? 
1 . Ym a . Ho 3. Ho opinion 
13.3(a) I f y«9« kindly spaelfy the reaaonst 
- Zt dalays the adjudication of a labour dlisputa 
» Xt la miauaod 
- I t l3 redundant 
- Any other (pleaae specify) 
- Can't say 
( i f taora than one* kindly rank thera). 
14.x. What i s your opinion on establishing a aaparate cadre o f 
labouz jadioiaxy in the state? 
1 . Strongly agree 2 . Agree 3. atccmgly diaagxee 
4 . Disagree 5 . ^ opinion 
14» lU) Zf ^gxem* strongly agrea# spec i fy i t s nature 
15.1. Please indicate your opinion on the following statementsf 
Z. Suppfviaoxy/appellate poirara of the higher Judioiazy 
d ia ts ie t ooart« the h l ^ oouzt and the oapxene oouxt -
ovex labour triJaunala/adJudieatoxy «athorltieo« prolongs 
adjudication of a liUaour oase unneeeasaxily. 
1. Strongly a«r«e 3 . AgxM 3. strongly dlMgroo 
4 . D l M f X M Ho QipialOil 
X Z ^ ^ W i a o c y / a m l l a t * pomn of tho h l ^ e r juaifliaxy «r«x 
l^bvis tsltaiiuii*/ii4j«di0«lt«ry Mthorl t las wmix/t*^  iMwrUy 
nmrnxAm pt^Xm baring mm^m t m m i ^ m , l»m 1® f(WNMir of 
yxof^riaitwra and iiono«ori«l posseenoX ft against iwrkaxa 
1* i t n n g l y aorao 2« JHprw 3 . strongly disagrMi 
4 . 9* Mo opinion 
XZZ. IiabwK oafl«a« being taAhnioal Mattors, ordinary oounts 
axe not attuned to adjudioato th«a* 
i . ationgXy agree 3* Affioa 3« Strongly diaagxee 
4 . DisftfiM 9* c«n|t a«y 
O ^^ 006 
X / . auparviaory/as^cllata pmmxm of th« hlgh«r Judiciary 
In Xoboux n««t«r« h«r« brougtit idE>oiit unifoxnity in th« 
applioatloc of laboar l«glal«t ion 
1 . StKQRglir 2 , AgxM 3 . StKongXy dlsagxM 
4« Disagraa 4« Can't siqr 
1 5 . 2 . Kindly ascpxasa your opinion on th« followingt 
I . Supervlsory/i^pollate powers of the h l ^ e t Judiciary 
in labour matters are t o be retained only in tha casas 
where a point o f law la involved. 
1 . Yes 2 . Mo 3. Can't say 
I I . If the guperviaory/appaila'te powers o f the higher 
Judiciary in labour matters are retained, specific 
direction needs t o be given t o i t t o dispose of labour 
eases speadily on p r i o r i t y bas i s . 
I . Yes 2 . No 3 . Can't aiy 
I I I . in the Absence of supervisory/appellate powers of the 
h i ^ e r Judiciary in labour matters, appellate labour 
tritxinal needs t o be set up t o hear appeals from the 
decisions of labour tribunals/adjudicatory author i t ies . 
1. Yes 2 . Ho 3. Can't say 
IV, 3upervi3ory/^>pellate powers o f the h i ^ e r judic iary 
in labour matters serve useful purpose and should b« 
retained. 
1 . Yes 2, Ho 3. c a n ' t say 
16.1. Aro the deoisions/awards of labour tribunals/adjudicatory 
authorit ies uoually followed by tha ejaacution/reoovery 
proceedings for their is^ltfn^tation? 
1. Y«s 2, Partly 3* Mo 
IS•2. Ar« thm dooisions of the h i ^ e r judiciary in labour natttera 
usually MM.omA by the aiaeeMtion/reeovery proa«adlnga for 
their impIvoentation 7 
U 2. 3 . No 
i « * a U ) Zf the mmwmx t o tyaestiona l i . l fr 16.2 la ym*, kindly 
Indicwto by whioh m t h o r i t i e s •atMUtlon/reeovery 
psooMdingi are oonduetad? 
1* Rav«nu« 2 . Judicial 3 . Any other 
4 . can't a«y (plaaaa apaeify) 
lAiat ia your aplnian en the time involved in reeorary/ 
itian psaaaadiega? 
1* I t la too mah 2 . Matfial Laaa 4 . Oan't aior 
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Do you any mqgmatUmlml t o iaqpcora th« psoewluiro 
In this tmgucAl 
- Bxa<utionA«eciiv«ry psoeoodings shouli!! b o eo^plotoly 
abollahod 
- Powoxo should bo dlzootly oonfoccod on t^e labouc 
tciJbunsl.s/«idJudicatoxy mthorit ios t o Xoiry the mount 
of aoH|>«ns«tlon# f ino, ota . 
- fixecutlon/cooov'ory proooodlngs oonductlng author i t ios 
should bo i^aelfloalXy instcuetod to dlsposo of tho 
proooodings apoedily on priority basis , 
> sons l e g i s l a t i v e neta»iro ahould be enacted t o s i m p l i f y 
the procedure f o r OMBoution/recovery proceed ings 
- Any other (k ind ly s p e c i f y ) 
- D<m't iKnaw 
- ( i f more than one, p l e a s e s p e c i f y in order or ir.portanoe) 
17 .1 . Of the f o l l o w i n g methods o f s e t t l i n g labour-manageaiwit 
d i s i ^ t e s * whieh do you favour t o s e t t l e a labour d ispute? 
- Labour adjudicaticwi 
- Voluntary n e g o t i a t i o n s ( c o l l e c t i v e bargaining) 
- Volountary a r b i t r a t i o n 
- Canoi l iat i cm 
( i f a o r o than one, k ind ly i n d i c a t e them in order 
o f p r i o r i t y ) • 
1 7 . 2 . Vfhat are your reascms f o r s e l e c t i n g t h e above method (a) 7 
- Xt i s relatively less espitfisive 
Zt i s ^eody 
« Zt i s infomal 
- Zt i s esmroniMBt t » both the parties 
« Zt i s miaplm 
• MKf wthex (please indicate) 
- D«ii*t Icnowdf More than ane« kindly raide them) • 
17 .3 • The Mfttlsment of UiboaKHsanagsment oonf l iets t h r o n g 
volttKttery negotietions has been proved higlily mKseeiMfitl ift 
oeiiBtries l ike the tl.a«A« Sweden end England • Zto view ef 
thie# would you l i k e to recassend t h i s method t o s e t t l e 
I i O m u s disputes? 
1 . Yea 2 . No 3. Cen*t say 
3 4 0 
i7.3Ca) If no# k;L&dly aqpooify your r««aoiui 
I . I I . I I I . IV. 
17 .4 . G«Dec«Xly voluntaxy negotiations as a mathod of 
sattllnQ tha Xabouc disputes are re lat ive ly unpopulax in tha 
s t a t e . What are the reasons in your opinion? 
- Voluntary negotiations have not make proaress in the 
state because tradsunic^ian) has not derelqped. 
- m e t o Govezmn^t's indi f ference towaxds voluntacy 
negotiations 
- MJudioation is easier 
- Due t o o f f i c i a l ' s p x e ^ i s p o s i t i o n t o adjudication 
- Any other (please spec i fy ) 
( i f more than one# kindly rank them) 
18.1 . From your es^eriWMSA, o«un you say that the labour adjudicatory 
apparatus has succeeded in establishing industrial peace in 
the s tate . 
1. Yes 2.KO 3. Partly 
18.1(a) If no« what changes are needed in this regard?(If nore than 
please ^ e c i f y in order of IjR^rtance). 
19 .1 , Are you s a t i s f i e d %d.th t h a conditions o f service of the 
members o f labour tribtinals/adJudicatory at3thoiritie3( 
including tonure of service and enolum^ts)? 
1 . Yes 2.Partly 3 . tio 
19.1(a) I f no« ifhat suggestions would you l i k e t o make t o improve 
the service conditions of the members of labour 
trlbunala/adJudicatory authorit ies? 
I , I I . I I I . IV. V . 
( i f More than one* kindly spec i fy them in order o f 
iqpoxtanee) • 
20*1. X>o yoa h«v« any suggestions for the inqprorement of tha 
ftmotienlng of the present labour adjudicatory macAianifln? 
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AhJ^^M'y- (XX b) 
B* SCKB>mil fOR OFrXCXMiSAWBRS 
9F T ^ f 
1 . 1 . Dm* 
1 .2 . Ag« 
1.3. 3mx 
I , Mal« 2« T m l 9 
1.4* Higheat educational ciiaXiflcationst 
- Qenecal 
- Technical 
1 . 5 . Prasant onqployment atatua 
1.6* I^ Tature of employmonts 
- Permanent 
- Teroporary 
-> Casual 
1 . 7 . Mo. of years of the present cnployiaent 
1 . 3 . Salary 
2.1* Are you a raeniber of a trade union 
1. Ym 2 . Mo. 
2*2. I£ no, marm t o question i^o.3.1 
2«3. Xf yes* please montion the name of the trade union of 
lihioh you are a number? 
2 . 4 . DO you hold any post in the uniMi? 
1* Ym 2 . Mo. 
2.S(a) Xf y«s« kindly ^ e e i f y 
a . i . Mhat ia the t o t a l iB«mb«rahip of your union? 
2 . 7 . Xa ymx union reoogniaad? 
1» YM 2 , Mo, 
2 . a . Xa your union regiatered? 
1. Y«s 2* HO. 
2 * 9 , Xs ycux union a f f i l i a t e d t o any of t h e otfttral trad* 
tiiiion organ ia«tion«Y 
a.lO.Xf yea, kindly apeoify 
l» i i«Do oCfioials 0f ywiE union aftttnd ishe adjudioatecy 
proeeadinsse 
1« Y m 2« Me. 
3 4 2 
2.11(a) If y«s* kindly giv* d « t « i l « 
2 . 12 . Hfts your union any polltloaX a f f i l i a t i o n ? 
( a f f l l i a t a d t o any pol i t ioa l pazty) 
1. Yoa 2, Ko 
2.12(a) I f yma, )tlndly spaoi fy 
5 . 1 . Of the fo l lowing mathods of sa t t l ing leibonx disqputaa* nhioh 
do ycu usually adopt t o set t la a disputa with tha managamont 
- Labour adj idieation 
- Voluntary nagotiations 
- Voluntary arbitration 
- G o n c i i i a t i c w i 
(if more than one* kinf'ly rank thenj) 
3.2. What are your reasons for aalvscting the above mnthoc?(s)? 
- It is relatively less axpenaive 
• It is speedy 
- It i3 informal 
- I t i s c o n v o r i i e R t t o b o t h t h e p a r t i e s 
• It is simple 
- Any other (please specify) 
- Don't )enoif (if mora thitfi one, kindly rank them) 
3.3. The 9«sttls3Qnt of labour disputes throu^i voluntary negotiations 
has been proved highly successful in resolving labour-
nanagenent ocmf l i e ts in countrias like Sweden and 
tttgland. m view of this , would you l i k e t o adopt t h i s method 
t o M t t l e labous disp^itea? 
Iv Ye« 2, No 3 . Don't know 
3 . 4 . Oanexally ^peaking* voluntaxy negotiations as a method of 
set t l ing the labour disputes are relatively unoopular in the 
s t a t e . Mhet axe the seasons in your qplnion? 
- Volttntaxy negetiatiotns h ave not made progress in the atata 
as the trade ttnioniawn has not derelopad 
- Due t o govezimeiit *a indifferenoe towards voluntary 
nagofelatlons 
^^Jodioation is easier 
.. Due to o f f l o i a l a pva-diaposit ion t o adjudioation 
- Any other (please speoify) 
Don't know 
(If wore than one* kindly rank thorn) 
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4*4* Zt i s odEftan aaid that mmplofmxmAuuMgmximX staf f aaualXy 
M t l s f i s d with the adjuaieatioik of Isiboux diaputas thxou^ 
indaatxial txibanaXA«boax eouct. Do you agraa with tha 
statanaDt? 
1 . strongly agsae 2 . Agzaa 3. Stcongly diaagsaa 
4. Disagree 5. Can 't aay 
4.4 (a) I f tha anstwer t o tha abova i s diaagraa or strongly disagraa* 
kindly miooify the raaaons* 
(Xf mora than one# plaasa spac i fy in order o f p r i o r i t y ) 
4*5. Zt i s o f ten said that mployQta/mmBgtktial s t a f f are usually 
s a t i s f i e d with the adjudioation of labour disputes througit 
labour tr ibunals /adjudioatory author i t ies consituted under 
d i f f e rent labour s ta tutes . Do ycur agree with the statement? 
1. strongly agre? 2 . Agree 3* Strongly disagree 
4 . Disagree 5. Don't aipca Imow 
4,S(a} I f the answer -to the above is disagree or strongly disagraa 
kindly 3t>oclfy the reasons in order of p r i o r i t y . 
4 . 6 . would yoi l i k e to give any stiggnstion(s) t o improve the 
present inechanism of labour judicat ion? 
1 . Yes 2 . »o 
4 .6 (a ) yes» kindly gpec i fy their. In order of Importance 
5 . 1 . Fr<M your experience, please t e l l us whether inf luenoe(s ) 
ot^er than merits of a vase weighs with tha government 
whila re ferr ing case for adjudicat ion . 
- Snf lueree of certa in union leaders 
* Influence o f par t i t i ons 
- Znfluenoe of h i ^ o f f i e i a l s 
- Hcmey cotisiderations 
- Mo Influenoe 
- Any other (ple«»e spec i fy ) 
• Don't know 
( i f more than one* kindly rank thami) 
f»2« Mould you l ike to abolish «Ata proeess of making m roCoronoo 
of a dispute for odjuidieation by the ^nvemnent? 
Yos 2« No 
S.a(«) Zf ymm, kindly opeoify the leaaons 
» Zf decays the adjudication of a lidMur dispute 
» Zt is miousodi 
«> Zt i s xoditndant 
O 4 4 
- m f oth«r {pl9mm mpmUtf) 
- Can't My 
( i f nose than on«« kindly tank than) 
Z. Collaotlvo dlapute I 
ZZ. individual dlaputa { 
6 .1 • vAiat ^s your opinion about the functioning o f labour 
trlfaunals/adjudleatory authorities? 
- Th«y act impartially 
- They don't act inpartially 
- They act c o i^e tant ly 
- Thaiy act without a grasp o f the problem 
C ^ ' t i3ay 
( i f more than ano, k ind ly rank them) 
7*1 • From your experience , plea^ie t e l l us influenoca 
other than marita o f a case w e i ^ t with the labour tribunals/ 
adjudicatory a i t h o r i t i ^ «mile d ischarging the adjudicatory functions? 
- Inf luence o l c e r ta in union l oaders 
> Intluance o f p o l i t i c i a n s 
- Inf luanca o f h i ^ o f f i c i a l s 
- Money cons iderat ions 
- Any othar (p lease s p e c i f y ) 
-> No in f luence 
- Don ' t know 
( I f more than (^e , k i n d l y rank thesi) 
0 . 1 . Hhat i s your op in ion on the procedure adopted by the labotit 
trlbunals/adjudioatory a u t h o r i t i e s in t h e dlsoharge o£ thelz 
adjudloatory functions? 
- Zt la too legal ls t le 
• Xfc Is m3ip9XMi»m 
» Zt is tiiD«»aonauiiiing(dilatory) 
•> Zt Is siirple and as such usefull 
• Zt needs to be changed 
- May other (please specify) 
- Don't know 
(If more than one« please specify in order of priority) 
••2. Vfould you l ike to make any suggest ions to inprove the 
procedure? 
X. 2 , Ko 3 . MO opinion 
• •3(a). Zf yes# kindly speoify them In of liq^Ktoneo 
3 4 : . 
8 .3 . Zn eux country we h«v« d i f f «xcmt pxooedures f ox d i f f « x « n t 
labour tr ibunala/ad judicatory author i t l a s . Do you think %m 
ohould have a oomnon pxooecUzal code £os a l l labour t r i b u n a l s / 
adjudlcatoxy s i t h o r i t i e a ? 
1. Yas 2. No 3. Don;^ t know 
8.3(a} If ye3# kindly specify your reasons in rank order 
- To avoid nultiplicity of procoduro 
So that the predilections of the laboar tribunals/ 
adjudicatory authorities do not op^ i^ ate In procedural 
matters 
- Any other (please soecify) 
(if more than one, please rank them) 
8.4. It is often said that tha nart of the lawyers is no mean in delaying a case before a labour tribunal/adjuc^ icatory authority, l o you agree with tVie statement® 
1. Yq3 2. Ko 3. Car^ 't say 
8.4(a) If yea, what are your suggestior a in this regard 
- Entry of the lawyer a should b e banne^T altogi^ther 
- H'heir entry should be permitte-"' only in c a s e s whore a question of law is involved 
- Where complicated factual situation is inolved 
- They render useful service arx as such should be 
freely parmittod to appear 
« ADy other (kindly spec i fy ) 
- No opinion 
8 . 5 . Zt la seen that « l o t of adjournments are s o u ^ t in the 
adjudioation of a l ^ o u r caae. What reasons you general ly 
adduoe fox a««3cln« adjoumnenta? 
- To aaittla diafpute by mutual negot iat ions 
- To vktand othar businaaa 
-> To attend proceedings in other courts 
- HoMMnrailability o f the lawyer <^e t o his being Itxisy with 
other oases 
• To delay the speedy disposal of the Caaa 
- «ny other (pleaae spec i fy ) 
- No opinion 
( i f More than one, kindly rank them) 
3 4 381 r.\; 
8 . 6 . DO you think that th« «q>loyers/1n«n«gttKial staff xapactadly 
saw unjustiflabia adjoumnants to dalay adjudloatoiy 
pKOoaadlngs? 
1. Yaa 2. Ko 3 . l>on*t taow 
8.6(a) If yaa# would you suggaat any ineasuxe^a) t o ohaek 
th i s prac t l ca? 
( i f more than pleasa spec i fy in ocdar of inqpoctanea) . 
9 . 1 . Please indicate your opinion an the fo l lowing statamanti 
I . superviaory/^ppallate powers of the hi^^er JucUciary-klistrict 
ccurt.« the h i ^ court and the supreme court - over laboar 
tr ibunala/adjudlcatory authorit las prolongs adjudicat ion 
of a labour casa unnecessari ly . 
1, i trongly agree 2. Agree 3 . 3tr<»igly disagraa 
4. Disagree 5 . t o opinion 
I I . Supervisory/appellate powers of the hi^er Judiciary over 
laboir tribunals/adjadlcatory authorities? weigh heavily 
towards people having ample rosources, i.e. in favour of 
a9ps0psl proprietors and r.aragerial oeraonnel & against 
workers. 
1. Jtrorigly agree 2 . Agree 3. ^3trongly rlisagrea 
4. isagree 5. lo c^ inior. 
III. Labour cases being technical matterSf orwirary courts are not attuned to adjudicate them. 
1.* s trongly agree 2 . Agree 3. strongly disagree 
4. Disagree 5. Don't know 
9.2. Kindly eapress your opinion on the followingj 
I . Supervisory/appellate powers of the h i ^ e r ^ d i c i a r y in 
Ittxiur matters are t o be retained only in the cases whasa 
a po int of law i s involved 
i . Yss 2 . ho 3 . Can't say 
ZZ. I f tha supervisory/appel late powers of the hig^as jud i c iasy 
in labour mattaxs axa retained* opaoi fy d i re c t i on naads 
t o be given t o i t t o dispose o f labour eases speedi ly on 
psiority bases 
laYes 2 . Ko 3 . Can't say 
ZZZ. m the abscoioe of the supervisory/iq^lMllate powers o f tha 
h i ^ e r jud i c ia ry in labour matters* appallate labour 
tr ibunal needs t o be saitup t o t o hear appeals in labour 
1* y«8 2 . Ko 3 . Can2t SiQr 
10,1 • Ara the dec is ions of the higher jud io iary in ItSocat aattexs 
usual ly fo l lowed by the exaeution/reaovery proeeadings for 
the i r iioplsBientationT 
1. rmm 2. Partly 3 . Mo 
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10.2(a) Zf thm to th« qaMtlon 10*1 «nd 10,2 is ymm, 
kindly i i idie«t« by whioh « a t h o r i t l M •sMOution/soMOVttsy 
pxoo«»diiigs mxm oonduetod. 
1 . R«v«iu« 2 . JUdlolaX 1 . M»y oth«r 4* Can't s«y 
10*3. Wh«t i s youx opiniqn on tha tiina InvolTod in coeovoxy/ 
•sMieiJition proooodings? 
1 , Zt i s t o o Buoh 2. MoxmaX 3. Loss 4 . Can't say 
10.4. Do you havo any sugga8tion(s) t o iiq>roira thm prooadura 
In th i s rogazd? 
- Sxocnition/xeoovary prooaedinfip ahoald bo oon^lotely abolishad 
- Poifass should ba d i rec t ly oonfarxad on the labour t r ibunals / 
ad judicatory author i t ias t o l«<iry tha amount of eoRipwisation» 
fina« e t o . 
- Bxaaution/rocovery prooaodings conducting authorities should 
be instructed t o dispose o f the proceedings speedlly on 
p r i o r i t y bas i s . 
- Sonm l e g i s l a t i v e measure should be enacted t o s impli fy the 
procedure f o r ejeecution/recovery proceedings. 
- Any other (kindly speci fy) 
- Don't know 
11.1 . I t i s g«neral in^ression that the «mployers>%an«gerial s t a f f 
resort t o d i f ferent delaying t a c t i o e t o evade the inplementa-
ti<»i o f awards/ decisions in labour ir.«tters» Do you agree 
with th i s ? 
I t Strongly agraa 2 . Agree 3. Sttrcmgly disagsaa 
4 . Disagree 5 . No opinion 
12 .1 . Has the labour adjudioatory meohanian sucoaedad in real is ing 
^ a goals sat up tha diraot ive prinoiplaa of tha oonstitution 
f o r the battarmant o f waxking olaaaT 
1 . Yas 2 . Mo 3 . Can't say 
12* 1(a) Zf nof what ohangaa axa naadad in tha laboux aiOJudiaatexy 
•aoliAiiaxy t o asabla i t to xaaliaa thasa geaU a^p«ditioitsly> 
( i f Mxa than mm, niadXy qpaoify in oxdax ef Aiyaxtaiioa) 
12*1 • HhaEt ia ymx cpAnion an asitakbiiahiag the sapaxata oadxa af 
la)9«ux jttdioiaxy in the ataekal 
1 . atxangiy agxaa 2, 3. Stxangly diaagxaa 
4 . Diaa«x«a §• Ma apinlan 
1 4 . r x o a iraux ma^lmmm, «an yau mmr that tha labaax 
adjiidioatoxy appaxatua has aaooaadad in aatablishlng induatxial 
paaoa in the atata? 
Y«a 2 . Ma 3 . I t liaa paxtly saoaaadad 
3 4 8 
14*1(«) It no, what dtiangM mxm n««d«d in t h l i 
{rlmomm spaoify In otAme of l^poctano«) • 
t ; 
* i . H«v« you «irttr b««n paxaonally involved in any \ 
> industrial l i t i g a t i o n ? * 
1 . Yaa a. He. 
i . ( a } If yas, kindly give dataUa 
l . ( b ) If no« what axe youx reaaona? 
- There had been no ocoaaion(s) whereby you would have 
involved yourself in l i t i ga t i on with your employers. 
> You had grievanoeCa) aminst your enqployer taut i t waa 
not taken t o adjudioation beoause of prohibit ive ooat 
o f l i t i g a t i o n 
- Legal is t io nature of adjudicatory prooeedinga prevented 
you from taking the matter t o adjudication 
•> Dilatory nature of the adjudloatory proceedings prevented 
you from taking the matter t o adjudication 
- Pear of invit ing the wrath of enployer 
-> Oovt. did not refer the case f o r adjudioation 
- Due t o your Hl i teracy 
- Any other 
(please speci fy) 
( Zf Bore than one» pl«uMi rank then ) . 
J 
I 
3 4 fy 
c . gyfi w^mm/twmm^ mm 
l a . M«in« 
1 . 2 . Agm 
1 .3 . S«x 
1. Mal« 2, F«m«l« 
1 .4 . Mazltal status 
1 . HazKiod 2 . single 3 . D I v o c o m 
1 .5 . Place o£ resldanoe 
1 . Rusal 2 . dxban 
1 . 6 . Highest aducatlor qi ial i f loatlonst 
1 . Ottneral 2 . Teohnlaal 
2 . 1 . l^loh ttada unions are c^erating in yous esti^lishnant? 
2 .2 . Please indicate against eadi whether they aret 
I . Recognised or unrecognized 
ZZ. Begistered or unregistered 
3 .1 . Of the following methods of se t t l ing labour-management 
disputes* which do you usually adopt? 
- Ziabour adjudleatio 
- Voluntary negot iat ions (co l leot ive bargaining) 
- Voluntary arbitration 
- conciliation 
( i f iBora than one* kindly indicate them in order of priority 
3*2. Mhat axe your xeMOtie fox selecting the abore method(•) 7 
- I t ia xeletiireXy Imm mmmmlYrn 
- Zt i e Infensal 
- Xt i s oonveniant to both the parties 
- Zt ie •liqpl* 
- Any other (please indicate) 
- Don't know 
4 If more than one« kindly rank then 
4*1 . The MtkleHMit of Idaoar-flneaageneiit oonfl iete thx«ui^ 
volttutaxy negotiaftiofui has been pxoved hiiiily aueoeMl^l 
In oMBtxiee l ike amAm li Sngland. m view f this , 
MMld you l ike t o adopt t h i s method t o s e t t l e lidaour diaputee, 
U Yes 2 . Mo 3 . Can't say 
s r j o 
4.1(a) If no. kindly specify your roaaona? 
4«2. QsDttrally spaaklng voluntaxy negotiations as a method of 
aottllng th« laboiax disputes aze relatively u>9»o|»ilat in 
the state . What axe the reasons in your opinion? 
- Voluntary negotiations h«re not made progress in the 
state becaise trade unionism has not developed 
- Due to government's indifference towards voluntary 
negotiations 
- Adjudication i s easier 
- Due t o o f f i c i a l ' s pre-dispositicun t o adjudication 
- Any other (please spec i fy ) 
- I f more than caia, kindly rank thsn. 
5 .1 . I t i s often said that ^nployers/kanagerial s ta f f are 
usually s a t i s f i e d with the adjudication of labour disputes 
through industrial tribunal/ labour cour t , po you agree 
with the statement? 
Is strongly agree 2. Agree 3. strongly disagree 
4-v Disagree 5 . Can't say 
5.1(a) I f the answer to the above i s disagrcie or strongly 
disagreer kindly spec i fy the reasons. If more than <»ne« 
please speci fy in order of p r i o r i t y . 
5 .2 . I t i s o f ten said that employers/managerial s t a f f are usually 
s a t i s f i e d with the adjudioation of labour disputes through 
labour tribunals /ad Judicatory authorit ies constituted under 
d i f f e r e n t labour statutes . Do you agree with the stat«n«nt7 
1. strongly agree 2. Agree 3. strongly disagree 
4 . Disagree S. Don't know 
S.2(a) If tdte answer of the above is disagree or strongly disagree 
kindly speolfy the reasons in order of priority 
5 . 3 . Viould you like to give « iy suggestion(s) to improve the 
pxeeent nedhanlsM iii labour adjudication? 
1 . Yea a. Vo 
^ f *3(«) If y«s« kindly specify them in order of iaportanee 
••X. From your •)«»eriefioe« please t e l l us i^ether influ«ncw(s) 
other than Mixits of a oase %#eigh with the gcnrt,, 
reffaxxlug • fox aijudioation 
- aiflueaoe of certain union leaders 
- Znfluenoe of politioians 
- Xnfluenee of high o f f i c i a l s 
- Money oooaidexations 
Mo influenoe 
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- Don't Icnow 
. If mora than ono« kindly rank 
6 .2 . nould you Ilka t o abolish tha prooass of making a rafer«nce 
of a dlaputa f o r adjudication by the governinant? 
U Yes 2 . NO 
6.2(a) If yas, kindly spec i fy the reasons 
- It delays t^ie adjudications of a labour dispute 
> I t i s misused 
> I t is redundant 
o Any other (please spec i fy ) 
. Can't say 
( i f more them one* kindly r a n k t h ^ ) 
7 . 1 . Whan a disi^te/claini arises In your ®3tablishni9nt, what 
procedure do you generally fo l low t o resolve i t ? 
-> Mutual negotiations 
- Ko negotiations 
- Any other (Kindly spec i fy ) 
7 . 1 ( a ) . (If the answer !•=» mutual nagotiationn, v^at Is the 
frequency of such negotiations? 
Ofteffi 2 . occasicmally 3. Rarely 
8 . 1 . Please indicate your opinicm on the fol lowina statements 
I . Trade union leaders aggravate the industrial l i t i g a t i o n 
1. Strongly agrM 2. Agree 3 . strongly disagrcMi 
4 . Disagree 5 . Ko <^lnion 
XZ. Trade union leaders s incerely try t o secure the just 
settlement of worker's claims/disputes with employers 
1. Strongly agree 2 . Agree 3. strongly disagree 
4 . Disagree S. l^ o opinicm 
ZIX. Trade unic»i leaders are bothered only to secure their own 
vested interests instead of s t r iv ing f o r the advancement of 
worker's cause. 
Strongly agree 2 . Agree 3. strongly disagree 
4* PisagrM 5. Mo opinion 
3V. Trade union leaders usually adopt antinmanageroent/ 
enployers stance* just t o harass them for their own ends 
1 . Strongly agree 2 . Agree 3. strongly disagree 
4 . Disagree 5 . No cpinion 
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9.1. St la •«Mn that • l o t of adjouzmiianta ax« s o u ^ t by tha 
onployexs/managwoeffits duriim the ptoQMs of adjudication 
of a oaaa. From yoar oj^ttxi-wnoe plaasa t a l l us* what reasons 
axa ganesally giv«n fox soaking an adjouxnment? 
- To sat t la dispute by nutual negotiations 
• To a t twd other important business 
- To attend l«igal prooaedings in other courts 
- No-availabil ity of the lawyer 
- Any other (kindly spec i fy ) 
- Don't know 
9 . 2 . Indicate your opinion on the £ollowinq statemontsi 
I.itabour tribujials /adjudicatory authorit ies discharge 
adjudicatory functions i inpartially. 
Strongly agraa 2 . Agree 3. strongly^disagree 
4. Disagree 5 . Ko opinion 
IZ.Laboir tribunals/adjudicatory aathorit ias discharge their 
functions hone5stly. 
1. ritrongly agree 2 . Agree 3. Strongly disagrfw 
4 . Disagree 5 . Ko qpinion 
9 .3 . Viftiat is your opinion on the procedure adopted by the labour 
tribunals/adjudicatory a i thor i t i e s in the discharge of their 
adjudicatory functions? 
- I t is too l e g a l i s t i c 
- I t i s e s ^ ^ s i v e 
« I t is t ine consuming (di latory) 
- Any other (kindly spec i fy ) 
- No opinicm 
9•4. Vfould you l i k e t o o f f e r any suggestions t o streamline 
the procedure? 
Im Ym 2 . Ko 3. Mo opinion 
9*4(a)Zf yas, kindly spaoi fy tham in order of importance 
9«9. ZB Ottc country we hava d i f f e rent procedures f o r d i f f e rent 
labour trlbunala/adjudicatory author i t i es . Do you think wa 
flhoald hanre a aomaon procedural code f o r a l l liOxiur 
tritaianals/adJudicatory authori t ies? 
2, Ko 3. Don't know 
9.SU) Zf yas« kindly spec i fy your reasons in rank order 
- To avoid mul t ip l i c i ty of procedures 
o r: O I' ( ) 
- 30 tliat thepc«dil«ctlon8 of th« liOxsar tciSaunaXs/adjudlcatory 
authozltlsa do not operate In pzoeedural fnattoKs. 
- Any other (please speel fy ) 
( I f more than cme# pleaae rank them) • 
9 . 6 . Zt i s oftsn said that the lawyers have an Interest in 
delaying the oase be fore a labour tribonal/adJudicatory 
aut^ority• DO you agree with the statement? 
1. Yea 2 . Mo 3. Can*t say 
9.6(a) Zf yes« what are your suggestions in th i s regard 
- Entry of the lawyers s h o u l d i e banned a l t o g e t h e r 
- Their entry should be permitted in cases v^ece ^ e s t i o n 
of law is involved 
- Vhere oanplicated factual situation is involved 
- They render useful service and as such they should be 
faeely permitted t o appear 
- Any opinion 
10,1, Please indicate your opinion on the fol lowing statementst 
I . Supervisory/ai»el late ponrars of the higher Judiciary d i s t r i c t 
court» the H i ^ Court and ^ e 3 u p r e n t e C o u r t o v e r labour 
tribunals/adjudicatory authorities prolong adjudication of 
a labour case unnecessarily 
1 . Strongly agree 2 . Agree 3. strongly disagree 
4 . Disagree 5 . No opinion 
ZZ. Supervisory/appellate powers o£ the hif^er Judiciary over 
labour tribunala/adjudicatory Authorities %feiqh heavily 
towards people having «R)ple resources^ i . e .^ in favour of 
proprietors and managerial personnel & against worlcers. 
1. Strongly agree 2 , Agree 3. strongly disagree 
4 . Disagree S. Ko opinion 
ZZZ. Labour oases being tachnical matters# ordinary courts are 
not attuned t o adjudicate tham 
!• atrongly agree 2 . Agree 3 . strongly disagree 
•• Disagxee 5 . Don't know 
10«2 Kindly ei^iEese your opinion on the following* 
Z. Supenrlsoxy/^ppellate powers of the hi5;^er Judioary in 
laboktx matters exeg t o be retained only in the cases where 
point of law i s involved 
1. Yes 2 . No 3 . Can't say 
O 1 ' 
ZZ. Z£ tha «up«xvlsoKy/app«ll«te powexa of the high«c judloiaxy 
in labouz inKtters cetain«d« spacif le dlxaotlon nmaOs to 
hm given to i t t o diaposa of labour oasaa apaadily on 
priority baaaa 
1 . Yaa 2 . No 3 . Can*t say 
ZZZ. Zn the abaanca of aupairviaorY/flppellate nowars of the 
h i ^ a r Ittdioiary in labour inattera« as>pallata labour 
tribunal needs to be set up to hear appeals in labour 
matters. 
1. Yes 2. No 3 . Can't say 
4 . Any other (kindly speci fy) 
11*1. Has the labour adjudicatory mecAtanism suoceadad in realising 
the goals set up by the direct ive principles of the 
constitution f o r the bettarrnent of labour c lass? 
1. Yes 2, No 3. Can't say 
11.1 (a) Zf no« %#hat ohangea are needed in the labour adjudicatory 
system t o wab la i t t o realise these goals expeditiously? 
(kindly speci fy tham in order of iiiq;>ortance) 
11.2. What i s your opinion aci establishing a separate cadre of 
labour judiciary Ir the state? 
!•* Strongly agree 2 . Agree 3. strcnngly disagree 
4 . Disagree S. ho opinicm 
11*3. Are the decisions of labour tribunals/adjudicatory 
authorities usually followed by the eseacution/recovery 
proceedings f o r their inrplesncmtation? 
1. Yes 2 . Partly 3. Ko 
11.4. Are the dacisioins of the higher judiciary in labour natters 
usually followed by the execution/recovery proceeding for 
their iraplamentation? 
1. Yes 2. Partly 3. Ko 
1 1 . 5 . What i s your opinion on the titra involved in recovery/ 
exsoution preeiwwaingsf 
1 . Zt is too nuch 2 , Monnal 3 . lioaa 4* Can't a«y 
1 1 . 6 . Do you have any auggaation(a) t o Inprora t h e proeaAira in 
thla xagaxd? 
- liMCMtiQfi/xaoofvasy prooaadinga ahould ba ooniplatalr 
aboXiahad 
• Poiwxa ahould ba diraotly aanfassad an tha Utomt 
txitamml/iAiudlaatOKy •ttthoxitias t o lanry tha tmmut of 
ooapanaatiap» f l n a , ata , 
- 8xemti«VEeoaraKy psoeeadingi oonduoting aithoxitlas 
should hm instructed t o d i o p m of tha pxooaadinga 
spMAly on pxioxlty basia . 
- son* Xsglfllatlr* nmrnixtt should hm m\matm& t o •iflq;>Ilfy 
tho pxooaduxoi»r ojncution/soooveKy pxoco«din5|» • 
- Any othor (kindly apooify) 
- Dan*t kRow 
1 1 . 7 . Zt i s gonosal impcossion that anployoKs/VBanagorial s ta f f 
resoxt to dlfferant dolaying tact ics t o orado tha 
iaplaaMntation of awards/daoi s ion a in labour matters. 
Do you agroe with t h i s ? 
strongly agraa 2« Agzaa 3 . strongly disagraa 
4 . Disagraa 5. Ko opinion 
11*8. Prom your es^arience can you aay that the laboir 
adjudicatory apparatus has saiccaedad in establishing 
industrial paaoa in tha state? 
1. Yes 2 . ^o 3. It has part ly 
succeeded 
11.8(a) If no« what changes are neaded in th i s regard? 
(pleasMS spec i fy in order of inportanoe) 
12 .1. Do you think that the part ies to the labour adjadlcaticm 
have s u f f i c i e n t knowledge of the procedural raiRadies -
adjudicative remedies f o r redressing grievances - under 
t i i a law? 
- The labourers axe Infonr-od of the ranedies by the 
trade unions 
- The management invariably makes known t o the labourers 
the adjudicatory procedhixes 
- The labourers are f u l l y informed of the remedies 
as a matter of oomnKm knowledge 
- Labourers do not know about the remedies u n t i l l the 
dispute anises 
* Any othax (pl«UMi opacify) 
( i f » O R « than OIMI« pltmm apeoify in oxdatx of 
iaqp0Xtanoe) • 
tOK th» oo^ifftKaii of f t i t i o a i d f 
statute 
а. aia>j«et lOAttax oC tho d lspat* 
3 . litfim OS paxtias t o Xhm dlaputa 
4. Data o f jUnatitdtlon o f «h« omo 
5 . Whothtts Xogal 001U&39I 
•) for applloant only 
b) fox non»a{ipX.leant only 
c ) f o e both partiaa 
б. vftuittMir xim;>reaaritatlvaa appaax«^ can bohalf of partiaa 
7 . Total DUidMir of tiaarinaa oolxliotad In tha oaaa 
8 . AdJoiimRMMQtai 
a) t o t a l wukms of adjounumnts grartad In tha casa 
b) adJournBMfita aMUXad by tha «|»plloant 
« ) adjousnnont aaourad by tha non»4^11o«nt 
d) adJottrn»«nt« aaoixad by tha p«jctlaa j o i n t l y 
a) adjournment a grmitad by the par t ies on their own 
9 . Orounda o f adjoumnantat 
a) abaactf b} lataf 0} buoy with othar woxkt a) party*s 
xmptmrnmntittiMm oat o f tha atat ioni f ) t o o l t a oaaa Uart g) 
t o produoa doaueantai h) t o produoa «Ltnaaaf 1} avoidanoa of 
aoRnoiia* notloat j ) i l lnaaa of tha party 1 k) t o px«para 
argunant; 1) non-aarvloa of auMBona# not loa i m) to f i l a 
•tatonant o f dananda* xajoiAdarr n) t o prodaoa la t tar of 
authority/ o) pzaaiding o f f l o a r not appolntadi p) praaiding 
o f f i a a OB la«ra# q ) pcaalding o f f i o a x on laava or Hit x ) 
pxasidiiia offioax iindax txanafar ordaxi a) pxaaidlng oCf loax 
buay v i t h othax woxlcf t ) pxaalding o f f l o a r out of tha atatlonr 
any athaxi v) adjouxi«Mnta gxantad aa part ^ tha 
iO* Data 9t f i<at haaxing 
i i . Data of laat hoaxing 
U . D««a of dlapoaal 
19 • Ka^^xa of tha daoiaian 
U » Nhathax W M l / W x i t f U a d 
IS . Xi yaa« t o tiliiah ooast 
Data of f U l A g appaal/Wxit 
17* Data of ateiaaioii# xajaotion 
n r-OO r 
^mhrns appMO/Wiit f in«Ily dlepeeefl oC 
19* Zf Miftux« of th« d«ei«ioD pmrnmrna in 
a ^ Q ^ 0£ writ 
20 . If rvo, du cat 1cm of p«nd«noy 
21. Mhoithtts je«ao<r«ry proc^odin^B took, plmam fox th« 
linpl«Mnt«tlQn of tha d«oision 
23* Z£ Ymt* d«t;« o< inatitutioD of caooiracy psotMHKling 
23 . DoslQMtian of the juthosity isy tho procowdlng* 
1NIE« ooiMlaot«d 
24 . Whether xeoovex^ pxoeMdlngs vexe ooMnOmA 
Xf yea, d«te o f oonolusioc of the xeooirexy 
pxooeedipg 
26* X£ no# du cation of pemdeney 
27 . Date of lavaeneDtetion of the deoislori. 
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Or^XpSR O f THE DliS>ABTMS(iT DSCiiARi^- AS 
^yjTHORXriS3 UKDBR PXyfgREUT LABOIFR H»AGTMEyiT8 
Z . L a b o u t OOKirniaalcmag ( f o r t h e s t a t s ) • 
1 . Ragistxax \xndmx tha Trada Onion Act 
2 . O o b c i l i a t i o n O f f i c e r us ider t h e I n d u s t r i a l D l r i p u t e s A c t * 
3 . Z h m p a o t o r u n d a r F a c t o r i e s A c t 
4 . i i ^ t h o r i t i a s u n d a r t h e v f o r k i n g J o u c n a l i a t a A c t 
5 . C h i e f I k i s p a c t o r u n d e r t h e Kio tor T r a n s p o r t w o r k e r s A c t . 
6 * A u t h o r i t y u n d e r t h e Payrn f^t o f S o m a A c t 
7 . A P p e X l a t a O f f i c e r u n d e r o o r i t r a c t L a b o u r ( R e g a l a t i < x n & 
A b o l i t i o n ) A c t , 1 9 7 0 
3 . O i i a f I n s q p e c t o r u n d e r t h e J ^ S h q p s a n d S a t a b l i a h i n e n t A c t 
9 . S a n c t i o n i n g A u t h o r i t y unriet: t h e J£cK S h o p s & n ^ s t a b l i s h m a n t A c t 
1 0 . O o n p u n d i n g A u t h o r i t y u n d e r t h a J&K s h o p s & S s t a b l i s h n e n t A c t 
1 1 . ODRsn i s s i oner u n d e r t h e J&K l a ^ l o y e e s P r o v i d ^ t Fund A c t 
a n d s c h o n e 
1 2 . S a n c t i o n i n g A u t h o r i t y u n d e r t h e J&K a a p l o y a a s 
P r o v i d e n t Fund A c t and J c h ^ e 
I X . U a a u t y ^i^JaQur O O B w i s a i o n e r C f o r Janmu D i v i a i o n y f o r Kaahia i r D i v . ) 
1 . O o B n i a s i o n e r u n d e r viorlcntcm'3 OoBBpcmsation A c t 
2 . / a d d i t i o n a l R e g i s t r a r u n d e r T r a d e !Jnicm A c t 
3 . i ^ t h o r i t y u n d e r t h e PaytnerJt o f ^ e g e a A c t 
4 « C e r t i f y i n g O f f i c e r u n d e r t h e I n d « i a t r i a l S n p l o y i a e n t 
( S t a n d i n g o i t e a ) A c t . 
5 . C J o n c i l i a t i o n O f f i c e r u n d e r I n d u s t r i a l D i s p u t e s A c t 
6 . A d d i t i o n a l m s p o c t o r u n d e r t h e F a c t o r i a s A c t ( C h a p . I l l & V ) , 
7 . i u t h o r i t y u n d e r t h e P a y m e n t o f B o m s A o t 
3 . R e g i s t e r i n g O f f i c e r u n d e r t h e c o n t r a c t l^abour 
( R e g u l a t i o n St A b o l i t i o n ) A c t , 1 9 7 0 
9 . 2«lcMnoing O f f i c e r u n d e r t h e Q n o t r a c t L a b o u t A c t 
10. lu thos i ty under the Payioei i t o f Oratuity Aot 
11. Authority ttodex the Equal Remuneration Aot 
1 2 . Daputy d i ie f Xnapeotor under the JOC S h o p s & H a t a b l i a t s a a n t A c t 
13. sanotionlng M t h o r i t y under the JCK shops & s s t a b l i M e n t Act 
14. Cbnpounding Aithor i ty under the JCJC shops 6 BatablishSMnt Act 
15. Dy» Oannisoloneg itader the JUC ispleyeoo Provident fund 
Aot and sohtfioo 
IZX. f ^ l f W ^ fctfb^g gpff lgyiypyy (Disteiotp^lso) 
1 . aosniooionox under tbe wonqsan's Onqpensation Act 
2 . Dy. RegiatraK under Tiado cm ion Aot 
3 . jttitlieKlty under the Paynant o f wages Aot 
4 . oonoiliotlon o f f i o e x under the XnduotitaX Disputes Aot 
5 . iu thos i ty under the Hininuio Wagaa Aot 
6 . Additional mspootoit under the raotoxleo Aet(Ghap*XXX ft V) 
7 . mapector under the Morking Journal lata Aot 
30,'^ 
a . InapmatQg under th« Motor Tranaport workers Aot 
9 . 2fcsp«etoK uodor th« Maternity Banafits Aet 
10. Inapmatoz under th« Paymont of Bonus Aet 
11. oontzoil ing Authority under th« Paynont of 
Qcataity Aet 
12. Authority under the iSqual Rasiunaration Act 
13. Doputy Chief Snspecrtor under J6K Shops and 
Bstablishnent Act 
14. Sanctioning Authority under the Jhops 
and Sstablishmant Act 
15. oompounding Authority under the J&K shopa 
and S3tabli3hnent» Act 
The Assistant Labour cjorciniaaioner, 
sr Inagar/Bazamul la 
ho, LC/PAAli3C./l49/78 Dated: 23-9-1978 
Subject I Dnfoxmaticm about the Gone i l l a t i o n cases . 
• • • • 
The bearer* 3hrl Santokh Kain« i s 
a research atudant ai.d Ititeijcla to have sonsa 
informatioii about the adjudication cases f o r 
the iai?t years. 
It i s re^peated that the aarr.e niay 
please be provided to him f o r research purposes. 
Sd/- (Z.S.Halhl) IAS 
Labour Oonntlssloner. 
3 G 4 
Oovercment o f JanuM 4 KashmiK 
O f f i c e of the Labour cxanmlssionec* J K Sxinager. 
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